Fink v. Y.B. and U.S. ( 2023 )

This opinion is subject to revision before publication.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
_______________
James D. FINK, Fireman
United States Coast Guard, Appellant
v.
Y.B., Aviation Maintenance Technician Third Class
United States Coast Guard, Appellee
and
UNITED STATES
Respondent
No. 23-0061
Crim. App. No. 001-23
Decided April 20, 2023
Military Judge: Timothy N. Cronin
For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander Kristen R.
Bradley and Lieutenant Commander Justin S. Dan-
iel (on brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Commander J. Matthew
Hurtt (on brief).
For Respondent: Lieutenant Commander Daniel P.
Halsig (on brief).
_______________
Fink v. Y.B. and United States, No. 23-0061/CG
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.
Appellant has filed a writ-appeal petition seeking re-
view of an interlocutory decision of the United States Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (CGCCA) that concerns
his pending court-martial. In re Y.B., 83 M.J. 501 (C.G. Ct.
Crim. App. 2022). The CGCCA’s decision addressed a peti-
tion for mandamus filed by the named victim of a charged
offense under Article 6b(e)(1), Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 806b(e)(1) (2018). In re Y.B.,
83 M.J. at 505. The CGCCA granted the petition and re-
versed the military judge’s pretrial ruling that Military
Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412 did not exclude certain evi-
dence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct. Id. at 508. Ap-
pellant’s writ-appeal petition presents three issues:
I. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to review a
writ-appeal petition filed by an accused to review
the decision of a court of criminal appeals on a pe-
tition for extraordinary relief filed under Arti-
cle 6b.
II. Whether the military judge clearly abused his
discretion in concluding limited evidence of an-
other sexual encounter is constitutionally re-
quired in order to impeach the credibility of the
alleged victim’s allegation against the accused.
III. Whether the lower court erred by (1) analyz-
ing the admissibility of the evidence at issue un-
der rules of evidence other than those for which
Article 6b authorizes review and (2) finding the
evidence inadmissible under those rules.
In an earlier order, we granted review of Issue I, while
reserving judgment on whether to grant Issues II and III.
In this order, we asked the Government, Appellant, and the
named victim for additional briefing on two questions re-
lated to Randolph v. HV, 76 M.J. 27, 30-31 (C.A.A.F. 2017),
which held that this Court does not have jurisdiction to
hear the appeal of an accused in the circumstances of this
case. These two questions were whether the amendment of
Article 67(c), UCMJ, in the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5331,
130 Stat. 2000, 2934-35 (2016) [hereinafter the 2017
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Opinion of the Court
NDAA], requires this Court to reconsider its holding in
Randolph, and whether Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 867(a)(3) (2018), now provides this Court jurisdiction.
Having received the requested additional briefing, we
answer Issue I in the affirmative. Specifically, we hold that
this Court’s decision in Randolph has been superseded by
statute, namely, by an amendment to Article 67(c), UCMJ,
in the 2017 NDAA. We further hold that this Court has ju-
risdiction under Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, to review a writ-
appeal petition filed by an accused that seeks review of a
decision of a Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) on a petition
for extraordinary relief filed under Article 6b(e)(1), UCMJ.
Based on our resolution of Issue I, we could grant re-
view of Issues II and III. But upon consideration of Appel-
lant’s writ-appeal petition, we determine that Appellant
has not shown good cause for us to grant review of those
issues at this time. We therefore deny review of Issues II
and III without prejudice to Appellant’s right to raise the
matters they concern during the ordinary course of appel-
late review if he is found guilty of an offense.
I. Background
Appellant is charged with the sexual assault of Y.B. and
other offenses. Before trial, Appellant moved in limine for
a ruling on the admissibility of anticipated testimony that
Y.B. had had consensual sex with another member of the
Coast Guard. The military judge ruled that M.R.E. 412 did
not bar this testimony because the testimony would contra-
dict certain relevant statements that Y.B. made to law en-
forcement authorities. Y.B. challenged the military judge’s
ruling by petitioning the CGCCA for a writ of mandamus
under the authority granted in Article 6b(e)(1), UCMJ. In
re Y.B., 83 M.J. at 503. The CGCCA granted the petition
and reversed the military judge’s ruling that the testimony
is admissible. Id. at 508. Appellant then filed his writ-ap-
peal petition in this Court.
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II. Jurisdiction
This Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction be-
fore it can act on a writ-appeal petition. Randolph, 76 M.J.
at 29. We decide the question of jurisdiction de novo. Id. If
the Court lacks jurisdiction, we must dismiss the writ-ap-
peal petition. See, e.g., id. at 28 (dismissing writ-appeal pe-
tition for lack of jurisdiction). But if we have jurisdiction,
we may either grant or deny review of the issues presented
in the petition, depending on whether Appellant has shown
“good cause” for their review. Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ.
In Randolph, a military judge ordered production of the
mental health records of a victim of an offense, rejecting
the victim’s claim of a privilege under M.R.E. 513. 76 M.J.
at 28-29. The victim challenged the order by petitioning the
CGCCA for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Article
6b(e)(1), UCMJ. Id. at 29. Then as now, Article 6b(e)(1),
UCMJ, provided that “the victim may petition the Court of
Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus” to require a
court-martial to comply with certain rules. As specified in
Article 6b(e)(4)(C) and 6b(e)(4)(D), UCMJ, these rules in-
clude M.R.E. 412 and 513. The CGCCA granted the peti-
tion and ordered the military judge to protect the victim’s
mental health records under its interpretation of M.R.E.
513. 76 M.J. at 29. 1 The accused then petitioned this Court
for review of the CGCCA’s decision. Id.This Court in Randolph dismissed the writ-appeal peti-
tion for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 28. In reaching this judg-
ment, the Court first concluded that Article 6b(e)(1),
UCMJ, did not provide jurisdiction. Id. at 29. The Court
reasoned that Article 6b(e)(1), UCMJ, only “provides that
enumerated victims’ rights can be enforced through a writ
of mandamus obtained at a Court of Criminal Appeals” and
1 The CGCCA held that the psychotherapist privilege in
M.R.E. 513 extends to diagnoses and treatments. H.V. v.
Kitchen, 75 M.J. 717, 717-18 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2016). This
Court later disagreed with the CGCCA’s interpretation of
M.R.E. 513 in United States v. Mellette, 82 M.J. 374, 380
(C.A.A.F. 2022).
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Opinion of the Court
“[t]here is no mention of additional appellate rights for the
accused, or of a grant of jurisdiction to this Court.” Id.The Court further concluded that Article 67(a)(3),
UCMJ, did not provide jurisdiction. Id. at 29-31. Article
67(a)(3), UCMJ, provides that “[t]he Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces shall review the record in . . . all cases
reviewed by a Court of Criminal Appeals in which, upon
petition of the accused and on good cause shown, the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces has granted a review.”
(Emphasis added.) The accused argued that the term
“cases” includes decisions by a CCA on a petition for man-
damus. 76 M.J. at 30. But the Court disagreed for two rea-
sons. One was that the accused’s view was unsupported by
any precedent. Id. The other was that the language of Ar-
ticle 6b(e), UCMJ, showed that Congress intended to
“limit[] review of Article 6b(e) petitions to the CCA level.”
Id.Finally, the Court concluded that the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012), did not provide this Court with ju-
risdiction. 76 M.J. at 31. The Court explained that the All
Writs Act authorized the Court to act within the jurisdic-
tion granted by other statutes but did not expand the
Court’s jurisdiction. Id. (citing LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J.
364, 367 (C.A.A.F. 2013)). The Court therefore dismissed
the writ-appeal petition. Id.In a concurring opinion, Judge Ryan expressed an addi-
tional reason for concluding that Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ,
did not provide jurisdiction. Id. at 31-32 (Ryan, J., concur-
ring). Judge Ryan focused on the language of the version of
Article 67(c), UCMJ, that was in effect at the time of the
case. Id. at 32. That version provided that “the Court of Ap-
peals for the Armed Forces may act only with respect to the
findings and sentence as approved by the convening au-
thority and as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by
the Court of Criminal Appeals.” Article 67(c), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 867(c) (2012). Judge Ryan reasoned that the refer-
ence to “cases” in Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, could not refer to
decisions of a Court of Criminal Appeals in which there
“are no findings or sentence,” because Article 67(c), UCMJ,
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Opinion of the Court
gave this Court no power to act on such decisions. 76 M.J.
at 32 (Ryan, J., concurring). As such, Judge Ryan con-
cluded that Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, did not grant this
Court jurisdiction to act on writ-appeals filed by the ac-
cused. Id. at 32-33.
Appellant urges this Court to reconsider Randolph in
the light of the amendment to Article 67(c), UCMJ, in the
2017 NDAA. As amended, Article 67(c)(1)(B), UCMJ, now
provides that this Court may act with respect to “a decision,
judgment, or order by a military judge, as affirmed or set
aside as incorrect in law by the Court of Criminal Appeals.”
Article 67(c)(1)(B), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(c)(1)(B) (2018).
Appellant contends that this expanded scope of review now
allows this Court to review his petition.
We agree with Appellant. The amendment to Article
67(c), UCMJ, in the 2017 NDAA changes our jurisdiction.
As explained above, this Court in Randolph saw no
indication from Congress that petitions for mandamus filed
by a victim in a CCA under Article 6b(e), UCMJ, could later
reach this Court. And as Judge Ryan explained in her
concurrence, the previous version of Article 67(c), UCMJ,
provided this Court no power to grant relief in such a case.
The amendment directly addresses both points. Under the
new Article 67(c)(1)(B), this Court is no longer limited to
acting on the findings or sentence of a court-martial. The
Court now may also address a military judge’s decision or
order on interlocutory questions. Accordingly, granting a
writ-appeal filed by the accused to review a decision of a
military judge on a matter such as the admissibility of
evidence fits within the plain language of Article 67(a)(3)
and (c)(1)(B), UCMJ.
Therefore, we now hold that if the victim of an offense
challenges a decision or order of a military judge by peti-
tioning a CCA for mandamus under Article 6b(e), UCMJ,
and if the CCA affirms or sets aside the decision or order of
the military judge, then the accused may petition this
Court for review under Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ, and this
Court may act with respect to the military judge’s decision
or order under Article 67(c)(1)(B), UCMJ. Our decision in
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Randolph has been superseded by statute in cases in which
the amended Article 67(c)(1)(B), UCMJ, applies.
III. Conclusion
Although we have satisfied ourselves that we have ju-
risdiction to review Appellant’s writ-appeal petition, upon
further consideration we also conclude that Appellant has
not shown good cause for us to review his petition at this
time. Accordingly, we deny review of Issues II and III with-
out prejudice to Appellant’s right to raise the matters they
concern during the ordinary course of appellate review if
he is found guilty of an offense.
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