FILED
DEC 15 2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. HI-22-1092-BSG
RILLANERA RUIZ SILLA,
Debtor. Bk. No. 21-01032
RILLANERA RUIZ SILLA,
Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM∗
NIMA GHAZVINI, Chapter 13 Trustee,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Hawaii
Robert J. Faris, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: BRAND, SPRAKER, and GAN, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Rillanera Ruiz Silla appeals an order denying her motion for
relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b).1 In her motion, filed more than
14 days after entry of the bankruptcy court's pertinent order, Silla challenged
what she argued was legal error by the court. She did not provide any reason
∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, and all "Civil Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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for not filing a timely appeal of the prior order. Accordingly, there was no
basis upon which the bankruptcy court could grant relief under Civil Rule
60(b). We AFFIRM.
FACTS
Silla filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case on November 7, 2021. In her
plan, Silla scheduled her mortgage lender, Bank of America, N.A. ("BOA"), as
a Class 7 creditor. BOA filed a proof of claim listing prepetition arrears of
$2,690.65, which was comprised of $510.03 in principal, $980.62 in interest,
and $1,200 in fees. The chapter 13 trustee objected to Silla's plan because
BOA's claim asserted a prepetition arrearage owed; thus, according to the
form plan for the district, BOA's claim had to be treated as a Class 1 claim.
The trustee also needed clarification on whether any interest should be paid
on the arrearage since Silla's plan was silent on that issue. 2
On January 26, 2022, the bankruptcy court issued its Memorandum of
Decision Regarding Accrual of Interest on Arrearage Cure Claims in Chapter
13 Case ("Interest Memorandum"). The court held that Silla had to pay
interest on the delinquent prepetition principal of $510.03, but not on any
other portion of the arrearage. To reach that conclusion, it looked to the
mortgage note, which is a standardized form promulgated by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac that states: "Interest will be charged on unpaid principal
until the full amount of Principal has been paid." Since the principal amount
2
BOA did not appear at the plan confirmation hearing and has not participated in
this matter.
2
of $510.03 was delinquent and not yet paid, then interest on that portion was
due.
On February 10, 2022, the bankruptcy court entered an order
confirming Silla's plan, which incorporated its decision in the Interest
Memorandum ("Confirmation Order"). Silla did not appeal the Confirmation
Order.
On March 22, 2022, Silla moved for reconsideration of the Interest
Memorandum under "Rules 9023/9024, [Local Bankruptcy Rule] 9024-1, and
11 U.S.C. § 105." Silla argued that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that
she had to pay interest on the delinquent prepetition principal. Silla
maintained that the BOA note was a "scheduled loan" as opposed to a "daily
accrual loan" and therefore did not require or authorize the payment of
additional interest on the principal regardless of the timing of the mortgage
payments. Silla requested that the court reconsider its prior ruling and
confirm that scheduled loans which have unpaid prepetition principal cured
through the chapter 13 plan are not subject to additional interest payments.
After a hearing, the bankruptcy court declined to change its prior ruling
and denied the motion. Silla timely appealed the order denying
reconsideration.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(L). Subject to our discussion below, we have jurisdiction under
28
U.S.C. § 158.
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ISSUE
Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
reconsider?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a motion for relief from order or judgment
under Civil Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. Tennant v. Rojas (In re Tennant),
318 B.R. 860, 866 (9th Cir. BAP 2004). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion
if it applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard,
or if its factual findings are illogical, implausible, or without support in the
record. United States v. Hinkson,
585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc).
"We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless of
whether the bankruptcy court relied upon, rejected or even considered that
ground." Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC,
771 F.3d 1119, 1125
(9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
DISCUSSION
A. Motions to reconsider generally
Motions to reconsider are not specifically mentioned in the Federal
Rules of Civil or Bankruptcy Procedure. But the rules allow a litigant subject
to an adverse judgment to file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment
under Civil Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule
60(b). Civil Rules 59(e) and 60(b) are made applicable to bankruptcy by Rules
9023 and 9024, respectively. Although they may overlap, these two rules are
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distinct.
Ordinarily, if a motion to reconsider is filed within 14 days of the order
or judgment, it is treated as a motion under Civil Rule 59(e)(Rule 9023); if it is
filed more than fourteen days after entry of the order or judgment, it is
treated as a motion under Civil Rule 60(b) (Rule 9024). Rule 8002(b) tolls the
time for filing an appeal if a party files a motion to alter or amend the order
or judgment under Civil Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief under Civil Rule
60(b) within fourteen days after the order or judgment is entered. Rule
8002(b)(1)(B), (D). An untimely motion for reconsideration, one filed after the
14-day appeal period, will not extend the time to file a notice of appeal.
Preblich v. Battley,
181 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying former 10-day
rule).
An appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider construed as a
Civil Rule 59(e) motion allows the appellate court to consider the merits of
the underlying order or judgment, while an appeal from the denial of a Civil
Rule 60(b) motion "does not bring up the underlying judgment for review."
Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Ill.,
434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978); see Molloy v.
Wilson,
878 F.2d 313, 315 (9th Cir. 1989); Atkins v. Fiberglass Representatives, Inc.
(In re Atkins),
134 B.R. 936, 939 (9th Cir. BAP 1992). Put another way, when a
motion to reconsider is filed within 14 days of entry of the underlying order
or judgment, we have jurisdiction to review both the underlying order or
judgment and the order denying reconsideration. Wall St. Plaza, LLC v. JSJF
Corp. (In re JSJF Corp.),
344 B.R. 94, 99 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (applying former
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10-day rule); Rule 8002(b). But when a motion to reconsider is filed after the
14-day appeal period has run, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the
underlying order or judgment and have jurisdiction only over the order
denying reconsideration. Preblich,
181 F.3d at 1057; In re Atkins,
134 B.R. at
938; see Pryor v. B Squared, Inc. (In re B Squared, Inc.),
654 Fed. App'x 268, 269
(9th Cir. 2016) ("To the extent that [debtor] challenges the underlying
dismissal order, we lack jurisdiction over that decision because [debtor] did
not timely appeal from it, and the late-filed motion for reconsideration did
not toll the time for filing the appeal.") (citations omitted).
B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to reconsider.
While Silla's argument that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that
she was required to pay interest on the delinquent prepetition principal has
some appeal, we are unable to review the merits of the court's decision on
that issue. As an initial matter, the Interest Memorandum was not a final
decision until the bankruptcy court entered the Confirmation Order on
February 10, 2022. The time to appeal the Confirmation Order and the
bankruptcy court's decision with respect to the interest matter expired on
February 24, 2022. Silla then sought reconsideration of the "Interest
Memorandum" on March 22, 2022, under Rules 9023 and 9024, after that
interlocutory decision had merged into the final Confirmation Order. While
Silla should have moved for reconsideration of the Confirmation Order, relief
under Rule 9023 was not available in any event because Silla's motion was
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filed nearly six weeks after the expiration of the appeal period for the
Confirmation Order.
Thus, Silla's motion to reconsider could only be construed as a motion
for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b). Alexander v. Bleau (In re
Negrete), 183 B.R. 195, 197 (9th Cir. BAP 1995), aff'd,
103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir.
1996). As such, we have jurisdiction only over the reconsideration order, and
our review is limited to the correctness of the bankruptcy court's denial of
Silla's motion.
Civil Rule 60(b) permits a bankruptcy court to grant relief from a final
order or judgment on six separate grounds. See Civil Rule 60(b)(1)-(6).3
Other than a passing reference to Rule 9024, Silla did not discuss Civil Rule
60(b) or articulate under which clause she was seeking relief. Further, the
bankruptcy court did not articulate what rule or clause it applied to deny the
motion. Notwithstanding, since Silla asserted legal error by the court, it
appears that she was seeking relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(1) – "mistake,
3
Civil Rule 60(b) provides: Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or
Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
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inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a judge's errors of law are
"mistakes" that can provide a basis for relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(1). See
Kemp v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 1856, 1860 (2022). However, the Court noted
that litigants must file Civil Rule 60(b) motions "within a reasonable time,"
and that circuit courts have found Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions to be untimely
when the movant should have challenged the alleged legal error sooner "(e.g.,
in a timely appeal)."
Id. at 1864 (citing Mendez v. Republic Bank,
725 F.3d 651,
660 (7th Cir. 2013)).
The Supreme Court's holding in Kemp has long been the law in the
Ninth Circuit. See Gila River Ranch v. United States,
368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir.
1966) (when a Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion is based on the court's error, the
motion must be made before the expiration of the time for appeal); accord
Sattler v. Russell (In re Sattler),
840 F. App'x 214, 215-15 (9th Cir. 2021) (Mem)
("Granting motions to vacate orders involving alleged legal errors on the
merits, 'after a deliberate choice has been made not to appeal, would allow
litigants to circumvent the appeals process and would undermine greatly the
policies supporting finality of judgments.'" (quoting Plotkin v. Pac. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 688 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982))).
One exception to the rule that a Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion alleging legal
error on the merits must be filed before the appeal time has run is "when the
movant can 'establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances which
prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute an appeal.'" In re Sattler, 840
8
F. App'x at 215 (quoting Plotkin,
688 F.2d at 1293); see also
id. at 215 n.2
(explaining that Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions require a showing of
extraordinary circumstances when they are based on alleged legal errors that
go to the merits and are brought after the deadline to appeal).
Here, the bankruptcy court's alleged legal error on the merits was the
sole basis for Silla's untimely motion to reconsider. As such, her motion
amounted to an attempt to circumvent the appeals process after her failure to
timely appeal the Confirmation Order. Civil Rule 60(b) motions are not a
substitute for an appeal. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo,
637
F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981) (Civil Rule 60 is "not intended to benefit the
unsuccessful litigant who long after the time during which an appeal from a
final judgment could have been perfected first seeks to express his
dissatisfaction.") (citation omitted); In re Atkins,
134 B.R. at 938-39 (movant
could not use Civil Rule 60(b) as an alternative to an appeal to obtain a
reconsideration of the merits). And Silla did not provide any reason for why
she was unable to file a timely appeal of the Confirmation Order much less an
"extraordinary" one.
Therefore, the bankruptcy court had no basis upon which it could grant
relief. Although the bankruptcy court did not deny Silla's motion for the
reasons we have stated above, the record supports its decision to deny it.
The only arguments Silla asserts on appeal are those that would have
been appropriate in an appeal of the Confirmation Order – i.e., that the
bankruptcy court erred in ruling that she had to pay interest on the
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delinquent prepetition principal. She does not cite Civil Rule 60(b) in her brief
(or 59(e) for that matter), or discuss the proper standard of review, or present
any argument that bears on the bankruptcy court's exercise of discretion in
denying the motion to reconsider. And, again, she has not provided any
explanation for why she did not bring a timely appeal of the Confirmation
Order.
On this record, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Silla's motion to reconsider.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.
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