Worcester v. Springfield Terminal Railway , 827 F.3d 179 ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1965
JASON WORCESTER,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Nancy Torresen, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Ryan P. Dumais, with whom Glen L. Porter and Eaton Peabody
were on brief, for appellant.
Marc T. Wietzke, with whom Flynn & Wietzke, P.C. was on brief,
for appellee.
June 29, 2016
BARRON, Circuit Judge. Defendant, Springfield Terminal
Railway Company ("Springfield"), appeals from a jury verdict
awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff, Jason Worcester, under
the whistleblower provisions of the Federal Railroad Safety Act
(the "FRSA"). 49 U.S.C. § 20109. Springfield argues that the
District Court gave the jury an incorrect instruction as to the
standard for awarding punitive damages. We affirm.
I.
On October 6, 2011, Springfield reported a leak of
hydraulic fluid to the Maine Department of Environmental
Protection. At that time, the plaintiff, Worcester, was an
employee of Springfield. He became involved in a dispute with his
supervisor about the safety implications of cleaning up the spill
and was eventually fired. He then brought suit against Springfield
under the FRSA's whistleblower protection provision, 49 U.S.C. §
20109. Following the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff
$150,000 in compensatory damages and an additional $250,000 in
punitive damages. This appeal followed.
II.
We begin with Worcester's challenge to our appellate
jurisdiction, which depends on Worcester's contention that
Springfield failed to timely file its notice of appeal. Generally,
a notice of appeal must be filed "within 30 days after entry of
the judgment or order appealed from." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
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Here, the notice was filed much later. Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) provides, however, that "[i]f a party timely
files" a motion for a new trial, "the time to file an appeal runs
for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last
such remaining motion." And the parties agree that Springfield
timely filed a motion for a new trial. The question, therefore,
is whether that motion tolled the clock for filing the notice of
appeal.
Worcester contends that the clock was not tolled because
there was no "order disposing of" that new trial motion. But we
do not agree. The judgment in this case was entered on June 27,
2014. On July 24, 2014, Springfield filed a timely Rule 59 motion
for a new trial. The plaintiff filed a response, and, on August
18, 2014, the District Court held a telephone conference with both
parties regarding the motion for a new trial. On that call, in
light of the plaintiff's response, Springfield withdrew its motion
for a new trial, at which point the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to just
take that as a verbal motion to withdraw that
motion, and we will just declare it withdrawn,
from our perspective, unless you wanted to
file something, Mr. Porter.
MR. PORTER: No, that's fine, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So then -- so that's
off the table, then, we don't have to worry
about that anymore. And is that the only
pending motion in the case, then? All right.
MR. WIETZKE: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. PORTER: Yes, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Okay. So that's decided as of
today, and clocks are running.
Then, that same day, an electronic entry was entered on the docket
noting: "ORAL WITHDRAWAL of: . . . MOTION for New Trial by
SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY."
The District Court's verbal ruling on the motion to
withdraw left no pending motions remaining before the District
Court, and -- as the District Court stated -- began the clock
running on the time to appeal. Thus, there was an "order disposing
of" the motion, and so the clock for filing the notice of appeal
was tolled. See De León v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1281 (10th Cir.
2011) ("[T]he district court's order acknowledging the withdrawal
of De Leon's Rule 59 motion is sufficient for purposes of Rule
4(a)(4)(A)."); United States v. Rodríguez, 892 F.2d 233, 236 (2d
Cir. 1989) ("[T]he filing of the motion for reconsideration stayed
the running of the time for appeal under [Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure] 4(b), even though the motion was withdrawn."); Brae
Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir.
1986) ("[A]n order was issued disposing of the Rule 59 motion.
The district judge referred to the motion and declared that it had
been withdrawn."); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1270 (10th ed.
2014) ("An order is the mandate or determination of the court upon
some subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action . . . ."
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(quoting 1 Henry Campbell Black, A Treatise on the Law of
Judgments, § 1, at 5 (2d ed. 1902))).
In arguing to the contrary, Worcester relies on
Vanderwerf v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 603 F.3d 842 (10th Cir.
2010). But in that case, the appellants filed their notice of
appeal on the same day that they filed a notice of withdrawal and
thus before the district court had a chance to respond in any way
to the notice of withdrawal. See id. at 845. In this case, by
contrast, the withdrawal of the motion for a new trial occurred
with the involvement of the District Court, which specifically
stated that it was treating the party's statements "as a verbal
motion to withdraw that motion," granted that verbal motion to
withdraw, and noted the withdrawal of the new trial motion on the
docket. As a result, Springfield's notice of appeal was timely,
and our jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.
III.
We turn now to the substance of the appeal. Springfield
challenges the instruction that the District Court gave to the
jury regarding punitive damages. "We review de novo preserved
claims of legal error in jury instructions." Drumgold v. Callahan,
707 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro,
597 F.3d 423, 434 (1st Cir. 2010)).
The FRSA's whistleblower provision explicitly provides
for punitive damages. 49 U.S.C. § 20109(e)(3). It does not
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specify, however, the standard for awarding punitive damages. The
District Court instructed the jury that it could award punitive
damages if it found that Springfield acted, "[w]ith malice or ill
will or with knowledge that its actions violated federal law or
with reckless disregard or callous indifference to the risk that
its actions violated federal law" (emphasis added). The District
Court took this standard from Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983). There, the Supreme Court looked to general common law
principles -- rather than the standard for awarding punitive
damages adopted by any particular state -- in determining that
this standard is the appropriate one for awarding punitive damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
Springfield argued below, as it argues here, that the
District Court was wrong to adopt the standard that the Court
approved in Smith. Springfield contends that the District Court
should have instructed the jury to award punitive damages on the
basis of the Maine state-law standard for punitive damages, as
this suit is being brought in federal district court in Maine.
And, accordingly, Springfield contends, the District Court should
have instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages only
if it determined that that Springfield acted with malice, which
Springfield contends is the standard for punitive damages under
Maine state law. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me.
1985).
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Even assuming Springfield is right about Maine state law
(a proposition that the plaintiff disputes), its argument still
fails. The Department of Labor is the federal agency charged with
administering the FRSA. See 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d). The
Department's Administrative Review Board has interpreted the FRSA
standard for awarding punitive damages to be the same as the Smith
standard. Petersen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., ARB Case No. 13-090,
2014 WL 6850019, at *3 (Nov. 20, 2014); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, 816 F.3d 628, 642 (10th Cir. 2016).1 And
while Springfield argues that this administrative interpretation
of the FRSA is not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
we still find the Administrative Review Board's "interpretation[]
persuasive." Grosso v. Surface Transp. Bd., 804 F.3d 110, 117
(1st Cir. 2015); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944).
Congress made clear that a primary purpose of the FRSA
was that "[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railroad
safety . . . shall be nationally uniform to the extent
practicable." 49 U.S.C. § 20106. That goal is hardly advanced
by -- as Springfield argues we should -- adopting in each
1The Tenth Circuit has also applied the Smith standard when
evaluating a punitive damages award under the FRSA, although the
standard was apparently not disputed in that case. See BNSF, 816
F.3d at 642.
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individual case the state-law punitive damages standard used by
the particular state in which an FRSA action arises. Rather, in
order to effectuate Congress's evident preference for
"uniform[ity]" in the "law[s], regulations, and orders related to
railroad safety," it makes sense to apply a single standard
throughout the country. Id.
Additionally, the reasons that the Court gave in Smith
for adopting the reckless disregard standard apply equally well
here. In Smith, the Supreme Court determined that, at common law,
"punitive damages in tort cases may be awarded not only for actual
intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness, serious
indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even
gross negligence." 461 U.S. at 48. And the Court concluded that
nothing about "the policies and purposes of § 1983 itself require
a departure from the rules of tort common law." Id.
The same is true regarding the FRSA, and Springfield
makes no argument that if we were to use a single national
standard, it should be the malice standard. For while Springfield
contends that in Smith no party "argue[d] that the common law,
either in 1871 or now, required or requires a showing of actual
malicious intent for recovery of punitive damages," 461 U.S. at
38-39, Springfield does not argue that Smith's characterization of
the prevailing common law standard for awarding punitive damages
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is mistaken or that the common law was different at the time that
the FRSA was passed.
Springfield's contention that adopting a uniform
standard -- as Congress clearly seems to have favored -- would
impermissibly create "federal common law" is also unpersuasive.
Springfield cites several cases for the well-established rule that
there is "no federal general common law." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981); Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). But when federal courts interpret words
in federal statutes -- here, the words, "punitive damages" -- they
often look to general common law principles in order to determine
the intended meaning of the word. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245-46 (2011) (relying on the
common law to determine the standard of proof required to show a
patent's invalidity); Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994)
(looking to the common law to determine the meaning of the term
"burden of proof" in the Administrative Procedure Act); id. at 282
(Souter, J., dissenting) (same). Indeed, when, as here, "Congress
uses a common law term and does not otherwise define it, it is
presumed that Congress intended to adopt the common law
definition." United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458, 466 (1st Cir.
2015) (quoting United States v. Patterson, 882 F.2d 595, 603 (1st
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Cir. 1989)); accord Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724
(2013); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997).
Springfield argues that even if the common law might be
relevant in defining which types of damages constitute the
"punitive damages" that the FRSA allows plaintiffs to recover,
general common law principles may not be relied upon in determining
the standard for awarding them. But we do not see why the common
law would be relevant only in that limited respect. Cf. Microsoft
Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2245-46; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I do not
understand Justice Brandeis's statement in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
that 'There is no federal general common law,' to deny that the
common law may in proper cases be an aid to or the basis of decision
of federal questions." (internal citation omitted)); Sony BMG
Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 515 n.27 (1st Cir. 2011)
("Congress is presumed to legislate incorporating background
principles of common law unless it indicates to the contrary.").
Given that the Supreme Court looked to the common law in
determining both the standard that should govern the award of
punitive damages in Smith, 461 U.S. at 34, and the standard that
governs the award of other damages that Congress provided may be
recovered under § 1983, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58
(1978) (construing the standard of compensatory damages under
§ 1983 in light of the common law), we find persuasive the
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Administrative Review Board's decision to follow that same course
in resolving the uncertainty presented here. Accordingly, there
was no error in the District Court's punitive damages instruction.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is affirmed.
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