Liu v. Holder, Jr. , 802 F.3d 69 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 14-1159
    XIN QIANG LIU,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    LORETTA E. LYNCH,*
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
    THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Torruella, Lipez, and Barron,
    Circuit Judges.
    Joshua Bardavid and Bardavid Law, on brief for petitioner.
    Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of
    Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and
    Eric W. Marsteller, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.
    September 11, 2015
    *
    Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General
    Loretta E. Lynch is substituted for former Attorney General Eric H.
    Holder, Jr. as respondent.
    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.    Petitioner Xin Qiang Liu
    ("Liu"), a native and citizen of China, seeks judicial review of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his
    appeal from an Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of his motion to
    rescind an in absentia removal order and motion to reopen removal
    proceedings.    After careful consideration, we must deny Liu's
    petition.
    I.   Background
    Liu entered the United States without inspection at St.
    Thomas, United States Virgin Islands, on or about March 18, 1998.
    On that same date, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
    ("INS") served Liu with a notice to appear, charging him with
    removability as an alien present in the United States without
    having been admitted or paroled.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).1
    INS advised Liu of his rights in Mandarin, and Liu claimed to
    understand them.
    While in custody, Liu retained former attorney Robert
    Porges ("Porges") to represent him in the removal proceedings.2 In
    1
    The INS ceased to exist after the Homeland Security Act of 2002
    transferred its functions to the Department of Homeland Security
    ("DHS").
    2
    On February 11, 2002, Porges pleaded guilty to (1) conspiracy to
    engage in racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 1962(d); (2) engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a); and (3) conspiracy to commit tax
    fraud in violation of various sections of Title 26 of the United
    States Code.     Porges admitted that he participated in the
    preparation and submission of fraudulent documents related to
    -2-
    a motion for bond determination, Porges indicated that Liu intended
    to seek political asylum in the United States, and that following
    his release on bond, Liu would reside with a cousin in Brooklyn,
    New York.    The immigration court scheduled a hearing for June 23,
    1998, and served Porges with notice of the hearing.
    On June 23, 1998, attorney Víctor Ocampo ("Ocampo") from
    Porges's law firm appeared telephonically on Liu's behalf from his
    office in New York. Liu, however, failed to appear at the hearing.
    Ocampo explained that Liu was absent because he was in Texas
    helping his uncle with an emergency.       Unpersuaded by Ocampo's
    excuse for Liu's absence, the IJ ordered Liu removed in absentia.
    Liu avers that Porges never informed him of his hearing date, and
    upon contacting Porges's law firm, he was told his hearing date had
    already passed.    After learning of the removal order, Liu sought
    assistance from a legal services agency in Manhattan, New York,
    which prepared a motion to reopen for him.3    According to Liu, he
    did not understand English, and simply signed the documents the
    agency had prepared for him.    As a result, Liu's motion was filed
    as a pro se motion to reopen and to change venue on August 7, 1998.
    claims for political asylum. Consequently, Porges was suspended
    from practicing law before the BIA, the immigration courts, and the
    INS. Subsequently, Porges was disbarred.
    3
    According to Liu, he hired individuals whom he believed to be
    lawyers, but turned out to be part of a non-attorney "travel
    agency." The agency prepared his motion to reopen, and Liu simply
    signed where instructed.
    -3-
    Contrary to the excuse provided by Ocampo, Liu's motion included a
    doctor's note dated June 22, 1998 (the day before his removal
    hearing), indicating that he had been seen by a doctor on that date
    for lower back pain and sciatica and that the doctor recommended
    bed rest as treatment.    On August 25, 1998, the IJ denied Liu's
    motion to reopen.   Liu did not appeal the IJ's decision to the BIA.
    Following the IJ's denial of his motion to reopen, Liu remained in
    the United States without authorization.
    On January 13, 2012, almost fourteen years after he was
    ordered removed, Liu filed a motion to rescind the in absentia
    removal order and a motion to reopen his removal proceedings to
    apply for asylum and related relief.     In his motion, Liu sought
    equitable tolling of the 180-day filing deadline to rescind a
    removal order on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and
    lack of notice, alleging that Porges's misconduct had caused him to
    miss his removal hearing.    Liu also sought to reopen his removal
    proceedings to apply for asylum and related relief due to his fear
    of religious persecution. According to Liu, since February 2011 he
    has attended weekly services at the New Life Chinese Alliance
    Church in Flushing, New York.     Liu claims that he became deeply
    religious, regularly participated in bible study and church choir,
    and was officially baptized on April 23, 2011.     Liu asserts that
    after reading news articles and media reports documenting China's
    persecution of Christians, he developed a fear that he would not be
    -4-
    able to freely worship if he returned to China and would be forced
    to attend private illegal gatherings, where members are regularly
    targeted for arrest and detention.             Liu averred that since the
    issuance    of   his    in   absentia    removal     order,     conditions   for
    Christians in China had materially worsened, warranting asylum on
    the basis of changed country conditions.
    In a written decision issued on March 12, 2012, the IJ
    denied Liu's motion to rescind the in absentia removal order and
    motion to reopen removal proceedings as untimely and numerically
    barred.    The IJ explained that Liu did not qualify for the changed
    country    conditions    exception      to    the   numerical    and   temporal
    limitations on motions to reopen because his motion was based
    solely on changed personal circumstances as a result of his
    conversion to Christianity.         Specifically, the IJ found that the
    evidence Liu submitted, which itself did not show that conditions
    had worsened for Christians in China, was not material because Liu
    only converted to Christianity in 2011, and was not a Christian in
    1998.      Therefore,    the   IJ    determined      that   changed    personal
    circumstances could not serve as the basis for a motion to reopen
    on the basis of changed country conditions. The IJ also determined
    that Liu failed to provide any reason to warrant equitable tolling
    of the 180-day filing deadline for a motion to rescind an in
    absentia removal order given that Liu had not indicated any steps
    -5-
    he took in the interim fourteen years to remedy his immigration
    status.4   Liu appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA.
    The BIA dismissed Liu's appeal on September 11, 2013. In
    addition to adopting and affirming the IJ's decision to deny Liu's
    motions, the BIA added that waiting fourteen years to raise his
    claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not amount to due
    diligence.     Furthermore, the BIA noted that Liu's conversion to
    Christianity was a change in personal circumstances and not a
    change in country conditions, and also that China's restrictions on
    religious practices were a continuation of previous policies,
    rather than an increase in religious persecution. Finally, the BIA
    concluded that Liu had failed to show that authorities in China
    either knew of or would likely become aware of his religious
    conversion if he returned to China.        This timely petition for
    review followed.
    4
    The IJ also determined that the notice provided to Liu's counsel
    was sufficient to charge Liu with notice under §§ 239(a)(1) and (2)
    of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"). The IJ further
    noted that Liu's claims that he did not have notice was
    contradicted by statements made in his August 1998 pro se motion to
    reopen, and that because Liu was personally served with a notice to
    appear, and was read his rights in Chinese, he was at least aware
    that removal proceedings had been initiated against him. Lastly,
    the IJ determined that even if Liu's claim based on ineffective
    assistance of counsel was not time-barred pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
    § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), it would fail on the merits because Liu did
    not establish that his failure to appear was his counsel's fault.
    -6-
    II.       Discussion
    Liu   alleges       that    the       IJ    abused        its    discretion       in
    determining that Liu failed to establish changed country conditions
    and construing his motion to reopen as based only on changed
    personal circumstances.              Though Liu concedes that his personal
    circumstances       did     change      as    a     result         of   his    conversion       to
    Christianity, he avers that his motion is explicitly based on the
    worsening of conditions for Christians in China.                            Furthermore, Liu
    claims that the IJ failed to consider the record as a whole, and
    ignored   reliable         evidence      showing         an    increase        in    attacks    on
    Christians in China. In addition, Liu asserts that the BIA ignored
    his   claim    that    he    would       continue        to        engage   in      unauthorized
    religious     activity       if    he     returned            to    China     by     joining    an
    underground church and openly preaching the gospel, and therefore,
    Liu contends that the BIA erred in determining that his religious
    activity would not be targeted in China.                           Liu further argues that
    the   evidence        of     Porges's         disbarment             and      conviction       was
    circumstantial corroboration for his claim that his failure to
    appear and initial motion to reopen were not his own fault.                                    Liu
    also avers that he has satisfied all of the requirements set forth
    in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988) for making
    an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.                                Liu suggests that
    Porges's failure to inform him of his hearing date constituted
    ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to amount to an
    -7-
    exceptional circumstance that would entitle him to reopen his
    proceedings.     Accordingly, Liu contends that the IJ and BIA's
    failure to find that ineffective assistance of counsel caused him
    to miss his hearing amounted to reversable error.             We are thus
    faced with two issues: (1) the merits of Liu's motion to rescind
    the in absentia removal order on the basis of extraordinary
    circumstances in the form of ineffective assistance of counsel and
    (2) the disposition of Liu's motion to reopen on the basis of
    changed country conditions.
    This Court has jurisdiction over the BIA's September 2013
    decision to dismiss Liu's appeal of the IJ's decision pursuant to
    the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which gives the courts
    of   appeals   exclusive    jurisdiction    to   review   final   orders   of
    removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Furthermore, "[f]or this court
    to have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal, the alien
    must have 'exhausted all administrative remedies available to the
    alien as of right.'"       Meng Hua Wan v. Holder, 
    776 F.3d 52
    , 56 (1st
    Cir. 2015) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)).                "The exhaustion
    requirement is satisfied where . . . the agency chooses to address
    the merits of a particular issue, regardless of whether the alien
    raised that issue."    
    Id. We also
    have "jurisdiction to review the
    BIA's decision to deny equitable tolling of the time and number
    limitations" on motions to reopen.         Neves v. Holder, 
    613 F.3d 30
    ,
    -8-
    33 (1st Cir. 2010).             Therefore, Liu's petition for review is
    properly before us.
    Motions to reopen are generally "disfavored as contrary
    to the compelling public interests in finality and the expeditious
    processing of proceedings." Xue Su Wang v. Holder, 
    750 F.3d 87
    , 89
    (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Nascimento v. Mukasey, 
    549 F.3d 12
    , 15
    (1st Cir. 2008)).
    We review the BIA's decisions under a deferential abuse
    of discretion standard. Kucana v. Holder, 
    558 U.S. 233
    , 242 (2010)
    (citing INS v. Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 323 (1992)).               This standard
    requires a movant to "show that the BIA committed an error of law
    or    exercised   its     judgment      in   an   arbitrary,   capricious,    or
    irrational way."        Xue Su 
    Wang, 750 F.3d at 89
    (quoting Raza v.
    Gonzales, 
    484 F.3d 125
    , 127 (1st Cir. 2007).                This Court accepts
    the   BIA's    findings    of    fact   under     the   "substantial   evidence"
    standard, which makes its findings conclusive if "supported by
    reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
    considered as a whole."         Hasan v. Holder, 
    673 F.3d 26
    , 33 (1st Cir.
    2012) (quoting Guzmán v. INS, 
    327 F.3d 11
    , 15 (1st Cir. 2003)).               We
    examine the BIA's legal conclusions de novo, while "remaining
    cognizant of and deferential to the BIA's expertise in applying the
    relevant statutory framework."           Hang Chen v. Holder, 
    675 F.3d 100
    ,
    106 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Matos-Santana v. Holder, 
    660 F.3d 91
    ,
    93 (1st Cir. 2011)).             Therefore, "[w]e reverse only if 'any
    -9-
    reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
    contrary.'"     Scatambuli v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 53
    , 58 (1st Cir. 2009)
    (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).           Finally, "[w]hen the BIA
    adopts and affirms the IJ's ruling but also examines some of the
    IJ's conclusions, this Court reviews both the BIA's and the IJ's
    opinion."      Perlera-Sola v. Holder, 
    699 F.3d 572
    , 576 (1st Cir.
    2012) (citing Matovu v. Holder, 
    577 F.3d 383
    , 386 (1st Cir. 2009)).
    Because motions to reopen and removal orders are governed
    by a statutory and regulatory complex, we first note the regulatory
    provisions relevant to Liu's petition.           Motions to reopen are
    "generally limited both numerically and temporally." Meng Hua 
    Wan, 776 F.3d at 56
    .       Specifically, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(1), a party may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion
    must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative order.
    There   are,    however,   two   pertinent   exceptions   to   the    filing
    deadlines. First, "an in absentia order of removal may be reopened
    if the alien can show either that he did not receive proper notice
    of the removal proceedings or that his failure to appear was due to
    exceptional circumstances beyond his control."        Meng Hua 
    Wan, 776 F.3d at 56
    (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A); Kozak v.
    Gonzáles, 
    502 F.3d 34
    , 35 (1st Cir. 2007)).          A motion to reopen
    based on exceptional circumstances must be filed within 180 days of
    the removal order.     8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1).          Second,
    a petitioner may file a motion to reopen at any time if he brings
    -10-
    the   motion   seeking   to   apply    for   asylum   based    on    changed
    circumstances arising in the country of nationality, and has
    material evidence that was not available and could not have been
    discovered or presented at the previous hearing.              
    Id. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii).    In extraordinary circumstances, parties may invoke
    equitable tolling to extend statutory deadlines when they are
    unable to comply with them through no fault of their own, although
    we have not decided whether such tolling is available in the
    immigration context.     
    Neves, 613 F.3d at 36
    .
    Here, as the government correctly notes and Liu does not
    dispute, Liu's motion to reopen based on exceptional circumstances
    was untimely because the removal order was entered on June 23,
    1998, and Liu did not file his motion to reopen until January 13,
    2012, nearly fourteen years after the order and well beyond the
    180-day regulatory deadline.          Therefore, Liu must rely on the
    doctrine of equitable tolling to bring his motion to reopen based
    on exceptional circumstances. It is a well "settled appellate rule
    that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by
    some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." United
    States v. Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17 (1st Cir. 1990);                  see also
    Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 
    659 F.3d 168
    , 175 (1st Cir.
    2011).   Though Liu notes in his opening brief that the BIA found
    that he failed to exercise the requisite due diligence to warrant
    equitable tolling, Liu makes no argument in his opening brief to
    -11-
    show   that   he   is   in   fact   entitled    to   equitable   tolling.
    Consequently, because Liu argues that he exercised the requisite
    due diligence to warrant equitable tolling for the first time in
    his reply brief, the issue is waived.          See Waste Mgmt. Holdings,
    Inc. v. Mowbray, 
    208 F.3d 288
    , 299 (1st Cir. 2000) ("We have held,
    with a regularity bordering on the monotonous, that issues advanced
    for the first time in an appellant's reply brief are deemed
    waived.").5
    5
    Assuming arguendo that the issue is not waived, the BIA did not
    abuse its discretion in determining that Liu failed to demonstrate
    the requisite due diligence to warrant equitable tolling of the
    180-day filing deadline.
    When applicable, "equitable tolling is a rare remedy to be
    applied in unusual circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely
    common state of affairs." 
    Neves, 613 F.3d at 36
    (quoting Wallace
    v. Kato, 
    549 U.S. 384
    , 396 (2007)).        To establish equitable
    tolling, a petitioner must demonstrate that: "(1) he has been
    pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) some extraordinary
    circumstance stood in his way." Bead v. Holder, 
    703 F.3d 591
    , 594
    (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting 
    Neves, 613 F.3d at 36
    ) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Indeed, a party who fails to exercise due diligence
    may not pursue equitable tolling at all. See Chedid v. Holder, 
    573 F.3d 33
    , 37 (1st Cir. 2009); 
    Neves, 613 F.3d at 36
    ("A party
    seeking equitable tolling must have diligently pursued his rights
    for the entire period he seeks tolled, not merely once he discovers
    the underlying circumstances warranting tolling."); Beltre-Veloz v.
    Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 7
    , 11 (1st Cir. 2008) ("It cannot be gainsaid
    that due diligence is a sine qua non for equitable tolling.").
    Notably, the record contains no information regarding any steps
    Liu took to remedy his immigration status in the nearly fourteen
    years since his removal order. See 
    Chedid, 573 F.3d at 37
    (finding
    that the BIA's determination was not "arbitrary or capricious"
    where petitioner's affidavit provided no information regarding the
    actions he took in the one-year period after his removal order);
    
    Beltre-Veloz, 533 F.3d at 11
    ("The critical datum is that the
    petitioner waited eight years before inquiring into his immigration
    status, despite knowing both that removal proceedings had commenced
    -12-
    Moving to Liu's second argument, the temporal bars to
    motions to reopen do not apply to a petitioner who brings the
    motion seeking to apply for asylum based on changed circumstances
    arising in the country of nationality, and who has material
    evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered
    or presented at the previous hearing.
    Liu contends that he is entitled to this exception
    because of the evidence he presented to the IJ and BIA of worsening
    conditions for Christians in China.    In advancing this contention,
    Liu relies on 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). This provision allows
    a late motion to reopen, with "no time limit," if "the basis of the
    motion is to apply for relief under sections 1158 or 1231(b)(3) of
    this title and is based on changed country conditions arising in
    the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been
    ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and
    would not have been discovered or presented at the previous
    proceeding."   
    Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);
    see, e.g., Sugiarto v.
    Holder, 
    761 F.3d 102
    , 103 (1st Cir. 2014).
    To take advantage of the changed country conditions
    exception, a petitioner must "make[] a convincing demonstration of
    changed conditions in his homeland."     
    Raza, 484 F.3d at 127
    .   To
    and that his work permit had expired. That inordinate period of
    delay belies any serious assertion of due diligence.").
    Accordingly, the BIA was well within its discretion in determining
    that Liu had failed to exercise the requisite due diligence to
    warrant equitable tolling of the 180-day filing deadline.
    -13-
    establish changed country conditions, the evidence must demonstrate
    the "intensification or deterioration of country conditions, not
    their mere continuation."       Tawadrous v. Holder, 
    565 F.3d 35
    , 38
    (1st Cir. 2009).   A petitioner must also establish a link between
    the evidence and an individualized risk of harm.              
    Id. at 39
    (quoting Tandayu v. Mukasey, 
    521 F.3d 97
    , 101 (1st Cir. 2008). The
    petitioner bears the burden of proving changed conditions.         Zhao-
    Cheng v. Holder, 
    721 F.3d 25
    , 28 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Larngar v.
    Holder, 
    562 F.3d 71
    , 76 (1st Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, a petitioner
    must present new evidence of changed conditions that is material,
    and, moreover, it must have been unavailable and undiscoverable at
    the former hearing.      8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Hang
    
    Chen, 675 F.3d at 106
    (quoting Le Bin Zhu v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 87
    ,
    92 (1st Cir. 2010)).      The BIA "compares the evidence of country
    conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the
    time of the merits hearing."     Haizem Liu v. Holder, 
    727 F.3d 53
    , 57
    (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253
    (BIA 2007)). As we have held previously, a showing of only changed
    personal circumstances cannot suffice; rather the petitioner must
    show changed country conditions.          "[The petitioner's] changed
    personal circumstances, [namely his] conversion to Christianity,
    did not constitute changed country circumstances and thus could not
    form the basis of his motion.      [Thus] . . . a change in personal
    circumstances   should    not   qualify    as   a   change   in   country
    -14-
    circumstances."          Yang Zhao-Cheng v. Holder, 
    721 F.3d 25
    , n.4 (1st
    Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Contrary to Liu's contentions, the BIA and IJ both acted
    within their discretion in finding that Liu had failed to establish
    changed country conditions. Although Liu seems to suggest that the
    IJ erred in not explicitly referencing certain pieces of evidence,
    the IJ was within its discretion in doing so.                        In its written
    decision, the IJ states that Liu "submitted over 500 pages of
    secondary evidence, mostly cumulative and redundant, and when
    concerning non-religious issues in China, irrelevant."6                          The IJ
    explicitly        references    and   compares       the    1998    and   2009    State
    Department        Country      Reports      on    China      and    concluded      that
    "unauthorized       Christian     groups      have    been    subject     to   blatant
    persecution since the time of [Liu's] departure."                     Like the BIA,
    the    IJ   "is    not    required    to    dissect    in    minute    detail     every
    contention that a complaining party advances."                     
    Raza, 484 F.3d at 128
    .    Rather, "[i]t is enough if the agency fairly considers the
    points raised by the complainant and articulates its decision in
    terms adequate to allow a reviewing court to conclude that the
    agency has thought about the evidence and the issues and reached a
    6
    A complete review of Liu's evidence supports the IJ's
    characterization. Liu includes more than fifteen news articles
    that do not specifically concern the persecution of unregistered
    Christian groups, but rather concern China's persecution of certain
    spiritual groups, its detainment of political activists and
    dissidents, and its suppression of pro-democracy protests.
    -15-
    reasoned conclusion." 
    Id. Nothing in
    the record suggests that the
    IJ completely disregarded the additional evidence Liu submitted,
    but instead the IJ's decision suggests that the IJ gave greater
    evidentiary weight to the State Department Reports. See Hang 
    Chen, 675 F.3d at 108
    (approving of the highly probative value of State
    Department Country Reports).          Accordingly, Liu's arguments to the
    contrary amount to an objection to the IJ's factual determinations
    and the evidentiary weight the IJ accorded to competing pieces of
    evidence, rather than legal error on the part of the IJ.                         See
    
    Hasan, 673 F.3d at 32-33
    .      Therefore,      the    IJ's   failure    to
    explicitly reference each piece of Liu's submitted evidence does
    not amount to an abuse of discretion.
    In addition, a review of the evidence that the IJ
    explicitly      considered    shows     that   the    IJ's     determination     was
    supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.                    The
    1998 State Department Country Report demonstrates that unregistered
    religious activity in China was restricted and subject to the
    closure    of    churches,    detainment       of    leaders,    destruction      of
    property, surveillance and other forms of government restrictions.
    The 2009 State Department Country Report provides that "[t]he
    government continued to strictly control religious practices and
    repress      religious       activity      outside       government-sanctioned
    organizations     and    registered      places     of   worship."      (emphasis
    -16-
    added).7 Therefore, the IJ properly determined that Liu's evidence
    did not establish the "intensification or deterioration of country
    conditions," but rather their "mere continuation" based on her
    comparison of the 1998 and 2009 State Department Country Reports.
    See 
    Tawadrous, 565 F.3d at 38
    .8   In addition, the BIA and IJ did
    not abuse their discretion in determining that Liu's conversion to
    Christianity in 2011 was a changed personal circumstance, which
    cannot serve as the basis for a motion to reopen based on changed
    country conditions.   As we have recently held:
    7
    This court has considered several of Liu's news articles and
    reports in recent cases, including the State Department Country
    Reports from 1997-2009, the 2010 Congressional Executive Commission
    on China Annual Report, the March 2011 report from ChinaAid, the
    2011 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Report,
    several newspaper articles covering the Shouwang Church in Beijing,
    and concluded that the evidence does not establish changed country
    conditions for Christians in China. See generally 
    Zhao-Cheng, 721 F.3d at 28-29
    ; Haizem 
    Liu, 727 F.3d at 57
    ; Li Sheng Wu v. Holder,
    
    737 F.3d 829
    , 833-34 (1st Cir. 2013).
    8
    A review of Liu's additional evidence also supports the IJ's and
    BIA's finding of ongoing, rather than materially worsened,
    religious persecution for Christians in China. For example, the
    2010 Congressional-Executive Commission on China Report provides
    that "Chinese authorities continued to ... harass and, in some
    cases, detain and imprison members of unregistered Protestant
    churches, while also razing church property." (emphasis added).
    Similarly, the 2011 Annual Report of the United States Commission
    on International Religious Freedom explains that "[u]nregistered
    religious groups ... continue to face severe restrictions, although
    the government tolerates some religious activity within approved
    organizations."   (emphasis added).     Though Liu submits a 2010
    Annual China Aid Report, which claims a 193.4% increase in
    persecution between 2006 and 2010, and several newspaper articles
    concerning the Shouwang Church in Beijing, the BIA "is not bound by
    an outside group's categorization of what counts as persecution or
    its estimates." Haizem 
    Liu, 727 F.3d at 57
    .
    -17-
    [The petitioner's] conversion to Christianity
    was clearly only a change in personal
    circumstances. Under the current case law, a
    change typically will be categorized as a
    change in personal circumstances, as opposed
    to a change in country conditions, if the
    change is self-induced . . . . This prevents
    aliens from repeatedly reopening their removal
    proceedings based on changes that are within
    their control. We treat self-induced changes
    as changes in personal conditions, even if the
    change in personal circumstances will expose
    the alien to persecution in his home country.
    Rei Feng Wang v. Lynch, No. 14-1845, 
    2015 WL 4597553
    , at *3 (1st
    Cir.   July    31,   2015)   (citations       and    internal    quotation   marks
    omitted).      Thus, "[a] change in personal circumstances alone does
    not meet the standard for the exception to the time bar for changed
    country conditions." 
    Id. at *3;
    see also 
    Zhao-Cheng, 721 F.3d at 27
    n.4 ("Before addressing Yang's evidence of changed circumstances,
    the    BIA   noted   --    correctly   --     that   Yang's     changed   personal
    circumstances,       his   2011   conversion        to   Christianity,    did   not
    constitute changed country circumstances and thus could not form
    the basis of his motion." (emphasis in original)).9
    Accordingly, the BIA and IJ acted within their discretion
    in determining that Liu failed to establish that conditions for
    9
    Liu's case is very similar to recent cases decided by this
    Court. See Haizem 
    Liu, 727 F.3d at 54
    ("This is one of a series of
    cases in which we have similarly upheld the BIA's determination
    that there have not been changed country conditions for Christians
    returned to China who wish to practice in unregistered churches,
    such as to warrant an exception to the time limits on motions to
    reopen.") (citing Zhao-Cheng, 
    721 F.3d 25
    ; Xiu Xia Zheng v. Holder,
    502 F. App'x. 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Le Bin Zhu, 
    622 F.3d 87
    ).
    -18-
    Christians in China materially worsened between 1998 and 2012. The
    evidence consistently represents a mere continuation of religious
    persecution, rather than an intensification.   Therefore, Liu does
    not qualify for the changed country conditions exception for filing
    motions to reopen.
    III.   Conclusion
    We find no error in the proceedings of the IJ and the
    BIA.   Accordingly, Liu's petition for review is denied.
    Denied.
    -19-