Stacey Hart v. Credit Control, LLC , 871 F.3d 1255 ( 2017 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-17126
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00387-JSM-PRL
STACEY HART,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CREDIT CONTROL, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 22, 2017)
Before TJOFLAT and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO,∗ District Judge.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
∗
Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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This appeal requires us to answer two important questions—one that we
have not addressed explicitly, and one that we have not had occasion to address at
all. Within the confines of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
15 U.S.C. § 1692, we must decide whether a voicemail left by a debt collector
constitutes a “communication,” and we must determine what information will and
will not constitute a “meaningful disclosure.” Stacey Hart appeals the dismissal of
her FDCPA claims against Credit Control, a debt collector. She alleges that Credit
Control violated the FDCPA not only by failing to provide the required disclosures
for initial communications with consumers, but also by failing to provide
meaningful disclosure. The district court dismissed Hart’s claims, finding that
Credit Control was not subject to the initial communication requirements because
the voicemail it left was not a communication, and finding that Credit Control
provided meaningful disclosure despite the individual caller not identifying herself
by name. Having had the benefit of oral argument, we reverse and remand in part
and affirm in part.
I.
In March 2015, Hart received a call from Credit Control, a debt collector.
When Hart did not answer the phone, Credit Control left a voicemail which, in its
entirety, stated:
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This is Credit Control calling with a message. This call
is from a debt collector. Please call us at 866-784-1160.
Thank you.
This was Credit Control’s first communication with Hart. Although Credit
Control was attempting to collect a debt from Hart, the individual caller did not
disclose that information. Nor did the individual caller identify herself by name.
Following that initial call and voicemail, Credit Control continued to call Hart,
leaving substantially similar voicemails each time.
Hart filed a complaint in the Middle District of Florida alleging that Credit
Control violated two provisions of the FDCPA—§ 1692e(11) and § 1692d(6)—
governing false or misleading representations and harassment and abuse
respectively. In granting Credit Control’s motion to dismiss, the district court
found that Credit Control did not violate § 1692e(11) because the first voicemail
was not a “communication” within the meaning of the statute. The district court
also found that Credit Control did not violate § 1692d(6) because its caller
provided Hart with “meaningful disclosure.” The district court reasoned that the
voicemails provided “meaningful disclosure” because they provided enough
information not to mislead the consumer as to the purpose of the call. Upon
dismissal, Hart timely appealed.
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II.
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Davidson v. Capital
One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015). We also conduct a
de novo review of a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
claim. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
III.
In order to protect consumers, Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR
Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “The [FDCPA] imposes civil liability on debt collectors for certain
prohibited debt collection practices.” Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer
& Ulrich L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 576, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1608 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Hart alleges that Credit Control violated two sections of the FDCPA—
§ 1692e(11) and § 1692d(6). First, she argues that Credit Control violated
§ 1692e(11) when it failed to make the required disclosures for initial
communications in its first voicemail to her. Credit Control counters that it was
not required to make such disclosures because the voicemail was not a
communication. Second, she argues that Credit Control violated § 1692d(6) when
its individual callers did not identify themselves by name in any of the voicemails,
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thus failing to provide Hart with “meaningful disclosure.” Credit Control contends
that the individual caller’s name is not necessary for such disclosure. While we
agree with Hart that the initial voicemail left by Credit Control is a communication
within the meaning of the FDCPA, thereby triggering the requirements of §
1692e(11), we disagree with her contention that Credit Control’s individual callers
failed to provide “meaningful disclosure” by failing to leave their names.
A.
The voicemail left by Credit Control falls squarely within the FDCPA’s
definition of a communication. And because it was Credit Control’s initial
communication with Hart, Credit Control’s failure to make the required disclosures
was a violation of § 1692e(11).
“As in all statutory construction cases, we assume that the ordinary meaning
of the statutory language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Marx v.
Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 376, 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the
conveying of information regarding a debt [either] directly or indirectly to any
person through any medium.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). We need not look any
further than the statutory language of the FDCPA to decide that the voicemail is a
“communication.” Credit Control’s first voicemail to Hart falls squarely within the
FDCPA’s broad definition of communication. The voicemail, although short,
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conveyed information directly to Hart—by letting her know that a debt collector
sought to speak with her and by providing her with instructions and contact
information to return the call. The voicemail also indicated that a debt collector
was seeking to speak to her as a part of its efforts to collect a debt. Credit Control
argues that because the voicemail “essentially reveals no more than a hang-up
call,” it cannot be a “communication.” However, adopting that view would cause
us to ignore the broad statutory language. The statute broadly defines
“communication” as a conveying of information “regarding a debt.” See id. In
order to be considered a communication, the only requirement of the information
that is to be conveyed is that it must be regarding a debt. We can assume that by
choosing to omit any qualifier other than requiring that the call must be regarding a
debt, Congress meant to allow any information, as long as it regards a debt. See id.
There is no requirement in the statute that the information must be specific or
thorough in order to be considered a communication.
Though the statutory language is dispositive, we draw additional support for
our conclusion from our caselaw. In Edwards v. Niagra Credit Solutions, Inc., we
dealt with a separate issue but analyzed similar voicemails and held that they too
were communications. See 584 F.3d 1350, 1351, 1353 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2009).
The voicemails there revealed only that the messages were intended for Edwards,
and left contact information and instructions regarding returning the call. See id.
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at 1351. While the issue there was the individual callers’ failure to reveal the fact
that the calls were in fact from a debt collection company, that distinction is
irrelevant to our analysis here because those voicemails were still considered
communications. See id. at 1353 & n.3. Furthermore, the fact that the voicemails
in Edwards were not initial communications is also irrelevant because, again, they
were communications nonetheless. Id. Credit Control’s argument that Edwards is
not applicable falls short. Edwards is not distinguishable here based on the fact
that it was not the first time the debt collector contacted the consumer; that fact has
no bearing on whether the voicemails constituted communications in the first
place.
Whether it was the debt collector’s first communication with the consumer is
significant only in determining whether the debt collector should have given the
required disclosures, also known as the “mini Miranda” warning. 1 Here, Credit
Control should have provided Hart with the required disclosures. The FDCPA
requires the “mini Miranda warning” to be given in the initial communication
between a debt collector and consumer. Specifically, this warning requires that the
debt collector disclose that he or she is “attempting to collect a debt and that any
information obtained will be used for that purpose.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). In
1
Courts have begun referring to the initial communication disclosures required by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e(11) as the “mini Miranda” warning. See Berg v. Merchants Ass’n Collection Div., Inc.,
586 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
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this case, because the voicemail was not only a communication, but the first
communication, Credit Control was required to do just that.
B.
On the other hand, Credit Control provided meaningful disclosure even
though its callers failed to leave their names. Generally, § 1692d aims to protect
consumers from harassment and abuse by unscrupulous debt collectors and
subsection (6) prohibits debt collectors from placing calls without “meaningful
disclosure of the caller’s identity.” In pertinent part, the FDCPA prohibits debt
collectors from:
engag[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of
which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in
connection with the collection of a debt. Without
limiting the general application of the foregoing, [it] is a
violation of this section . . . [to place] telephone calls
without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.
15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). We are now asked to determine whether “meaningful
disclosure” is provided when an individual caller fails to disclose her name but
discloses the name of the debt collection company and the nature of the company’s
business. We answer that question in the affirmative.
The FDCPA is silent on what constitutes “meaningful disclosure.” To date,
the question of what constitutes “meaningful disclosure” has been addressed
neither by this court nor our sister circuits. Although many lower courts have
addressed the issue, they have failed to reach a full consensus. Compare Wright v.
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Credit Bureau of Ga., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 591, 597 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that
“meaningful disclosure” requires a debt collector to disclose the debt collection
company’s name, the nature of the business, and the individual caller’s name or
“desk name”), with Torres v. ProCollect, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1105 (D.
Colo. 2012) (“A caller’s name (and certainly not a caller’s alias) has no real
‘meaning’ to a consumer . . . . Thus, the only way for an identity disclosure to be
meaningful to a consumer is if it discloses the name of the debt collection
company.”). We hold that meaningful disclosure does not require the individual
caller to reveal her name, and this holding comports with text of the FDCPA.
Section 1692 prohibits debt collectors from “harass[ing], oppress[ing], or
abus[ing] any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. §
1692d. And in line with that goal, subsection (6) prohibits placing “telephone calls
without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” See id. at §1692d(6). The
FDCPA provides consumers with recourse following abusive behavior by debt
collectors during the course of collecting a debt. Given this scheme, the debt
collection company’s name is plenty to provide “meaningful disclosure.” The
individual caller here is working on behalf of the debt collection company, which
is the actual entity collecting the debt. An individual caller’s name is ancillary to
the debt collection company’s name and adds little value to a consumer who seeks
to complain about the debt collection company’s behavior. The company is
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collecting the debt; the caller is merely an arm of the company. Equipped with the
knowledge that the call is being placed on behalf of a debt collection company and
the company’s name, a consumer has enough information to protect herself under
the FDCPA.
Among other things, Hart argues that the plain language of the statute
requires the individual caller to reveal her name because the FDCPA states that
debt collectors may not place “calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s
identity.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) (emphasis added). Hart advocates for us to take
the phrase “the caller’s identity” quite literally, which would imply that meaningful
disclosure requires the identity of the individual actually placing the call.
However, that reading is a little too literal and adopting it would pull us away from
our duty to “bear[] in mind the fundamental canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Utility Air Regulatory Grp.v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. ___, ___,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014); see also King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.
Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015) (explaining that context matters). Overall, the FDCPA and,
more specifically, § 1692d aims to protect consumers from unsavory practices of
debt collectors. Thus as long as the consumer is made aware of the debt collector’s
name, i.e., the company collecting the debt, meaningful disclosure is provided.
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The identity of the caller is meaningfully disclosed provided that both the
name of the debt collection company and the nature of the company’s business are
disclosed. This is so because the debt collection company’s name and the nature of
its business are enough to prevent the debt collector from “harass[ing],
oppress[ing], or abus[ing]” the consumer. Because the individual callers here
disclosed that they were calling on behalf of Credit Control, a debt collection
company, Hart was provided with meaningful disclosure, and thus no violation of
§ 1629d(6) occurred.
IV.
We find that this voicemail, and other voicemails like it, constitute a
communication within the meaning of the FDCPA. Specifically, we hold that a
voicemail can, and will, be considered a communication under the FDCPA if the
voicemail reveals that the call was from a debt collection company and provides
instructions and information to return the call. However, we stop short of requiring
individual callers to identify themselves by name to avoid violating the FDCPA.
Specifically, we hold that meaningful disclosure is provided as long as the caller
reveals the nature of the debt collection company’s business, which can be satisfied
by disclosing that the call is on behalf of a debt collection company, and the name
of the debt collection company. We remand to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.
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