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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-11148
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00299-HLM
DOUGLAS EDWARDS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
versus
SOLOMON and SOLOMON, P.C.,
Defendant – Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(September 30, 2020)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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At issue in this appeal is whether Georgia’s renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-
61, can save a claim that is otherwise time-barred under the Fair Debt Collection
Practice Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. We conclude that it cannot and
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Douglas Edwards’s complaint against
Solomon and Solomon, P.C. as time-barred.
I.
On April 26, 2019, Edwards filed a complaint against Solomon and
Solomon—a third-party collection agency—in the Superior Court of Bartow
County, Georgia. The complaint alleged that Solomon and Solomon violated
various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692 et seq. On May 20, 2019, Solomon and Solomon removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia based on federal
question jurisdiction. The same day that Solomon and Solomon removed the case
to federal court, Edwards voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Six months later, on November 27, 2019, Edwards refiled his complaint in
the Superior Court of Bartow County, which alleged the same FDCPA claims
against Solomon and Solomon as in the initial complaint. Once again, Solomon
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and Solomon removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
This time, however, Solomon and Solomon also moved to dismiss
Edwards’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Solomon and Solomon argued that Edwards’s claims were time barred
under the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). As
Solomon and Solomon pointed out in its motion, Edwards’s complaint specifically
alleged that the FDCPA violations occurred on May 1, 2018, May 25, 2018, and
July 23, 2018. But the new complaint was filed on November 27, 2019, and
therefore, pursuant to § 1692(k)(d), any FDCPA violation must have occurred on
or after November 26, 2018 to be actionable. Edwards opposed the motion,
arguing that Georgia’s renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, prevented his claims
from being deemed time-barred. The district court ultimately dismissed Edwards’s
complaint as time-barred, concluding that where Congress has set a specific statute
of limitations, it cannot be extended by operation of state law. Edwards now
appeals.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of Solomon and Solomon’s motion to
dismiss de novo, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
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them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
942 F.3d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019).
III.
“The FDCPA imposes civil liability on debt collectors for certain prohibited
debt collection practices.” Hart v. Credit Control, LLC,
871 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th
Cir. 2017) (alteration adopted) (quoting Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A.,
559 U.S. 573, 576 (2010)). The only relevant FDCPA
provision in this appeal is its statute of limitations provision, which provides that
“[a]n action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in
any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in
controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from
the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (emphasis added).
On appeal, Edwards does not dispute that his claims fall outside of the
FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Rather, he argues that his claims are not
time barred because he complied with Georgia’s renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-
61. That statute provides in pertinent part:
When any case has been commenced in either a state or federal court
within the applicable statute of limitations and the plaintiff
discontinues or dismisses the same, it may be recommenced in a court
of this state or in a federal court either within the original applicable
period of limitations or within six months after the discontinuance or
dismissal, whichever is later . . .
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O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a). Edwards’s argument hinges on whether the Georgia
renewal statute applies notwithstanding the FDCPA’s express one-year statute of
limitations. If it does, then his new complaint, which was filed within six months
of the dismissal of his initial complaint, would have been timely.
Georgia’s renewal statute does not apply to the FDCPA. Our case law is
clear that, where Congress has set an express statute of limitations, state law cannot
otherwise extend it. In Phillips v. United States, for example, we considered
whether the Georgia renewal statute could extend the time for filing a claim under
the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”).
260 F.3d 1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir.
2001). We reasoned that because “a [federal] court looks to state law to define the
time limitation applicable to a federal claim only when Congress has failed to
provide a statute of imitations for a federal cause of action,” and Congress
expressly provided a [six-month] limitation period for FTCA claims, “the
incorporation of diverse state renewal provisions into [the FTCA] would
undermine the uniform application of [the FTCA’s] six month time limitation just
as effectively as would the incorporation of state law for the accrual of a cause of
action.”
Id. at 1318−19 (quotations omitted). Accordingly, we held that the
Georgia renewal statute could not extend the FTCA’s limitations period. Id.; see
also Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,
380 U.S. 424, 433 (1965) (rejecting a claim
that Ohio’s savings statute applied to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act because
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“[t]he incorporation of variant state savings statutes would defeat the aim of a
federal limitation provision designed to produce national uniformity”); Holmberg
v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (“If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon
the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter. The
Congressional statute of limitation is definitive.”).
The same reasoning applies to FDCPA claims. Congress specifically
provided for a one-year limitations period for FDCPA claims. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(d). And incorporating Georgia’s renewal statute into the FDCPA would
undermine the uniform application of this federal limitation. We therefore
conclude that Georgia’s renewal statute does not extend the FDCPA’s one-year
statute of limitations. 1
1
Edwards argues that our holding in Phillips does not extend to the FDCPA because
FTCA plaintiffs may only bring claims in federal court, whereas the FDCPA permits claims to
be filed in state and federal court. And he points out that the FTCA involves a specific waiver of
sovereign immunity, which the FDCPA does not include, and therefore the FTCA’s statute of
limitations provision is construed more strictly than the one at issue here. But Edwards does not
present any authority showing that either distinction matters. Moreover, other circuits have also
reached the same holding as Phillips outside the FTCA context. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. W.H.
Braum, Inc.,
347 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “[t]he federal scheme is
complete and it is inappropriate to import state statutes of limitations, such as a savings clause, to
time-bar an individual aggrieved employee under the ADA”); Beck v. Caterpillar Inc.,
50 F.3d
405, 407 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Where, as [in this hybrid suit under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act], the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a lawsuit which was brought in federal court,
asserts a purely federal claim, and is subject to a federal statute of limitations, state savings
statutes do not apply.”); Garrison v. Int’l Paper Co.,
714 F.2d 757, 759 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983)
(noting that “[b]ecause Title VII actions are governed by a federal statute of limitations, the
Arkansas saving clause is inapplicable”).
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Instead of following Phillips, Edwards urges to rely on Arias v. Cameron,
776 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015). In Arias, we held that a district court did not
abuse its discretion by allowing the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his state law tort
claim, which had been removed to federal court by the defendants, regardless of
whether dismissal prejudiced defendants by stripping the defendants’ statute of
limitations defense.
Id. at 1273. In reaching that conclusion, we observed that the
defendant would likely not have had a statute of limitations defense if the
defendant had not removed the case to federal court because the plaintiff could
have invoked Georgia’s renewal statute in state court.
Id. at 1272. Thus, Edwards
claims that Solomon and Solomon created the statute of limitations defense by
removing his claims to federal court and if they had not, his suit would have been
timely under Georgia law.
Edwards’s reliance on Arias is misplaced. Unlike this case, which concerns
a federal claim where Congress has set the applicable statute of limitations, Arias
concerned a state law tort claim where the state legislature set the statute of
limitations.
Id. at 1265. Thus, Arias is of no help to Edwards.
In conclusion, because the Georgia renewal statute does not apply to federal
causes of action where Congress expressly set a limitations period, such as the
FDCPA, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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