United States v. Jeremie Saintvil ( 2023 )

USCA11 Case: 22-10004 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 1 of 20
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10004
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEREMIE SAINTVIL,
a.k.a. Jeremie Stvil,
a.k.a. Jeremie Saint Vil,
a.k.a. Jeremi Stvil,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10004
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00013-AW-GRJ-1
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremie Saintvil appeals his conviction and sentence for four
fraud-related crimes. 1 In short, Saintvil orchestrated an extensive
scheme to obtain Paycheck Protection Program 2 (“PPP”) loans for
illegitimate businesses that he created with information he stole
from elderly persons. On appeal, Saintvil contends that (1) the
district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the
indictment for duplicity and failing to strike surplusage from the
1
A jury found Saintvil guilty of each count with which he was charged: (1)
aiding and abetting bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2, (2)
submitting a false statement to a federally insured institution, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1014, (3) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1028A(a)(1), and (4) making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001(a).
2
In March 2020, “as a result of the coronavirus pandemic,” Congress passed
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act which
authorized the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to administer funds
under the PPP to help businesses retain employees and pay other qualified
expenses. The CARES Act also included a “special allocation . . . of funds
committed directly [to] the [Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”)
program] to respond to the COVID pandemic.” The EIDL program provides
assistance to businesses affected by certain disasters—in this case, the
coronavirus pandemic.
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indictment, (2) venue was improper, and (3) his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
From February 2018 through June 2020, Saintvil
“fraudulently obtained and possessed” the personal identifying
information of several elderly individuals in assisted or senior living
facilities. Alongside other fraudulent activities (i.e., opening lines
of credit, obtaining physical checks and debit cards, and
transferring funds), Saintvil used the stolen identities to create
fictitious businesses and apply for nine PPP loans. Seven of the
nine applications were approved, and funding was distributed. In
similar fashion, Saintvil also fraudulently applied for, and received,
an EIDL loan. One way or another, the distributed proceeds—
which totaled more than $1,000,000—ended up in Saintvil’s
control.
In its indictment against Saintvil, the grand jury detailed
Saintvil’s entire scheme as perpetrated against various banks and
financial institutions, but in Count One 3 it only charged a single
execution of bank fraud as against Florida Credit Union (“FCU”). 4
3
We focus on Count One for two reasons. First, Saintvil’s duplicity and
surplusage arguments are targeted at Count One. Second, the remaining
three counts reallege and incorporate by reference the factual allegations laid
out in Count One.
4
The indictment started by detailing Saintvil’s larger fraudulent scheme:
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Specifically, the indictment focused on Saintvil’s use of a certain
individual’s identity (referred to as R.J.H.) to create the fictitious
business HEJ Holding, Inc. (“HEJ Holding”) and to apply to FCU
for a PPP loan. Accordingly, our recitation of the factual
background will focus primarily on facts pertinent to this
fraudulent instance.5
B. The Charge
Between on or about February 1, 2018, and on or about June
30, 2020, in the Northern District of Florida and elsewhere, the
defendant, . . . did knowingly and willfully execute and
attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a federally
insured financial institution, that is, FCU, [and 12 other
institutions], and to obtain moneys owned by and under the
custody and control of FCU, [and 12 other institutions] by
means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations, and promises.
The indictment then narrowed in on the fraud related to FCU in outlining the
“execution” of Saintvil’s fraud.
D. Execution of the Scheme
Between on or about May 4, 2020, and on or about May 21,
2020, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute
this fraudulent scheme, the defendant . . . did knowingly and
willfully submit false and fraudulent representations to FCU in
an SBA PPP loan application, and in supporting loan
documents and emails.
5
Saintvil’s use of R.J.H.’s identity to create HEJ Holding and apply for a loan
with FCU is part of a pattern. The rest of Saintvil’s scheme was perpetrated
in the same way; he just changed the identities and financial institutions that
he used.
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In May 2020, FCU—a federally insured credit union
headquartered in Gainesville, Florida—received an email
purportedly from R.J.H. who claimed to be the owner of HEJ
Holding. 6 The email contained numerous attachments in support
of HEJ Holding’s request for a PPP loan for $159,202.30. 7 The
attachments included a PPP Borrower Application Form, two
federal tax documents for HEJ Holding, a copy of R.J.H.’s Florida
Driver’s License, and a document showing the average monthly
6
The email was sent to Jane Harris, a FCU employee, from a Gmail address
that included R.J.H.’s name. The email read:
Good afternoon Jane, I’m a proud Veteran and owner of HEJ
Holding Inc. I have heard nothing but amazing reviews from
members of [FCU] about your handling of the SBA [PPP].
Unlike major banking institutions that has [sic] caused
tremendous hardship with ineffective processes, we’re in
desperate need for personalize [sic] banking attention that can
ensure funding as quickly as possible.
The pandemic has crippled my business and continue [sic] to
wreck incalculable havoc to me personally, my team and their
families. I beg of you to please help me with the prompt
submittal of my SBA PPP application. I’ve included all
necessary documents to ensure expeditious processing.
Thank you very much for all of your help Jane and I look
forward to hearing from you promptly.
Sincerely,
[R.J.H.]
7
According to the application, HEJ Holding had 17 employees and average
monthly payroll expenses of $63,680.92.
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payroll for HEJ Holding. FCU did not immediately issue any
funding because it believed the application was fraudulent.
R.J.H. and FCU continued to communicate about the loan
application. In a series of emails over the next two-and-a-half
weeks, FCU was “able to capture the IP address from where the
email originated” which was later determined to be registered to
Saintvil’s mother and the physical address where the IP was
registered, in Delray Beach, Florida, was owned by Saintvil. And,
“[i]n one of the email exchanges between [R.J.H.] and FCU, a
completed PPP loan application was electronically signed.”
FCU, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) by this time, called R.J.H. to request his physical presence
in order to complete the loan application process. The FCU
employee who conducted the call testified that the male voice on
the other end of the line started the call by attempting to sound like
an older man but his voice “changed to frustration” as the call
progressed. The following morning, R.J.H. emailed FCU stating,
“we have officially concluded it is not in the best interest of our
team’s safety to have someone or myself drive from South Florida
to Gainesville to open an account in this day age [sic].”
Further investigation revealed that (1) R.J.H.’s address was
changed from a senior living facility to the address for HEJ Holding
in January 2020, (2) R.J.H. was alive and residing in a “memory
center, or assisted living facility, in Central Florida,” (3) when
contacted by the FBI, R.J.H.’s daughter stated that R.J.H. never
owned a business, never operated HEJ Holding, and did not
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control the email address or phone number associated with the
PPP loan, (4) HEJ Holding was not a registered business with the
Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and the
State did not have any record of 2019 corporate income tax returns
for HEJ Holding, and (5) the service used to generate the payroll
document, Paychex Flex, advised that they could “find no record
of [HEJ Holding or R.J.H.].” In light of these findings, in June 2020,
the FBI obtained and executed a search warrant for the Delray
Beach residence (tied to the IP address from which the email
application was submitted).
Saintvil was at the residence when the search warrant was
executed. The FBI uncovered extensive evidence of Saintvil’s
fraudulent scheme, including the following evidence 8 specific to
the R.J.H./HEJ Holding fraud: “[C]redit cards, banking check
books, and other identification documents for [Saintvil], and
others, including a . . . debit card in the name of R.J.H.”; and a
computer on which agents were able to locate “emails pertaining
to [HEJ Holding’s] SBA PPP loan application, including the same
attachments that were submitted to FCU in support of the loan.”
B. Procedural History
In March 2021, a grand jury indicted Saintvil with bank
fraud, submission of a false statement to a federally insured
8
Significant evidence of Saintvil’s other fraudulent PPP applications was
uncovered—including numerous debit cards and check books in the names of
other individuals as well as a copy of one identity-theft victim’s driver’s license
on a photocopier.
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institution (specifically, FCU), aggravated identify theft, and
making a false statement to the government (specifically, the SBA).
Based on the indictment, Saintvil filed a Motion to Dismiss or
Strike Surplusage. He argued first that the district court “should
dismiss Count One . . . because it is duplicitous,” in that it
“improperly alleg[ed] two separate offenses in the same count.” In
other words, Saintvil argued that Count One was duplicitous
because the bank fraud statute has two subsections, 9 each
constituting separate offenses, so that he was improperly charged
with two crimes in a single count of the indictment. Alternatively,
Saintvil moved the court to “strike as surplusage from Count One
the allegations regarding the twelve financial institutions [other
than FCU] . . . and eight businesses [other than HEJ Holding]
. . . because [their inclusion was] not only irrelevant to the offenses
charged but also prejudicial to [Saintvil] and inflammatory.”
9
The bank fraud statute provides:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,
securities, or other property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, a financial institution, by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1344.
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The district court denied Saintvil’s motion. As to Saintvil’s
duplicity argument, the district court determined that the bank
fraud statute’s two subsections provided “alternative ways in
which the statute may be violated,” rather than separate offenses.
As such, the district court found that Count One was not
duplicitous. And, as to Saintvil’s surplusage argument, the district
court concluded that Saintvil had not met the “exacting standard”
for showing surplusage because he had not shown that the
information at issue was immaterial, inflammatory, or prejudicial.
After an eight-day jury trial in which Saintvil proceeded pro
se, the jury found Saintvil guilty of all four counts. After the verdict
but before sentencing, Saintvil filed a motion arguing that venue
was improper as to each count because his actions took place in the
Southern, rather than Northern, District of Florida. At sentencing,
the district court denied Saintvil’s motion, because “at trial there
was proof to support the venue that was presented,” i.e., the
Northern District of Florida, and Saintvil’s motion was further
“untimely” 10 and “unfounded.”
10
On this point, the district court questioned Saintvil as to why he had not
waived his motion by failing to raise it pretrial. Saintvil responded that he
“was not exposed to the government presentation at trial” so there was “no
record as to whether they were going to provide evidence to prove [venue].”
The district court found that venue was proper, but later clarified its statement
on the untimeliness of Saintvil’s motion:
I want to correct a misstatement I made earlier when I was
reviewing your venue motion. I asked if it was waived by not
raising it pretrial. Of course, you could raise – to the extent
you could waive it as an evidentiary matter, that time has
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In total, the district court sentenced Saintvil to 204 months’
imprisonment. 11 The district court recognized that this sentence
was “above the guidelines,” but concluded that it was necessary
because Saintvil’s case was “out of the heartland of normal fraud
cases.” Specifically, the district court concluded that an above-
guideline sentence was proper because “the conduct was
egregious,” in that “[t]he overall fraud” and “amount of loss” were
extreme, the “breadth of fraud was extraordinary,” Saintvil
targeted many people “who were among the most vulnerable
people there are,” and Saintvil took advantage of the PPP program
that was intended to move money “quickly to the people who
need[ed] it.” The district court also considered Saintvil’s abilities
and education, criminal history, motive, and refusal to accept
responsibility, which when considered alongside the need to
protect the public from Saintvil, counseled in favor of a stronger
sentence. In sum, the district court concluded that “all of the
circumstances of the offense” showed that “a guideline sentence
would [not] be sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offense.”
Saintvil timely appealed.
passed, too. There are different kinds of venue objections. At
any rate, I have denied that motion already.
11
The district court sentenced Saintvil to two concurrent terms of 180 months’
imprisonment as to Counts 1 and 2, as well as a term of 24 months’
imprisonment as to Count 3 to run consecutively with Counts 1 and 2.
Additionally, the district court imposed a term of 60 months’ imprisonment as
to Count 4 to run concurrently with Counts 1 and 2.
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II. Discussion
Saintvil puts forth three arguments on appeal. First, he
argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the indictment as duplicitous and failing to strike surplusage from
the indictment. Second, he argues that venue was improper.
Third, he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
We address each argument in turn, ultimately affirming Saintvil’s
conviction and sentence.
A. Duplicity and Surplusage
Saintvil’s first set of arguments concern the district court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss. We start with his argument that
Count One of his indictment improperly charged him with two
separate crimes and then consider his argument that the indictment
contained unlawful surplusage.
1. Duplicity
We review alleged deficiencies in an indictment de novo. See
United States v. Pacchioli, 718 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013).
“A count is duplicitous if it charges two or more separate
and distinct offenses.”12 United States v. Deason, 965 F.3d 1252, 1267
(11th Cir. 2020). Put differently, each count of an indictment may
12
“[D]uplicitous count[s] pose three dangers: (1) A jury may convict a
defendant without unanimously agreeing on the same offense; (2) A defendant
may be prejudiced in a subsequent double jeopardy defense; and (3) A court
may have difficulty determining the admissibility of evidence.” United States
v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 977 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
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only charge a single offense. But “where a statute defines two or
more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be
alleged in the conjunctive in one count.” United States v. Felts, 579
F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also United
States v. Burton, 871 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Where a
penal statute, . . . prescribes several alternative ways in which the
statute may be violated and each is subject to the same
punishment . . . the indictment may charge any or all of the acts
conjunctively, in a single count[.]”); id. at 1574 (“An indictment is
not duplicitous if, in one count, it charges a defendant with
violating the statute in both ways.” (footnote omitted)).
“Bank fraud is established under two alternative methods.”
United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). First,
to prove bank fraud under § 1344(1), “the government must
establish that the defendant (1) intentionally participated in a
scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property; and
(2) that the victim of the scheme or artifice was an insured financial
institution.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, to prove bank fraud
under § 1344(2), the government must establish “(1) that a scheme
existed in order to obtain money, funds, or credit in the custody of
the federally insured institution; (2) that the defendant participated
in the scheme by means of false pretenses, representations or
promises, which were material; and (3) that the defendant acted
knowingly.” Id. (quotation omitted). Finally, we have held that
“[a] conviction can be sustained under either section [of the bank
fraud statute] when the indictment . . . charge[s] both clauses.” Id.
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Saintvil relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014), which he argues held
that the bank fraud statute’s subsections establish different
offenses. Saintvil, however, misstates the law. In Loughrin, the
Supreme Court held that § 1344(1), unlike § 1344(2), requires a
showing of “intent to defraud a bank.” Id. at 359–62. That is, the
two subsections of the bank fraud statute have different elements.
It does not follow, however, that the two subsections therefore
define different offenses altogether. Rather, just as the district
court reasoned, and as we have held, see Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303,
subsections (1) and (2) of the bank fraud statute are merely two
ways to prove the same offense—bank fraud. Loughrin hurts,
rather than helps, Saintvil’s case.
Without Loughrin, Saintvil’s position has no support.
Indeed, his argument collapses in light of our holdings that the
bank fraud statute provides alternative ways to prove the same
offense and that the two subsections can be charged together in
one count. See Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303; Felts, 579 F.3d at 1344;
Burton, 871 F.2d at 1573.
We agree with the district court that Count One was not
duplicitous.13
2. Surplusage
13
We need not reach Saintvil’s argument that the jury instructions did not
properly account for the duplicity because we conclude that Count One was
not duplicitous.
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We review the district court’s refusal to strike alleged
surplusage for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Awan, 966
F.2d 1415, 1426 (11th Cir. 1992).
“A motion to strike surplusage from an indictment should
not be granted unless it is clear that the allegations are not relevant
to the charge and are inflammatory and prejudicial.” Id. (quotation
omitted). We have recognized that this threshold is a “most
exacting standard.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“For an indictment to be valid, it must contain the elements
of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprise the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” United States v.
Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted and
alterations adopted). Specifically for bank fraud, “[t]he allegation
of a scheme is an essential element[.]” United States v. Adkinson, 135
F.3d 1363, 1377 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1344). In other
words, an indictment that includes bank fraud as a charge should
“set forth the manner and means by which the scheme and artifice
to defraud operated.” Bobo, 344 F.3d at 1084.
Saintvil argues that the indictment included “surplusage”
because there was extraneous information in Count One (i.e.,
references to financial institutions other than FCU and fraudulent
businesses other than HEJ Holding) that referenced parts of his
scheme that were not directly charged in Count One. This
argument is a non-starter. Because an allegation of bank fraud
requires the government to prove the existence of a scheme, and
the scheme-related evidence is exactly the information that Saintvil
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argues is surplusage, he cannot prove that this information is not
“relevant to the charge.” Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426; see also Bobo, 344
F.3d at 1083–84. While the included information is extensive, the
scheme was extravagant and multi-faceted which necessitated the
inclusion of additional information in the indictment beyond his
actions vis-à-vis FCU and HEJ Holding. Because the additional
information was relevant and required in order to charge Saintvil
properly, 14 Saintvil fails to meet the “exacting standard” for a
motion to strike surplusage. See Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426. The
district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to
strike certain information from Saintvil’s indictment.
B. Venue
“We review de novo a determination that the government
established venue by a preponderance of the evidence.” United
States v. Smith, 22 F.4th 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022). We view
venue-related evidence “in the light most favorable to the
government and make all reasonable inferences and credibility
determinations in favor of the verdict the jury returned.” Id.“Like most rights, a defendant’s venue right is not absolute,
and it will be deemed waived unless asserted prior to trial.” United
States v. White, 590 F.3d 1210, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United
14
Because Saintvil clearly fails to meet one of three mandatory conditions for
a motion to strike surplusage, we need not reach his arguments as to the other
two conditions (that the allegations are inflammatory and prejudicial). We do
note, however, that his arguments as to the latter two elements also lack
persuasive force.
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States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 761 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that
“the right to be tried in the state and district where the crime was
alleged to have been committed may be waived voluntarily by the
defendant”). If, however, a defendant “has no notice of a defect of
venue until the [g]overnment rests its case,” the outer limit for
raising a venue objection is extended so that it “is timely if made at
the close of the evidence.” United States v. Daniels, 5 F.3d 495, 496
(11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1152
(11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a challenge to venue failed because
“appellant did not present his venue objection until the prosecution
had rested its case”).
“In many (and perhaps most) cases in which the defendant
fails to object to a defect in venue, the defendant’s silence may be
taken to imply a waiver of the venue right.” White, 590 F.3d at 1214(alterations adopted and quotations omitted). We will not find
waiver, however, when “there is evidence which suggests that the
defendant has not waived his venue right.” Id. In White, for
example, we held that a defendant waived his venue right through
silence when he “did not object before or during trial” and instead
“waited until after he was convicted to complain [about venue].”
Id.Here, Saintvil did not challenge venue before or at trial, but
rather waited a week prior to sentencing to file a motion
challenging venue. As such, he has waived his venue right. See id.Indeed, Saintvil was put on notice as to a potential venue challenge
because the evidence adduced at trial revealed that his actions (i.e.,
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submitting the fraudulent documents and otherwise carrying out
his scheme) occurred in the Southern District of Florida rather
than the Northern District of Florida. Therefore, at the latest,
Saintvil should have challenged venue during trial. See Daniels, 5
F.3d at 496; Roberts, 308 F.3d at 1151–52.
C. Substantive Reasonableness
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a
deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A district court abuses its considerable
discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only
when it ‘(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that
were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
judgment in considering the proper factors.’” United States v.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). “The
party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the
sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a)
factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.”
Id.
Under § 3553(a), a sentencing court must impose a sentence
that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to
provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate
deterrence, and to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, the sentencing court
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must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences
available, the guideline sentencing range, and the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Id.§ 3553(a)(1), (3)–(4), (6).
The district court may impose an upward variance based on
the § 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627,
637–38 (11th Cir. 2013), but sentences outside the guideline range
require sufficiently compelling justifications, Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
For example, the district court may impose an upward variance if
it concludes that the guideline range insufficiently accounted for
the defendant’s criminal history. United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814
F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court may likewise
vary upward based on factors already accounted for in calculating
the guideline range. See United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619–
20 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court’s failure to discuss mitigating
evidence does not indicate that it ignored or failed to consider this
evidence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
Despite Saintvil’s contention otherwise, his sentence is
substantively reasonable. First, the district court quite clearly
“consider[ed] the extent of the deviation and ensure[d] that the
justification [for the deviation was] sufficiently compelling.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 50. The district court canvassed the applicable
considerations on the record, including: the breadth of the fraud,
the duration of the fraudulent scheme, the large number of victims,
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the vulnerability of those victims, the high loss amount, the
circumstances of the offense (i.e., Saintvil taking advantage of
emergency PPP funds), his history of fraudulent behavior, the need
for deterrence, the need to protect the public from his actions, and
his refusal to accept responsibility for his crimes. Each of these
considerations was explained to Saintvil during sentencing. Id.(“After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the district court]
must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for
meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.”). Second, these same considerations support the
district court’s sentencing determination and cut against Saintvil’s
unfounded argument that he is less culpable than other defendants
(that he identifies in case law) who received upward variances.
Third, the district court’s extensive explanation shows that it
adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that an
above-guideline sentence was necessary. See Osorio-Moreno, 814
F.3d at 1288. To the extent that the district court did not recite
each individual factor, that is not required anyway. Amedeo, 487
F.3d at 832. Fourth, and finally, Saintvil argues that the district
court erred in sentencing because “every single one of the grounds
used by the district court” to support the upward variance was
“accounted for in the sentencing guidelines.” This argument has
no support under our law. See Johnson, 803 F.3d at 620 (“[The
appellant] contends that all relevant factors for the district court to
consider in imposing a sentence already were incorporated into the
calculation of his advisory guidelines range, such that no fact or
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10004
circumstance warranted a variance. This argument is
meritless . . . .” (quotation omitted)).
Simply put, Saintvil has not carried his burden of
demonstrating that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256.
AFFIRMED.