Belya v. Kapral ( 2023 )

21-1498
Belya v. Kapral, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 8th day of February, two thousand twenty-three.
Present:
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Chief Judge,
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
MICHAEL H. PARK,
WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
STEVEN J. MENASHI,
EUNICE C. LEE,
BETH ROBINSON,
MYRNA PÉREZ,
ALISON J. NATHAN,
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ALEXANDER BELYA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. 21-1498
HILARION KAPRAL, AKA
METROPOLITAN HILARION,
1
NICHOLAS OLKHOVSKIY, VICTOR
POTAPOV, SERGE LUKIANOV, DAVID
STRAUT, ALEXANDRE ANTCHOUTINE,
GEORGE TEMIDIS, SERAFIM GAN,
BORIS DMITRIEFF, EASTERN
AMERICAN DIOCESE OF THE RUSSIAN
ORTHODOX CHURCH OUTSIDE OF
RUSSIA, THE SYNOD OF BISHOPS OF
THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA, MARK MANCUSO,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________________
For Defendants-Appellants: Diana Verm Thomson (Daniel H. Blomberg,
Lori H. Windham, Daniel D. Benson, on the
brief), The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, Washington, DC, and Donald J.
Feerick, Jr. (Alak Shah, on the brief), Feerick
Nugent MacCartney, PLLC, South Nyack,
NY.
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Bradley Girard (Richard B. Katskee, on the
brief), Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Washington, DC, and
Oleg Rivkin, Rivkin Law Group PLLC, New
York, NY.
For Amici Curiae Roman Gordon D. Todd, Daniel J. Hay, John L.
Catholic Archdiocese of New Gibbons, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington,
York, Jurisdiction of the Armed DC.
Forces and Chaplaincy of the
Anglican Church in North
America, General Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists,
2
Lutheran Church–Missouri
Synod, International Society for
Krishna Consciousness
(ISKCON), Serbian Orthodox
Diocese of New Gracanica–
Midwestern America, in
support of Defendants-
Appellants:
For Amicus Curiae Jewish Ryan Paulsen, Haynes and Boone, LLP,
Coalition for Religious Liberty, Dallas, TX.
in support of Defendants-
Appellants:
For Amici Curiae Constitutional Matthew T. Nelson, Warner Norcross +
Law Scholars, in support of Judd LLP, Grand Rapids, MI.
Defendants-Appellants:
Amici Curiae States of James A. Campbell, Solicitor General of
Nebraska, Alabama, Alaska, Nebraska; Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney
Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, General of Nebraska; David T. Bydalek,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Chief Deputy Attorney General of
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska; Steve Marshall, Attorney General
Oklahoma, South Carolina, of Alabama; Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
Texas, and Utah, in support of General of Alaska; Mark Brnovich, Attorney
Defendants-Appellants: General of Arizona; Leslie Rutledge,
Attorney General of Arkansas; Chris Carr,
Attorney General of Georgia; Derek
Schmidt, Attorney General of Kansas;
Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of
Kentucky; Jeff Landry, Attorney General of
Louisiana; Lynn Fitch, Attorney General of
Mississippi; Austin Knudsen, Attorney
General of Montana; John M. O’Connor,
Attorney General of Oklahoma; Alan
Wilson, Attorney General of South
3
Carolina; Ken Paxton, Attorney General of
Texas; and Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General
of Utah.
Following disposition of this appeal on August 17, 2022, Defendants-
Appellants filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The opinion was amended
September 16, 2022, and an active judge of the Court thereafter requested a poll on
whether to rehear the case en banc. A poll having been conducted and there being
no majority favoring en banc review, the petition for rehearing en banc is hereby
DENIED.
Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., Circuit Judge, joined by Eunice C. Lee, Beth Robinson,
Alison J. Nathan, and Sarah A. L. Merriam, Circuit Judges, concurs by opinion in
the denial of rehearing en banc.
José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judge, dissents by opinion from the denial of
rehearing en banc.
Michael H. Park, Circuit Judge, joined by Debra Ann Livingston, Chief Judge,
and Richard J. Sullivan, William J. Nardini, and Steven J. Menashi, Circuit Judges,
dissents by opinion from the denial of rehearing en banc.
Denny Chin, Circuit Judge, filed a statement with respect to the denial of
rehearing en banc.
Joseph F. Bianco, Circuit Judge, took no part in the consideration or decision
of the petition.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judge, joined by EUNICE C. LEE, BETH ROBINSON,
ALISON J. NATHAN, and SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges, concurring in the
order denying rehearing en banc:
I concur fully in the decision to deny in banc rehearing in this case for the
reasons stated in the panel opinion, see Belya v. Kapral, 45 F.4th 621 (2d. Cir. 2022),
as well as for the reasons contained in the excellent statement of my colleague,
Senior Judge Chin, in support of denial. I add only a few observations.
First, there is no circuit split on the extremely narrow procedural issue
presented in this case. The panel opinion avoids generating one, and the dissents
from the denial of rehearing in banc identify none. Judge Park’s dissent, by
contrast, proposes a significant judicial expansion of the collateral order doctrine
and the circumstances under which application of the doctrine is warranted under
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949), and it
does so without offering any limiting principle. Nothing in the dissent’s
approach would prevent a further expansion of the collateral order doctrine to
include virtually every other “liberty”-based right. And the approach runs head-
long into the Supreme Court’s admonition that “the class of collaterally appealable
orders must remain ‘narrow and selective in its membership,’” Mohawk Indus., Inc.
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009) (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350
1
(2006)), even if that means litigants are “require[d] . . . to wait until after final
judgment to vindicate valuable rights,” id. at 108-09. “This admonition has
acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating
rulemaking, not expansion by court decision, as the preferred means for
determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately
appealable.” Id. at 113 (quotation marks omitted).
Second, even a casual reader will notice the total mismatch between the
dissent’s description of Belya’s lawsuit and the lawsuit itself. It bears repeating
Judge Chin’s observation that there is no basis whatsoever to second-guess the
nature of Belya’s defamation claim or to suspect that his lawsuit is not what it
purports to be. The dissent insinuates that it is merely “styl[ed]” as a defamation
claim to avoid the church autonomy doctrine and “questions of religious
doctrine.” Dissent at 21-22. But at this stage, Belya’s claim is a genuine
defamation claim that, as the dissent’s refusal to take it at face value suggests,
would not implicate church autonomy.
Third, by comparing the “[d]enial of a church autonomy defense . . . to
qualified immunity,” the dissent unfortunately distorts the panel opinion’s
holding that the defense is premature rather than unavailable. Dissent at 15; see
2
Belya, 45 F.4th at 631 (“It is possible that at some stage Defendants’ church
autonomy defenses will require limiting the scope of Belya’s suit, or the extent of
discovery, or even dismissal of the suit in its entirety. But we cannot and do not
prematurely jump into the fray.”). And even if the comparison were meaningful,
the panel opinion employs essentially the same order of analysis that applies in
appeals from denials of qualified immunity. A defendant who claims qualified
immunity must fully stipulate to the plaintiff’s recitation of facts and show her
entitlement to qualified immunity as a matter of law before a court of appeals can
have jurisdiction over the claim. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
Any dispute of fact, no jurisdiction. Here, of course, the church disputes the facts
relevant to Belya’s defamation claim. See Belya, 45 F.4th at 634 (“The[r]e are
outstanding secular fact questions that are not properly before us – and would not
require a fact-finder to delve into matters of faith and doctrine.”).
Finally, the panel’s decision regarding appellate jurisdiction at this stage in
the case poses no threat to the church autonomy doctrine, which has thrived
without help from the expansion of the collateral order doctrine that the dissent
proposes. We can agree on the narrow procedural issue before us without
disagreeing about the vital importance of church autonomy and governance.
3
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the order denying rehearing en
banc:
I write separately simply to underscore that the issues at hand are of
“exceptional importance” and surely deserve further appellate review.
Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2). The denial of en banc review in this case is a signal that
the matter can and should be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
1
MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judge, joined by DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge,
and RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, and STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit
Judges, dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc:
This case arises from a minister’s suspension by his church. The church
autonomy doctrine, which is rooted in the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, generally requires courts to stay out of such matters. But the panel
decision leaves the church defendants subject to litigation, including discovery
and possibly trial, on matters relating to church governance. This imperils the
First Amendment rights of religious institutions. Denials of church autonomy
defenses should be included in the narrow class of collateral orders that are
immediately appealable.
The panel decision adopts a “neutral principles of law” limitation on the
church autonomy doctrine that would allow courts to resolve “secular
components of a dispute involving religious parties.” Belya v. Kapral, 45 F.4th
621, 630 (2d Cir. 2022). Here, that means that a minister’s lawsuit against his
former church—because it is styled as a defamation claim—must proceed to final
judgment before the church can appeal the denial of its religious autonomy
defense. The panel’s extension of this “neutral principles” test from an entirely
different line of cases involving church property disputes will invite courts to
1
wade into the details of ecclesiastical matters. And although the panel attempts
to cabin its decision to these defendants on the facts available at this stage of their
case, its holding will categorically deny interlocutory appeals for church
autonomy defenses and reduce the doctrine to a defense against liability only.
In my view, the First Amendment provides more protection to religious
institutions than that, so I would have granted the petition for rehearing en banc.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Alexander Belya was a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church
Outside of Russia (“ROCOR”), which is a “semi-autonomous” part of the Russian
Orthodox Church. J. App’x at 88. Church rules govern the relationship
between ROCOR and the Russian Orthodox Church, including elections of
ROCOR bishops, which must be approved by the Russian Orthodox Church.
In December 2018, ROCOR’s bishops elected Belya as Bishop of Miami.
Defendant Hilarion Kapral—then the leader of ROCOR—sent a letter to the
Russian Orthodox Church seeking approval of Belya’s election. But a group of
church leaders opposed to Belya urged Hilarion to “undo” the appointment. Id.
at 95. These church leaders sent a letter to Hilarion and ROCOR leaders
2
questioning the authenticity of the letters announcing Belya’s election. Hilarion
suspended Belya from his “priestly duties,” pending an investigation. Belya then
left ROCOR for the Greek Orthodox Church.
B. Procedural History
In August 2020, Belya sued ROCOR and its leadership, including the church
leaders who opposed his elevation. Belya alleged defamation and sought
damages for reputational injury and losses from the decline in his church
membership.
Defendants sought to file a motion to dismiss in a three-page pre-motion
letter as required by the district court’s individual practices. This letter
previewed Defendants’ argument that the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction under the church autonomy doctrine. The district court sua sponte
construed the letter as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and denied it. 1 Belya v.
Hilarion, No. 20-CIV-6597, 2021 WL 1997547, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2021). The
court was “persuaded Belya brings a suit that may be resolved by appealing to
neutral principles of law.” Id. at *4.
1 We have repeatedly urged district courts against using this practice to dispose of
complex matters. See Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes Inc., 43 F.4th 46, 53–56 (2d Cir. 2022)
(collecting cases and noting that “the district court’s course of action did nothing to conserve
judicial resources”).
3
Defendants moved to certify an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the
application of the church autonomy doctrine is a “controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” District Ct. Doc.
No. 54 at 1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). The district court summarily denied the
motion, concluding that “the controlling legal doctrines . . . are well established”
and “Defendants’ arguments amount to . . . factual disputes.” Belya v. Kapral, No.
20-CIV-6597, 2021 WL 2809604, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2021).
Finally, Defendants submitted another pre-motion letter seeking leave to file
a motion to bifurcate discovery in order to protect against disclosures that might
infringe on church autonomy. In the alternative, Defendants sought a stay
pending appeal. The district court again sua sponte construed the letter as a fully
briefed motion and summarily denied it, stating that bifurcation was
“unwarranted” and that it “w[ould] not pass judgment on the internal policies and
or determinations of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia.” J. App’x at
147. The district court also denied a stay as “unnecessary” without explanation.
Id.4
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
This case involves a conflict between two legal doctrines. On one hand, the
church autonomy doctrine protects religious institutions from court interference
in matters of faith and church governance. On the other hand, the collateral order
doctrine permits appellate review of only a narrow set of non-final decisions.
A. The Church Autonomy Doctrine
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The
Religion Clauses together establish the “independence” of churches “in matters of
faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government.” Our
Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2061 (2020). That
independence includes “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions
that are essential to the institution’s central mission,” including “the authority to
select, supervise, and if necessary, remove a minister without interference by
secular authorities.” Id. at 2060.
The church autonomy doctrine has a “rich historical pedigree” that
“informed the meaning of the Constitution and its Religion Clauses at the
Founding.” McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 980 F.3d
5
1066, 1075–76 (5th Cir. 2020) (Oldham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc). “[T]he jurisdictional line prohibiting civil courts from intruding on
ecclesiastical matters is an ancient one.” Id. at 1077, 1076–78 (tracing the
jurisdictional boundaries between civil and ecclesiastical courts from the Middle
Ages and English law). The Founders incorporated this jurisdictional
understanding of religious institutional autonomy into the First Amendment. See
id. at 1078–80. This meant that the state had no role in church governance,
including the selection of ministers, rulemaking, and organization. Indeed,
James Madison, “the leading architect of the religion clauses,” vetoed a bill that
established “rules and proceedings relative purely to the organization and polity
of the church.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171, 184–85 (2012) (quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S.
125, 141 (2011), and 22 Annals of Cong. 982–983 (1811)).
The Supreme Court first explicitly articulated a form of the church
autonomy doctrine in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). Watson explained that
the First Amendment gives churches independence in matters of “theological
controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the
members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Id. at 733.
6
Subsequent cases clarified the reach of the doctrine. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York law that recognized the Russian
Orthodox Church in the United States as the true owner of church property instead
of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia. See id. at 107–08. The Court reasoned
that “[Watson] radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine.” Id. at 116.
The Supreme Court later held that the Illinois Supreme Court should not
have intervened in a dispute involving a church’s suspension of a minister. See
Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 718–20 (1976).
The Court also interpreted the National Labor Relations Act to deny the National
Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over religious schools because there was a
significant risk of excessive entanglement with religion. See NLRB v. Cath. Bishop
of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979). More recently, the Supreme Court has held that
the ministerial exception “precludes application of [employment discrimination
7
laws] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
In sum, the church autonomy doctrine has long prohibited court
interference with “matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2055 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions of
the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Although ‘final decisions’ typically are
ones that trigger the entry of judgment, they also include a small set of
prejudgment orders that are ‘collateral to’ the merits of an action and ‘too
important’ to be denied immediate review.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949)).
The collateral order doctrine is “best understood not as an exception to the
‘final decision’ rule . . . but as a ‘practical construction’ of it.” Will v. Hallock, 546
U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (citation omitted). Under the collateral order doctrine, the
courts of appeals have jurisdiction over certain non-final decisions involving
claims that are “too important to be denied review and too independent of the
8
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case
is adjudicated.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. Appeals are thus permitted from
collateral orders “[1] that are conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions
separate from the merits, and [3] that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from
the final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n,
514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995).
In deciding whether a collateral order is appealable, “we do not engage in
an individualized jurisdictional inquiry”—“[r]ather, our focus is on the entire
category to which a claim belongs.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (cleaned up). The
Supreme Court has emphasized that the scope of the doctrine is modest and
membership in the “small class” of collaterally appealable orders is “narrow and
selective.” Will, 546 U.S. at 350. “[T]he decisive consideration is whether
delaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial
public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at
107 (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 352–53).
III. DISCUSSION
The panel dismissed Defendants’ appeal, holding that it lacked appellate
jurisdiction to review the district court’s denials of Defendants’ church autonomy
9
defenses. The panel concluded that the district court’s orders (1) were not a “final
rejection” of Defendants’ church autonomy defenses, (2) did not deny “a claim of
right separable from the merits,” and (3) were not “effectively unreviewable on
appeal” because the case turned on “outstanding secular fact questions” that
“would not require a fact-finder to delve into matters of faith and doctrine.”
Belya, 45 F.4th at 631–34.
The panel erred in two ways. First, it misapplied the collateral order
doctrine. Rejections of church autonomy defenses should be immediately
appealable, in the same way that denials of qualified immunity are appealable.
Second, the panel’s novel extension of the “neutral principles” approach is
inconsistent with precedent and will substantially limit the church autonomy
doctrine.
A. Denials of Church Autonomy as Appealable Collateral Orders
1. The Panel’s Misapplication of the Collateral Order Doctrine
The panel misapplied each prong of the collateral order doctrine. First, the
district court’s decision is “conclusive” because it subjects Defendants to litigation
over religious matters. The church autonomy doctrine protects religious
institutions from the litigation process itself where the dispute concerns “matters
10
of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct.
at 2055 (citation omitted); see also Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. at 502 (“It is not only
the conclusions that . . . may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion
Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and
conclusions.”); Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718 (describing the Illinois Supreme Court’s
“detailed review” of “internal church procedures” as “impermissible under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments”); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 205–06 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he mere adjudication of such questions would pose grave
problems for religious autonomy.”). 2 A court order denying a church autonomy
defense is “conclusive” because it decides the church’s “right not to face the other
burdens of litigation,” which is the “critical part of this inquiry.” Liberty
Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
The panel decided that the district court’s orders were not “conclusive
because they d[id] not bar any defenses, they did not rule on the merits of the
church autonomy defense, and they permit Defendants to continue asserting the
2 To be sure, none of these cases arose at the motion to dismiss stage, so none explicitly
held that the church autonomy doctrine shields churches from the litigation process altogether.
See Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2058–59 (appeal from summary judgment); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at180–81 (same); Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. at 495 (petition for review of agency proceeding);
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 707 (appeal from judgment after trial). But the reasoning of these cases
leads to the same conclusion: that “the very process of inquiry” into matters of faith and church
governance offends the Religion Clauses. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. at 502.
11
defense.” Belya, 45 F.4th at 631; see also Statement of Judge Chin (“Statement”) at
5 (noting that “at a later point,” “the scope of Belya’s claims and discovery might
have to be limited and dismissal . . . might even be warranted”). But here,
“conclusiveness” does not turn on whether the church autonomy defense may be
raised again later because subjecting Defendants to further litigation would itself
burden their First Amendment rights. See Liberty Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 151(“[W]hen the essence of a right is to shield certain defendants from the burdens of
litigation, collateral review is not defeated by the opportunity for post-judgment
review of the same legal question that arose when considering the earlier order.”).
Second, the church autonomy doctrine involves a “claim[] of right separable
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action” that is “too important to be
denied review.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. A church autonomy defense is distinct
from the merits of a defamation claim. Cf. Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int’l, 36 F.4th
1021, 1036 (10th Cir. 2022) (agreeing that the applicability of the ministerial
exception is “clearly . . . separate from the merits,” even while ruling against the
defendant on other grounds).
The panel decision does not seriously contest this point. Indeed, the panel
itself emphasized that Belya’s defamation claim raised “secular fact questions”
12
that “would not require a fact-finder to delve into matters of faith and doctrine.”
Belya, 45 F.4th at 634. And the panel acknowledged that “it is possible that, in
some circumstances, the church autonomy doctrine can present questions
separable from the merits of a defamation claim,” but it ultimately concluded that
it was “too soon to say at this point.” Id. at 632. The panel’s effort to cabin its
holding to the specific procedural posture and the facts available to it at the time,
however, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated “warn[ing]
that . . . appealability under § 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to
which a claim belongs,” and is not “a case-by-case . . . determination.” Digit.
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (cleaned up). Whether
the church autonomy defense applies is a separate—and important—question
from the merits of a defamation claim.
Third, the district court’s order is not “effectively reviewable” on appeal
from final judgment. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107. As noted above, the First
Amendment “prohibits” the very “inquiry into the procedures that canon or
ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow.”
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713; see supra at 10–11. “[A] civil court must accept the
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them,” and no more.
13
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713; accord Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2069 (warning against
“judicial entanglement in religious issues”); Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle
Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“[A]voidance, rather
than intervention, should be a court’s proper role when adjudicating disputes
involving religious governance.”). Thus, after final judgment, the harm from
judicial interference in church governance will be complete.
The panel relied on the Supreme Court’s statement in footnote four of
Hosanna-Tabor that the ministerial exception “operates as an affirmative defense to
an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.” 565 U.S. at 195 n.4. But
that does not resolve the issue because affirmative defenses, such as qualified
immunity, may still be immediately appealable. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (“Qualified . . . immunity is an affirmative defense.”); Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding that denials of qualified immunity are
appealable under the collateral order doctrine).
The panel thus misapplied the collateral order doctrine. The denial of a
church autonomy defense is conclusive, separate from the merits, and effectively
unreviewable on appeal after final judgment.
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2. Comparison to Qualified Immunity
Denial of a church autonomy defense should be an appealable collateral
order in light of its strong resemblance to qualified immunity. First, both are
rooted in foundational constitutional interests. In the case of qualified immunity,
“subjecting officials to the risks of trial” may “implicate separation-of-powers
concerns.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816, 817 n.28. Similarly, the church autonomy
doctrine is “a structural [constitutional protection] that categorically prohibits
federal and state governments from becoming involved in religious leadership
disputes.” Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir.
2015); see supra at 5–6.
And second, both are protections against the burdens of litigation itself.
Qualified immunity recognizes “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal
question” whether the doctrine applies. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (“The
entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and
like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial.” (emphasis omitted)). Similarly, subjecting churches to litigation and
trial over matters of church government itself infringes their First Amendment
15
rights. See supra at 11 (citing Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. at 502; Milivojevich, 426
U.S. at 718).
Several courts have acknowledged the similarities between church
autonomy and qualified immunity. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 975
(7th Cir. 2013) (justifying collateral review of the denial of church autonomy
because it is “closely akin to a denial of official immunity”); Skrzypczak v. Roman
Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he ministerial
exception, like the broader church autonomy doctrine, can be likened ‘to a
government official’s defense of qualified immunity.’” (citation omitted)); Petruska
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2006) (agreeing that the church
autonomy doctrine is similar to a defense of qualified immunity because “[t]he
exception may serve as a barrier to the success of a plaintiff’s claims, but it does
not affect the court’s authority to consider them”).
The panel’s rejection of the analogy is unpersuasive. It stated that a denial
of qualified immunity is immediately appealable only “to the extent that it turns
on an issue of law.” Belya, 45 F.4th at 634 (citation omitted). And in this case,
the panel concluded that “[d]ecidedly non-ecclesiastical questions of fact remain.”
Id. But the applicability of the church autonomy doctrine, like qualified
16
immunity, is at bottom a question of law. Both inquiries require applying law to
facts—here, assessing whether the dispute involves “matters of church
government” or “of faith and doctrine,” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2055—but that does
not change the nature of the inquiry. Answering the question whether the church
autonomy defense applies is not somehow prohibitively more fact-bound than
determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 3
In light of these doctrinal similarities, denial of a church autonomy defense,
like denial of qualified immunity, should be an appealable collateral order. 4
B. The “Neutral Principles” Approach
Finally, the panel’s novel extension of the “neutral principles” approach is
inconsistent with precedent and threatens to eviscerate the church autonomy
doctrine. The panel held that “[w]hen a case can be resolved by applying well-
established law to secular components of a dispute, such resolution by a secular
3 Both the Statement and Concurrence correctly note that denials of qualified immunity
cannot be appealed when they turn on facts. See Statement at 8–9; Concurrence at 2–3. But this
is of little relevance here. First, when the district court denied the church autonomy defense,
Defendants did not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence. Franco v. Gunsalus, 972 F.3d 170, 174
(2d Cir. 2020); J. App’x at 16–18. Second, the panel decision categorically denies immediate
appealability of any church autonomy defense, no matter what the facts might be. See supra at
13.
4 Sovereign immunity provides another helpful comparator for immediately appealable
orders. Like qualified immunity and church autonomy, sovereign immunity is “implicit in the
constitutional design,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999), and protects states from the
burdens of litigation, P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993).
17
court presents no infringement upon a religious association’s independence.”
Belya, 45 F.4th at 630; see also Statement at 11 (“Using neutral principles of law to
resolve secular components of a dispute involving religious parties does not
infringe on religious parties’ independence.”). There are several problems with
this.
First, the Supreme Court has already rejected this approach in the context of
church employment disputes. Even “valid and neutral” employment
discrimination laws cannot apply to “an internal church decision that affects the
faith and mission of the church itself.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. The same
principle applies here.
Second, the panel’s extension of the “neutral principles” approach from a
different context involving church property disputes is unfounded. See Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (“[A] State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral
principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.” (emphasis
added)). Courts have generally declined to extend this approach to other areas.
See, e.g., Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The ‘neutral
principles’ doctrine has never been extended to religious controversies in the areas
of church government, order and discipline, nor should it be.”); Simpson v. Wells
18
Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493–94 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting a dismissed minister’s
claim that “neutral principles” could apply to his civil rights and constitutional
claims for being evicted from the church parsonage). But see McRaney v. N. Am.
Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2020) (relying
on “neutral principles” to reverse a district court’s dismissal of a church official’s
tort claims against a church).
Finally, the “neutral principles” approach does not make sense for disputes
about church governance. The panel decision appears at times to limit the scope
of the church autonomy defense to “matters of faith and doctrine” only. See, e.g.,
Belya, 45 F.4th at 634; see also Statement at 7 (describing the defense as applying to
“matters of ‘religious doctrine[]’ or ‘religious belief’”). But Supreme Court
precedent is clear that the defense is broader and covers “matters of church
government” as well. Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2055.
In Jones, the “true” owner of church property was disputed, so there was not
a church government to which the court could defer. 5 See 443 U.S. at 597–98
5 The “neutral principles” approach makes sense only when churches themselves invite
judicial scrutiny. See McRaney, 980 F.3d at 1071 (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (explaining that Jones’s “neutral principles” approach will “protect religious
autonomy . . . by assuring that secular courts would intervene in religious affairs only when the
religious community itself had expressly stated in terms accessible to a secular court how a
particular controversy should be resolved” (quoting W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, 1
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS & THE LAW § 5:16 (2017))).
19
(describing the split between two church factions). Giving courts a license to
apply “neutral principles” to matters of church government, faith, or doctrine
would swallow the church autonomy doctrine altogether. Almost any cause of
action has secular components that can be resolved using some facially neutral
principles. In Milivojevich, the Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that the
church “had not followed its own laws and procedures” in suspending a minister. 6
426 U.S. at 713. The Supreme Court held that this approach was wrong because
“inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires
the church judicatory to follow . . . is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment
prohibits.” Id. “[R]ecognition of such an exception would undermine the
general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court
inquiry.” Id. 7
6 There were neutral principles in Milivojevich. The Supreme Court of Illinois decided
that the minister’s suspension was not valid because, under church procedures, the minister “was
not validly tried within one year of his indictment” by the church tribunals, among other issues.
426 U.S. at 708. The Supreme Court rejected this foray into church governance. Here, the panel
assures us that neutral principles govern “non-ecclesiastical questions of fact” raised by Belya,
including whether the “bishop’s official letterhead” and the “bishop’s official seal” were used
and whether “the purported signatories actually sign[ed] the letters.” Belya, 45 F.4th at 634;
Statement at 2–3. But these are the same types of factual questions the Court rejected in
Milivojevich.
7 See also Robert Joseph Renaud & Lael Daniel Weinberger, Spheres of Sovereignty: Church
Autonomy Doctrine and the Theological Heritage of the Separation of Church and State, 35 N. KY. L. REV.
67, 89, 92 (2008) (“There is no way to resolve an issue of church discipline by ‘neutral
principles.’”).
20
Here, Belya brought a defamation claim, alleging a false campaign by
church leaders to remove him. But it is difficult to see how a court could assess
that claim without considering the reasons for the church’s decisions, including
whether Defendants correctly determined that Belya was never elected Bishop of
Miami and whether they acted in good faith—all matters of “internal church
procedures.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718. 8
The panel’s focus on whether there are “secular components of a dispute”
that can be resolved using “neutral principles of law” is thus misplaced. 9 Simply
accepting Belya’s styling of the case as a defamation claim, and reasoning that such
a claim can be decided with neutral principles of law, elevates form over
substance—almost any ministerial dispute could be pled to avoid questions of
8 State courts have come to similar conclusions in defamation cases involving church
governance and discipline. See, e.g., Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of the
Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington, 877 N.W.2d 528, 541 (Minn. 2016) (“[W]e simply
recognize that adjudicating a defamation claim based on statements made during the course of a
church disciplinary proceeding and published exclusively to members of the religious
organization and its hierarchy necessarily fosters an excessive entanglement with religion . . . .”);
Purdum v. Purdum, 301 P.3d 718, 727 (Kan. 2013) (“[Plaintiff’s] defamation action involves an
ecclesiastical subject matter, and adjudication of it would entangle the civil courts in a church
matter.”); C.L. Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 400 (Tex. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s tort
claims against her church, including defamation, could not be adjudicated by neutral principles
without “imping[ing] upon [the church’s] ability to manage its internal affairs”).
9 The panel decision states that “simply having a religious association on one side of the
‘v’ does not automatically mean a district court must dismiss the case or limit discovery.” Belya,
45 F.4th at 630. But this is not a fair characterization of the church autonomy defense. See Our
Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061. The charge that “the Dissent’s view is that churches are generally
immune from the litigation process” is also wrong. Statement at 6.
21
religious doctrine. Taken to its logical endpoint, this approach would eviscerate
the church autonomy doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our Court’s disagreement in this case reflects the growing number of courts
struggling to define the contours of the church autonomy doctrine in the wake of
Hosanna-Tabor. 10 But under the panel’s “neutral principles” approach, this
confusion will quickly dissipate as the church autonomy doctrine is reduced to a
defense against liability only, eroding the First Amendment’s protections for
religious institutions. I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.
10 The Concurrence notes that there is no circuit split on the questions raised in this case.
Concurrence at 1. That may be true, but our closely divided Court today joins two other closely
divided courts of appeals that have narrowly denied petitions for rehearing en banc, see Tucker, 36
F.4th 1021, reh’g en banc denied, 53 F.4th 620 (10th Cir. 2022); McRaney, 966 F.3d 346, reh’g en banc
denied, 980 F.3d 1066 (5th Cir. 2020); and another with internal tension in its own decisions,
compare Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1086, 1090 (7th Cir. 2014), with
McCarthy, 714 F.3d at 975.
22
DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judge, statement in support of denial of rehearing en banc: 1
In this case, defendants-appellants are individuals and entities affiliated
with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia ("ROCOR" and, collectively,
"Defendants"). They appealed from three interlocutory orders of the district
court: orders denying motions to dismiss, for reconsideration, and to bifurcate
discovery or otherwise stay proceedings. Defendants argued that we had
appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory orders based on the collateral order
doctrine, which allows for appellate review of an interlocutory order in certain
limited circumstances. We disagreed, and held that the collateral order doctrine
does not apply in the circumstances here. Accordingly, we dismissed the appeal.
See Belya v. Kapral, 45 F.4th 621, 625 (2d Cir. 2022). A petition for rehearing en banc
followed, and the Court now denies the petition.
For the reasons set forth in the panel decision and in Judge Lohier's
concurrence in the denial of the petition (the "Concurrence"), I believe the Court
has correctly denied the petition. I write to address certain arguments raised in
Judge Park's dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc (the "Dissent").
1 As a senior judge, I have no vote on whether to rehear a case en banc. See 28 U.S.C.
46(c); Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). As a member of the panel that decided the case that is the subject of
the en banc order, however, I may file a statement expressing my views in the circumstances here,
where an active judge has filed an opinion addressing that order.
1
First, the Dissent writes that "[t]his case arises from a minister's suspension
by his church," and that the lawsuit "is styled as a defamation claim." Dissent at
1. The suggestion is that this case is not really a defamation case, but instead
seeks to intrude on a church's autonomy by subjecting Defendants "to litigation
over religious matters." Id. at 10. In fact, this is a defamation case and not a case
over religious matters. If Belya's allegations are true -- and we must assume they
are for now -- this is, as the first amended complaint (the "Complaint") declares, "a
case of egregious defamation." J. App'x at 87. If the allegations are true,
Defendants made public accusations that Belya forged and fabricated certain
documents, including accusations that Belya forged the signature of the "ruling
bishop" of ROCOR onto two letters, that he fabricated or otherwise improperly
obtained official letterhead, and that he falsely affixed to the letters what appeared
to be the ruling bishop's official seal. See id. at 95-97. The allegation that Belya
committed forgery was posted on the church's social media site by one or more of
the Defendants and was re-posted and circulated by religious news outlets and
publications. Id. at 98.
2
Simple, non-ecclesiastical factual questions are presented: Did Belya forge
the letters in question? Or did the ruling bishop actually sign the letters? Were
the letters on the ruling bishop's official letterhead? Were the letters stamped
with the purported signatory's official seal? Or were the purported letterhead
and stamps a fabrication? These are factual questions that a fact-finder could
answer without delving into matters of faith and doctrine.
Significantly, the Complaint seeks only damages (and attorney's fees and
costs) and not injunctive or declaratory relief. The Complaint does not seek an
order declaring that Belya was in fact elected to the position of Bishop of Miami or
an injunction requiring Defendants to install him into that or any other position;
nor does it seek to vacate Belya's suspension from the church. See Belya v.
Hilarion, No. 20-CV-6597, 2021 WL 1997547, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2021) (district
court noting that "Belya does not ask this Court to determine whether his election
was proper or whether he should be reinstated to his role as Bishop of Miami").
Rather, the Complaint asserts only three defamation claims and a fourth claim for
vicarious liability related to the defamation claims, and it seeks only damages.
This is, indeed, a defamation case.
3
Second, the Dissent refers to "the district court's denials of Defendants'
church autonomy defenses." Dissent at 9-10. The district court has not,
however, denied Defendants' religious autonomy defenses and it has not rejected
the application of the church autonomy doctrine. To the contrary, the district
court specifically recognized that issues could arise that it "would not consider"
under the doctrine. Belya, 2021 WL 1997547, at *4. Indeed, the district court
explicitly stated that under the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention it would not
consider a request to install Belya as the Bishop of Miami. Id.In other words, the Dissent's assertion that "the panel decision categorically
denies immediate appealability of any church autonomy defense, no matter what
the facts might be," Dissent at 17 n. 3, is simply not correct. Where a district court
in fact rejects the church autonomy defense and injects itself into matters of church
governance, such an order might indeed be immediately appealable. But that is
not the situation before us. Rather, as we recognized, the district court here did
not rule on the merits of the church autonomy defense or preclude its future
invocation. See Belya, 45 F.4th at 631; see also Concurrence at 2-3. Instead, as
further explained in the district court's order entered July 27, 2021, denying
Defendants' request to bifurcate discovery or otherwise stay proceedings, the
4
district court ruled that it would "not pass judgment on the internal policies and
or determinations of [ROCOR]," and recognized that it would not "be able to under
the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention." J. App'x at 147. As the district court's
orders make clear, Defendants may indeed invoke the defense at a later point in
the litigation if it becomes apparent that further inquiry and litigation will
implicate church autonomy. At that point, the scope of Belya's claims and
discovery might have to be limited and dismissal of the lawsuit might even be
warranted. The rulings do not bar or decide the merits of the church autonomy
defense, and they are not a final rejection of the defense because Defendants may
assert it during discovery or later in the course of the lawsuit. Cf. Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss
an indictment on double jeopardy grounds could be appealed under the collateral
order doctrine because such an order constitutes "a complete, formal, and, in the
trial court, final rejection of a criminal defendant's double jeopardy claim"). 2
2 For example, if, as the litigation proceeds, Belya is unable to prove the falsity of the
accusations, the Complaint will be dismissed without any inquiry into church doctrine or
governance. If he does prove the falsity of the accusations, the district court at that point will
determine whether Belya's claims can be further litigated without intrusion into the church's
autonomy.
5
In similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit also declined to find appellate
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. When the diocese in that case
sought appellate review of the district court's order denying summary judgment
for the diocese on a sex-discrimination claim, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc.,
772 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that it did
not have appellate jurisdiction because the district court "ha[d] not ordered a
religious question submitted to the jury for decision," and in fact the district court
"promised to instruct the jury not to weigh or evaluate the Church's doctrine." Id.
at 1091; cf. McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 975-76 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that an
order was collaterally appealable because it sent the religious question of whether
party was a nun to the jury). Here, the district court has made clear that it will
not pass judgment on religious questions or submit them to the jury should the
case get that far. See Belya, 2021 WL 1997547, at *4.
Third, it is apparent that the Dissent's view is that churches are generally
immune from the litigation process. But the church autonomy doctrine does not
go that far. While the church autonomy doctrine provides religious associations
with "independence in matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters
6
of internal government," Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct.
2049, 2061 (2020), it does not provide them with "a general immunity from secular
laws," id. at 2060. To the contrary, "[t]he church autonomy doctrine is not without
limits . . . and does not apply to purely secular decisions, even when made by
churches." Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th
Cir. 2002). Rather, the church autonomy doctrine relates to matters of "religious
doctrine," McCarthy, 714 F.3d at 975, or "religious belief," Bryce, 289 F.3d at 657("Before the church autonomy doctrine is implicated, a threshold inquiry is
whether the alleged misconduct is 'rooted in religious belief.'" (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))).
The church autonomy doctrine is a defense and it does not provide a general
immunity that serves as a jurisdictional bar to suit. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 195 n.4 (2012) ("[T]he [ministerial]
exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not
a jurisdictional bar."); cf. Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int'l, 36 F.4th 1021, 1036-47
(10th Cir. 2022) (dismissing an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
rejecting the argument that the ministerial exception "immunizes a religious
employer from suit on employment discrimination claims"). The church
7
autonomy doctrine surely does not give church officials free rein to falsely accuse
someone of forgery and fraud. The district court's rulings allow discovery to
proceed into secular components of Belya's claims of defamation, and they allow
the litigation to proceed with respect to non-ecclesiastical factual questions that
would not require a fact-finder to consider matters of faith or internal church
government. See generally Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009)
(noting that "we have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders," and
holding that the collateral order doctrine did not permit appeal of disclosure
orders adverse to attorney-client privilege) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And, although the "interlocutory posture" of this appeal "complicate[s] our review,
nothing "would preclude [ROCOR] from . . . seeking review in this Court when
the decision is actually final." Gordon Coll. v. DeWeese-Boyd, 142 S. Ct. 952, 955
(2022) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (denying certiorari and
permitting a case to go forward to discovery and trial, notwithstanding
defendant's invocation of the church autonomy doctrine).
Fourth, the Dissent likens the church autonomy doctrine to the qualified
immunity defense applicable to § 1983 claims. We agree, as the Dissent observes,
that "both are rooted in foundational constitutional interests," and that "both are
8
protections against the burdens of litigation itself." Dissent at 15. But qualified
immunity is not a general immunity, and it does not insulate government officials
from discovery and trial in every instance. Qualified immunity is an
immediately appealable collateral order only "to the extent that it turns on an issue
of law." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Where there is a factual
dispute, "an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified
immunity," Franco v. Gunsalus, 972 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2020), and, as happens
every day of the week, government officials in many § 1983 cases are subject to
discovery and even trial.
This case does not yet present any factual questions that implicate church
doctrine, and thus this interlocutory appeal is not properly before this Court. See
McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346, 347,
349 (5th Cir. 2020) (reversing district court's order dismissing case under the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because the district court's finding that "it would
need to resolve ecclesiastical questions in order to resolve [plaintiff's]
claims . . . was premature," as "it is not clear that any of [the anticipated factual]
determinations will require the court to address purely ecclesiastical questions"),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2852 (2021). Defendants have not stipulated, even for
9
purposes of appellate review, to the facts alleged by Belya; they have not admitted,
for example, that Belya was falsely accused of forgery. Hence, we do not have
appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, the Dissent argues that the panel's decision results in a "novel
extension of the 'neutral principles' approach [that] is inconsistent with precedent
and threatens to eviscerate the church autonomy doctrine." Dissent at 17.
Under the "neutral principles" approach, so long as a court relies "exclusively on
objective, well-established [legal] concepts," it may resolve a dispute even when
parties are religious bodies. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979). The panel
decision does not extend the law or deviate from precedent. Although the
neutral principles of law approach was established in a church property case, see
id., we (and other courts) have applied it in other types of disputes. Indeed, in a
copyright case involving dissemination of "a prayerbook widely used within the
Lubavitch movement of Hasidic Judaism," we rejected the argument that the
courts lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because of the church autonomy
doctrine and held that:
Courts may decide disputes that implicate religious interests as long
as they can do so based on 'neutral principles' of secular law without
undue entanglement in issues of religious doctrine.
10
Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir.
2002) (citing Jones, 443 U.S. at 604); see also, e.g., Moon v. Moon, 833 F. App'x 876,
880 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (applying the neutral principles of law
approach to plaintiff's defamation claim against a religious organization), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2757 (2021); McRaney, 966 F.3d at 349 (holding that plaintiff's
defamation claim against a church organization allows the court to "apply neutral
principles of tort law" and is thus not barred by the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine).
Using neutral principles of law to resolve secular components of a dispute
involving religious parties does not infringe on religious parties' independence.
Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in Jones that it could not agree "that the First
Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to
religious authority . . . even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved."
443 U.S. at 605.
***
The collateral order doctrine allows for appellate review of interlocutory
orders if the ruling (1) is conclusive; (2) resolves important questions separate from
the merits; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment
11
in the underlying action. See Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42
(1995); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Supreme
Court has admonished that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain
"narrow and selective." Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006). Here, as we
explained in the panel opinion, the district court's rulings are not conclusive, do
not involve claims of right separate from the merits of the case, and would not be
unreviewable on appeal after final judgment.
Therefore, the panel correctly held that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
the appeal.
12