Quincy Patrick v. Kingston Police Department ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-1348
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QUINCY MICHAEL PATRICK,
Appellant
v.
KINGSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; STATE PAROLE SCRANTON;
DET. RICHARD KOTCHIN; SCOTT L. RAVERT; and JOHN B.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 3:22-cv-01167)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 16, 2023
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed August 11, 2023)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Quincy Michael Patrick’s parole officer discovered drugs inside Patrick’s home
during a visit in 2016. Patrick would later plead guilty in Pennsylvania state court to a
drug offense and be sentenced to nineteen to forty months in prison. His direct appeal and
post-conviction applications all were unsuccessful.
More than six years after he was arrested, Patrick filed the underlying pro se civil
rights action against, among other defendants, his parole officer and the Kingston Police
Department. Patrick claimed that discovery of the drugs during the home visit was
predicated on violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Magistrate Judge screened Patrick’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
and issued a Report recommending sua sponte dismissal. The Magistrate Judge
concluded that Patrick’s claims were facially untimely under Pennsylvania’s two-year
statute of limitations (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7)). The Magistrate Judge then offered
several rulings in the alternative: Patrick’s claims against the Kingston Police Department
were not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because municipal police departments are
not “person[s]” under the statute; any claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution
were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and the complaint should be
dismissed based on the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Over Patrick’s objections, the District Court entered an order on September 8,
2022, which set forth detailed reasoning and analysis, and which adopted the Magistrate
2
Judge’s Report “in its entirety.” The District Court dismissed Patrick’s complaint without
leave to amend, concluding that “the fact that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations renders futile any amendment of his complaint.”
This timely appeal followed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(c)(2)(B); see also LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 224
(3d Cir. 2007).1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo an
order dismissing an action under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. See Allah
v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review the District Court’s denial of
leave to amend for abuse of discretion, although we review de novo the determination
that amendment would be futile. See U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P.,
769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).
Like the District Court, we conclude that Patrick failed to state viable claims and,
further, that allowing him to amend his complaint would have been a futile act. But our
rationales are not identical. Cf. Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of City of Scranton, 975 F.3d
406, 412 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[W]e may affirm based ‘on any ground supported by the
record.’”) (citation omitted).
Insofar as Patrick raised illegal search or false imprisonment claims under the
Fourth Amendment, based on events predating his complaint by more than two years, we
1
While Patrick was not incarcerated at the time he filed the underlying action or this
appeal, he has informed the Court that he has since been reincarcerated.
3
agree with the District Court that such claims are untimely. See Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 390 (2007); Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018); cf.
Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 888 (4th Cir. 2022) (rejecting argument that illegal
search claims were subject to deferred accrual under Heck). But insofar as Patrick raised
wrongful conviction or malicious prosecution claims, those would not begin to accrue
until the criminal case terminated in his favor. See Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346, 354
(3d Cir. 2022). And Patrick’s complaint makes plain that his drug conviction is intact.2
Thus, the District Court should not have ruled that all of Patrick’s claims were untimely.
That said, dismissal of the wrongful conviction and malicious prosecution claims was
nevertheless proper based on the District Court’s alternative ruling that the claims are
Heck-barred. See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).3
A final point: The District Court did not explicitly say whether its order of
dismissal was with or without prejudice, which means it was the former. See Shane v.
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311,
1314 (10th Cir. 2010). Because the wrongful conviction and malicious prosecution
2
While Patrick devotes a substantial portion of his opening brief to challenging the
constitutionality of his conviction (notwithstanding his guilty plea), an appeal of an
adverse decision in a § 1983 case is the wrong place to do that.
3
For those same reasons, we do not agree with the District Court’s determination that
amendment of Patrick’s complaint would have been futile on the ground that all of his
claims are time-barred. Instead, amendment would have been futile because some claims
are untimely, and because the remainder are Heck-barred.
4
claims are only properly dismissed as Heck-barred, the District Court’s September 8,
2022 order must be modified to reflect that dismissal of those claims is without prejudice.
See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016).4
Accordingly, we will modify the District Court’s September 8, 2022 order in the
manner described above, and will affirm it as modified. Patrick’s motion to expedite the
appeal is denied as moot.
4
Abstention under Younger requires that there be “an ongoing judicial proceeding.” PDX
N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 879 n.3 (3d Cir.
2020). It is not apparent from the record on appeal that there was something pending in
Patrick’s criminal case between (1) the time he filed this § 1983 action and (2) the
issuance of the Magistrate Judge’s Report (which, as noted above, relied on Younger
abstention as an alternative basis for dismissal). See id. at 885; cf. Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC
v. Gwinnett County, Ga., 940 F.3d 1254, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019).
5