Jones v. Sternheimer , 387 F. App'x 366 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-2242
SPENCER E. JONES, III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROSS STERNHEIMER, CEO, Everything Casual, incorporated f/n/a
Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; PAT MONEY,
Assistant CEO, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer
Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; ADDRIANE LATHAN, Head of Human
Resources, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro.,
Inc., t/a A & N Stores; JAMES BAILEY, Warehouse Manager,
Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A
& N Stores; ANGELA CRAWLEY, Dock Supervisor, Everything
Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N
Stores,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:09-cv-00648-REP)
Submitted: June 14, 2010 Decided: July 6, 2010
Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Spencer E. Jones, III, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Spencer Jones, III, appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and instructing
the clerk not to file Jones’s complaint. In his complaint,
Jones raises general allegations of discriminatory retaliation
and termination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (“Title VII”);
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (2006); and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) (“ADA”).
Additionally, Jones alleged that his termination violated the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2619 (2006)
and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). Jones also
filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
The basis for the district court’s denial of Jones’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis and instruction to the clerk
not to file Jones’s complaint was its finding that Jones’s
complaint was frivolous, as Jones sought relief against
individual employees under statutes that the district court
concluded afforded redress only against employers.
Additionally, the district court noted that it had previously
dismissed a prior complaint against the same individual
defendants on such a basis, see Jones v. Sternheimer Bros.,
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Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00187-REP (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2009), and found
that the allegations raised in this complaint were virtually
identical to those made in the prior complaint. Jones filed a
timely appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Initially, we note that the district court did not
explicitly dismiss Jones’s action. Instead, it issued a sua
sponte order instructing the clerk not to file Jones’s complaint
on the grounds that it was frivolous and without merit.
Nevertheless, such action was akin to a frivolity dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006), and we analyze it
accordingly.
A federal court possesses authority to dismiss an in
forma pauperis case at any time the court determines the action
or appeal is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) (2006). “The overriding goal in policing in forma
pauperis complaints is to ensure that the deferred payment
mechanism of § 1915(b) does not subsidize suits that prepaid
administrative costs would otherwise have deterred.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 257 (4th Cir. 2004). Dismissal of an
action or appeal is appropriate when it lacks an arguable basis
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in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
We review such dismissals for abuse of discretion. Nagy, 376
F.3d at 254.
In his informal brief, Jones contends that the claims
in the instant case, though against some of the same parties,
are not identical to the issues raised in No. 09-2375.
Additionally, in his notice of appeal, Jones argued that, though
captioned against six defendants in their individual capacities,
his action lay instead against Everything Casual, Inc., a
corporation formerly known as Sternheimer Bros, Inc., which
operated the now-defunct A & N stores in Virginia.
However, regardless of Jones’s purported intent, the
complaint in its current form raises allegations against several
former employees of Everything Casual, Inc., in their individual
capacities. The district court found that Jones’s complaint
sought “relief from individual employees for alleged violations
of federal statutes . . . [that] afford[] relief only against
employers.” This statement is not entirely accurate. To the
extent that the finding applied to Jones’s claims under Title
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, the district court was correct, as
these statutes do not provide for causes of action against
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defendants in their individual capacities. * See McNeal v.
Montgomery County, Md., 307 F. App’x 766, 775 n.6 (4th Cir.
2009) (argued but unpublished) (“[O]nly an employer, not an
individual employee, may be held liable under the ADEA.”); Baird
ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999)
(finding that neither Title VII nor the ADA provides for actions
against individual defendants for violation of its provisions).
Conversely, whether the FMLA imposes liability on
employee supervisors in their individual capacities is an open
question in this circuit, as we have expressly declined to
decide this issue when it has arisen before us. See Lizzi v.
Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 136 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e do not
address the question of whether, in an action against a private
employer, an individual supervisor is subject to personal
liability for violating the FMLA.”); Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc.,
192 F.3d 437, 441 n.5 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The district court did
not squarely address whether McGillicuddy was subject to
individual liability under the FMLA. We note that this court
has not addressed this issue and need not address it today.”).
Further, at least two other circuits have found such liability
*
Regardless of whether the Equal Pay Act imposes liability
upon employee supervisors, Jones entirely fails to allege any
form of gender discrimination, so this claim is without merit.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
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exists. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 827 (6th Cir.
2003) (“As under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate
officers “acting in the interest of an employer” are
individually liable for any violations of the requirements of
the FMLA.”); Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002)
(noting that private sector employees are subject to liability
under the FMLA for actions taken “in the interest of an employer
to any employees of such employer.”).
Accordingly, because this issue is an open question in
this circuit, we find that the district court abused its
discretion in summarily dismissing Jones’s action as frivolous.
However, in so holding, we express no opinion as to the
viability of Jones’s claim. Indeed, the fact that the district
court’s frivolity dismissal was in error is not to say that
there is any basis to Jones’s claim, or that dismissal for
failure to state a claim would have been inappropriate. See
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (“When a complaint
raises an arguable question of law which the district court
ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff,
dismissal on [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)
grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of
frivolousness is not.”). Should the Defendants file a dismissal
motion following remand, the district court may well reach the
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conclusion that the FMLA does not provide for a cause of action
against corporate officers in their individual capacities, and
may thus dismiss on that basis, without contravening our present
holding. However, in such an instance, the dismissal would be
for failure to state a claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
not upon a sua sponte finding that Jones’s claim was wholly
frivolous. Here, the fact that supervisory liability under the
FMLA is an open question in this circuit necessarily renders the
district court’s frivolity dismissal in error.
Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, affirm the district court’s judgment as to Jones’s
claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Equal Pay
Act, vacate the district court’s judgment as to Jones’s FMLA
claim, and remand in order to allow Jones to file his complaint
under the FMLA. Additionally, as noted above, Jones has
indicated some confusion in his notice of appeal and informal
brief as to whether he intended to proceed against corporate
entities or individual defendants in this action. Therefore, we
advise Jones that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), he may
request leave of court to amend his complaint to substitute or
include whatever intended Defendants he may wish to add to his
complaint. However, we express no opinion on the likely outcome
or merits of any such request. We dispense with oral argument
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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