City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth , 420 F.3d 440 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED AUGUST 24, 2005
August 8, 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 04-20527
CITY OF SHOREACRES; ET AL,
Plaintiffs,
CITY OF SHOREACRES; CITY OF
TAYLOR LAKE VILLAGE TEXAS;
GALVESTON BAY CONSERVATION AND
PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION; TEXAS
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES;
GALVESTON BAY FOUNDATION; HOUSTON
YACHT CLUB; PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED
IN SEAFOOD CONCERNED ENTERPRISES;
GULF RESTORATION NETWORK; CITY OF
SEABROOK; CITY OF EL LAGO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
LEONARD D WATERWORTH, Colonel,
District Engineer, Galveston
District – US Army Corps of
Engineers; ROBERT B FLOWERS,
Lieutenant General, Commander
and Chief of Engineers, US Army
Corps of Engineers; LES BROWNLEE,
Acting Secretary of the Army;
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
Defendants-Appellees,
PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY,
Intervenor Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before GARWOOD, SMITH and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellants brought this suit under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., and
the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., against the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) seeking recision of
a 33 U.S.C. § 1344 dredge and fill permit issued by the Corps to
the Port of Houston (Port) for the construction of a ten-berth
cargo and cruise ship terminal adjacent to the Bayport Shipping
Channel off Galveston Bay. The district court granted summary
judgment to the Corps and the intervenor Port. We affirm.
Facts and Proceedings Below
On October 8, 1998, the Port filed an application with the
Corps for a 33 U.S.C. § 1344 permit to dredge and fill navigable
waters of the United States. The Port proposed building a cargo
and cruise ship terminal on undeveloped land adjacent to the
Bayport Shipping Channel along the northwestern coast of
Galveston Bay. The plan called for seven cargo ship berths,
three cruise ship berths, and extensive ancillary facilities
2
along a region of the coast that is heavily industrialized. The
Port intends to finance the Bayport project with proceeds from a
$387 million 1999 bond issue for that purpose approved by the
voters of Harris County, Texas in which both the Port and Bayport
are located.
The Corps undertook the comprehensive technical and public
interest review required by the Code of Federal Regulations.
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 230 (procedures for implementing NEPA); 33
C.F.R. § 320 (outlining the Corps’ general regulatory policy); 40
C.F.R. § 1502 (preparation of an environmental impact statement).
Following public input and preliminary technical work, the Corps
issued its Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) on
November 12, 2001. The Corps continued its technical work and
accepted public comment on the DEIS until August 2002. Nine
months later, on May 16, 2003, the Corps issued its Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and entertained further
public comment until August 2003. The Corps then issued its
eight-volume Record of Decision (ROD) on December 19, 2003, in
which the Corps approved a plan for the construction of the
Bayport terminal and the mandatory preservation of undeveloped
areas elsewhere to compensate for the environmental loss at
Bayport. The Corps granted the 33 U.S.C. § 1344 dredge and fill
permit on January 5, 2004, over five years after the permit
application was filed.
3
Meanwhile, as the Corps was considering the Bayport permit
application, it was also considering a similar dredge and fill
permit application filed in April 2000 by Texas City, Texas to
build a six-berth cargo terminal at Shoal Point in Galveston
County along the southwestern coast of Galveston Bay. The Corps
issued a permit to Texas City on April 23, 2003, approximately
one month before it handed down its FEIS on the Port’s Bayport
permit application.
On January 29, 2004, appellants filed their second (and
final) amended complaint asking the district court to vacate the
permit and enjoin the Port from proceeding with the Bayport
project because the Corps had issued the permit in violation of
the CWA and NEPA.1 Appellants also sought a preliminary
injunction against construction while judicial review was
pending. Rather than rule on this motion, the district court
agreed to an expedited pretrial schedule and a summary judgment
ruling by May 4, 2004. The Port then agreed to “stand still”
while the case went forward through summary judgment. The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in April 2004,
and the district court granted summary judgment to appellees and
against appellants on May 4, 2004. Final judgment was entered
1
As with the original and first amended complaints
(respectively filed June 24 and August 15, 2003), the second
amended complaint did not name the Port as a defendant. The Port
is an intervenor, having been permitted on October 16, 2003, to
intervene as a matter of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
4
the same day.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo under the same
standard applied by the district court. Terrebonne Parish Sch.
Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir. 2002).
The decision of the Corps to grant a permit under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 is reviewed under the standard set forth in the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. We will
“hold unlawful and set aside” the Corps’ permit to the Port only
if we determine that the Corps’ “action, findings, and
conclusions” are, inter alia, “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A); Shell Offshore v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir.
2001). “We accord substantial weight” to the Corps’
interpretation of its permit granting authority under 33 U.S.C. §
1344 because “‘[a]n agency’s construction of a statute it is
charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of
Congress.’” Save Our Community v. USEPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1163
(5th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes
Council, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455, 461 (1985)); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir 1983) (“This
standard of review is highly deferential”); Sabine River
5
Authority v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir.
1992) (“[u]nder this highly deferential standard of review, a
reviewing court has the ‘least latitude in finding grounds for
reversal’”) (quoting North Buckhead Civic Assoc. v. Skinner, 903
F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990)). “We must look at the decision
not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that we are
qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but as a
reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding
agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality.”
Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 905 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
This deferential standard of review applies regardless of
whether we are reviewing the Corps’ decision under the CWA or
NEPA.
2. The Clean Water Act
a. Determination of Wetlands Jurisdiction
The centerpiece of appellants’ challenge to the dredge and
fill permit is that the Corps erroneously determined the extent
of its regulatory jurisdiction over the wetlands at the Bayport
site.2 Appellants maintain the entire approximately 146 acres of
2
The Clean Water Act requires a permit “for the discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters” of the
United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). “Waters of the United
States” are those waters affecting interstate or international
commerce, including “interstate wetlands.” 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(2). The Corps does not have the authority to regulate
isolated, intrastate waters. Solid Waste Agency v. US Army Corps
6
wetlands at the Bayport site constitutes jurisdictional wetlands,
substantially more than what the Corps concluded were present
(the Corps found only 19.7 acres of jurisdictional wetlands, as
well as 126.7 acres of non-jurisdictional wetlands and 1.56 acres
of intertidal mud flats). Appellants contend that the Corps, by
undercounting the acreage within its wetlands jurisdiction,
corrupted the entire decisional process under the CWA.3
of Eng’rs, 121 S. Ct. 675, 683-84 (2001) (holding that the mere
presence of migratory birds does not bring an otherwise isolated
body of water under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Corps).
3
Appellants argue that the Corps’ determination of its
wetlands jurisdiction is a legal question subject to de novo
review. In particular, they argue that it was an error of law
for the Corps to refuse to consider whether overland sheet flow
should be used at all in determining whether certain waters are
“waters of the United States.” We disagree with this
characterization of the Corps’ decision. The Corps did not
categorically refuse to use overland sheet flow in its analysis.
Rather, it determined that in this particular setting the
overland sheet flow shown was as a factual, scientific matter
inadequate to establish a sufficient hydrological nexus with
interstate waters. In other words, unlike in In re Needham, 354
F.3d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2003), in which the appellant challenged
the district court’s construction of the Oil Pollution Act, 33
U.S.C. 2201 et seq., the jurisdictional issue here may be more
properly considered as a question of fact concerning “the extent,
not the existence, of agency jurisdiction.” Avoyelles, 715 F.2d
897, 906 (5th Cir. 1983). The Corps generally has broad
discretion to decide whether a sufficient hydrological nexus
exists to bring wetlands under regulatory control:
The wetlands determination is precisely the
type of agency decision that is normally
subject to limited judicial review. The EPA
developed an extensive administrative record
in making its decision; it collected reports
from its own expert consultants, as well as
from the parties. The determination itself,
which requires an analysis of the types of
vegetation, soil and water conditions that
7
According to the ROD, the Corps, using its Wetlands
Delineation Manual, initially determined on April 28, 1999, that
there were 102 acres of wetlands at the Bayport site subject to
its regulatory jurisdiction.4 The Corps concluded, however, that
it needed to reevaluate its jurisdictional determination after
the Supreme Court handed down Solid Waste Agency v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 121 S. Ct. 675, 683-84 (2001) (holding that
the “migratory bird rule,” upon which much of the Corps’ initial
determination in this case had been predicated, overreached the
Corps’ authority under the Clean Water Act). After re-surveying
Bayport, the Corps concluded that of the total some 146 acres of
wetlands at the site only 19.7 acres came within its
jurisdiction. The Corps then evaluated the Port’s permit
application in light of this determination.
We do not find it necessary to consider the several ways in
which appellants challenge the Corps’ jurisdictional
would indicate the existence of wetlands, is
the kind of scientific decision normally
accorded significant deference by the courts.
De novo review would permit the courts to
intrude into an area in which they have no
particular competence.
Id. (citations omitted); see also 40 C.F.R § 230.41(a)(2)
(stating that determining the extent of wetlands is a task for
specialists).
4
This determination followed a year and a half of study and
was the result of the Port’s request for an initial survey, filed
well before the Port actually submitted its dredge and fill
permit application, on the extent of the Corps’ wetlands
jurisdiction.
8
determination. In the ROD, the Corps responded point-by-point to
substantive public questions about its environmental impact
statements. One question concerned the possibility that using a
particular survey technology called LIDAR would enlarge wetlands
jurisdiction to 40 acres. The Corps replied that LIDAR is not an
approved technique in the Wetlands Delineation Manual, but in any
case:
Even assuming that all wetlands and other
aquatic areas on the Bayport site were
jurisdictional, which is not the case, the
mitigation provided by the [Port], involving
over 1,130 acres of wetlands and other
habitat, adequately compensates for
environmental impacts as evidenced by the
acceptance of this plan by the [other state
and federal] resource agencies. As a result,
even if the [Corps] were to conclude that all
of the aquatic areas on the site, including
all of the wetlands on the site, were subject
to [Clean Water Act] jurisdiction, the [Port]
has provided ample mitigation to compensate
for the loss of all aquatic areas on the site
that will be filled in or otherwise degraded
by the project. Consequently, the [33 U.S.C.
§ 1344] permit that the [Corps] proposes to
issue would still be fully justified in this
case by the generous mitigation package
offered by the [Port]. Therefore, issuance
of the proposed permit would still be
appropriate under all applicable laws and
regulations even if all aquatic areas on the
project site were subject to [Clean Water
Act] jurisdiction.
(emphasis added). Given that the Corps clearly would have made the
same decision even if it used the wetlands determination that
appellants advocate, we need not consider whether the Corps abused
its discretion in concluding that it could exercise regulatory
9
jurisdiction over only 19.7 acres of wetlands. Manning v. Upjohn
Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Principles of judicial
restraint dictate that if resolution of an issue effectively
disposes of a case, we should resolve the case on that basis
without reaching any other issues that might be presented.”).5
b. Practicable Alternatives
The Corps may not issue a 33 U.S.C. § 1344 dredge and fill
permit “if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed
discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other
significant adverse environmental consequences.” 40 C.F.R. §
230.10(a). Appellants contend that Shoal Point and Pelican Island,
both of which are in southwestern Galveston Bay, are practicable
alternatives to the Bayport site but, in an abuse of discretion,
5
Appellants also argue that the allegedly flawed
jurisdictional determination resulted in inadequate compensatory
mitigation. They contend in particular that the permit the Corps
approved violated the longstanding Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
between it and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)concerning how to define proper compensatory mitigation. We
reject this contention. Not only does the Corps disagree with
this contention, which it has the discretion to do, the EPA
itself was involved in the decisionmaking process and ultimately
approved the Corps’ mitigation plan. Furthermore, the other
three resource management agencies that took part in the decision
– the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality, and the Texas Parks and
Wildlife Department – also approved of the Corp’s permit plan.
Moreover, in light of the unanimous approval of the Corps’ action
by every environmental regulator involved in this case, it simply
cannot be said that the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in issuing the dredge and fill permit to the Port.
10
were not considered by the Corps. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(ii)
(defining a practicable alternative as, inter alia, “[d]ischarge of
dredged or fill material at other locations in waters of the United
States...”). They assert that, as a result of this oversight, the
dredge and fill permit issued to the Port is unlawful under the
CWA.
While Shoal Point and Pelican Island are arguably plausible
alternatives given that they are reasonably proximate to Bayport
and may be environmentally acceptable, they must nevertheless be
“practicable” under a detailed test. An alternative is practicable
only if
“it is available and capable of being done
after taking into consideration cost, existing
technology, and logistics in light of overall
project purposes. If it is otherwise a
practicable alternative, an area not presently
owned by the applicant which could reasonably
be obtained, utilized, expanded, or managed in
order to fulfill the basic purpose of the
proposed activity may be considered.”
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2).
The Corps contends that neither Shoal Point nor Pelican Island
is a “practicable alternative” under this definition for several
reasons. First, Shoal Point was not “available.” On April 23,
2003, the Corps issued a permit to Texas City to build a six-berth
cargo and cruise ship terminal at Shoal Point and thus Shoal Point
was not available to the Port. Shoal Point was also unavailable
for the additional reason that the Port undisputedly has no
11
authority to condemn land outside of Harris County, TEX. WATER CODE
§ 62.1071(c), and the absence of eminent domain power would present
a serious impediment to assembling the many contiguous parcels at
Shoal Point that the project would require.6
Furthermore, neither Shoal Point nor Pelican Island is a
logistically feasible alternative, and thus is not “practicable,”
because the Port intends to fund its project with the proceeds of
a 1999 Harris County bond issue. The proceeds of this bond issue,
however, could not legally be spent outside of Harris County, which
excludes both Shoal Point and Pelican Island because they are in
Galveston County.
In addition, building the new terminal at Shoal Point or
Pelican Island would not comport with the Port’s “overall project
purpose,” which was to further expand Harris County as one of the
nation’s major ports. Situating the port at either Shoal Point or
Pelican Island would frustrate the overall project purpose in the
further sense that it would needlessly complicate, rather than
simplify, the logistics of maritime commerce through Harris County
because the shipping industry would have to move passengers and
goods through locations that are comparatively remote from
metropolitan Houston.
Appellants only dispute two of these reasons. They contend
that the absence of condemnation power and the 1999 bond issue do
6
This was not a problem with respect to Pelican Island
because the Port purchased Pelican Island in 2000.
12
not ipso facto preclude acquiring land outside of Harris County
because the Port could have financed the project at Shoal Point or
Pelican Island with operating revenues. However, there is no
evidence that the Port has any surplus operating revenues, much
less that any such would be sufficient for that purpose, and the
passage of the bond issue suggests otherwise. Even if we were to
consider the Corps’ other reasons arbitrary and capricious, which
we hold they are not, appellants would still not prevail under this
objection because an unowned alternative site is a “practicable
alternative” under 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2) only if the site “could
reasonably be obtained.” A mere, unsupported theoretical
possibility of acquiring the alternative site, which is all that
appellants offer, does not constitute a showing that the
alternative site is reasonably obtainable, much less that the
Corps’ decision was arbitrary and capricious. Appellants have not,
therefore, shown that the Corps’ decision not to consider Shoal
Point and Pelican Island was an abuse of discretion.
c. Deepening the Houston Ship Channel
Appellants contend that the scope of shipping to and from the
Bayport terminal will eventually lead to deepening the Houston Ship
Channel from forty-five to fifty feet to accommodate the larger
vessels that are expected to traverse the oceans in the future.7
7
We note that the evidence plainly supports the Corps’
finding that the Bayport terminal does not require deepening of
the channel. The Corps determined that the current depth was
13
They argue that deepening the channel will have an adverse effect
on Galveston Bay’s freshwater ecosystems because it will alter the
Bay’s salinity. Because, they allege, the Bayport project will
lead to the deepening of the Houston Ship Channel and such
deepening will “cause or contribute to significant degradation of
the waters of the United States[,]” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c), the
Corps should not have issued the Port its dredge and fill permit.
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) does not, however, require the Corps to
consider the effects of the Bayport terminal itself once it begins
operations. Instead, section 230.10(c) requires the Corps to
consider whether “the discharge of dredged or fill material
[pursuant to a 33 U.S.C. § 1344 permit] will cause or contribute to
significant degradation of the waters of the United States”
(emphasis added), not the effect of any completed project. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c)(3) (instructing the regulatory agency
to consider “[s]ignificantly adverse effects of the discharge of
more than “sufficient for operation of the Panamax vessels that
are expected to be the most common vessels calling at the
proposed facilities;” that “[t]he largest of these [Panamax
class] ships . . . are able to operate in minimum water depths of
40 feet;” and that :[f]or the foreseeable future, containerized
cargo shipped through the Gulf of Mexico ports, including the
Port of Houston, will be carried almost exclusively by Panamax
class ships, which include the largest ships able to transit the
Panama Canal.” These findings are not arbitrary or capricious or
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Of course, nothing in the challenged permit authorizes or
purports to authorize any channel deepening. As all parties
recognize, any deepening of the Houston Ship Channel requires
Congressional authorization.
14
pollutants on aquatic ecosystem diversity”) (emphasis added); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(g) (defining a “cumulative impact” for the
purposes of the CWA as “changes in an aquatic ecosystem that are
attributable to the collective effect of a number of individual
discharges of dredged or fill material”). The deepening of the
Houston Ship Channel will not result from the discharge of dredged
or fill material from the Bayport project. Rather, the deepening
of the Houston Ship Channel, if it ever occurs, will be the result
of a separate project (requiring Congressional approval) undertaken
for that specific purpose. It was, therefore, not an abuse of
discretion for the Corps to construe the CWA and its regulations as
not requiring the Corps to consider any future deepening of the
Houston Ship Channel as an adverse environmental consequence of
issuing a dredge and fill permit to the Port.8
3. The National Environmental Policy Act
Unlike the Clean Water Act, which has substantive
environmental goals, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (“The objective of this
chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”), the National
Environmental Policy Act is strictly procedural. Robertson v.
8
Furthermore, even if we were to credit appellants’
construction of section 230.10, which is so capacious as to reach
even the most attenuated effects, the Corps plainly has the
discretion under the APA to adopt the narrower, and indeed far
more plausible, view that the regulation reaches only the
proximate environmental effects of the discharge itself.
15
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1846 (1989)
(stating that “it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process”). “Indeed, NEPA does not prohibit the undertaking of
federal projects patently destructive of the environment; it simply
mandates that the agency gather, study, and disseminate information
concerning the projects' environmental consequences.” Sabine, 951
F.2d at 676.
NEPA requires, among other things, the preparation of a
comprehensive environmental impact statement whenever “proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affect[] the quality of the human environment...” 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502. Appellants contend that the Corps’
final environmental impact statement was procedurally defective
under NEPA because (1) it did not properly elucidate the no-action
alternative required by 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14, and (2) it did not
treat the deepening of the Houston Ship Channel as a foreseeable
environmental consequence of the Bayport project under 40 C.F.R. §
1502.16. Appellants also argue that the Corps’ ultimate decision
to grant the dredge and fill permit to the Port was irrationally
inconsistent with one of the conclusions set forth in the FEIS.
a. The No-Action Alternative
An essential feature of an EIS is its analysis of alternatives
to the proposed action. This alternatives analysis, described by
16
the relevant regulation as “the heart of the environmental impact
statement[,]” must “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate
all reasonable alternatives” to the proposed action, including the
“no-action alternative” in which it is assumed that the project
does not go forward. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. The importance of the
alternatives analysis is reflected in our three-part test for
evaluating an EIS, which requires, inter alia, determining “whether
the agency in good faith objectively has taken a hard look at the
environmental consequences of a proposed action and
alternatives...” Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d
170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).9 NEPA requires only that the Corps consider alternatives
relevant to the applicant’s goals and the Corps is not to define
what those goals should be. Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v.
Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 198 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 616
(1991). In this case, the Corps identified seven alternative sites
and configurations for the Bayport project. These alternatives
were evaluated under twenty broad criteria and the Corps ultimately
9
We note that this three-part test is applied under the
highly deferential standard of review set forth in the APA.
Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174-75 (5th
Cir. 2000) (stating that the APA governs and that an agency
conclusion supported by evidence in the record warrants
deference).
The other two prongs of the test are (1) whether the
environmental impact statement is sufficiently detailed to allow
others to understand its reasoning; and (2) whether the
alternatives are sufficiently well developed to allow a “reasoned
choice.” Id.
17
issued a permit to build the ten-berth terminal at Bayport.
Appellants contend that the Corps’ no-action alternative,
which was part of the FEIS issued on May 16, 2003, was flawed
because it proceeded under the assumption that no new ship
terminals would be built in Galveston Bay. Appellants argue that
this assumption was irrational on its face because the Corps, just
three weeks earlier on April 23, had granted a permit to Texas City
to construct a six-berth terminal at Shoal Point on the
southwestern tip of Galveston Bay. Appellants assert that an
environmental impact statement this defective violates NEPA because
it does not supply a basis for informed decisionmaking.
The Corps responds that its Bayport FEIS was all but finished
when the ROD and permit for the Texas City project were issued. In
rejecting a request to prepare a supplemental EIS, the Corps
decided not to treat the proposed Shoal Point project as “an
existing condition” for the purposes of the Bayport FEIS because
the mere issuance of a 33 U.S.C. § 1344 permit to Texas City did
not make its six-berth project a fait accompli. The ROD noted that
other factors controlled when, or even if, the Shoal Point terminal
would ever be built. See Custer County Action Assn v. Garvey, 256
F.3d 1024, 1040 (10th Cir. 2001) (characterizing the no-action
alternative as the “status quo” or the “current level of
activity”). Rather than frame the not-yet-constructed Shoal Point
terminal as an “existing condition,” the Corps treated it as a
18
potential cumulative impact and evaluated the Port’s Bayport permit
application in light of this assumption.10 While appellants may not
agree with this methodology, it is neither arbitrary nor capricious
and thus is entitled to deference.
b. Deepening the Houston Ship Channel
Appellants contend, as discussed previously, supra § 2(c),
that the cargo ships of the future will be too large to use the
Houston Ship Channel at its current depth of forty-five feet and
will require future dredging to fifty feet. By being an otherwise
potential destination for such vessels, appellants assert that the
Bayport terminal, and by extension the 33 U.S.C. § 1344 permit to
dredge and fill for that terminal, will in effect “cause” the
channel to be deepened by five feet sometime in the future. Such
deepening, they maintain, will have drastic environmental
consequences because the deeper channel will raise the salinity of
transitional ecosystems in Galveston Bay that are primarily
freshwater. They charge that the Corps acted arbitrarily under
NEPA in refusing to consider the deepening of the Houston Ship
Channel as an indirect effect of granting the Port’s dredge and
fill permit because such deepening is a reasonably foreseeable, not
10
A cumulative impact “is the impact on the environment
which results from the incremental impact of the action when
added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or
person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can
result from individually minor but collectively significant
actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
19
speculative, cumulative effect of the permit.
First, before we examine whether deepening the Houston Ship
Channel is too speculative to warrant consideration as a cumulative
impact, there is meaningful doubt that deepening the channel can be
an effect NEPA requires the Corps to consider at all. NEPA
requires the Corps to take into account both the direct and
indirect adverse environmental consequences of issuing a 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 dredge and fill permit. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii); 40 C.F.R.
1502.16(a) & (b). Indirect effects are those “which are caused by
the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance,
but are still reasonably foreseeable.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b)
(emphasis added). “[A] ‘but for’ causal relationship is
insufficient to make an agency responsible for a particular effect
under NEPA and the relevant regulations.” DOT v. Pub. Citizen, 124
S. Ct. 2204, 2215 (2004). Rather, a plaintiff mounting a NEPA
challenge must establish that an alleged effect will ensue as a
“proximate cause,” in the sense meant by tort law, of the proposed
agency action. Id. (citing Prosser and Keeton for the proximate
cause standard).
However, it is doubtful that an environmental effect may be
considered as proximately caused by the action of a particular
federal regulator if that effect is directly caused by the action
of another government entity over which the regulator has no
control. In DOT v. Public Citizen, the Supreme Court held that the
20
Department of Transportation had no duty under NEPA to prepare an
environmental assessment of the effects of Mexican motor carriers
using American highways because the authority to allow or prohibit
Mexican motor carriers into the country rested solely with the
President. 124 S. Ct. at 2214-15. The Court held, in other words,
that pollution from Mexican motor carriers was not an “effect” that
the DOT had to consider because no “action” by the DOT would
“cause” Mexican motor carriers to enter the United States. It is
undisputed that the Houston Ship Channel can only be deepened by an
Act of Congress, not any decision by the Corps.11 If the rationale
of Public Citizen is applicable, the deepening of the Houston Ship
Channel, if it ever occurs, would not be treated as a 40 C.F.R. §
1508.8(b) “indirect effect” “caused” by the Corps’ decision to
grant a 33 U.S.C. § 1344 dredge and fill permit to the Port. 124
S. Ct. at 2217 (“We hold that where an agency has no ability to
prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority
over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a
legally relevant ‘cause’ of the effect.”). Under such an analysis,
the Corps, therefore, would not be obligated under NEPA to consider
this possibility and did not abuse its discretion in declining to
11
In the FEIS for the Bayport project, the Corps considered
the cumulative environmental consequences to Galveston Bay of
permitting the Bayport project to go forward in light of other
current projects in the Bay, including the current deepening of
the Houston Ship Channel from 40 to 45 feet, which was authorized
by Congress as part of the Water Resources Development Act of
1996, 33 U.S.C. § 2230 et seq.
21
do so.12
We need not, and do not, ultimately determine whether such a
Public Citizen analysis is appropriate in this context. That is so
because in any event, even if we were to assume that deepening the
Houston Ship Channel is not per se excluded as a matter of law
(merely because requiring Congressional approval) from the sorts of
cumulative environmental effects that the Corps ought to account
for in its FEIS, there was no need to do so in this case because
for a number of reasons it is impossible to know whether the
channel will ever be deepened. The Corps’ obligation under NEPA to
consider cumulative impacts is confined to impacts that are
“reasonably foreseeable.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. An impact is
“reasonably foreseeable” if it is “sufficiently likely to occur
that a person of ordinary prudence would take it into account in
reaching a decision.” Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st
Cir. 1992). “Reasonable foreseeability” does not include “highly
speculative harms” that “distort[] the decisionmaking process” by
emphasizing consequences beyond those of “greatest concern to the
public and of greatest relevance to the agency’s decision.”
12
Appellants try to distinguish Public Citizen on the
ground that it involved whether the DOT had any obligation at all
to prepare an environmental assessment whereas in this case there
is no dispute that the Corps had to prepare an EIS. However,
both Public Citizen and this case turn on whether the
environmental consequences of another governmental entity’s
independent action should be treated as an “indirect effect” of a
prior action by a different agency.
22
Robertson, 109 S. Ct. at 1849 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1215-16 (1978)
(“Time and resources are simply too limited to hold that an impact
statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out every
possible alternative, regardless of how uncommon or unknown that
alternative may have been at the time the project was approved.”);
Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 745 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Port properly cites several reasons why asserting that the
channel will be deepened is pure speculation. First, the Corps
expressly concluded that for the “foreseeable” future “almost” the
only vessels using the Bayport terminal would be Panamax-class
ships, the largest able to traverse the Panama Canal. Such vessels
already operate safely in the Houston Ship Channel and would not
require deepening it in the future. See note 7, supra. The Port
also points to a report prepared for Texas City’s Shoal Point
project indicating that there is no plausible economic
justification for deepening the channel in the foreseeable future.
In addition to the absence of any need to deepen the channel, it
could only be done, as mentioned above, by Congress alone and there
is no proposal for any such project.13 Finally, even if there were
13
This is not to imply that the absence of a proposal for a
related action means that it can automatically be excluded from
NEPA consideration. See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225,
1243 (5th Cir. 1985).
23
a proposal, history indicates that it takes decades to dredge the
channel. The Port notes that the channel is only now being dredged
to forty-five feet and this comes more than thirty years and three
hundred million dollars after the deepening was initially
proposed.14
Significantly, appellants themselves offer absolutely no
concrete analysis with respect to the likelihood that the channel
will need to be dredged within the Corps’ twenty-seven year
planning horizon. Rather than explain how the Corps erroneously
interpreted the evidence in the administrative record, they simply
recite the platitude that mere uncertainty does not equal a lack of
reasonable foreseeablity. While this is true, indeed obvious, in
a sense, such proposition does not mean that it was an abuse of
discretion for the Corps to treat deepening the Houston Ship
Channel as too speculative to warrant consideration as a cumulative
impact of the Port’s dredge and fill permit. None of the cases
appellants cite involves an undertaking remotely resembling in any
of its implications an enterprise like deepening the Houston Ship
Channel. It cannot be said that the Corps acted arbitrarily and
capriciously under NEPA in reaching its decision.
14
We note too that the Corps concluded that Bayport will be
responsible for less than two percent of the expected growth in
shipping in Galveston Bay over the next several decades. Given
this conclusion, which appellants do not challenge, it cannot
plausibly be said that the Bayport project is foreseeably going
to “cause” the Houston Ship Channel to be deepened.
24
c. The Split Alternative
Appellants also argue that it was arbitrary and capricious for
the Corps to issue a dredge and fill permit to the Port for the
construction of a ten-berth terminal at Bayport after granting a
permit to Texas City for the construction of a six-berth terminal
at Shoal Point because the Corps expressly rejected splitting the
Bayport project’s seven cargo berths between the two sites.
Appellants contend that if it was environmentally unacceptable to
split the Bayport project into four cargo berths at Bayport and
three cargo berths at Shoal Point, then it must, a fortiori, be
environmentally unacceptable for there to be seven cargo berths at
Bayport (plus three cruise ship berths) and six at Shoal Point.
Appellants misunderstand the nature of the Corps’
responsibility under NEPA, which is not to produce any particular
outcome but instead simply to produce informed decisionmaking with
respect to the specific application before it. The Corps prepared
its FEIS and ROD as part of the process of considering the Port’s
application for a 33 U.S.C. § 1344 dredge and fill permit for the
purpose of constructing a ten-berth terminal at Bayport. One of
the alternatives developed by the Corps contemplated splitting the
seven cargo berths between Bayport and Shoal Point. After careful
deliberation, the Corps concluded that the inefficiencies of this
four-three split rendered it inferior to siting all seven cargo
berths at Bayport alone. Nothing in this specific conclusion,
25
which pertained only to the Bayport permit application, implies
that the Corps could not rationally approve two separate permits
for two separate projects at Bayport and Shoal Point.15 Appellants,
therefore, have not shown that the Corps acted arbitrarily and
capriciously.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
15
We also note that Bayport is significantly closer to
Houston than is Shoal Point. The Port’s Bayport project was
always intended to handle cargo destined for Houston (including
that to thereafter be further transported over land out of
Houston). That was not true to the same extent with respect to
Texas City’s Shoal Point project.
26