Paul Harrington v. Equitrust Life Ins Co , 778 F.3d 1089 ( 2015 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARY HELEN ELLER,                         No. 12-17119
    Plaintiff,
    D.C. No.
    and                      4:09-cv-00029-
    DCB
    PAUL HARRINGTON, individually and
    on behalf of all others similarly
    situated,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    EQUITRUST LIFE INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    2        HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.
    MARY HELEN ELLER,                           No. 12-17267
    Plaintiff,
    D.C. No.
    and                       4:09-cv-00029-
    DCB
    PAUL HARRINGTON, individually and
    on behalf of all others similarly
    situated,                                     OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    EQUITRUST LIFE INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    December 11, 2014—San Francisco, California
    Filed February 24, 2015
    Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Raymond C. Fisher,
    and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Hurwitz
    HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.                       3
    SUMMARY*
    RICO
    The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment
    and vacated its denial of costs in a putative class action
    alleging violations of federal and state law in the sale of
    annuities.
    Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    in favor of the defendant on a RICO claim, the panel held that
    the plaintiff failed to establish any actionable predicate acts
    in alleged fraudulent schemes concerning the promise of
    premium bonuses, the application of the annuity’s market
    value adjustment, or the circumvention of state nonforfeiture
    laws. The panel also affirmed the district court’s summary
    judgment on state-law claims.
    Vacating the unexplained denial of costs, the panel
    remanded to allow the district court either to award costs or
    to state its reasons for denying them.
    COUNSEL
    Steve W. Berman (argued), Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
    LLP, Seattle, Washington; Elaine T. Byszewski, Hagens
    Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Pasadena, California, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    4        HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.
    Margaret A. Grignon (argued), Robert D. Phillips, Jr.,
    Brandon W. Corbridge, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles,
    California, for Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:
    I. Introduction
    This is a putative class action against EquiTrust Life
    Insurance Company (“EquiTrust”), alleging violations of
    federal and state law in the sale of annuities. The district
    court granted EquiTrust’s motion for summary judgment, but,
    without explanation, declined to award costs to the prevailing
    party. We affirm the summary judgment, but vacate the
    denial of costs and remand for the district court either to
    award costs or explain its refusal.
    II. Facts
    A. The Annuity
    In 2007, Paul Harrington purchased an EquiTrust
    MarketPower Bonus Index Annuity (the “Annuity”) from an
    insurance agency. The Annuity uses “index accounts” to
    generate “index credits” that increase the Annuity’s
    accumulation value (the total amount in the account). Index
    credits (essentially interest) are calculated based on periodic
    HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.                          5
    changes in the closing value of the S&P 500.1 EquiTrust has
    the express discretion to choose the amount of index credits
    awarded (the “index cap”), but the Annuity guarantees a
    minimum cap.
    The Annuity permits annual withdrawals of up to 10% of
    the accumulation value with no penalty. Larger withdrawals
    are subject to: (1) a surrender charge, a specified percentage
    of the accumulation value that decreases each year until it
    disappears in the fourteenth year; and (2) a market value
    adjustment, which increases or decreases the accumulation
    value based on interest rates in the market.2 After his 105th
    birthday, the annuitant can opt to receive the accumulation
    value incrementally for a specified period without any
    surrender charges or market value adjustments. When the
    annuitant dies, the full accumulation value is available to
    beneficiaries.
    Harrington’s initial premium was $432,530.92. The
    Annuity included a “10% premium bonus,” under which
    EquiTrust added to the accumulation value a sum equal to
    10% of the premiums paid during the first year. The
    1
    Harrington had two index accounts. For the 1-year Average Cap Index
    Account, index credits are based on a comparison of the percentage
    change in the S&P 500 from the previous Annuity contract anniversary
    date to the daily average of the S&P 500 over the intervening year. For
    the 2-year Average Cap Index Account, the comparison is to the monthly
    average over the two-year period between Annuity Anniversaries.
    2
    A full surrender receives the cash surrender value, which is the greater
    of (a) the accumulation value less the penalties discussed above; or (b) the
    minimum guaranteed contract value, which is “87.5% of Premium Paid
    (excluding any Premium Bonus), less any partial withdrawals, plus
    interest earned at a rate no lower than 1% and no higher than 3%.”
    6              HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.
    accumulation value of Harrington’s account was thus
    immediately increased by 10% ($43,253.10).3
    B. Procedural Background
    In 2009, Harrington filed this putative class action in the
    District of Arizona, alleging that EquiTrust’s marketing of the
    Annuity violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
    Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1962
    (c), and
    Arizona law. Harrington later filed a motion for class
    certification, and EquiTrust filed a motion for summary
    judgment. The district court granted EquiTrust’s motion,
    denied class certification as moot, and entered judgment for
    the defendant. The court, however, declined without
    explanation to award costs to the prevailing party. Harrington
    timely appealed the judgment, and EquiTrust timely appealed
    the denial of costs.
    III. Discussion
    A RICO claim requires “racketeering activity (known as
    predicate acts).” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de
    Nemours & Co., 
    431 F.3d 353
    , 361 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
    Grimmett v. Brown, 
    75 F.3d 506
    , 510 (9th Cir. 1996))
    (internal quotation marks omitted). The racketeering
    activities alleged by Harrington were violations of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1341
     (mail fraud) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
     (wire fraud). See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1961
    (1) (identifying violations of these statutes
    as racketeering activity).
    Mail and wire fraud can be premised on either a non-
    disclosure or an affirmative misrepresentation. See United
    3
    Harrington later withdrew $43,253 without penalty.
    HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.                 7
    States v. Benny, 
    786 F.2d 1410
    , 1418 (9th Cir. 1986). A non-
    disclosure, however, can support a fraud charge only “when
    there exists an independent duty that has been breached by
    the person so charged.” United States v. Dowling, 
    739 F.2d 1445
    , 1449 (9th Cir. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 
    473 U.S. 207
     (1985). “Absent an independent duty, such as a fiduciary
    duty or an explicit statutory duty, failure to disclose cannot be
    the basis of a [RICO] fraudulent scheme.” Cal. Architectural
    Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 
    818 F.2d 1466
    , 1472 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Dowling, 
    739 F.2d at 1449
    ).
    Harrington’s complaint is based entirely on the language
    of the Annuity contract and the EquiTrust marketing
    materials; he makes no claim of misrepresentation by the
    insurance agency that sold him the Annuity. Harrington
    alleges three fraudulent schemes: (1) the promise of premium
    bonuses; (2) the application of the Annuity’s market value
    adjustment; and (3) the circumvention of state nonforfeiture
    laws. The district court found no actionable predicate acts,
    and we agree.
    A. The Premium Bonus
    Harrington claims that the promise in the Annuity of a
    “10% premium bonus” was fraudulent because EquiTrust
    failed to disclose that it does not invest any additional money
    in the market when crediting the bonus to an annuitant’s
    account, and eventually “recoups” the bonus by crediting
    lower index credits to the Annuity than it might have in an
    annuity contract without the bonus feature. Harrington also
    argues that the “10% bonus” is illusory, because the ultimate
    increase over time in the accumulation value from the bonus
    8         HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.
    might be less than increases that would occur for an annuity
    which provided higher returns.
    We begin from the settled premise that a seller generally
    has no duty to disclose internal pricing policies or its method
    for valuing what it sells. Thus, in Thorman v. American
    Seafoods Co., we held that there was no fraudulent
    concealment by a fishing company that did not disclose its
    methodology for determining wages because, in the absence
    of a fiduciary relationship or a statutory duty, the company’s
    “silence or passive conduct does not constitute fraudulent
    concealment.” 
    421 F.3d 1090
    , 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
    Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 
    816 F.2d 1406
    , 1416 (9th Cir.
    1987)). Courts in other circuits agree. See, e.g., Langford v.
    Rite Aid of Ala., Inc., 
    231 F.3d 1308
    , 1313–14 (11th Cir.
    2000) (“As a general matter of federal law, retailers are under
    no obligation to disclose their pricing structure to
    consumers.”); Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 
    150 F.3d 62
    , 71
    (1st Cir. 1998); Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 
    167 F.R.D. 649
    , 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 
    113 F.3d 1229
     (2d
    Cir. 1997) (unpublished).
    Harrington does not allege that EquiTrust was a fiduciary
    or that some statute required the disclosure of its internal
    pricing policies. In the absence of such a relationship, there
    is no duty to disclose that the Annuity may provide lower
    index credits than might have been available in an alternative
    product without the bonus feature. See Cal. Architectural,
    
    818 F.2d at 1472
    .4
    4
    A number of district courts have reached the same conclusion in
    evaluating comparable annuities. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Jackson Nat’l Life
    Ins. Co., No. C 07–0371 CW, 
    2010 WL 4123994
    , at *11–13 (N.D. Cal.
    Oct. 6, 2010); Cirzoveto v. AIG Annuity Ins. Co., 
    625 F. Supp. 2d 623
    ,
    HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.                       9
    Of course, even absent a duty to disclose, a seller can be
    liable for affirmatively misrepresenting its product. See
    Lustiger v. United States, 
    386 F.2d 132
    , 136 (9th Cir. 1967);
    see also Benny, 
    786 F.2d at 1418
    . Thus, if an annuity
    company promises a bonus, but does not deliver as
    advertised, there can be actionable misrepresentation.5
    But it is uncontested here that EquiTrust delivered
    precisely what it promised. The 10% bonus was accurately
    described in the Annuity materials and properly credited to
    Harrington’s account. The bonus increased Harrington’s
    accumulation value without requiring him to deposit
    additional funds, allowing him to withdraw more money
    without penalty than otherwise would have been possible.
    The promise of a “bonus” was thus not, as Harrington claims,
    illusory. See Kennedy v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. C
    07–0371 CW, 
    2010 WL 4123994
    , at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6,
    2010) (finding that added liquidity is a bonus). Nor is it clear
    that Harrington would have been better off absent the bonus
    feature. If the index credits were regularly low, Harrington’s
    investment would outperform a non-bonus annuity that
    628–31 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); Phillips v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 
    498 F. Supp. 2d 690
    , 696–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Delaney v. Am. Express Co., Civ. No.
    06–5134 (JAP), 
    2007 WL 1420766
    , at *5–6 (D.N.J. May 11, 2007); Sayer
    v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. 7:05–CV–1423–RDP, 
    2006 WL 6253201
    , at *7–10 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 12, 2006).
    5
    See, e.g., In re Nat’l W. Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litig., No.
    05cv1018 AJB (WVG), 
    2012 WL 440820
    , at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10,
    2012); Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., Nos. CV 05–6838 CAS
    (MANx), CV 05–8908 CAS (MANx), 
    2011 WL 4852314
    , at *11–14
    (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011); Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No.
    05CV633 JLS (CAB), 
    2008 WL 8929013
    , at *9–12, *14–16 (S.D. Cal.
    July 8, 2008).
    10         HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.
    provided the possibility of higher credits.6 The district court
    thus correctly concluded that use of the term “bonus” was not
    fraudulent. Compare, e.g., Cirzoveto v. AIG Annuity Ins. Co.,
    
    625 F. Supp. 2d 623
    , 627 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (finding no
    breach of contract for a “bonus” annuity that offered, and
    provided, an increased rate of interest in the first year), with
    Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 05CV633 JLS
    (CAB), 
    2008 WL 8929013
    , at *11 (S.D. Cal. July 8, 2008)
    (finding actionable an affirmative misrepresentation about an
    “immediate” bonus that was not available for years).
    B. The Market Value Adjustment
    The Annuity includes a market value adjustment
    (“MVA”), a “positive or negative adjustment that may apply
    to [an annuity’s accumulation] value upon early withdrawal
    or surrender, based on the movement in an external index.”
    The MVA takes account of the capital gains or losses
    resulting from the sale of securities needed to fund early
    withdrawal or surrender requests. EquiTrust’s brochure
    provides the precise formula used to calculate the MVA,
    explains how to determine the variables in the formula, and
    offers examples of its application.7
    Harrington alleges that the brochure fails to explain that
    the disclosed constant in the formula, which he refers to as a
    6
    In addition, because the bonus feature in the Annuity locks in value
    immediately, it may increase the amount paid to an annuitant’s
    beneficiaries more than would an alternative annuity.
    7
    The formula is: [(1+s)/(1+c+.005)]n/12-1, where s is the treasury rate
    when the annuity was purchased, c is the treasury rate when the annuity
    is surrendered, and n is the number of months until the end of the
    fourteen-year surrender-charge period.
    HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.           11
    “bias,”8 serves to decrease upward adjustments and increase
    downward ones. Harrington claims that this omission is
    fraudulent because the bias contradicts what he characterizes
    as the “stated purpose” of the MVA, increasing the
    accumulation value when interest rates are lower and
    decreasing it when interest rates are higher.
    The district court correctly rejected this argument.
    EquiTrust meticulously explains the MVA and provides
    examples of how it operates in various circumstances. See
    Kennedy, 
    2010 WL 4123994
    , at *10 (“Plaintiff complains
    that Defendant defined the other variables in the MVA/EIA
    formula, but failed to explain the 0.005 value. This is not
    fraud.”). More importantly, even if we assume that
    Harrington correctly divines the MVA’s implicit purpose, the
    bias does not violate it. Even with the bias, the MVA raises
    the accumulation value if interest rates decline and decreases
    it when they rise. To be sure, the increase is less and the
    decrease greater than it would be without the bias, but
    EquiTrust never promised anything different.
    C. The Nonforfeiture Law
    The model standard nonforfeiture law for individual
    deferred annuities (“SNFLIDA”), codified at 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 20-1232
    , has specific regulations for annuities with optional
    maturity dates. See 
    id.
     § 20-1232(G). Whether a maturity
    date is optional or fixed is determined by the contract terms.
    See id.
    The terms in the Annuity do not comply with SNFLIDA.
    The Annuity contract, however, has an explicit fixed maturity
    8
    The “bias” is the .005 in the formula.
    12        HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.
    date. Nonetheless, Harrington argues that the Annuity
    effectively has an optional maturity date because EquiTrust’s
    internal policy is to consider affording annuitants relief from
    the fixed-date terms of their contracts upon request.
    Harrington argues that the Annuity therefore violates
    SNFLIDA, and is an attempt by EquiTrust to defraud Arizona
    regulators.
    The district court correctly rejected this claim.
    Harrington offers no authority for the proposition that an
    insurer’s willingness to consider providing relief on a case-
    by-case basis to its annuitants from the fixed-term provisions
    of an annuity contract mutates the annuity into one with an
    optional maturity date; indeed, because the internal policy is
    only invoked at the annuitant’s request, we can perceive no
    reason to so conclude. More significantly, Harrington has no
    conceivable injury from the internal policy, as the potential of
    relief from the Annuity’s fixed maturity date can only add
    value to his annuity. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1964
    (c) (requiring
    injury for civil RICO recovery).9
    9
    Because we affirm the district court’s summary judgment on
    Harrington’s claims and he was the only putative class representative, we
    do not address claims based on the other annuities described in the
    complaint. The complaint also alleged violations of Arizona consumer
    fraud laws, see 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1521
     to -1534; 
    id.
     §§ 20-441 to -
    469.01, and common law unjust enrichment. The state law fraud claims
    were predicated on the same allegations that underlie the RICO claim, and
    fail for the same reasons. The unjust enrichment claim also fails; it is
    based on the erroneous theory that the Annuity promised, but did not
    actually deliver, a bonus.
    HARRINGTON V. EQUITRUST LIFE INS. CO.              13
    IV. EquiTrust’s Appeal
    EquiTrust argues that the district court erred by not
    awarding it costs as the prevailing party pursuant to Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Although a district court has
    the discretion to decline to award costs to a prevailing party,
    it must explain a denial. See Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v.
    California, 
    231 F.3d 572
    , 591–93 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
    The court here did not do so. Thus, we vacate the order
    denying costs and remand to allow the district court either to
    award costs or state its reasons for denying them. See Quan
    v. Computer Scis. Corp., 
    623 F.3d 870
    , 889 (9th Cir. 2010),
    abrogated on other grounds by Fifth Third Bancorp v.
    Dudenhoeffer, 
    134 S. Ct. 2459
    , 2467 (2014).
    V. Conclusion
    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment, VACATE the order denying costs to EquiTrust,
    and REMAND to allow the district court to address the issue
    of costs.