Alonso-Castenada v. Garland ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUN 26 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    OSCAR ALBERTO ALONSO-                           No.    21-231
    CASTENADA,
    Agency No. A200-626-073
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted June 14, 2023**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BYBEE and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    Oscar Alberto Alonso-Castenada (“Alonso-Castenada”), a citizen of Mexico,
    petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
    denying his motion to reopen pursuant to 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii). We have
    jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . See Kucana v. Holder, 
    558 U.S. 233
    , 253 (2010).
    Reviewing the agency’s factual determinations for substantial evidence and legal
    questions de novo, see Najmabadi v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    , 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
    Bhasin v. Gonzales, 
    423 F.3d 977
    , 983 (9th Cir. 2005)), we deny the petition.
    1. The BIA properly concluded that Alonso-Castenada failed to establish prima
    facie cases of eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal because he failed to
    establish membership in a cognizable social group. “An asylum or withholding
    applicant’s burden includes (1) demonstrating the existence of a cognizable particular
    social group, (2) his membership in that particular social group, and (3) a risk of
    persecution on account of his membership in the specified particular social group.”
    Reyes v. Lynch, 
    842 F.3d 1125
    , 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). “[I]t is now well-established that an applicant seeking relief based on
    membership in a particular social group must establish that the group is: ‘(1)
    composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined
    with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.’”
    Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 1070
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of
    2
    M-E-V-G-, 
    26 I. & N. Dec. 227
    , 237 (BIA 2014)). “Under the BIA’s established
    standards, social groups must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” 
    Id. at 1080
    (quotations and citations omitted). Although Alonso-Castenada asserts membership
    in social groups consisting of individuals with past criminal history or individuals who
    testify against smugglers, the BIA properly concluded that Alonso-Castenada failed
    to meet his burden of establishing membership in a cognizable social group, and thus
    has failed to establish prima facie cases of eligibility for asylum and withholding of
    removal.
    2. The BIA properly concluded that Alonso-Castenada failed to establish a
    prima facie case of eligibility for protection under the CAT. To qualify for protection
    under the CAT, “[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant . . . to establish that it is
    more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
    country of removal.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(2) (2022). “To qualify as torture, actions
    must be ‘inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
    public official or other person acting in an official capacity.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 
    140 S.Ct. 1683
    , 1688 n.1 (2020) (quoting 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.18
    (a)(1) (2019)). Although
    “country conditions alone can ‘play a decisive role in granting relief under [CAT],’”
    Nuru v. Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 1207
    , 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original)
    (quoting Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 
    251 F.3d 1279
    , 1280 (9th Cir. 2001)), “generalized
    3
    evidence of violence and crime” in the country of removal that is not particular to the
    petitioner is an insufficient basis for granting such relief. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,
    
    600 F.3d 1148
    , 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
    Although Alonso-Castenada maintains “that there has been an increasing rate
    of homicides in Mexico since he was last before the Immigration Court, and that the
    Mexican government has demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to adequately
    protect its citizens,” he has provided only generalized evidence of an increase of
    violence and crime in Mexico, and has presented no evidence particular to himself by
    which the BIA could concluded that he more likely than not will face torture inflicted
    by or with the consent of the Mexican government. Therefore, the BIA properly
    concluded that Alonso-Castenada failed to establish eligibility for protection under the
    CAT.
    PETITION DENIED.
    4