Arcelormittal France v. Ak Steel Corp. , 700 F.3d 1314 ( 2012 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE AND
    ARCELORMITTAL ATLANTIQUE ET LORRAINE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    AK STEEL CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    AND
    SEVERSTAL DEARBORN, INC. AND
    WHEELING-NISSHIN INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________________
    2011-1638
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in case no. 10-CV-0050, Judge Sue L.
    Robinson.
    __________________________
    Decided: November 30, 2012
    ___________________________
    CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR., Sidley Austin LLP, of
    Chicago, Illinois, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With
    him on the brief were DAVID T. PRITIKIN and CONSTANTINE
    KOUTSOUBAS. Of counsel on the brief were JEFFREY B.
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                        2
    BOVE and CHAD S.C. STOVER, Connolly Bove Lodge &
    Hutz LLP, of Wilmington, Delaware.
    CHRISTOPHER N. SIPES, Covington & Burling, LLP, of
    Washington, DC, argued for all defendants-appellees.
    With him on the brief were RODERICK R. MCKELVIE and
    JEFFREY H. LERNER for AK Steel Corporation. Of counsel
    on the brief were RICHARD W. HOFFMANN and DAVID J.
    SIMONELLI, Reising Ethington, PC, of Troy, Michigan for
    Severstal Dearborn, Inc, et al.
    __________________________
    Before DYK, CLEVENGER, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. Opinion
    dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH.
    DYK, Circuit Judge.
    ArcelorMittal France and ArcelorMittal Atlantique et
    Lorraine (collectively “ArcelorMittal”) appeal from a final
    judgment of the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware. The judgment is based on a jury
    verdict finding that defendants AK Steel Corporation,
    Severstal Dearborn, Inc., and Wheeling-Nisshin Inc. (“AK
    Steel”) did not infringe ArcelorMittal’s 
    U.S. Patent No. 6,296,805
     (“the ’805 patent”) and that the asserted claims
    were invalid as anticipated and obvious. ArcelorMittal
    challenges both the district court’s claim construction and
    the jury’s verdict.
    We uphold the district court’s claim construction in
    part and reverse it in part. We also reverse the jury’s
    verdict of anticipation. With respect to obviousness, a
    new trial is required because the district court’s claim
    construction error prevented the jury from properly
    considering ArcelorMittal’s evidence of commercial suc-
    3                          ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    cess. We therefore affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-
    in-part, and remand for a new trial.
    BACKGROUND
    The ’805 patent covers boron steel sheet with an alu-
    minum-based coating applied after rolling the sheet to its
    final thickness. The steel is used for “hot-stamping,” a
    process which involves rapidly heating the steel, stamping
    it into parts of the desired shape, and then rapidly cooling
    them (“quenching”). The rapid heating and cooling alters
    the crystalline structure of the steel, converting it to
    austenite and then martensite. By altering the steel’s
    microstructure in this manner, hot-stamping produces
    particularly strong steel. Because hot-stamped steel is so
    strong, parts created by hot-stamping can be thinner and
    lighter than steel parts produced by other processes while
    being just as strong. This is particularly desirable in the
    manufacture of automobile parts because strong parts are
    required for safety and light parts promote fuel efficiency.
    Although hot-stamping has clear benefits, its use has
    historically been limited because of problems associated
    with the process. The high temperatures required for hot-
    stamping cause oxidation, resulting in the formation of
    “scale” on the steel’s surface. Scale must be removed
    before the steel can be painted or welded, but removing it
    requires expensive and environmentally harmful “shot-
    blasting” and “pickling” operations, in which the steel is
    blasted with an abrasive material and immersed in a
    chemical bath. Shot-blasting is also problematic because
    it can damage thin parts, undermining the strength and
    efficiency advantages of hot-stamping. Oxidation also
    causes the loss of carbon from the steel’s surface (“decar-
    burization”), which weakens the steel.
    The aluminum-based coating claimed in the ’805 pat-
    ent prevents oxidation from occurring during hot-
    ARCELOR MITTAL    v. AK STEEL CORP                      4
    stamping. As a result, scale does not form and decarburi-
    zation does not occur when the claimed steel is hot-
    stamped. This makes hot-stamping less costly, reduces
    its environmental impact, and allows its use in the pro-
    duction of parts that are too delicate to survive shot-
    blasting.
    The asserted claims of the ’805 patent are claim 1 and
    dependent claims 2, 5, 7, and 16. Claim 1, the only as-
    serted independent claim, reads:
    1. A hot-rolled coated steel sheet comprising a
    hot-rolled steel sheet coated with an aluminum or
    aluminum alloy coating, wherein the steel in the
    sheet comprises the following composition by
    weight:
    0.15%755 F. Supp. 2d 542
    , 545 (D. Del. 2010). The court first
    construed the term “hot-rolled steel sheet.” 
    Id.
     at 546–49.
    The court noted that those of ordinary skill in the art
    distinguished between “hot-rolled” and “cold-rolled” steel
    sheet based on which process is used to reduce the sheet
    to its final thickness. 
    Id. at 547
    . Relying on evidence of
    this industry convention, the court concluded that Arce-
    lorMittal “did not claim a ‘sheet’” generally but rather
    “specifically claimed a sheet made by hot-rolling.” 
    Id. at 548
    . Consequently, the court assigned “hot-rolled steel
    sheet” the meaning “a steel sheet that has been reduced
    to its final thickness by hot-rolling.” 
    Id. at 549
    . This
    construction excluded steel that was first hot-rolled and
    then cold-rolled to its final thickness.
    The court next examined the term “the steel sheet has
    a very high mechanical resistance.” 
    Id.
     The court noted
    that there is no applicable industry standard defining
    “very high” mechanical resistance. 
    Id. at 550
    . The court
    relied on the statements in the specification that “high”
    and “substantial” mechanical resistance “may exceed 1500
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                           6
    MPa.” 
    Id.
     at 550–51. Accordingly, the court construed
    “the steel sheet has a very high mechanical resistance” to
    mean that “the flat-rolled steel has been subjected, after
    rolling, to additional controlled heating and cooling and
    has an ultimate tensile strength of 1500 MPa or greater.”
    
    Id. at 550
    .
    None of AK Steel’s accused products literally in-
    fringed the claims as construed, so the district court
    prohibited ArcelorMittal from asserting literal infringe-
    ment. Memorandum Order, ArcelorMittal Fr. v. AK Steel
    Corp., No. 10-CV-00050 (D. Del. Jan. 4, 2011), ECF No.
    205. The case proceeded to trial on the basis of the doc-
    trine of equivalents, and the jury returned a verdict on
    January 14, 2011, finding that AK Steel did not infringe
    the ’805 patent and that the asserted claims were both
    obvious and anticipated. ArcelorMittal then moved for
    judgment as a matter of law on the invalidity issues and
    for a new trial on infringement. The district court denied
    those motions and entered final judgment for AK Steel on
    August 25, 2011. ArcelorMittal Fr. v. AK Steel Corp., 
    811 F. Supp. 2d 960
     (D. Del. 2011). ArcelorMittal timely
    appealed.     We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    This court “review[s] a district court’s denial of . . .
    judgment as a matter of law without deference, and its
    denial of a motion for [a] new trial for abuse of discretion.”
    CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 
    424 F.3d 1168
    , 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We review de novo the
    district court’s claim construction. Markman v. Westview
    Instruments, 
    52 F.3d 967
    , 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
    aff’d 
    517 U.S. 370
     (1996).
    7                           ARCELOR MITTAL    v. AK STEEL CORP
    I Claim Construction
    A. “Hot-rolled steel sheet”
    All claim construction issues concern claim 1, the only
    asserted independent claim in the patent. ArcelorMittal
    first argues that the district court erroneously construed
    the term “hot-rolled steel sheet,” improperly excluding
    from the scope of the claim steel sheet that has been cold-
    rolled to its final thickness following initial hot-rolling.
    AK Steel replies that the district court properly inter-
    preted the term in accordance with its ordinary and
    customary meaning in the art. We agree with ArcelorMit-
    tal.
    By its use of the term “comprising,” claim 1 expressly
    contemplates additional, unstated steps such as cold-
    rolling. “The transition ‘comprising’ creates a presump-
    tion . . . that the claim does not exclude additional, unre-
    cited elements.” Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech
    Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 
    246 F.3d 1336
    , 1348 (Fed. Cir.
    2001). To rebut this presumption, AK Steel offers only
    the conclusory assertion that “[t]he very definition of ‘hot-
    rolled steel sheet’ is steel sheet that has been reduced to
    its final thickness by hot-rolling.” Appellee’s Br. 36–37.
    It is true that there is ample extrinsic evidence establish-
    ing that the ordinary meaning of “hot-rolled steel sheet”
    in the industry refers to steel sheet that has not been
    cold-rolled. Expert witnesses for both ArcelorMittal and
    AK Steel agreed that this definition was customary in the
    industry. Furthermore, a leading steel-making treatise
    classified steel sheet according to this industry usage.
    However, while AK Steel is correct that the ordinary
    meaning of the term in the industry is clear, the specifica-
    tion is not consistent with that meaning. In Phillips v.
    AWH Corp., we emphasized that the specification is the
    primary guide to claim interpretation, recognizing that
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                          8
    “the specification is ‘the single best guide to the meaning
    of a disputed term.’” 
    415 F.3d 1303
    , 1320–21 (Fed. Cir.
    2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
    Inc., 
    90 F.3d 1576
    , 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Although
    definitions based on dictionaries, treatises, industry
    practice, and the like often are important aids in inter-
    preting claims, they may not be “used to contradict claim
    meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic
    evidence.” Id. at 1324. Here, the specification makes
    clear that the claim term “hot-rolled steel sheet” does not
    preclude a cold-rolling step.
    References to an optional cold-rolling step abound in
    the specification of the ’805 patent. ’805 patent col. 1 ll.
    47–48, col. 2 ll. 30–31, 37–40, col. 3 ll. 7–9. AK Steel
    argues that these references describe “distinct products”
    and that the specification elsewhere uses the word “sheet”
    where it means to refer to both steel that has been hot-
    rolled to its final thickness and steel that was also cold-
    rolled. Appellee’s Br. 29. The district court based its
    claim construction on similar reasoning. See ArcelorMit-
    tal, 
    755 F. Supp. 2d at
    546–47. However, that is not a
    coherent reading of the specification for at least two
    reasons.
    First, the specification contemplates that “[t]he sheet
    according to the invention . . . may be cold-rerolled again
    depending on the final thickness desired.” ’805 patent col.
    2 ll. 37–40. It also describes the invention’s purpose as
    including the production of “cold-rolled steel sheet.” 
    Id.
     at
    col. 1 ll. 37–38. This directly contradicts the district
    court’s claim construction, under which the sheet must be
    reduced to its final thickness by hot-rolling. The claims
    and specification should be read “‘in a manner that ren-
    ders the patent internally consistent.’” Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva
    Pharm. USA, Inc., 
    429 F.3d 1364
    , 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
    9                           ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    (quoting Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
    250 F.3d 1369
    ,
    1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
    Second, the specification describes an embodiment
    “having a thickness of approximately 1 mm.” ’805 patent
    col. 4 ll. 8–9. That thickness, at least at the time of the
    invention, could only have been achieved by cold-rolling.
    Indeed, the specification states that “[a]ccording to the
    invention” the sheet’s thickness may be as low as 0.25
    mm, ’805 patent col. 3 ll. 44–46, a thickness that even AK
    Steel concedes is achievable only by cold-rolling. To be
    sure, patent protection does not extend to subject matter
    disclosed but not claimed. Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
    Brown, 
    939 F.2d 1558
    , 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). How-
    ever, “[w]e normally do not interpret claim terms in a way
    that excludes disclosed examples in the specification.”
    Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 
    503 F.3d 1295
    , 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
    Because the specification unambiguously contem-
    plates cold-rolling, the district court erred by interpreting
    the claim term “hot-rolled steel sheet” to exclude steel
    sheet subsequently cold-rolled.1 The correct construction
    of “hot-rolled steel sheet” is “a steel sheet that has been
    hot-rolled during its production.”
    1    This conclusion is not contradicted by the prosecu-
    tion history. Although ArcelorMittal amended claim 1 to
    remove the explicit reference to optional cold-rolling, the
    initial rejection of the claim was because it was ambigu-
    ous whether the coating was optional, and the substitu-
    tion of the “comprising” language made clear that optional
    additional steps were still contemplated. Nothing in the
    prosecution history amounted to a disclaimer of cold-
    rolling.
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                        10
    B. “Very high mechanical resistance”
    ArcelorMittal also disputes the district court’s inter-
    pretation of the claim term “very high mechanical resis-
    tance.” The district court interpreted that term to mean
    “the flat-rolled steel has been subjected, after rolling, to
    additional controlled heating and cooling and has an
    ultimate tensile strength of 1500 MPa or greater.” Arce-
    lorMittal, 
    755 F. Supp. 2d at
    549–50. We agree with the
    district court. We begin with the specification, which
    states that a “high” or “substantial” mechanical resistance
    “may exceed 1500 MPa.” ’805 patent col. 2 ll. 51–54, col. 3
    ll. 52–54. The specification does not define “very high”
    mechanical resistance, but it implies that the 1500 MPa
    level is necessary for “high” mechanical resistance. If
    1500 MPa is high mechanical resistance, then very high
    resistance must be at least 1500 MPa. ArcelorMittal
    argues that “very high” mechanical resistance can include
    a resistance as low as 1000 MPa, pointing to language in
    the specification stating that the invention “makes it
    possible to obtain a mechanical resistance in excess of
    1000 MPa.” 
    Id.
     at col. 1 ll. 40–42. However, the specifica-
    tion does not refer to 1000 MPa as “high” much less “very
    high.” 
    Id.
     Thus, the specification supports the district
    court’s construction.
    Turning to the extrinsic evidence, the district court
    observed that the term “very high mechanical resistance”
    is not a term of art in the steelmaking industry and does
    not have any ordinary meaning. ArcelorMittal, 
    755 F. Supp. 2d at 550
    . ArcelorMittal points to various docu-
    ments suggesting that steel with mechanical resistance as
    low as 700 MPa may be considered “ultra high” strength
    steel, but the record does not establish that these refer-
    ences concern boron steel comparable to that described in
    the patent. On the other hand, one of the inventors of the
    ’805 patent coauthored an article on heat-treated boron
    11                          ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    steel before the patent was filed. This article is prior art.
    The article describes steel with “high mechanical charac-
    teristics (UTS > 1500 MPa and YS > 1100 MPa)” after
    heat treatment. X. Bano & JP. Laurent, Heat Treated
    Boron Steels in the Automotive Industry, in XXXV 39th
    MWSP Conf. Proc. ISS 673, 673, 677 (1998) (“Bano”).
    Prior art can “help to demonstrate how a disputed term is
    used by those skilled in the art.” Vitronics Corp., 
    90 F.3d at 1584
    . Thus, while testimony regarding an inventor’s
    subjective understanding of patent terminology is irrele-
    vant to claim construction, Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v.
    Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 
    540 F.3d 1337
    , 1346–47 (Fed. Cir.
    2008), when an inventor’s understanding of a claim term
    is expressed in the prior art, it can be evidence of how
    those skilled in the art would have understood that term
    at the time of the invention. Markman, 
    52 F.3d at 991
    (“[E]vidence, in the form of prior art documentary evi-
    dence or expert testimony, can show what the claims
    would mean to those skilled in the art”); Howmedica, 
    540 F.3d at
    1347 & n.5. By defining “high” mechanical resis-
    tance as greater than 1500 MPa, the prior art here sug-
    gests that “very high” mechanical resistance would be
    understood to be at least that high.
    Accordingly, both the intrinsic evidence and extrinsic
    evidence support the district court’s conclusion that “a
    very high mechanical resistance” means a mechanical
    resistance of 1500 MPa or greater. Therefore, we affirm
    the district court’s construction of “the steel sheet has a
    very high mechanical resistance.”
    At oral argument, AK Steel’s counsel conceded that at
    least some accused products have a mechanical resistance
    of 1500 MPa or greater. However, as a result of the
    district court’s incorrect claim construction of “hot-rolled
    steel sheet,” the jury was instructed at trial to consider
    direct infringement only under the doctrine of equiva-
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                        12
    lents. Final Jury Instructions, ArcelorMittal Fr. v. AK
    Steel Corp., No. 10-CV-00050, at 22 (D. Del. Jan. 14,
    2011), ECF No. 212. Thus, there has been no determina-
    tion below regarding which accused products would or
    would not literally infringe under the correct claim con-
    struction. That infringement issue will need to be ad-
    dressed in the first instance on remand, either by the
    court on summary judgment or by a jury in a new trial.
    Because the jury found no infringement under the doc-
    trine of equivalents, and ArcelorMittal has not challenged
    that aspect of the verdict, any infringement analysis
    found to be necessary on remand should be limited to
    literal infringement.
    II Anticipation
    ArcelorMittal argues that the evidence cannot support
    the jury’s anticipation verdict. “Anticipation is a question
    of fact, reviewed for substantial evidence when tried to a
    jury.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 
    523 F.3d 1323
    ,
    1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The jury’s finding of anticipation
    was based on Bano. The Bano article was written and
    presented by inventor Jean-Pierre Laurent and his col-
    league Xavier Bano during the development of the pre-
    coated steel claimed in the ’805 patent, and the parties
    agree that it discusses hot-stamping boron steel. AK
    Steel argued, and the jury found, that the article disclosed
    the entire invention. ArcelorMittal challenges that find-
    ing on the grounds that Bano disclosed neither coating
    the steel sheet before thermal treatment nor coating the
    steel sheet with aluminum or an aluminum alloy. We
    conclude that there is not substantial evidence that Bano
    disclosed coating with aluminum or aluminum alloy.
    A claim is anticipated only where “each and every
    limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a
    single prior art reference.” Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rock-
    13                         ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    well Int’l Corp., 
    150 F.3d 1354
    , 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    Anticipation must be proven by clear and convincing
    evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 
    131 S. Ct. 2238
     (2011). Bano does not expressly disclose either pre-
    coating or particular coating compositions. However, it
    does state that “it is advisable to protect heat treated
    finished parts with coatings” and that “[i]t is possible to
    coat this new heat treated boron steel after degreasing as
    with conventional steels.” Bano at 676.
    As discussed in the next section, these statements
    could have supported a jury finding that Bano disclosed
    pre-coating. However, the jury’s apparent conclusion that
    Bano disclosed coating with aluminum or aluminum alloy
    is more problematic. In denying JMOL, the district court
    relied on In re Petering, 
    301 F.2d 676
     (C.C.P.A. 1962), to
    hold that “aluminum was a member of a very small class
    of metals suitable for use in coating boron steel,” and
    therefore inherent in Bano. ArcelorMittal, 811 F. Supp.
    2d at 967–68. Petering establishes that when a prior art
    reference discloses a “definite and limited class” of suit-
    able members within a general formula, it may be read to
    disclose each member of that class. Petering, 
    301 F.2d at 681
    . Yet Bano does not even explicitly refer to coating
    with metals; indeed, the only specific coating it references
    is “phosphatization . . . followed by cataphoresis.” Bano at
    676. That process refers to coating with paint, not metal,
    and it is not clear how paint and metal coatings would
    both fit into any general formula comparable to that
    found in the prior art in Petering. Moreover, even if paint
    and metal were part of the same general formula, the
    record does not support a finding that there is a “definite
    and limited class” of coatings for steel sheet. There is
    insufficient evidence that the varieties of paints and
    metal alloys are sufficiently narrow that one of ordinary
    skill in the art would “at once envisage each member of
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                        14
    this limited class.” Petering, 
    301 F.2d at 681
     (emphasis
    added).
    Without an explicit disclosure of aluminum coating or
    substantial evidence that aluminum belonged to a suffi-
    ciently definite and limited class of possible coatings, the
    jury verdict of anticipation based on Bano cannot stand.
    We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL
    as to anticipation.
    III Obviousness
    ArcelorMittal also urges us to overturn the jury’s ob-
    viousness verdict, arguing both that the jury’s verdict was
    not supported by substantial evidence and that the jury
    was foreclosed from consideration of the secondary factor
    of commercial success by the district court’s incorrect
    claim construction. “We review [the] jury’s conclusions on
    obviousness, a question of law, without deference, and the
    underlying findings of fact . . . for substantial evidence.”
    Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 
    561 F.3d 1319
    ,
    1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (internal
    quotations omitted).
    A. Prima Facie Case
    ArcelorMittal concedes that “each element of the in-
    vention” was known in the prior art. Appellant’s Br. 3.
    The jury found the asserted claims of the ’805 patent
    obvious in view of Bano in combination with French
    Patent No. 1,297,906 (“French ’906 patent”). The French
    ’906 patent describes coating steel with aluminum to
    protect against oxidation during hot forging (the missing
    element in the anticipation finding). We agree that Bano
    15                         ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    together with the French ’906 patent supported a jury
    finding of a prima facie case of obviousness.2
    The aluminum-based coating described in the ’805
    patent is applied to the steel sheet prior to hot-stamping
    in order to prevent oxidation. Regarding that pre-coating
    requirement, AK Steel argues that Bano in discussing
    coating distinguishes between “heat treated finished
    parts” and “boron steel,” and that the reference to coating
    the latter inherently discloses coating before hot-
    stamping. Appellee’s Br. 44–45. Further, AK Steel
    argues that the reference to coating after degreasing
    makes clear that the coating is applied before hot-
    stamping. ArcelorMittal counters that the “degreasing”
    language could refer to the removal of oil applied after
    hot-stamping and that the article’s discussion of decar-
    burization problems is inconsistent with pre-coating.3
    What a prior art reference discloses is a factual question.
    Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 
    257 F.3d 1331
    ,
    1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We think the resolution of this
    factual dispute was up to the jury, and that the jury could
    2  Because the correct claim construction broadens
    the scope of the claims, it does not undermine the prima
    facie case of obviousness found by the jury.
    3   The Bano reference contains graphs that show de-
    carburization which would not occur if the steel was
    coated in accordance with claim 1 of the ’805 patent.
    However, there is no evidence that other coatings not
    covered in claim 1 would have prevented decarburization.
    Moreover, Bano only states that “[i]t is possible to coat
    this new heat treated boron steel.” Bano at 676. This
    language suggests that coating is only an optional step,
    and there is no reason to assume that the steel would
    have necessarily been coated for the purposes of measur-
    ing decarburization during thermal treatment. Thus, the
    graph is of limited use in evaluating whether or not Bano
    disclosed pre-coating.
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                        16
    properly conclude that Bano teaches applying the coating
    before thermal treatment.
    As for coating with aluminum, the French ’906 patent
    disclosed coating steel with aluminum during hot forging4
    to protect against the same oxidation and decarburization
    problems that the ’805 patent was intended to address.
    AK Steel thus urges that the invention described in the
    ’805 patent is no more than the application of known
    solutions to equivalent problems in an analogous context.
    The thrust of ArcelorMittal’s objection to this reasoning is
    that the hot forging described in the French ’906 patent is
    so different from hot-stamping that there would be no
    motivation to combine. ArcelorMittal points to several
    differences between the hot forging process described in
    the French ’906 patent and hot-stamping and cites evi-
    dence that those skilled in the art did not think that an
    aluminum coating would survive hot-stamping. Arcelor-
    Mittal’s implication appears to be that hot-stamping and
    hot forging are not analogous art. For its part, AK Steel
    points to the similarity of the problems confronted by the
    two patents and evidence that aluminum coatings were
    known to survive thermal treatment and quenching.
    Whether a particular technology is analogous art is a
    question of fact. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 
    616 F.3d 1231
    ,
    1237–38 (Fed. Cir. 2010). As with the evidence about
    whether a skilled artisan would read Bano to disclose pre-
    coating, we think this factual dispute was for the jury to
    resolve. We also conclude that substantial evidence
    supports the jury’s determination that there was a suffi-
    cient motivation to combine. AK Steel provided signifi-
    cant expert testimony that a person of ordinary skill in
    the art would have had the knowledge to combine the
    4    Hot forging does not involve the rapid heating and
    cooling of hot-stamping and does not change the steel’s
    microstructure.
    17                         ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    aluminum coating disclosed by the French 906 patent
    with the pre-coating that the jury found Bano disclosed
    and would have expected to succeed. In short, the jury
    properly concluded that AK Steel had established a prima
    facie case of obviousness.5 The district court properly
    denied ArcelorMittal’s JMOL motion of non-obviousness.
    B. Secondary Considerations
    The final issue is whether the district court’s errone-
    ous claim construction of “hot-rolled steel sheet” requires
    a new trial on obviousness. ArcelorMittal argues that a
    new trial is necessary because under the district court’s
    claim construction the jury could not consider the com-
    mercial success6 of their cold-rolled commercial product.
    Although ArcelorMittal’s commercial success evidence
    was before the jury, the district court instructed the jury
    only to consider “[c]ommercial success or lack of commer-
    cial success of products covered by the asserted claims.”
    Final Jury Instructions, ArcelorMittal Fr. v. AK Steel
    Corp., No. 10-CV-00050, at 37 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2011)
    (emphasis added). The jury was also instructed that only
    steel sheet hot-rolled to its final thickness was covered by
    the asserted claims. Id. at 20. Thus, the jury was pro-
    scribed from considering the commercial success of Arce-
    lorMittal’s cold-rolled steel sheet.
    A district court’s incorrect claim construction may re-
    quire a new trial, Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 
    285 F.3d 1362
    , 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2002), but only where the party
    5   We conclude that AcelorMittal’s assertion that
    claim 7 would not have been obvious even if claim 1 would
    have been obvious was waived. Claim 7 must stand or
    fall with claim 1.
    6   ArcelorMittal makes passing reference to other
    secondary considerations such as copying and unexpected
    results, but ArcelorMittal has not briefed those issues
    sufficiently to preserve them.
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                         18
    seeking a new trial shows that they were prejudiced by
    the error. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
    
    503 F.3d 1295
    , 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
    AK Steel argues that it is not necessary to consider
    the commercial success of the cold-rolled product because
    of the well-established principle that claims which read
    on obvious subject matter are unpatentable even if they
    also read on nonobvious subject matter. Muniauction,
    Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 
    532 F.3d 1318
    , 1328 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
    2008) (noting the “long-established rule that ‘[c]laims
    which are broad enough to read on obvious subject matter
    are unpatentable even though they also read on nonobvi-
    ous subject matter.’” (quoting In re Lintner, 
    458 F.2d 1013
    , 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1972))). AK Steel urges that even if
    the claims included both hot-rolled steel (which was not
    cold-rolled) and cold-rolled steel, the jury’s verdict that
    the hot-rolled steel embodiment was obvious rendered the
    whole claim obvious whether or not the cold-rolled em-
    bodiment is nonobvious in view of its commercial success.
    However, this is not a situation in which the claims
    themselves describe distinct alternative embodiments of
    the invention, and where the obviousness of one embodi-
    ment would invalidate the entire claim. Rather, it is a
    situation in which the claim is limited to steel that is hot-
    rolled, but contains “comprising” language permitting the
    performance of an additional (cold-rolling) step. In such
    circumstances our cases make clear that the commercial
    success of the embodiment with additional unclaimed
    features is to be considered when evaluating the obvious-
    ness of the claim, provided that embodiment’s success has
    a sufficient nexus to the claimed and novel features of the
    invention. In re Kao, 
    639 F.3d 1057
    , 1068 (Fed. Cir.
    2011); In re Glatt Air Techniques, Inc., 
    630 F.3d 1026
    ,
    1030 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced
    Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 
    98 F.3d 1563
    , 1570
    19                         ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[A] patentee need not show that all
    possible embodiments within the claims were successfully
    commercialized in order to rely on the success in the
    marketplace of the embodiment that was commercial-
    ized.”)
    Thus, in Kao, we required consideration of a patent
    applicant’s commercially successful controlled release
    painkiller even though the success was not proven across
    the full range of claimed dissolution rates. 
    639 F.3d at 1069
    . However, we emphasized that the required consid-
    eration of commercial success includes a threshold deter-
    mination of whether the commercial success has the
    necessary nexus with the claimed invention. 
    Id.
     at 1068–
    69; see also Wyers, 
    616 F.3d at 1246
    . The same rules
    apply here. The commercial success of ArcelorMittal’s
    cold-rolled embodiment must be considered to the extent
    that its success results from the claimed combination of
    elements that constitutes the invention, rather than from
    cold-rolling, which was not claimed and already known in
    the prior art, or from other unclaimed features. In other
    words, whether there is a nexus here depends upon a
    comparison between cold-rolled steel produced by the
    patented process and cold-rolled steel produced by alter-
    native processes to see if the former achieved material
    commercial success over and above the latter. Absent a
    demonstrated nexus, ArcelorMittal’s commercial success
    evidence is not significant. See Ormco Corp. v. Align
    Tech., Inc., 
    463 F.3d 1299
    , 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[I]f the
    feature that creates the commercial success was known in
    the prior art, the success is not pertinent.”).
    The remaining issue is whether a new trial on obvi-
    ousness is required to address the issue of commercial
    success. We think this is not a case in which the prima
    facie case so strong that, as a matter of law, it would
    overcome ArcelorMittal’s commercial success evidence.
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                        20
    See, e.g., Wyers, 
    616 F.3d at 1245
    . Therefore, we conclude
    that the district court’s claim construction prejudiced
    ArcelorMittal with respect to obviousness. Accordingly,
    we vacate the jury’s obviousness verdict and remand for a
    new trial addressing only the commercial success aspect
    of obviousness and infringement under the correct claim
    construction.
    IV Conclusion
    On remand, the district court must address whether,
    under the correct claim construction, the asserted claims
    of the ’805 patent are obvious in light of any evidence of
    commercial success of hot-rolled steel that is also cold-
    rolled and that has the required nexus with ArcelorMit-
    tal’s claims. Additionally, as discussed above, the district
    court must address the issue of literal infringement under
    the correct claim construction. In remanding for a limited
    new trial addressing only infringement under the correct
    claim construction and whether ArcelorMittal has perti-
    nent commercial success evidence sufficient to overcome
    the prima facie case of obviousness, we do not foreclose
    the district court from entertaining a motion for summary
    judgment on these issues that might obviate the need for
    a further trial.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
    VACATED-IN-PART, REMANDED
    COSTS
    Costs to neither party.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE AND
    ARCELORMITTAL ATLANTIQUE ET LORRAINE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    AK STEEL CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    AND
    SEVERSTAL DEARBORN, INC. AND
    WHEELING-NISSHIN INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________________
    2011-1638
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in case no. 10-CV-0050, Judge Sue L.
    Robinson.
    __________________________
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge, dissenting-in-part.
    I do not agree that “very high mechanical resistance”
    means a mechanical resistance of 1500 MPa or greater.
    Rather, because I conclude that intrinsic evidence sup-
    ports a reading of this term to mean a mechanical resis-
    tance in excess of 1000 MPa, I respectfully dissent.
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                           2
    The disputed term “very high mechanical resistance”
    is not defined expressly in the specification. “Mechanical
    resistance” and “resistance,” however, are discussed in
    multiple passages.      Their references throughout the
    specification are instructive, and they necessarily conflict
    with the majority’s construction for the following reasons.
    The majority’s focus on “very high,” “high,” and “sub-
    stantial” is unwarranted because these terms, and other
    similar laudatory terms, are used interchangeably in the
    ’805 patent. See Bid for Position, LLC v. AOL, LLC, 
    601 F.3d 1311
    , 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding “bid” and
    “value of the bid” to have the same meaning because the
    claim language and specification used the terms inter-
    changeably). For example, the patent is entitled, “Coated
    Hot- and Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet Comprising a Very High
    Resistance After Thermal Treatment.” ’805 patent col. 1
    ll. 1-4 (emphasis added). The “subject of the invention” is
    then described as a steel composition that ensures a “very
    high mechanical resistance after thermal treatment” and
    a “high resistance to corrosion.” 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 47, 61-63
    (emphases added). Also, the “purpose of the invention” is
    purported as producing a coated steel sheet with a me-
    chanical resistance in excess of 1000 MPa after thermal
    treatment, which is described as “substantial resistance to
    shocks, fatigue, abrasion and wear” and a “good resis-
    tance to corrosion.” 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 37-43 (emphases added).
    In another instance, the patent states that the “descrip-
    tion which follows will make the invention clearly under-
    stood . . . .” and recites a steel sheet that exhibits “a high
    mechanical resistance after thermal treatment and a high
    resistance to corrosion . . . .” 
    Id.
     col. 2 ll. 34-35, 43-44
    (emphasis added).
    Other passages in the specification further exemplify
    the interchangeability of these terms. For instance, the
    patent reads in one paragraph that “[t]he thermal treat-
    3                             ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    ment applied . . . makes it possible to obtain high me-
    chanical characteristics which may exceed 1500 MPa” and
    in the very next paragraph, describes a “substantial
    resistance to abrasion, wear, fatigue, shock, as well as a
    good resistance to corrosion . . . .” 
    Id.
     col. 2 ll. 49-52, 59-60
    (emphases added). Likewise, the claimed steel sheet is
    disclosed as having a “substantial resistance to corrosion
    in the delivery state, during shaping and thermal treat-
    ments as well as during usage of the finished casting,”
    and after thermal treatment, is described as having “a
    substantial mechanical resistance, which may exceed
    1500 MPa . . . .” 
    Id.
     col. 3 ll. 49-53 (emphases added).
    Finally, the specification explains that modulation of
    certain elements in the composition of the steel including
    “carbon makes it possible to achieve high mechanical
    characteristics . . . .” 
    Id.
     col. 4 ll. 20-21 (emphasis added).
    The patentee’s use of “very high,” “high,” and “sub-
    stantial” shows that these terms are used interchangea-
    bly. It does not appear the patentee made technical
    distinctions as to varying resistance levels with the use of
    these terms. On the contrary, the patentee used these
    terms interchangeably and in a laudatory fashion without
    any limiting purposes. See Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
    Dealers, Inc., 
    336 F.3d 1373
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (declin-
    ing to construe “traded efficiently,” in part, because
    “efficiently” on its face does not inform the mechanics of
    how the trade is executed and concluding that it is a
    laudatory term characterizing the result of the executing
    step); see also Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 
    299 F.3d 1336
    , 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (declining to hold that
    the “fast steering” language in the preamble was limiting
    because it was laudatory, merely setting forth the in-
    tended purpose of the claimed combination). As such, the
    interchangeable use of these laudatory terms does not
    shed light on the disputed claim’s proper scope.
    ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP                           4
    I would instead focus on the touted increase in me-
    chanical resistance the ’805 patent purports to achieve
    over prior art—namely, the obtention of mechanical
    resistance “in excess of 1000 MPa.” 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 41-42. In
    particular, “very high,” “high,” and “substantial” were
    used to promote the invention’s improved levels of resis-
    tance without the “detriment of shaping properties”—a
    problem in the prior art. 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 10-11. The majority’s
    construction of requiring a mechanical resistance of “at
    least 1500 MPa” unduly contracts the wide breadth of the
    invention the patentee discloses. Without clear language
    providing otherwise, 1500 MPa cannot be set as the floor
    of a range of mechanical resistance levels recited in the
    patent, principally because “excess of 1000 MPa” is stated
    as within the range of resistance levels that satisfy the
    purpose of the invention. See Apple Comp., Inc. v. Articu-
    late Sys., Inc., 
    234 F.3d 14
    , 25 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
    claim must be interpreted in light of the teachings of the
    written description and purpose of the invention described
    therein.”). Additionally, other values of resistance levels,
    including 1500 MPa, are recited in permissive form, and
    therefore, are less than instructive in determining the
    scope of “very high mechanical resistance.” ’805 patent
    col. 2 ll. 51-53 (“may exceed 1500 MPa for mechanical
    resistance . . . .”) (emphasis added); 
    id.
     col. 4 ll. 52-61
    (Table 2 illustrating ranges with examples of “maximal
    resistance of the steel sheet according to the invention
    after thermal treatment,” ranging from 1665 to 1695
    MPa).
    The majority nevertheless takes a different approach.
    It implies that the use of the terms, “high” or “substan-
    tial,” correspond only to a mechanical resistance that
    “may exceed 1500 MPa.” Based on this reading, the
    majority determines that “if 1500 MPa is high mechanical
    5                          ARCELOR MITTAL   v. AK STEEL CORP
    resistance, then very high resistance must be at least
    1500 MPa.” Majority Op. 10.
    As discussed above, however, the specification shows
    that “high,” “substantial,” and other similar terms are
    used to describe varying levels of mechanical resistance.
    Specifically, in addition to references to “may exceed 1500
    MPa” as “high” or “substantial” resistance, the patent
    recites “excess of 1000 MPa” as “substantial” resistance.
    Compare ’805 patent col. 3 ll. 52-53 (“[A] substantial
    mechanical resistance, which may exceed 1500 MPa . . .
    .”) (emphasis added), with 
    id.
     col. 1 ll. 40-43 (“[M]akes it
    possible to obtain a mechanical resistance in excess of
    1000 MPa, a substantial resistance to shocks, fatigue,
    abrasion and wear . . . .”) (emphasis added). The specifi-
    cation thus describes both 1500 MPa and 1000 MPa as
    “substantial.”
    “High” or “substantial” interchangeably describe in
    similar context the mechanical resistance level of 1500
    MPa, giving “high” and “substantial” similar meaning.
    Hence, “high” or “substantial” likewise may describe
    interchangeably the mechanical resistance level of “excess
    of 1000 MPa.” Applying the majority’s logic, if 1000 MPa
    characterizes both “substantial” and “high” mechanical
    resistance, then “very high” resistance must be in excess
    of 1000 MPa. Accordingly, “very high mechanical resis-
    tance” should be construed as a mechanical resistance in
    excess of 1000 MPa. I find the specification sufficiently
    instructive, and therefore, no need to turn to extrinsic
    evidence.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-1638

Citation Numbers: 700 F.3d 1314

Judges: Clevenger, Dyk, Wallach

Filed Date: 11/30/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023

Authorities (28)

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