Elbit Systems of America, LLC v. Thales Visionix Inc. , 881 F.3d 1354 ( 2018 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ELBIT SYSTEMS OF AMERICA, LLC,
    Appellant
    v.
    THALES VISIONIX, INC.,
    Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-1355
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2015-
    01095.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 6, 2018
    ______________________
    RANGANATH SUDARSHAN, Covington & Burling LLP,
    Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented
    by MATTHEW AARON KUDZIN; KURT CALIA, Redwood
    Shores, CA.
    DANIEL I. KONIECZNY, Tabet DiVito & Rothstein, LLC,
    Chicago, IL, argued for appellee. Also represented by
    MEREDITH MARTIN ADDY, ASHLEY CRETTOL INSALACO.
    ______________________
    Before MOORE, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    2               ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Elbit Systems of America, LLC (“Elbit”)
    sought inter partes review of various claims of Appellee
    Thales Visionix, Inc.’s (“Thales”) U.S. Patent No.
    6,474,159 (“the ’159 patent”). The U.S. Patent and
    Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board
    (“PTAB”) issued a final written decision, see Elbit Sys. of
    Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., No. IPR2015-01095
    (P.T.A.B. Oct. 14, 2016) (J.A. 1–25), finding that, inter
    alia, Elbit failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
    evidence that claims 3–5, 13, 24–28, 31, and 34 (“the
    Asserted Claims”) of the ’159 patent would have been
    obvious over U.S. Patent No. 4,722,601 (“McFarlane”) in
    combination with two other prior art references, see
    J.A. 2, 4−5.
    Elbit appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Entitled “Motion-Tracking,” the ’159 patent generally
    relates to “tracking motion relative to a moving platform,
    such as motion-base simulators, virtual environment
    trainers deployed on board ships, and live vehicular
    applications including helmet-mounted cueing systems
    and enhanced vision or situational awareness displays.”
    ’159 patent, Abstract. The claimed invention purportedly
    “enables the use of inertial head-tracking systems on-
    board moving platforms by computing the motion of a
    ‘tracking’ Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) mounted on
    [a head mounted display] relative to a ‘reference’ IMU
    rigidly attached to the moving platform.” 
    Id. This elimi-
    nates the need to calculate an object’s position relative to
    the ground, 
    id. col. 1
    ll. 23–25, col. 6 l. 67–col. 7 l. 12,
    col. 8 ll. 37–41, which improves functionality when “track-
    ing on moving vehicles, where millimeter-level vehicle
    position data is generally not available,” 
    id. col. 6
    ll. 65–
    67; see 
    id. col. 7
    l. 40–col. 8 l. 17 (explaining the method of
    ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.          3
    calculating the object’s orientation without requiring
    additional calculation of its orientation relative to earth).
    Dependent claim 3 is effectively representative 1 and
    depends from dependent claim 2, which in turn depends
    from independent claim 1. Claims 1–3 are reproduced
    below:
    1. A system for tracking the motion of an object
    relative to a moving reference frame, comprising:
    a first inertial sensor mounted on the
    tracked object;
    a second inertial sensor mounted on the
    moving reference frame; and
    an element adapted to receive signals
    from said first and second inertial sensors
    and configured to determine an orienta-
    tion of the object relative to the moving
    reference frame based on the signals re-
    ceived from the first and second inertial
    sensors.
    2. The system of claim 1[,] in which the first and
    second inertial sensors each comprises three an-
    gular inertial sensors selected from the set of an-
    1   Although the PTAB appears to have treated
    claims 1–3 as illustrative, see J.A. 4, the parties do not
    designate a claim as representative, see generally Appel-
    lant’s Br.; Appellee’s Br. However, Elbit limits its sub-
    stantive arguments to claim 3, see Appellant’s Br. 29–47,
    and argues that “claims 4[–]5, 13, 24–28, 31, and 34 are
    unpatentable for the same reasons as claim 3,” 
    id. at 47
    (capitalization omitted). Therefore, the Asserted Claims
    “stand or fall” with claim 3. In re Affinity Labs of Tex.,
    LLC, 
    856 F.3d 883
    , 894 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    4               ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.
    gular accelerometers, angular rate sensors, and
    angular position gyroscopes.
    3. The system of claim 2, in which the angular in-
    ertial sensors comprise angular rate sensors, and
    the orientation of the object relative to the moving
    reference frame is determined by integrating a
    relative angular rate signal determined from the
    angular rate signals measured by the first and
    second inertial sensors.
    
    Id. col. 11
    l. 50–col. 12 l. 2 (emphasis added).
    DISCUSSION
    I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard
    “We review the PTAB’s factual findings for substan-
    tial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo.” Redline
    Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 
    811 F.3d 435
    , 449
    (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence
    is something less than the weight of the evidence but
    more than a mere scintilla of evidence,” meaning that “[i]t
    is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
    accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re NuVa-
    sive, Inc., 
    842 F.3d 1376
    , 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (inter-
    nal quotation marks and citations omitted). If two
    “inconsistent conclusions may reasonably be drawn from
    the evidence in record, [the PTAB]’s decision to favor one
    conclusion over the other is the epitome of a decision that
    must be sustained upon review for substantial evidence.”
    In re Cree, Inc., 
    818 F.3d 694
    , 701 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (inter-
    nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    A patent claim is invalid “if the differences between
    the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
    are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
    been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
    person having ordinary skill in the [relevant] art
    ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.         5
    [(‘PHOSITA’)].” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 2 Obviousness
    is a question of law based on underlying findings of fact.
    See In re Gartside, 
    203 F.3d 1305
    , 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
    Those underlying findings of fact include (1) “the scope
    and content of the prior art,” (2) “differences between the
    prior art and the claims at issue,” (3) “the level of ordi-
    nary skill in the pertinent art,” and (4) the presence of
    objective indicia of nonobviousness such “as commercial
    success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,”
    and unexpected results. Graham v. John Deere Co. of
    Kan. City, 
    383 U.S. 1
    , 17 (1966); see United States v.
    Adams, 
    383 U.S. 49
    , 50–52 (1966). In assessing the prior
    art, the PTAB also “consider[s] whether a PHOSITA
    would have been motivated to combine the prior art to
    achieve the claimed invention.” In re Warsaw Orthopedic,
    Inc., 
    832 F.3d 1327
    , 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quota-
    tion marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
    II. Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Determina-
    tion that the Asserted Claims Would Not Have Been
    Obvious
    This appeal concerns whether, in light of McFarlane,
    the method of integrating the “relative angular rate
    signal” 3 taught in claim 3 of the ’159 patent would have
    2    Congress amended § 103 when it enacted the
    Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). Pub. L. No.
    112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). However, be-
    cause the application that led to the ’159 patent has never
    contained (1) a claim having an effective filing date on or
    after March 16, 2013, or (2) a reference under 35 U.S.C.
    §§ 120, 121, or 365(c) to any patent or application that
    ever contained such a claim, the pre-AIA § 103 applies.
    See 
    id. § 3(n)(1),
    125 Stat. at 293.
    3    Although Elbit now appears to contest the PTAB’s
    lack of explicit construction of “relative angular rate
    signal” in Elbit’s favor, see Appellant’s Br. 45–47, neither
    6               ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.
    been obvious to a PHOSITA. Oral Arg. at 2:02–31, 13:37–
    51. After determining that Elbit “ha[d] not directed [the
    PTAB] to prior art of record that allegedly teaches the
    ‘relative angular rate signal,’” J.A. 16−17, and that there
    were many “deficiencies” in the testimony of Elbit’s ex-
    pert, the PTAB concluded that Elbit had not “met its
    burden of proving [the Asserted Claims] unpatentable by
    a preponderance of the evidence,” J.A. 18. We agree.
    Substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s conclusion
    of nonobviousness. It is undisputed that the method of
    calculating the “relative angular rate signal” taught in the
    ’159 patent “is not explicitly disclosed” in the prior art
    because the prior art and the Asserted Claims employ
    different steps to calculate the orientation or position of a
    moving object relative to a moving reference frame.
    J.A. 468; see Oral Arg. at 1:19–2:01, 12:00–13:34. The
    PTAB credited the testimony of Thales’s expert, see
    J.A. 14−15, who explained the prior art calculates an
    object’s relative orientation using a three-step method:
    First, the orientation of a moving object . . . is cal-
    culated with respect to an inertial reference
    frame . . . using inertial sensors mounted to a
    moving object (e.g., angular rate sensors . . . ).
    Next, the orientation of a moving reference
    frame . . . is calculated with respect to the inertial
    reference frame using inertial sensors mounted to
    party proffered a construction of this limitation to the
    PTAB, Oral Arg. at 1:09–13, http://oralarguments.
    cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2017-1355.mp3 (conced-
    ing, by Elbit’s attorney, that “the parties never asked for
    constructions”), 11:35–45 (same by Thales’s attorney).
    Therefore, this argument is waived. See Conoco, Inc. v.
    Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C., 
    460 F.3d 1349
    , 1358 (Fed. Cir.
    2006) (“[A] party may not introduce new claim construc-
    tion arguments on appeal . . . .” (citation omitted)).
    ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.              7
    the moving reference frame . . . . Finally, the rela-
    tive orientation of the moving object with respect
    to the moving platform . . . is calculated by resolv-
    ing the two orientation calculations.
    J.A. 2109–10. For example, McFarlane calculates direc-
    tional angles to detect the orientation of the moving object
    and then “appl[ies] . . . inputs from the [moving reference
    frame’s] own inertial platform so that movements of the
    reference frame may be off set against movements indi-
    cated by the [moving object],” indicating that McFarlane
    twice calculates orientation and then resolves those two
    calculations to determine relative orientation. McFarlane
    col. 4 ll. 14−21; see 
    id. col. 2
    ll. 37–54; see also J.A. 2138–
    39 (explaining, by Thales’s expert, that a PHOSITA would
    have understood McFarlane to disclose this three-step
    method).
    In contrast, Thales’s expert explained that the Assert-
    ed Claims employ a two-step method: “the raw signal
    data from the inertial sensors . . . is used to determine the
    relative angular rate signal”; and “[t]hat relative angular
    rate signal . . . is then used to calculate the relative orien-
    tation.” J.A. 2112. This testimony is supported by the
    specification of the ’159 patent, which explains that “this
    system operates independently without any inputs from
    the motion-base controller or the vehicle attitude[4] refer-
    ence system, and without the need to ever know or meas-
    ure or calculate the orientation or position of the moving
    platform.” ’159 patent col. 8 ll. 37–41; see, e.g., 
    id. col. 1
    ll. 36–40 (explaining that, prior to the ’159 patent, “[t]he
    inertial sensors would measure head motion relative to
    the ground, while the drift-correcting range sensors would
    measure head pose relative to the vehicle platform in
    which the reference receivers are mounted”).
    4   “Attitude” is another          term    for   orientation.
    J.A. 810 (Elbit’s Expert Decl.).
    8               ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.
    Moreover, Thales’s expert explained that the two-step
    method employed by the Asserted Claims “reduces both
    the number of calculations required to determine relative
    orientation . . . and the propagation of errors that inevita-
    bly occur when using inertial sensors to track motion.”
    J.A. 2112; see J.A. 2108 (“Contrary to the . . . prior
    art, . . . without performing all computations related to
    the Earth as a fixed reference frame, transformation
    errors are minimized.”); see also ’159 patent col. 1 ll. 40–
    42 (explaining that, prior to the ’159 patent, “[w]hile the
    vehicle is turning or accelerating, the . . . filter would
    attempt to fuse inconsistent data and produce unpredict-
    able results”).     This constitutes substantial evidence
    showing that the prior art does not teach the Asserted
    Claims’ “relative angular rate signal.”
    Elbit’s expert attempts to undermine this testimony
    by arguing that the two- and three-step methods are
    “mathematically equivalent” and that “there is no practi-
    cal difference” between them. J.A. 2034. However, the
    PTAB determined that Elbit’s expert’s testimony was
    “unsupported” and entitled to “little weight” because he
    did not address or account for the recited relative angular
    rate signal limitation “anywhere in his opinion.” J.A. 17–
    18. “The PTAB [i]s entitled to weigh the credibility of the
    witnesses,” Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Illumina, Inc., 620
    F. App’x 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Inwood Labs., Inc.
    v. Ives Labs., Inc., 
    456 U.S. 844
    , 856 (1982) (“Determining
    the weight and credibility of the evidence is the special
    province of the trier of fact.”), and, thus, we decline to
    disturb these credibility determinations here.
    Elbit’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First,
    Elbit argues that the method employed by the Asserted
    Claims merely reorders the steps employed by the prior
    art and that “[c]hanging the order of steps does not pro-
    duce a new or unexpected result.” Appellant’s Br. 32; see
    
    id. at 31–34.
    However, Thales’s expert explained the
    differences between the three-step method employed by
    ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.           9
    the prior art and the two-step method employed by the
    Asserted Claims, compare J.A. 2109–10, with J.A. 2112,
    as well as the benefits of the two-step method, J.A. 2112,
    and Elbit conceded that it failed to argue that substantial
    evidence does not support the PTAB’s decision to credit
    Thales’s explanation of the nonobviousness of the two-
    step method, see Oral Arg. at 27:30–32 (acknowledging
    that they “did not make . . . a legal argument” that the
    PTAB’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence),
    which constitutes waiver, see Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v.
    United States, 
    810 F.3d 1333
    , 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (hold-
    ing that failure to present arguments under the operative
    legal framework “typically warrants a finding of waiver”).
    Second, Elbit argues that the PTAB applied the incor-
    rect legal standard because it “fail[ed] to credit the
    knowledge of a [PHOSITA],” who would allegedly under-
    stand that the sum of integrals principle 5 extends to
    navigation equations, and, “[i]nstead, . . . required Elbit to
    produce a prior art reference expressly teaching that the
    sum of integrals principle applies ‘in the context of navi-
    gation equations.’” Appellant’s Br. 35 (quoting J.A. 17);
    see 
    id. at 34–37.
    However, Elbit improperly attempts to
    create legal error by selectively quoting from a portion of
    one of the PTAB’s multiple findings analyzing why it
    5   Pursuant to this principle, “as a matter of calcu-
    lus, the sum of integrals is equal to the integral of sums.”
    J.A. 2144. According to Elbit, this principle dictates that
    the same result will be reached whether data is “first
    integrated, then subtracted” or “first subtracted, then
    integrated,” such that “the order in which these steps are
    performed does not matter.” Appellant’s Br. 3. As ap-
    plied to the ’159 patent, Elbit contends that the sum of
    integrals principle renders the ’159 patent “no more than
    a predictable variation of the prior art” and, thus, un-
    patentable. 
    Id. at 5
    (citation omitted).
    10              ELBIT SYS. OF AM., LLC   v. THALES VISIONIX, INC.
    found Elbit’s expert unpersuasive, and “[w]e will not find
    legal error based upon an isolated statement stripped
    from its context.” Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
    870 F.3d 1350
    , 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). As for whether a PHOSITA
    “would understand that the sum of integrals principle
    applies to all equations, including navigation equations,”
    Appellant’s Br. 37 (capitalization omitted); see 
    id. at 37–
    41, Elbit fails to present any evidence supporting this
    contention beyond attorney argument, see 
    id. at 37–
    41,
    and “[a]ttorney argument is not evidence” and cannot
    rebut other admitted evidence, Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.
    v. Strava, Inc., 
    849 F.3d 1034
    , 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In
    contrast, Thales’s expert testified that a PHOSITA could
    have determined that it would be “mathematically inap-
    propriate or invalid” to apply the principle to the naviga-
    tion equations disclosed in the ’159 patent. J.A. 2143. In
    sum, substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s determi-
    nation that the Asserted Claims would not have been
    obvious to a PHOSITA.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Elbit’s remaining arguments and
    find them unpersuasive. Thales’s request for attorney
    fees is denied. Accordingly, the Final Written Decision of
    the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and
    Appeal Board is
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Costs to Thales.