TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp. , 429 F. App'x 975 ( 2011 )


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  •         NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    TIVO INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    ECHOSTAR CORPORATION,
    ECHOSTAR DBS CORPORATION,
    ECHOSTAR TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,
    ECHOSPHERE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
    ECHOSTAR SATELLITE LLC,
    AND DISH NETWORK CORPORATION,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    __________________________
    2009-1374
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Texas In Case No. 2:04-CV-01, Chief
    Judge David Folsom.
    __________________________
    ON MOTION
    __________________________
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, MAYER, LOURIE,
    BRYSON, GAJARSA, LINN, DYK, PROST, MOORE, O’MALLEY,
    and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
    ORDER
    The parties jointly move to dismiss this appeal due to
    settlement.
    TIVO   v. ECHOSTAR                                        2
    This court issued its en banc decision and opinion in
    this case on April 20, 2011. The judgment affirmed in
    part, vacated in part, and remanded for additional pro-
    ceedings. In part, we affirmed the district court’s exercise
    of its discretion to impose sanctions against the appel-
    lants.
    On May 2, 2011, prior to this court’s issuance of the
    mandate, the parties informed us that they had settled
    the case on April 29, 2011, and asked us to dismiss the
    appeal. The parties did not inform us that they had
    settled the matter before issuance of our decision nor do
    they inform us that they had agreed to a disposition of the
    matter dependent upon our decision. It is clear that if the
    parties had entered into such an agreement before issu-
    ance of our decision, it was counsel’s duty to inform this
    court of the agreement. Board of License Comm’rs of
    Tiverton v. Pastore, 
    469 U.S. 238
    , 240 (1985); see also
    Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
    520 U.S. 43
    , 68
    n.23 (1997) (citing Pastore) (“It is the duty of counsel to
    bring to the federal tribunal's attention, ‘without delay,’
    facts that may raise a question of mootness.”) (emphasis
    in original). Clearly, they did not settle before our deci-
    sion.
    Our judgment vacated in part, affirmed in part, and
    remanded to the district court. If we were to grant the
    parties’ motion, the judgment would be that the appeal is
    dismissed. Although the parties do not ask us to vacate
    our decision, at this stage, days before issuance of a
    mandate, we determine that granting the motion to
    dismiss, which would result in a modification or vacatur
    of our en banc judgment, is neither required nor a proper
    use of the judicial system. Miller v. Anderson, 
    268 F.3d 485
    , 486 (7th Cir. 2001) (during rehearing stage, denying
    motion to dismiss appeal due to settlement; “the court will
    not dismiss an appeal after the appeal has been decided”);
    see also U.S. v. Payton, 
    593 F.3d 881
     (9th Cir. 2010)
    (denying vacatur and dismissal of appeal when mootness
    arose after appellate court’s opinion issued); Show-
    3                                           TIVO   v. ECHOSTAR
    time/The Movie Channel, Inc. v. Covered Bridge Condo-
    minium Ass’n, Inc., 
    895 F.2d 711
    , 713 (11th Cir. 1990)
    (stating that “a motion to dismiss an appeal and to with-
    draw a decision and opinion once published [should be
    granted] only in rare cases and for valid reason”).
    The parties are of course free upon our remand to the
    district court to request that the district court dismiss the
    complaint and vacate its previously imposed sanctions
    because they have settled the underlying matter. ∗ How-
    ever, consistent with our sister circuits, we conclude that
    we should not dismiss the appeal after it has been de-
    cided.
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    The motion to dismiss is denied. The mandate will is-
    sue in due course.
    FOR THE COURT
    May 10, 2011                  /s/ Jan Horbaly
    ——————————                      ——————————
    Date                       Jan Horbaly
    Clerk
    ∗
    Of course, the district court would have no juris-
    diction to do either unless and until we return the case to
    its docket. See Showtime, 895 F.2d at 713.
    TIVO   v. ECHOSTAR                4
    cc: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Esq.
    Seth P. Waxman, Esq.
    Edward A. Pennington, Esq.
    Robert Patrick Merges, Esq.
    Matthew D. McGill, Esq.
    Seth D. Greenstein, Esq.
    Edward R. Reines, Esq.
    Christopher J. Kelly, Esq.
    Philip J. Graves, Esq.
    Raymond Millien, Esq.
    Elaine J. Goldenberg, Esq.
    Matthew Schruers, Esq.
    Rodney A. Cooper
    Richard A. Epstein, Esq.
    Gary M. Hoffman, Esq.
    Scott A.M. Chambers, Esq.
    Alexander C.D. Giza, Esq.
    Bruce A. Lehman, Esq.
    Philip S. Johnson, Esq.
    Herbert C. Wamsley, Esq.
    Mark J. Abate, Esq.
    William P. Nelson, Esq.
    Michael K. Kellogg, Esq.
    Willard K. Tom, Esq.
    Paul D. Clement, Esq.