Ncube Corporation v. Seachange International Inc. , 732 F.3d 1346 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    NCUBE CORPORATION (now known as ARRIS
    Group, Inc.),
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ______________________
    2013-1066
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in No. 01-CV-0011, Judge Leonard P.
    Stark.
    ______________________
    Decided: October 10, 2013
    ______________________
    GREGORY A. CASTANIAS, Jones Day, of Washington,
    DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief
    were RYAN D. NEWMAN; and KRISTA S. SCHWARTZ and
    ISRAEL SASHA MAYERGOYZ, of Chicago, Illinois. Of counsel
    was MARY B. GRAHAM, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell,
    LLP, of Wilmington, Delaware.
    STEVEN M. BAUER, Proskauer Rose, LLP, of Boston,
    Massachusetts, argued for defendant-appellee. With him
    on the brief were KIMBERLY A. MOTTLEY, JUSTIN J.
    DANIELS and THOMAS HOEHNER. Of counsel was MELANIE
    2       NCUBE CORPORATION   v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.
    K. SHARP, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, of
    Wilmington, Delaware.
    ______________________
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, PROST and TARANTO,
    Circuit Judges.
    PROST, Circuit Judge.
    On July 31, 2009, ARRIS Group, Inc. (“ARRIS”) 1 filed
    a motion to hold SeaChange International Inc.
    (“SeaChange”) in contempt of a permanent injunction
    order. The United States District Court for the District of
    Delaware found that ARRIS failed to meet its burden of
    showing contempt by clear and convincing evidence and
    declined to hold SeaChange in contempt. ARRIS appeals.
    Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying the contempt motion, we affirm.
    I
    ARRIS and SeaChange are providers of video-on-
    demand products and services. ARRIS owns 
    U.S. Patent No. 5,805,804
     (“’804 patent”), which discloses and claims a
    media server capable of transmitting multimedia infor-
    mation over any network configuration in real time to a
    client that has requested the information. The patented
    technology allows a user to purchase videos that are then
    streamed to a device such as a television.
    ARRIS commenced the present litigation on January
    8, 2001, alleging the infringement of certain claims of the
    1    When the underlying litigation in this case began,
    ARRIS was known as nCUBE Corporation. Eventually,
    nCUBE Corporation was acquired by C–COR Corpora-
    tion. Subsequently, ARRIS purchased C–COR. For
    clarity’s sake, we refer to nCUBE, C–COR, and ARRIS
    collectively as ARRIS.
    NCUBE CORPORATION   v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.       3
    ’804 patent by SeaChange’s Interactive Television (“ITV”).
    On May 28, 2002, the jury returned a verdict in ARRIS’s
    favor, finding that SeaChange willfully infringed the
    asserted claims in the ’804 patent. We later affirmed the
    jury verdict and the district court’s subsequent decision to
    enhance the damages award.            See nCube Corp. v.
    SeaChange Int’l, Inc., 
    436 F.3d 1317
     (Fed. Cir. 2006).
    Following our affirmance, on April 6, 2006, the dis-
    trict court entered a permanent injunction enjoining
    SeaChange from selling products that infringe the ’804
    patent. Specifically, SeaChange was enjoined from “mak-
    ing, using, selling, or offering to sell . . . the SeaChange
    Interactive Television System . . . as well as any devices
    not more than colorably different therefrom that clearly
    infringe the Adjudicated Claims of the ’804 patent.”
    nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int’l, Inc., 
    809 F. Supp. 2d 337
    ,
    341-42 (D. Del. 2011).
    Seven days after the 2002 jury verdict, and approxi-
    mately four years before the entry of the permanent
    injunction, SeaChange began to modify its ITV system.
    Soon after, SeaChange released a system that it views as
    outside the scope of the ’804 patent. Naturally, ARRIS
    disagrees. The parties attempted to resolve their differ-
    ences without litigation, but failed. On July 31, 2009,
    ARRIS filed a motion in the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware seeking to hold SeaChange in
    contempt of the permanent injunction alleging that
    SeaChange’s modifications were minor changes that did
    not remove any key components or the relevant function-
    ality that formed the basis for the jury’s infringement
    verdict. The district court found that ARRIS failed to
    prove contempt by clear and convincing evidence and,
    therefore, declined to hold SeaChange in contempt.
    ARRIS appeals.
    4     NCUBE CORPORATION    v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.
    A
    Only claim 4 of the ’804 patent—specifically, the itali-
    cized limitation below—is at issue in this appeal.
    4. A computer-implemented method for re-
    trieving and transporting multimedia data be-
    tween a client and a server on a network, said
    computer-implemented method comprising the
    steps of:
    receiving a client request for initialization in a
    message to an upstream manager in said server,
    said upstream manager being coupled to a first
    network;
    obtaining an upstream physical address for
    said client as said client request enters said serv-
    er;
    allocating a downstream physical address and
    downstream logical address to said client corre-
    sponding to the upstream physical address ob-
    tained for said client, said downstream physical
    address being used by a downstream manager for
    sending a stream of said multimedia data from a
    service on said server to said client, said down-
    stream manager being coupled to a second net-
    work; and
    updating a connection service table with said
    upstream physical address, said downstream
    physical address, and said downstream logical ad-
    dress for said client.
    ’804 patent col. 25 ll. 22-42 (emphasis added).
    In order to function, the ITV system utilizes a series
    of identifiers, including one known as the ClientID and
    another known as the SessionID. The ClientID is a 20-
    byte data field containing addressing information includ-
    ing, inter alia, a 6-byte MAC address. The SessionID is a
    NCUBE CORPORATION   v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.       5
    10-byte data field that also includes the 6-byte MAC
    address. At the May 2002 trial, ARRIS’s expert, Dr.
    Schonfeld testified that the ClientID met the upstream
    physical address limitation of claim 4, and that the sys-
    tem’s Connection Table (combined with something called
    the Stream Table) met the connection service table limita-
    tion. J.A. 5024. Dr. Schonfeld also explained how the
    upstream physical address was updated in the connection
    service table and how the accused system actually used
    the ClientID to refer to the particular client. 
    Id.
     Notably,
    neither ARRIS, nor its expert, ever mentioned the Ses-
    sionID as potentially being the upstream physical ad-
    dress. And while a SeaChange witness stated in passing
    that the SessionID was another identifier of the client,
    J.A. 5164, ARRIS’s infringement proof and argument
    included no contention that the system found to infringe
    used the SessionID as such an identifier, and ARRIS does
    not contend that the modified system does so either.
    Following the jury verdict of infringement, SeaChange
    modified its system so that the Connection Table (i.e. the
    “connection service table”) in the ITV system no longer
    received the ClientID. Instead, the processing of the
    ClientID that previously occurred in the Connection Table
    in SeaChange’s infringing ITV system was relocated and
    performed elsewhere in SeaChange’s modified ITV sys-
    tem. The district court pointed out that there are a
    number of facts to which the parties agree:
    The parties do not dispute that, as a result of
    SeaChange’s redesign efforts, the Connection Ta-
    ble is no longer updated with the ClientID in the
    modified ITV system. Nor do the parties dispute
    that the Connection Table is updated with the
    SessionID in both the infringing and modified ITV
    systems; this functionality was not changed dur-
    ing SeaChange’s redesign efforts. The parties
    likewise appear to agree that the ClientID and
    SessionID both contain the same 6-byte “MAC ad-
    6     NCUBE CORPORATION    v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.
    dress” information. Thus, whereas SeaChange’s
    infringing ITV system previously updated the
    Connection Table with both the ClientID and Ses-
    sionID (each containing the same MAC address
    information), the modified ITV system now up-
    dates the Connection Table with only the Ses-
    sionID (which still contains MAC address
    information).
    nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int’l Inc., CA 01-011-LPS, 
    2012 WL 4863049
     (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2012).
    II
    On a contempt motion, the party seeking to enforce
    the injunction bears the burden of proving by clear and
    convincing evidence “both that the newly accused product
    is not more than colorably different from the product
    found to infringe and that the newly accused product
    actually infringes.” TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 
    646 F.3d 869
    , 882-83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). While we review
    the grant or denial of a motion for contempt of an injunc-
    tion for abuse of discretion, see Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.,
    
    681 F.3d 1283
    , 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012), we review the
    finding as to whether two products are more than colora-
    bly different for clear error. TiVo, 
    646 F.3d at 883
    . A
    district court abuses its discretion, by definition, where its
    decision rests on an error of law. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson
    Inc., 
    417 F.3d 1241
    , 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
    Prior to TiVo, the colorable-differences prong required
    determining “whether ‘substantial open issues with
    respect to infringement to be tried’ exist.” TiVo, 
    646 F.3d at 883
     (quoting KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones
    Co., 
    776 F.2d 1522
    , 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). In TiVo, we
    rejected “that infringement-based understanding of the
    colorably different test.” Id. at 882. Rather, in determin-
    ing whether more than colorable differences are present
    the court focuses “on those elements of the adjudged
    infringing products that the patentee previously contend-
    NCUBE CORPORATION   v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.         7
    ed, and proved, satisfy specific limitations of the asserted
    claims.” Id. We went on to explain in TiVo that:
    Where one or more of those elements previously
    found to infringe has been modified, or removed,
    the court must make an inquiry into whether that
    modification is significant. If those differences be-
    tween the old and new elements are significant,
    the newly accused product as a whole shall be
    deemed more than colorably different from the ad-
    judged infringing one, and the inquiry into wheth-
    er the newly accused product actually infringes is
    irrelevant. Contempt is then inappropriate.
    Id. Finally, we must be mindful that contempt “is a
    severe remedy, and should not be resorted to where there
    is a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the
    defendant’s conduct.” Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v.
    Molitor, 
    113 U.S. 609
    , 618 (1885).
    A
    ARRIS bore the burden of proving both that the modi-
    fied ITV system is not more than colorably different from
    the ITV system found to infringe and that the modified
    ITV system actually infringes. TiVo, 
    646 F.3d at 882-83
    .
    The district court concluded that ARRIS proved neither.
    The thrust of ARRIS’s argument with respect to the
    colorable-differences prong of TiVo is that while the
    ClientID in the modified system no longer meets the
    “upstream physical address” limitation because it is no
    longer updated in the Connection Table, the Connection
    Table in the modified system is still updated with the
    SessionID. ARRIS contends that the differences between
    the ClientID and the SessionID are not significant and,
    therefore, no more than colorable.
    Prior to beginning its analysis, the district court noted
    that only the ClientID of SeaChange’s infringing ITV
    system was previously accused at trial as satisfying the
    8     NCUBE CORPORATION   v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.
    “upstream physical address” limitation. nCube, 
    2012 WL 4863049
    , at *4. The ClientID in the modified system
    performs the same task as it did in the old system, but it
    does so in a way that all parties agree is non-infringing.
    
    Id.
     Thus, the court held that ARRIS did not prove by
    clear and convincing evidence that there is no colorable
    difference between the ClientID in the two systems. The
    court also found that ARRIS could not rely on the Ses-
    sionID to meet this prong of TiVo because it was not
    identified at trial as meeting this limitation. 
    Id. at *5
    .
    ARRIS contends that the court erred by ignoring the
    “removed” language of TiVo and failing to analyze wheth-
    er removing the ClientID from the Connection Table was
    a significant change to the system when the SessionID
    remains. TiVo states that “[w]here one or more of those
    elements previously found to infringe has been modified,
    or removed the court must make an inquiry into whether
    that modification is significant.” TiVo, 
    646 F.3d at 882
    (emphasis added). According to ARRIS, the ClientID was
    removed, not modified and the district court failed to
    analyze the system as one in which the element had been
    removed. ARRIS contends that court erred because it
    accepted the removal of the ClientID as dispositive of the
    colorable-differences prong. In short, ARRIS argues that
    the district court ended its analysis where it should have
    begun. We disagree.
    The difference between the infringing and modified
    systems represents a modification rather than a removal
    of the accused element. The relevant element of the
    adjudged infringing system is the Connection Table,
    which was updated with the ClientID. Neither the Con-
    nection Table, nor the ClientID were removed from the
    infringing device. Rather, the ClientID was moved out of
    the Connection Table and placed elsewhere in the modi-
    fied system. The district court found this modification
    significant because the ClientID still performs the same
    relevant functions in both systems, but does so in a way
    NCUBE CORPORATION   v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.      9
    that all parties admit puts the ClientID outside the claim,
    i.e., not through updating in the Connection Table. That
    is a significant change to the system. The district court
    properly found that ARRIS “failed to prove, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that there is no colorable difference
    between the ClientID functionality in the infringing ITV
    system and the ClientID functionality in the modified ITV
    system.” nCube, 
    2012 WL 4863049
    , at *5.
    ARRIS also argues that the court erred in its analysis
    by failing to compare the Connection Table of the infring-
    ing system, which is updated with both the ClientID and
    the SessionID, with the Connection Table of the modified
    system, which is updated only with the SessionID. In
    short, ARRIS argues that the ClientID and SessionID
    each contain the same 6-byte MAC address information
    and, therefore, the Connection Table in both versions of
    the system is updated with the MAC address. In the
    infringing system the Connection Table was updated with
    the two MAC addresses and in the modified system it is
    updated with only one. That, according to ARRIS, is an
    insignificant difference.
    In order for this argument to hold sway, the MAC ad-
    dress must be the portion of the ClientID that meets the
    upstream physical address limitation of claim 4. The
    problem is that ARRIS never relied on the MAC address
    at trial to prove infringement. Rather, ARRIS relied on
    the ClientID to prove infringement, but never called out
    the MAC address as the infringing aspect of that element.
    As it stands, there are significant differences between the
    ClientID and the SessionID. As is evident from the
    district court opinion, they are made up of different con-
    stituent numbers and are actually used in SeaChange’s
    systems to perform distinct functions. ARRIS does not
    challenge these facts.
    Finally, ARRIS complains that it need not prove every
    possible avenue of infringement at trial and, as such, it
    10    NCUBE CORPORATION    v. SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL INC.
    was under no obligation to prove that the SessionID also
    met the upstream physical address of the claim. Though
    ARRIS is correct that it need not prove every avenue of
    infringement, it is likewise true that the determination of
    whether more than colorable differences are present
    requires the court to focus “on those elements of the
    adjudged infringing products that the patentee previously
    contended, and proved, satisfy specific limitations of the
    asserted claims.” TiVo, 
    646 F.3d at 882
    . As the separa-
    tion of the colorable-differences and infringement compo-
    nents in TiVo indicates, the colorable-differences standard
    focuses on how the patentee in fact proved infringement,
    not what the claims require. In this way, the TiVo stand-
    ard preserves values of notice and preservation of trial
    rights by keeping contempt suitably limited. Here, as
    already described, ARRIS’s infringement proof focused
    specifically on the ClientID, not the Mac address or the
    SessionID, and—whether unnecessarily or not—stressed
    how the accused system actually used the ClientID, as to
    which the SessionID is colorably different.
    III
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the dis-
    trict court did not err in its factual findings and, there-
    fore, did not abuse its discretion in denying ARRIS’s
    motion for contempt. Because we affirm the district
    court’s analysis with respect to its treatment of the color-
    able-differences prong of TiVo, we need not reach the
    question of actual infringement by the modified ITV
    system.
    AFFIRMED