Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. 10x Genomics Inc. ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 19-2255    Document: 58     Page: 1   Filed: 08/03/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC., THE
    UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees
    v.
    10X GENOMICS INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant
    ______________________
    2019-2255, 2019-2285
    ______________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in No. 1:15-cv-00152-RGA, Judge
    Richard G. Andrews.
    ______________________
    Decided: August 3, 2020
    ______________________
    EDWARD R. REINES, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Red-
    wood Shores, CA, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also rep-
    resented by CHRISTOPHER SHAWN LAVIN, DEREK C.
    WALTER.
    E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
    LLP, New York, NY, argued for defendant-appellant. Also
    represented by ELIZABETH MOULTON, Menlo Park, CA;
    MELANIE L. BOSTWICK, Washington, DC; AZRA
    HADZIMEHMEDOVIC, Tensegrity Law Group LLP, McLean,
    VA; MATTHEW D. POWERS, ROBERT LEWIS GERRITY,
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58     Page: 2     Filed: 08/03/2020
    2           BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    Redwood Shores, CA.
    STEVEN R. TRYBUS, Locke Lord LLP, Chicago, IL, for
    amicus curiae The Broad Institute, Inc.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
    O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.
    Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. and the University of Chi-
    cago (collectively, “Bio-Rad”), accused 10X Genomics Inc.
    (“10X”) of infringing three patents: U.S. Patent Nos.
    8,889,083 (“’083 patent”); 8,304,193 (“’193 patent”); and
    8,329,407 (“’407 patent”). The United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware held a jury trial in November
    2018. The jury found all three patents valid and willfully
    infringed. It also awarded damages in the amount of
    $23,930,716. Post-trial, the district court denied 10X’s mo-
    tion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) under Fed-
    eral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), rejecting 10X’s
    arguments that (1) the accused products do not infringe; (2)
    10X’s infringement was not willful; (3) the asserted claims
    are invalid; and (4) Bio-Rad had failed to present a legally
    sufficient damages case. Bio-Rad Labs. Inc. v. 10X Ge-
    nomics, Inc., 
    396 F. Supp. 3d 369
    (D. Del. 2019). The dis-
    trict court also granted Bio-Rad’s motion for a permanent
    injunction. Bio-Rad Labs. Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc., No.
    15-cv-152-RGA, 
    2019 WL 3322322
    , at *1 (D. Del. July 24,
    2019). This appeal followed. For the reasons discussed be-
    low, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, and
    remand. Specifically, we affirm the judgment of infringe-
    ment of the ’083 patent and the entirety of the jury’s dam-
    ages award. We reverse, however, the district court’s
    construction of the asserted claims of the ’407 and ’193 pa-
    tents and vacate the judgment of infringement of those pa-
    tents. We remand for a new trial on the issue of whether
    10X’s accused products infringe the ’407 and ’193 patents
    under the proper claim construction. We also vacate the
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.           3
    district court’s injunction, but only with respect to 10X’s
    Linked-Reads and CNV product lines.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. The Claimed Technology and
    the Patents-in-Suit
    The patents-in-suit are directed to systems and meth-
    ods for forming microscopic droplets (also called “plugs”) of
    fluids to perform biochemical reactions. Microfluidic sys-
    tems—often called “labs-on-a-chip”—allow scientists to
    conduct microscale chemical and biological reactions. For
    example, the technology allows scientists to analyze and
    compare DNA, RNA, and proteins within large numbers of
    individual cells. This technology therefore has applica-
    tions in medical diagnostics and high-throughput screen-
    ing.
    Microfluidic systems utilize chips that have “microflu-
    idic channels,” hair-width pathways through which cells
    and fluids flow. In these systems, biological samples can
    be partitioned into single-cell-width droplets, which func-
    tion as mini-test tubes. Each droplet holds a single cell and
    the required reagents for the biochemical reaction. Drop-
    lets are formed by “pinching off”—flowing a carrier-fluid
    and substrate/plug-fluid (which are immiscible with each
    other) through the microfluid channels and applying pres-
    sure. The biochemical reactions may occur “on chip,” i.e.,
    in the channels inside the microchips, or, the droplets may
    be collected to allow the reactions to occur “off chip.”
    The parties agree that claim 1 of the ’083 patent, copied
    below, is representative.
    1. A microfluidic system comprising:
    a non-fluorinated microchannel;
    a carrier fluid comprising a fluorinated oil and a
    fluorinated surfactant comprising a hydrophilic
    head group in the microchannel;
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    4            BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    at least one plug comprising an aqueous plug-fluid
    in the microchannel and substantially encased by
    the carrier-fluid, wherein the fluorinated surfactant
    is present at a concentration such that surface ten-
    sion at the plug-fluid/microchannel wall interface is
    higher than surface tension at the plug-fluid/carrier
    fluid interface.
    ’083 patent, claim 1.
    During prosecution of the ’083 patent, the inventors
    amended the claims to overcome a rejection based on the
    prior art U.S. Patent No. 7,294,503 (“Quake”). Quake dis-
    closed microchannels formed or coated with Teflon (a fluor-
    inated polymer) or other fluorinated oils. The inventors
    distinguished the prior art by arguing that, unlike Quake,
    the as-filed application for the ’083 patent attempts to pre-
    vent droplets from sticking to the walls of microchannels
    and requires that the “surfactant should be chemically sim-
    ilar to the carrier fluid and chemically different from the
    channel walls.” J.A. 16640. The inventors amended the
    claims to require non-fluorinated microchannels and a
    fluorinated surfactant, which would not react with each
    other. 1 They explained that, as amended, the claims were
    1   The amendment at issue added the claim limita-
    tions shown in underlined text below:
    A microfluidic system comprising:
    a non-fluorinated microchannel;
    a carrier fluid comprising a fluorinated oil and a
    fluorinated surfactant comprising a hydrophilic
    head group in the microchannel;
    at least one plug comprising an aqueous plug-fluid
    in the microchannel and substantially encased by
    the carrier-fluid, wherein the fluorinated surfactant
    is present at a concentration such that surface
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.           5
    distinct from Quake, which did not teach microchannels
    and carrier fluids that were chemically distinct. Rather, in
    their view, Quake taught coating the microchannels with a
    fluorinated oil and using fluorinated surfactants in the car-
    rier fluid. The fluorinated microchannels and surfactants
    could, therefore, react with each other.
    The other two asserted patents, the ’407 and the ’193
    patents, are continuations of the same parent application.
    Claim 1 of the ’407 patent is reproduced below:
    1. A method for conducting a reaction in plugs in a
    microfluidic system, comprising the steps of:
    providing the microfluidic system comprising at
    least two channels having at least one junction;
    continuously flowing an aqueous fluid containing at
    least one biological molecule and at least one rea-
    gent for conducting the reaction between the biolog-
    ical molecule and the at least one reagent through
    a first channel of the at least two channels;
    continuously flowing a carrier fluid immiscible with
    the aqueous fluid through the second channel of the
    at least two channels;
    forming at least one plug of the aqueous fluid con-
    taining the at least one biological molecule and the
    at least one reagent by partitioning the aqueous
    fluid with the flowing immiscible carrier fluid at the
    junction of the at least two channels, the plug being
    substantially surrounded by the immiscible carrier
    fluid flowing through the channel, wherein the at
    tension at the plug-fluid/microchannel wall inter-
    face is higher than surface tension at the plug-
    fluid/carrier fluid interface.
    J.A. 16635.
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    6            BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    least one plug comprises at least one biological mol-
    ecule and the at least one reagent for conducting the
    reaction with the at least one biological molecule;
    and
    providing conditions suitable for the reaction in the
    at least one plug involving the at least one biological
    molecule and the at least one reagent to form a re-
    action product.
    ’407 patent, claim 1.
    The only independent claim of the ’193 patent is iden-
    tical to claim 1 of the ’407 patent, except that it specifies
    “an autocatalytic reaction” instead of a biological reaction.
    10X maintains that its arguments regarding the ’407 pa-
    tent “apply equally to the ’193 patent unless otherwise
    noted.” Appellant’s Br. 44 n.3.
    B. The Accused Products
    10X has five accused product lines: Single Cell 3’ Gene
    Expression, Linked-Reads, Single Cell V(D)J, Single Cell
    ATAC-seq, and Single Cell CNV. 10X claims to have suc-
    cessfully invented non-infringing alternatives for three of
    its five product lines but has not yet been able to design a
    replacement for two: Linked-Reads and Single Cell CNV.
    Each product line uses a hardware instrument, micro-
    fluidic chips, and a variety of specialized reagents. The
    hardware instrument is called a “controller.” The disposa-
    ble microfluidic chips, which fit in the instrument, have
    networks of “microfluidic channels,” each about the width
    of a human hair. In the accused products, droplets are
    formed at junctions in the microfluidic channels. The rea-
    gents encompass a variety of products such as enzymes,
    DNA barcodes, and 10X’s proprietary microscopic beads.
    The record does not establish which 10X products cor-
    respond to each of the product lines. For the ’083 patent,
    there were 6 accused products: Chromium Genome/Exome;
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.           7
    Chromium Genome/Exome with Kynar; GemCode Long
    Read; Chromium Single Cell 3’; Chromium Single Cell 3’
    with Kynar; and Chromium Single Cell V(D)J with Kynar.
    The jury found that all six products infringe all asserted
    claims (claims 1 and 9) of the ’083 patent. For the ’193 pa-
    tent, there were two accused products: Chromium Ge-
    nome/Exome and GemCode Long Read. The jury found
    both products infringe all asserted claims (claims 6 and 8)
    of the ’193 patent. For the ’407 patent, there were four ac-
    cused products: Chromium Genome/Exome; GemCode
    Long Read; Chromium Single Cell 3’; and Chromium Sin-
    gle Cell V(D)J. The jury found these products infringe the
    asserted claims (claims 1, 10, and 11).
    C. Procedural History
    In February 2015, patent owner University of Chicago
    and its licensee RainDance Technologies, Inc.
    (“RainDance”) filed this patent infringement suit against
    10X. Bio-Rad subsequently purchased RainDance and, in
    May 2017, was substituted for RainDance in the litigation.
    After the litigation was filed, 10X modified its products to
    add 0.02% Kynar—a non-reactive amount of a fluorine-con-
    taining resin—to its microchannels. 10X concedes that the
    addition of this amount of Kynar is irrelevant to the func-
    tioning of its products. The district court held a jury trial
    in November 2018. The jury found the patents-in-suit not
    invalid and willfully infringed. The jury then awarded Bio-
    Rad damages in the amount of $23,930,716.
    10X moved for JMOL, asserting that the accused prod-
    ucts do not infringe, that its infringement was not willful,
    that the asserted claims are not valid, and that Bio-Rad
    failed to present a legally sufficient damages case. 10X also
    requested a remittitur and moved for a new trial. On July
    3, 2019, the district court denied 10X’s motion. Bio-Rad,
    for its part, moved for a permanent injunction, attorneys’
    fees, enhanced damages, supplemental damages, and pre-
    and post-judgment interest. On July 24, 2019, the district
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    8           BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    court granted the motion with respect to the permanent in-
    junction, supplemental damages, and pre- and post-judg-
    ment interest, but denied the motion with respect to
    attorneys’ fees and enhanced damages. This appeal fol-
    lowed. 2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    §§ 1295(a)(1) and 1292(c)(2).
    II. DISCUSSION
    We review a denial of JMOL or new trial under the law
    of the regional circuit. Energy Transp. Grp., Inc. v. William
    Demant Holding A/S, 
    697 F.3d 1342
    , 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    The Third Circuit “exercise[s] plenary review of an order
    granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of
    law and appl[ies] the same standard as the district court.”
    Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 
    4 F.3d 1153
    , 1166 (3d
    Cir. 1993). JMOL is “granted only if, viewing the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it
    the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there
    is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could
    find” for the nonmovant.
    Id. The decision to
    grant or deny
    2    On August 19, 2019, 10X filed a Rule 8 Motion for
    a Stay Pending Appeal, seeking a stay of the district court’s
    injunction order. We initially ruled that 10X could con-
    tinue to sell its Linked-Reads and CNV products subject to
    the royalty and deposit requirements set forth in the dis-
    trict court’s injunction order. Order, Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v.
    10X Genomics Inc., No. 2019-2255 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19,
    2019). On September 24, 2019, we concluded that our prior
    stay order should remain in effect during the pendency of
    the appeal, noting that “10x Genomics indicates that, while
    it did not immediately have available to offer to new cus-
    tomers an instrument that would be capable of running
    only [the Linked-Reads and CNV] products, it could, in a
    matter of weeks, implement such a solution.” Order, Bio-
    Rad Labs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc., No. 2019-2255, at *2
    (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2019).
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.            9
    a new trial is committed to the discretion of the district
    court, which grants a new trial only where “a miscarriage
    of justice would result if the verdict were to stand” or where
    the verdict “shocks [the] conscience.” Williamson v. Consol.
    Rail Corp., 
    926 F.2d 1344
    , 1353 (3d Cir. 1991).
    On appeal, 10X argues that (1) it is entitled to JMOL
    of non-infringement of the three patents-in-suit; (2) the
    damages award should be vacated because it was based on
    both inadmissible and insufficient evidence; and (3) the dis-
    trict court abused its discretion in enjoining all five product
    lines. We address these arguments in turn.
    A. Infringement of the ’083 Patent
    The asserted claims of the ’083 patent recite “non-fluor-
    inated microchannels.” As of trial, 10X’s accused products
    contained microchannels with 0.02% Kynar—a fluorine-
    containing coating resin. The jury found that 10X’s ac-
    cused products, as modified, do not literally satisfy the
    “non-fluorinated microchannels” limitation but meet the
    limitation under the doctrine of equivalents. On appeal,
    10X argues that the district court erred in denying JMOL
    because “two independent legal principles” barred Bio-
    Rad’s theory of equivalence: prosecution history estoppel
    and claim vitiation. Appellant’s Br. 31–40. It also argues
    that its products cannot satisfy one of the claim limitations
    relating to the surface tension at the plug-fluid/carrier-
    fluid interface. As discussed below, we reject 10X’s argu-
    ments.
    1. Bio-Rad Was Not Estopped From
    Asserting the Doctrine of Equivalents
    “[E]quivalents remain a firmly entrenched part of the
    settled rights protected by the patent.” Festo Corp. v. Sho-
    ketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
    535 U.S. 722
    , 733
    (2002) (“Festo I”). There are certain limitations, however,
    on a patentee’s ability to obtain an infringement verdict
    under the doctrine of equivalents. One such limitation is
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    10             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    prosecution history estoppel. See, e.g.
    , id. at 737–40.
    An-
    other limitation—the doctrine of claim vitiation—ensures
    that “the application of the doctrine [of equivalents] . . . is
    not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate [a
    claim] element in its entirety.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
    Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 
    520 U.S. 17
    , 29 (1997). Both are
    at issue in this appeal.
    a. Prosecution History Estoppel
    Prosecution history estoppel arises when a patent ap-
    plicant narrows the scope of his claims during prosecution
    for a reason “substantial[ly] . . . relating to patentability.”
    See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Ka-
    bushiki Co., 
    344 F.3d 1359
    , 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en
    banc) (“Festo II”). A narrowing amendment is presumed to
    be a surrender of all equivalents within “the territory be-
    tween the original claim and the amended claim.” Festo 
    I, 535 U.S. at 740
    . This presumption can be overcome if the
    patentee can show that one of the following “exceptions” to
    prosecution history estoppel applies: (1) the rationale un-
    derlying the amendment bears no more than a tangential
    relation to the equivalent in question; (2) the equivalent
    was unforeseeable at the time of the application; or (3)
    there was some other reason suggesting that the patentee
    could not reasonably be expected to have described the
    equivalent.
    Id. at
    740–41.
    
         “[W]hether prosecution history estoppel applies, and
    hence whether the doctrine of equivalents may be available
    for a particular claim limitation, presents a question of
    law.” Festo 
    II, 344 F.3d at 1367
    –68. In making this deter-
    mination, we must “look to the specifics of the amendment
    and the rejection that provoked the amendment to deter-
    mine whether estoppel precludes the particular doctrine of
    equivalents argument being made.” Intervet Inc. v. Merial
    Ltd., 
    617 F.3d 1282
    , 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
    The district court held that prosecution history estop-
    pel does not apply in this case because the amendment at
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         11
    issue was only tangentially related to the accused equiva-
    lent. The court reasoned that, during prosecution, the in-
    ventors sought to distinguish the microchannels in their
    system from fluorinated prior art microchannels that
    would react with the carrier fluid. Bio-Rad, 
    396 F. Supp. 3d
    at 377. In the court’s view, the objectively apparent rea-
    son for the amendment was to distinguish fluorinated mi-
    crochannels from microchannels that had no fluorinated
    properties. The district court concluded that an accused
    product like 10X’s—having minute or negligible quantities
    of fluorine that have no function in the product and do not
    react with the microchannels—could meet the “non-fluori-
    nated” limitation under the doctrine of equivalents.
    Id. On appeal, the
    parties do not dispute that the amend-
    ment at issue was narrowing, or that it was made to over-
    come prior art.      Instead, they dispute whether the
    tangentiality exception to prosecution history estoppel ap-
    plies. 10X argues, as it did before the district court, that
    prosecution history estoppel applies because the ’083 pa-
    tent inventors narrowed the claims to recite a “non-fluori-
    nated microchannel” to overcome Quake, which taught
    “fluorinated” microchannels. 10X argues that, with this
    amendment, the inventors surrendered all territory be-
    tween the original limitation—microchannels generally—
    and the amended limitation—non-fluorinated microchan-
    nels. Appellant’s Br. 33–34. Accordingly, 10X contends
    that the district court erred in applying the “tangentiality”
    exception for a narrowing amendment. 10X characterizes
    the district court’s analysis as “recasting” the inventors’
    disclaimer as covering only microchannels coated with flu-
    orine “for a purpose.”
    Id. at
    35 
    (emphasis omitted). In
    10X’s view, by rewriting the claims during prosecution, the
    inventors surrendered the right to expand their monopoly
    to cover microchannels containing fluorine, “for whatever
    purpose.”
    Id. at
    36.
    
         Bio-Rad argues that the tangentiality exception to
    prosecution history estoppel allows it to assert and prevail
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    12             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    under the doctrine of equivalents. In Bio-Rad’s view, the
    reason for narrowing the claims was “peripheral, or not di-
    rectly relevant to the alleged equivalent.” Appellees’ Br. 20
    (quoting Festo 
    II, 344 F.3d at 1369
    ). Bio-Rad contends that
    the patentees amended the claims to make clear that the
    carrier fluid and the microchannel wall should be chemi-
    cally distinct, which bears no more than a tangential rela-
    tion to the alleged equivalent—microchannel walls
    containing a nominal amount of fluorine that is not chemi-
    cally distinct from the carrier fluid. We agree with Bio-
    Rad.
    The prosecution history of the ’083 patent establishes
    that the objectively apparent reason for adding the “non-
    fluorinated microchannels” limitation was no more than
    tangentially related to the equivalent at issue. In amend-
    ing the claims, the patentees sought to distinguish the
    claimed invention from Quake, which disclosed fluorinated
    microchannel wall coatings that would react with the car-
    rier fluid. The inventors argued that preventing droplets
    from sticking to the walls of the microchannels requires the
    surfactant to be chemically similar to the carrier fluid and
    chemically different from the channel walls. The inventors
    therefore amended the claims to make clear that the car-
    rier fluid and the microchannel wall should be chemically
    distinct. By claiming non-fluorinated microchannels and a
    fluorinated surfactant, the inventors made sure that, in
    contrast to the Quake disclosure, the carrier fluid and mi-
    crochannels in the claimed invention would not react with
    each other, thereby preventing droplets from sticking to
    the walls of the microchannels. As such, the inventors’ de-
    cision to add the “non-fluorinated microchannels” limita-
    tion must be considered in the context of adding, at the
    same time, the limitation of a “fluorinated surfactant” to
    the carrier fluid.
    The inventors’ statements during prosecution confirm
    that the “rationale underlying the [narrowing] amendment
    [bore] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         13
    in question”—here, microchannels containing negligible
    amounts of fluorine, which cannot react with the carrier
    fluid. See Festo 
    I, 535 U.S. at 740
    –41. As the district court
    explained, the inventors surrendered microchannels
    coated with fluorine “for a purpose—not those containing
    de minimis amounts of fluorine that have no effect on how
    the microchannel functions in the system.” Bio-Rad, 
    396 F. Supp. 3d
    at 377 (emphasis added). As such, Bio-Rad was
    not barred from asserting that microchannels containing
    negligible amounts of fluorine are equivalent to “non-fluor-
    inated microchannels.”
    We reject 10X’s argument that the “Quake patent un-
    ambiguously contained the accused equivalent,” and there-
    fore, this amendment cannot be tangential. Appellant’s Br.
    34–35. The crux of the tangentiality inquiry remains “the
    patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing
    amendment . . . [as] discernible from the prosecution his-
    tory record.” Festo 
    II, 344 F.3d at 1369
    . As explained
    above, the prosecution history record reveals that the rea-
    son for the amendment was to distinguish microchannels
    that reacted with carrier fluids. Quake disclosed fluori-
    nated microchannels generally. It did not expressly dis-
    close microchannels with non-reacting, negligible levels of
    fluorine, like in the accused equivalent. The question here
    is not whether Quake disclosed fluorinated microchannels,
    but rather, whether Quake taught the use of non-reactive
    amounts of fluorination in the microchannels. It did not.
    Accordingly, the narrowing amendment can only be said to
    have a tangential relation to the equivalent at issue—neg-
    ligibly fluorinated microchannels, or, put differently, mi-
    crochannels with non-fluorinated properties.
    The parties each cite several of our cases in support of
    or against the application of the tangentiality exception to
    prosecution history estoppel. Prosecution history estoppel,
    including the tangentiality inquiry, is always a case-spe-
    cific analysis. The objectively apparent reason discernable
    from the prosecution history record will, accordingly, differ
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    14             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    in each case. For example, we recently considered these
    issues in Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 
    945 F.3d 1368
    (Fed. Cir. 2020). There, the accused product
    used “pregelatinized starch” as a binder, and the asserted
    claim did not list pregelatinized starch in its Markush
    group reciting binders.
    Id. at
    1380. 
    The patent owner as-
    serted infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, ar-
    guing that pregelatinized starch functioned as a binder in
    the accused product. We noted that the patent owner re-
    vised the claim’s binder limitations to be in Markush group
    format to overcome prior art references that taught the use
    of pregelatinized starch as a binder.
    Id. at
    1382. 
    Accord-
    ingly, we concluded that the amendment—made to avoid
    prior art that contains the equivalent in question—was not
    tangential.
    Id. Because the prior
    art references at issue
    taught the use of the alleged equivalent for the claimed
    function, the tangentiality exception to prosecution history
    estoppel could not apply. Here, by contrast, Quake did not
    teach the use of the alleged equivalent—negligibly fluori-
    nated microchannels or those with no fluorinated proper-
    ties.
    We also recently addressed the tangentiality exception
    in Eli Lilly v. Hospira, Inc., where the patent owner nar-
    rowed the claims during prosecution to recite “pemetrexed
    disodium” instead of “an antifolate.” 
    933 F.3d 1320
    ,
    1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The accused equivalent at issue
    was pemetrexed ditromethamine, which is functionally
    identical to pemetrexed disodium.
    Id. at
    1327. 
    We con-
    cluded that “[t]he reason for Lilly’s amendment . . . was to
    narrow original claim 2 to avoid Arsenyan, which only dis-
    closes treatments using methotrexate, a different antifo-
    late.”
    Id. at
    1331. 
    Thus, claiming the functionally
    equivalent pemetrexed salts was tangential to overcoming
    prior art disclosing an antifolate other than pemetrexed.
    Here too, functionally equivalent microchannels (i.e., mi-
    crochannels with no fluorinated properties) are tangential
    to the patentees’ reason for distinguishing Quake, which
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 15    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.          15
    disclosed fluorinated microchannels. We find this case
    more analogous to Eli Lilly than to Amgen.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the district court cor-
    rectly held that prosecution history estoppel does not apply
    in this case.
    b. Claim Vitiation
    Claim vitiation presents another bar to a finding of in-
    fringement under the doctrine of equivalents. “[S]aying
    that a claim element would be vitiated is akin to saying
    that there is no equivalent to the claim element in the ac-
    cused device based on the well-established ‘function-way-
    result’ or ‘insubstantial differences’ tests.” Brilliant In-
    struments, Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC, 
    707 F.3d 1342
    , 1347
    (Fed. Cir. 2013). More recently, we have explained that vi-
    tiation “is not an exception or threshold determination that
    forecloses resort to the doctrine of equivalents, but is in-
    stead a legal conclusion of a lack of equivalence based on
    the evidence presented and the theory of equivalence as-
    serted.” UCB, Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 
    927 F.3d 1272
    ,
    1283 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Ex-
    ela PharmSci Inc., 
    780 F.3d 1364
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015));
    see also DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
    Inc., 
    469 F.3d 1005
    , 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he ‘all ele-
    ments’ rule generally is not met—and therefore a claim
    limitation can be said to be vitiated—if the theory or evi-
    dence of equivalence is legally incapable of establishing
    that the differences between the limitation in the claim and
    the accused device are insubstantial; i.e., if the theory or
    evidence is so legally insufficient as to warrant a holding of
    non-infringement as a matter of law.”).
    On appeal, 10X argues that the doctrine of equivalents
    is unavailable to Bio-Rad because “fluorinated” and “non-
    fluorinated” are “diametric opposites” and because a fluor-
    inated microchannel is the “antitheses” of a non-fluori-
    nated microchannel. Appellant’s Br. 37–40 (citing, e.g.,
    Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 
    229 F.3d 1091
    ,
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 16       Filed: 08/03/2020
    16             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    1115 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). In 10X’s view, allowing Bio-Rad
    to argue that fluorinated microchannels are equivalent to
    non-fluorinated microchannels entirely vitiates the “non-
    fluorinated microchannel” limitation. 10X also cites sev-
    eral of our prior cases where we found that a claim element
    cannot be supplied by an alleged equivalent that was the
    opposite of the missing element. Despite some surface ap-
    peal, these arguments do not hold up under even minimal
    scrutiny.
    10X attempts to extend our cases regarding claim viti-
    ation beyond their facts. Relying on Deere & Co. v. Bush
    Hog, LLC, 
    703 F.3d 1349
    , 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the district
    court concluded that a reasonable jury could find on the
    facts presented here that non-fluorinated microchannels
    and minimally-fluorinated microchannels with no reactive
    properties are equivalent. 10X criticizes the district court’s
    reliance on Deere as “invok[ing] only dicta.” Appellant’s
    Br. 39. It also argues that Deere did not override our prior
    cases discussing “opposites” but instead dealt with a sce-
    nario where the claim element did not present a binary
    choice. Appellant’s Reply Br. 7. 10X, however, ignores the
    fact that we have repeatedly emphasized the principle out-
    lined in Deere in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Cadence
    Pharm. 
    Inc., 780 F.3d at 1371
    (collecting cases).
    In Brilliant Instruments, for example, we explained
    that vitiation comes into play when the alleged equivalent
    is “diametrically opposed” to the missing claim element.
    “[W]hen the accused structure has an element that is the
    opposite of the claimed element,” it is “more difficult” for a
    patentee to succeed on a theory of 
    equivalents. 707 F.3d at 1347
    . We also explained that “[i]f the claimed and ac-
    cused elements are recognized by those of skill in the art to
    be opposing ways of doing something, they are likely not
    insubstantially different.”
    Id. at
    1347–48. 
    And, we noted,
    “this concept [applies] to cases where we have recognized
    that two alternatives exist that are very different from
    each other and therefore cannot be equivalents for
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 17    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.          17
    infringement purposes.”
    Id. at
    1348 
    (citing, e.g., Moore
    U.S.A., 
    Inc., 229 F.3d at 1106
    ).
    Notably, in Cadence Pharmaceuticals, we cautioned
    against using labels like “antithesis” in lieu of conducting
    the proper inquiry of infringement under the doctrine of
    equivalents:
    Characterizing an element of an accused product as
    the “antithesis” of a claimed element is also a con-
    clusion that should not be used to overlook the fac-
    tual analysis required to establish whether the
    differences between a claimed limitation and an ac-
    cused structure or step are substantial vel non. The
    determination of equivalence depends not on labels
    like “vitiation” and “antithesis” but on the proper
    assessment of the language of the claimed limita-
    tion and the substantiality of whatever relevant dif-
    ferences may exist in the accused structure.
    Cadence 
    Pharm., 780 F.3d at 1372
    .
    Accordingly, we reject 10X’s attempt to limit the in-
    quiry to a binary choice between “fluorinated” and “non-
    fluorinated” microchannels, and its conclusion that in-
    fringement under the doctrine of equivalents is unavaila-
    ble to Bio-Rad as a matter of law. The appropriate inquiry
    is whether a reasonable juror could have found that a neg-
    ligibly-fluorinated microchannel performs the same func-
    tion, in the same way, and achieves the same result, as a
    non-fluorinated microchannel. Here, based on the evidence
    presented at trial—including the testimony of Bio-Rad’s ex-
    pert, Dr. Sia—the district court concluded that a reasona-
    ble juror could find that a 0.02% Kynar-containing
    microchannel is insubstantially different from a non-fluor-
    inated microchannel. Bio-Rad, 
    396 F. Supp. 3d
    at 378. The
    non-fluorinated microchannel claim limitation is not
    stripped of meaning, or “effectively eliminate[d],” Warner-
    
    Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29
    , by Bio-Rad’s theory and the
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58     Page: 18      Filed: 08/03/2020
    18             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    jury’s finding that the accused microchannel, having too lit-
    tle fluorine to alter its reactive properties, is an equivalent.
    10X does not challenge that substantial evidence sup-
    ports the jury’s finding that a 0.02% Kynar-containing mi-
    crochannel is insubstantially different from a non-
    fluorinated microchannel. Accordingly, 10X’s challenges
    concerning the infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
    lents fail.
    2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict
    that 10X’s Accused Products Meet the Claimed
    Surface Tension Relationship
    10X next argues that it is entitled to JMOL of non-in-
    fringement of the ’083 patent because none of its products
    have a plug-fluid/microchannel wall interface. Appellant’s
    Br. 40–42. According to 10X, without such an interface, its
    products cannot satisfy the claim limitation “wherein the
    fluorinated surfactant is present at a concentration such
    that the surface tension at the plug-fluid/microchannel
    wall interface is higher than the surface tension at the
    plug-fluid/carrier-fluid interface.”
    Id. at
    40 
    (quoting ’083
    patent, col. 73 ll. 16–21) (emphasis omitted). 10X contends
    that the droplets in its chips are fully encased by the car-
    rier fluid and do not touch the channel wall, meaning they
    do not have the plug-fluid/microchannel wall interface, and
    thus cannot infringe.
    Bio-Rad responds that the claims do not require the
    plug-fluid to be in actual physical contact with the micro-
    channel walls. Appellees’ Br. 24. In Bio-Rad’s view, the
    asserted claims merely require that the droplet/wall sur-
    face tension is higher than the droplet/carrier-fluid surface
    tension. According to Bio-Rad, the purpose of the claimed
    surface tension relationship is to allow the formation of
    plugs/droplets that do not stick to the channel walls, just
    like those in 10X’s products.
    Id. at
    25. 
    We again agree with
    Bio-Rad.
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.             19
    The district court correctly noted that the claims do not
    require direct contact between the plug-fluid and the mi-
    crochannel wall. They only require that the surface tension
    at the plug-fluid/microchannel wall interface is higher than
    that between the carrier fluid and the plug fluid. The spec-
    ification explains the purpose of this claimed surface ten-
    sion relationship: “If this condition is not satisfied, plugs
    tend to adhere to the channel walls and do not undergo
    smooth transport.” ’083 patent, col. 20 ll. 56–58. And, the
    specification clearly sets forth the purpose of introducing
    the surfactant:
    Because the walls of the channels (PDMS, not fluor-
    inated) and the carrier-fluid (fluorinated oil) are
    substantially different chemically, when a fluori-
    nated surfactant is introduced, the surfactant re-
    duces the surface tension at the oil-water interface
    preferentially over the wall-water interface. This
    allows the formation of plugs that do not stick to the
    channel walls.
    Id. at
    col. 20 l. 63–col. 21 l. 2. Given this, we find that 10X’s
    argument that its accused products cannot meet this limi-
    tation is without merit.
    We also agree with the district court that sufficient ev-
    idence supports the jury’s finding that 10X’s products meet
    the claimed surface tension limitation. 10X’s own expert,
    Dr. Huck, admitted that the surface tension relationship is
    met if the droplets do not contact channel walls. The par-
    ties do not dispute that this is the case for 10X’s accused
    products. The jury also considered the testimony of Bio-
    Rad’s expert, Dr. Sia, who presented testing evidence
    demonstrating that the claim limitation was met. Accord-
    ingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied
    10X’s motion for JMOL of non-infringement of the ’083 pa-
    tent and affirm the judgment of infringement of this pa-
    tent.
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 20       Filed: 08/03/2020
    20             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    B. Infringement of the ’407 and ’193 Patents
    10X’s non-infringement arguments regarding the ’407
    and ’193 patents are based on its contention that the dis-
    trict court misconstrued the asserted claims of these pa-
    tents. Specifically, 10X argues that, contrary to the district
    court’s construction, the preambles of these patents’ inde-
    pendent claims are limiting. We review claim construction
    de novo, reviewing subsidiary factual findings based on ex-
    trinsic evidence for clear error. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.
    Sandoz, Inc., 
    574 U.S. 318
    (2015).
    Whether a preamble is limiting is “determined on the
    facts of each case in light of the overall form of the claim,
    and the invention as described in the specification and il-
    luminated in the prosecution history.” Applied Materials,
    Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 
    98 F.3d 1563
    , 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A preamble limits the
    claimed invention if it recites essential structure or steps,
    or if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to
    the claim. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
    182 F.3d 1298
    , 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). If the claim uses the pre-
    amble only to state a purpose or intended use for the inven-
    tion, then the preamble is not limiting. Catalina Mktg.
    Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 
    289 F.3d 801
    , 808 (Fed.
    Cir. 2002). And, a preamble is generally not limiting un-
    less there is “clear reliance on the preamble during prose-
    cution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior
    art.”
    Id. Reliance on a
    preamble phrase for antecedent ba-
    sis, however, may limit claim scope. Bell Commc’ns Re-
    search, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 
    55 F.3d 615
    , 620
    (Fed. Cir. 1995).
    The preamble at issue recites “[a] method for conduct-
    ing a reaction in plugs in a microfluidic system, comprising
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 21    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.          21
    the steps of . . . .” ’407 patent, col. 78 ll. 54–55. 3 At the
    Markman stage, the district court found that the preamble
    was limiting “only to the extent that it provides an ante-
    cedent basis for the terms ‘microfluidic system’ and ‘reac-
    tion.’” Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc., No.
    1:15-CV-00152-RGA, 
    2017 WL 382235
    , at *7 (D. Del. Jan.
    26, 2017)). It found that the preamble at issue “states an
    intended use for the invention, ‘followed by the body of the
    claim, in which the claim limitations describing the inven-
    tion are recited.’”
    Id. (quoting TomTom, Inc.
    v. Adolph,
    
    790 F.3d 1315
    , 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It also found that
    the invention, as claimed, was “‘structurally complete’
    without the remaining preamble language.”
    Id. In its motion
    for JMOL, 10X argued that, under the
    correct claim construction, the preambles limit the claims
    to methods of conducting reactions inside a microfluidic
    system, i.e., to “on-chip” reactions only. The district court
    rejected 10X’s argument. It found that the preamble terms
    “reaction” and “microfluidic systems” provide antecedent
    basis for the use of those terms in the body of the claim, but
    that this does not necessarily convert the entire preamble
    into a limitation. Bio-Rad, 
    396 F. Supp. 3d
    at 380 (“While
    portions of a preamble may be limiting where those por-
    tions provide an antecedent basis for terms appearing in
    the body of the claim, it is inappropriate to construe an en-
    tire preamble as limiting if the rest of the preamble lan-
    guage is not limiting.”). According to the district court, the
    italicized portion of the preamble “conducting a reaction in
    plugs in a microfluidic system” was not limiting because
    3   The preamble of the claims of the ’193 patent recite
    an “autocatalytic reaction” instead of a “reaction.” ’193 pa-
    tent, col. 78 ll. 8–9. 10X states that the same arguments
    apply to the preambles of both the ’407 and ’193 patent
    claims and Bio-Rad offers no dispute on that point. Accord-
    ingly, our analysis applies to both patents.
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    22             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    this language does not “provide an antecedent basis for the
    rest of the claim and follows the standard pattern of a
    ‘method for a purpose or intended use comprising,’ followed
    by the body of the claim.”
    Id. at
    381 (citing 
    TomTom, 790 F.3d at 1324
    ).
    On appeal, 10X again argues that the preamble term
    “reaction in plugs in a microfluidic system” is limiting. In
    10X’s view, the preamble requires the chemical reaction to
    take place in the droplets while the droplets are inside the
    microfluidic system, i.e., the claimed methods are limited
    to “on-chip” reactions. By contrast, 10X argues, the reac-
    tions in its accused products are “off-chip” reactions—they
    are not completed until after a researcher removes the
    droplets from the microchannel and places them in a ther-
    mal cycler. Appellant’s Br. 51–53.
    10X argues that, as the district court found, the pream-
    ble clearly provides antecedent basis for the claim limita-
    tions “the microfluidic system” and “the reaction.” It
    contends that, taken in conjunction with the specification
    and the prosecution history of the ’407 patent, this estab-
    lishes the drafter’s intent to treat the entire preamble as
    limiting. Although we held in TomTom that it is possible
    for one part of the preamble to be limiting even though an-
    other portion is not, 10X asserts that TomTom does not ap-
    ply where, as here, the preamble terms at issue were not
    distinct phrases. According to 10X, it was error to give lim-
    iting effect to certain terms in the preamble (“reaction” and
    “microfluidic system”) but not to other terms surrounding
    those limiting parts (“conducting” and “in”).
    In Bio-Rad’s view, the district court correctly found
    that the disputed language is a non-limiting statement of
    intended use or purpose. Bio-Rad also argues that, under
    TomTom, an entire preamble need not be limiting simply
    because it provides an antecedent basis in part. Bio-Rad
    further argues that 10X’s non-enablement theory at trial
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    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         23
    contradicts its arguments here. This time, we agree with
    10X.
    The district court’s application of TomTom to the facts
    before it is erroneous. In TomTom, we held that the district
    court erred in determining that it had to construe the en-
    tire preamble if it construed a portion of it. 
    TomTom, 790 F.3d at 1322
    –24. The two-part preamble of the asserted
    claim recited: “[1] [a] method for generating and updating
    data [2] for use in a destination tracking system of at least
    one mobile unit comprising . . . .”
    Id. at
    1322 (alteration
    omitted). We held that the first part of the preamble,
    “method for generating and updating data,” was not limit-
    ing and did not provide an antecedent basis for any claim
    terms.
    Id. at
    1323–24. We also found that the term did not
    recite essential structure or steps, or give necessary life,
    meaning, and vitality to the claim; rather, it stated “a pur-
    pose or intended use.”
    Id. At the same
    time, we held that
    the second part of the preamble, “destination tracking sys-
    tem of at least one mobile unit,” was limiting because it
    provided antecedent basis for “the mobile unit” recited in
    the body of the claims.
    Id. Thus, we found
    that TomTom
    involved a partially-limiting preamble.
    Crucially, unlike TomTom, the preamble in this case
    cannot be neatly packaged into two separate portions. Nor
    does it simply recite a method for an intended use or pur-
    pose. The district court held that the preamble terms “re-
    action” and “microfluidic systems” provide antecedent
    basis for the use of those terms in the body of the claim.
    We agree with the court on this point. But we disagree that
    these limiting terms can be read separately from the re-
    mainder of the preamble. The language relied upon for an-
    tecedent basis in the preamble at issue is intertwined with
    the rest of the preamble. The term “conducting” in the pre-
    amble is not analogous to the non-limiting language at is-
    sue in TomTom.
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    24             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    We also are disinclined to sanction finding a preamble
    “partially” limiting by splicing it as the district court did
    here. The fact that the terms “reaction” and “microfluidic
    systems” provide antecedent basis for these terms in the
    body of the claim is a strong indication that the preamble
    acts “as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”
    Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 
    323 F.3d 1332
    , 1339
    (Fed. Cir. 2003). Based on the antecedent relationship, it
    is clear the claim drafters intended to limit the claimed
    methods to on-chip reactions, using both the preamble and
    the body of the claim to define the claimed invention. 4 Ac-
    cordingly, we conclude that the district court’s claim con-
    struction is erroneous. Under the correct construction, the
    claimed methods are limited to on-chip reactions.
    Bio-Rad argues that, even if the preamble is limiting,
    the jury’s infringement verdict should be upheld. As a
    court of review, we refuse to decide, in the first instance,
    whether 10X’s systems would infringe under the correct
    construction. Even Bio-Rad concedes that the district court
    precluded 10X from arguing that the entire preamble is
    limiting. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judg-
    ment of infringement of the claims of the ’407 and ’193 pa-
    tents and remand for a new trial on those issues.
    4  The prosecution history of the patent, although not
    dispositive in this case, provides additional support for con-
    struing the claims as limited to reactions in a microfluidic
    system. During prosecution, the examiner amended both
    the preambles and the titles of the patents to specify that
    the reactions are conducted “in plugs in the microfluidic
    system.” J.A. 8625–29; J.A. 8632.
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 25    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.          25
    C. DAMAGES
    Despite vacating the district court’s judgment of in-
    fringement of two of the patents-in-suit, we proceed with
    considering the parties’ arguments concerning damages be-
    cause we affirm the judgment of infringement of the ’083
    patent—which covers all six accused product lines. The
    jury verdict and jury instructions show that the damages
    award is not predicated on infringement of any one patent.
    J.A. 378 (“If you found that 10X Genomics infringed any of
    the asserted claims of the ’083, ’193, or ’407 [p]atents . . .
    then with respect to that claim or those claims, please an-
    swer [the question on damages].”); J.A. 410 (“If you find
    that Plaintiffs have established infringement of a valid pa-
    tent claim of the patents-in-suit, Plaintiffs will be entitled
    to a reasonable royalty to compensate them for that in-
    fringement.”). As Bio-Rad explained during oral argument,
    affirming the judgment of infringement on the ’083 pa-
    tent—which includes the only asserted apparatus claims—
    would leave the damages award undisturbed. Oral Arg. at
    21:18–44, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.g
    ov/default.aspx?fl=19-2255.mp3. 10X did not dispute this
    point either at oral argument or in its briefing to us. In
    fact, in its opening brief, 10X argued that reversal as to the
    ’083 patent would affect the damages award, see Appel-
    lant’s Br. 42, but did not make such an argument for the
    ’407 and ’193 patents.
    The jury awarded almost $24 million in damages—the
    full requested amount based on a reasonable royalty rate
    of 15%. On appeal, 10X argues that the damages award
    should be vacated because Bio-Rad’s expert relied on li-
    censes that were not comparable to the hypothetical nego-
    tiation. 10X further argues that Bio-Rad’s expert did not
    apportion damages to the value of the patented technology.
    As discussed below, we reject these arguments.
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58      Page: 26     Filed: 08/03/2020
    26             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
    in Allowing the Jury to Consider Testimony
    Regarding the Three Licenses at Issue
    At trial, the parties used the hypothetical negotiation
    or the “willing licensor-willing licensee” approach for calcu-
    lating reasonable royalty damages. This approach at-
    tempts to calculate the royalty rate the parties would have
    agreed upon had they negotiated an agreement prior to the
    start of the infringement. In determining a reasonable roy-
    alty, parties frequently rely on comparable license agree-
    ments. See Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,
    
    318 F. Supp. 1116
    , 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Radio
    Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 
    788 F.2d 1554
    , 1557
    (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The determination of a reasonabl[e] roy-
    alty . . . is based . . . on the royalty to which a willing licen-
    sor and a willing licensee would have agreed at the time
    the infringement began.”). Assessing the comparability of
    licenses requires a consideration of whether the license at
    issue involves comparable technology, is economically com-
    parable, and arises under comparable circumstances as the
    hypothetical negotiation. See generally LaserDynamics,
    Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 
    694 F.3d 51
    (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    We review the district court’s decision to admit expert
    testimony for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
    
    522 U.S. 136
    , 146 (1997). The jury’s determination of the
    amount of damages is an issue of fact, which we review for
    substantial evidence. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
    
    580 F.3d 1301
    , 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A jury’s damages
    award “must be upheld unless the amount is grossly exces-
    sive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence,
    or based only on speculation or guesswork.”
    Id. (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    At trial, Bio-Rad’s damages expert, Mr. Malackowski,
    based his reasonable royalty calculation on three licenses
    that he deemed comparable: (1) the Caliper/RainDance li-
    cense (2) the Applera/Bio-Rad license, and (3) the Applied
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 27    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         27
    Bio/QuantaLife license. In its motion for JMOL, 10X ar-
    gued that Mr. Malackowski’s testimony was not suffi-
    ciently tied to the facts of the case because it was based on
    technologically noncomparable licenses. The district court
    agreed with 10X as to the Applera/Bio-Rad license, finding
    that Bio-Rad had failed to present sufficient evidence of the
    technological comparability of this license. But it nonethe-
    less denied 10X’s motion for JMOL because the other two
    licenses provided sufficient support for Mr. Malackowski’s
    reasonable royalty opinions. Bio-Rad, 
    396 F. Supp. 3d
    at
    386.
    On appeal, 10X argues that Mr. Malackowski’s expert
    opinion should be vacated because it was based on evidence
    that was “both inadmissible and insufficient.” Appellant’s
    Br. 54. 10X also provides extensive argument as to why
    each of the three licenses is not technologically comparable
    to the technology at issue in the hypothetical negotiation.
    Id. at
    59–64.
    This court has often excluded licenses that are techno-
    logically or economically non-comparable. See, e.g., La-
    
    serDynamics, 694 F.3d at 77
    –78 (“The propriety of using
    prior settlement agreements to prove the amount of a rea-
    sonable royalty is questionable.”); ResQNet.com, Inc. v.
    Lansa, Inc., 
    594 F.3d 860
    , 873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (district
    court erred by considering certain licenses and adjusting
    “upward” the reasonable royalty rate “without any factual
    findings that accounted for the technological and economic
    differences between those licenses”). The court has also
    held, however, that the issue of comparability is often one
    of sufficiency of the evidence, not admissibility. Ericsson,
    Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 
    773 F.3d 1201
    , 1227 (Fed. Cir.
    2014) (“[T]he fact that a license is not perfectly analogous
    generally goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admis-
    sibility.”); see also Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
    
    626 F.3d 1197
    , 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2010); ActiveVideo Net-
    works, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 
    694 F.3d 1312
    , 1333
    (Fed. Cir. 2012). Finjan, for example, involved a license
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 28       Filed: 08/03/2020
    28             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    which related to a lump sum payment rather than a run-
    ning 
    royalty. 626 F.3d at 1211
    –12. We affirmed a damages
    award because the “differences permitted the jury to
    properly discount [that license].”
    Id. at
    1212. Likewise, in
    ActiveVideo, the damages expert relied on two agreements,
    one of which did not involve the patents or technologies in
    the 
    case. 694 F.3d at 1333
    . We concluded that the district
    court did not abuse its discretion by failing to exclude the
    testimony of the damages expert because the “degree of
    comparability” of the license agreements is a “factual is-
    sue[] best addressed by cross examination and not by ex-
    clusion.”
    Id. Here, the district
    court concluded that Mr. Malackow-
    ski had met a showing of “baseline comparability” and that
    the “degree of comparability is a factual issue best ad-
    dressed through cross examination.” Bio-Rad, 396 F.
    Supp. 3d at 388. The Caliper/RainDance and Applied-
    Bio/QuantaLife licenses covered patents related to micro-
    fluids. The third license, Applera/Bio-Rad, dealt with
    thermal PCR cyclers—instruments that are used in bio-
    chemical reactions. The “degree of comparability” was ap-
    propriately left for the jury to decide. See Active 
    Video, 694 F.3d at 1333
    . Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in
    allowing Mr. Malackowski to testify about these licenses.
    We are also not persuaded by 10X’s argument that, be-
    cause the district court ultimately concluded that Bio-Rad
    had not presented sufficient evidence of comparability of
    the Applera/Bio-Rad agreement, the jury should never
    have heard testimony regarding this agreement. 10X con-
    tends that it is entitled to a new trial on this ground alone,
    unless it is “highly probable” that the error of admitting
    testimony about this license did not affect the jury’s ver-
    dict. Appellant’s Br. 58 (quoting Hirst v. Inverness Hotel
    Corp., 
    544 F.3d 221
    , 228 (3d Cir. 2008)). We see several
    problems with 10X’s argument.
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 29    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.          29
    Even assuming 10X sufficiently developed this argu-
    ment in its opening appellate brief (which it did not), 10X
    does not challenge the jury instructions regarding the cal-
    culation of a reasonable royalty, which properly instructed
    the jury to account for any differences between the licenses.
    J.A. 415 (“[I]f you choose to rely upon evidence from any
    other license agreements, you must account for any differ-
    ences between those licenses and the hypothetically nego-
    tiated license . . . in terms of the technologies and economic
    circumstances of the contracting parties.”). The record also
    shows that 10X’s Daubert motion regarding Mr. Malackow-
    ski’s opinions was directed to his overall testimony, not to
    the exclusion of any one agreement. 10X also did not move
    the court during trial to exclude the specific agreement.
    10X’s arguments on this issue again conflate the question
    of admissibility with the question of degree of comparabil-
    ity of the licenses. On this record, we see no abuse of dis-
    cretion in admitting Mr. Malackowski’s testimony, even if
    the district court ultimately determined that Bio-Rad did
    not provide substantial evidence of technological compara-
    bility of one of the three licenses. Accordingly, we disagree
    with 10X that the jury should have never heard testimony
    regarding the Applera/Bio-Rad license, and reject its re-
    quest for a new trial.
    2. The Jury’s Damages Award Is Supported
    by Substantial Evidence
    10X also argues that no reasonable juror could find the
    three licenses comparable to the claimed invention. In-
    stead of the three licenses relied upon by Mr. Malackowski,
    10X contends that the University of Chicago/RainDance li-
    cense is the most comparable license because it concerns
    the patents-in-suit. We are not persuaded.
    The evidence at trial addressed each of the non-compa-
    rability arguments 10X is now raising on appeal. As to the
    University of Chicago/RainDance license, Mr. Malackow-
    ski opined that this license, from a university to a licensor
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 30       Filed: 08/03/2020
    30             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    in the nascent period of the droplet technology, is not com-
    parable to the hypothetical negotiation between two com-
    petitors in the context of a more developed field. He also
    explained that it was a non-competitive and exclusive li-
    cense, further distinguishing it from the hypothetical nego-
    tiation. 10X then cross-examined Mr. Malackowski on this
    issue. The jury was free to accept this testimony and to
    reject the 1–3% royalty rate proposed by 10X based on the
    University of Chicago/RainDance agreement.
    As to the comparability of the Caliper/RainDance li-
    cense, 10X argues that the license is not comparable for
    several reasons: (1) it deals with consumables (reagents
    and chips) and not with expensive instruments; (2) the li-
    cense involved 500+ patents relating to microfluids, not
    three patents dealing with specific droplet generation and
    manipulation; and (3) the 15% rate was “pure fiction” and
    never really actualized because RainDance and Caliper
    never competed in the licensed space. Appellant’s Br.
    62–63.
    The evidence at trial was sufficient to show compara-
    bility of the Caliper/RainDance agreement. The jury heard
    the testimony of Bio-Rad’s technical expert, Dr. Sia, who
    testified that the Caliper patents were comparable because
    they dealt with microfluids and the asserted patents also
    deal with the same subject matter, but specifically with
    droplets. Bio-Rad’s corporate witness, Ms. Tumolo, also ac-
    counted for the difference in the number of patents in the
    Caliper/RainDance agreement and the hypothetical nego-
    tiation. According to Ms. Tumolo, the large number of Cal-
    iper patents in the Caliper/RainDance license were a
    necessary but very small part of the licensed RainDance
    portfolio; the main technology was the droplet technology,
    covered by the three patents-in-suit. Ms. Tumolo also ad-
    dressed the 15% royalty rate, confirming that once
    RainDance directly competed with Caliper, the 15% royalty
    rate would apply. As to differentiating between licenses
    relating to consumables versus instruments, most of the
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 31    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         31
    reasonable royalty damages at issue come from sales of
    consumables, not instruments. Accordingly, a reasonable
    juror could have concluded that the Caliper/RainDance li-
    cense was comparable to the hypothetical negotiation, and
    substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that a 15%
    reasonable royalty applies.
    10X makes similar arguments regarding the Applied-
    Bio/QuantaLife license. It argues that (1) the license does
    not require payments for instruments or even chips, and
    the 10–15% royalty rate for reagents cannot be directly
    translated to a royalty rate for expensive instruments; (2)
    the license focuses on a PCR enzyme that transformed the
    field; and (3) Mr. Malackowski did not address these differ-
    ences. Appellant’s Br. 60–61. We disagree.
    The evidence at trial supports a finding of comparabil-
    ity for this agreement as well. For example, the jury con-
    sidered the testimony of Dr. Sia, who explained that the
    license was comparable to the hypothetical negotiation be-
    cause the AppliedBio license covered reagents that would
    enable a researcher to perform PCR in an improved man-
    ner, and the patents-in-suit also deal with performing im-
    proved PCR reactions using droplet technology. The jury
    also heard the testimony of Bio-Rad’s corporate witness,
    Ms. Tumolo, who compared the two technologies and testi-
    fied that the $0.12 per-unit royalty for the improved rea-
    gents in the AppliedBio agreement would translate to a
    much higher royalty rate per reaction in the hypothetical
    negotiation because one would use more quantities of the
    reagents in microfluidic systems. Accordingly, the evi-
    dence presented at trial regarding this agreement also sup-
    ports the 15% reasonable royalty rate. 5
    5   Having concluded that substantial evidence sup-
    ports the jury’s verdict of a 15% royalty rate, we need not
    address the parties’ arguments regarding the
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 32       Filed: 08/03/2020
    32             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    Finally, we note that 10X’s reliance on our decisions in
    LaserDynamics and ResQNet in support of its arguments
    is misplaced. In LaserDynamics, for example, the royalty
    rate proposed by the expert was “untethered from the pa-
    tented technology at issue and the many licenses 
    thereto.” 694 F.3d at 81
    . Likewise, ResQNet involved a royalty
    award based entirely on inapposite 
    licenses. 594 F.3d at 872
    . In both cases, the expert used licenses that served no
    purpose other than “to increase the reasonable royalty rate
    above rates more clearly linked to the economic demand for
    the claimed technology.” 
    LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 80
    .
    Here, by contrast, Mr. Malackowski evaluated the various
    licenses at issue and applied the Georgia-Pacific factors.
    He testified that it made sense to adopt a 15% reasonable
    royalty rate where the parties to the hypothetical negotia-
    tion are direct competitors. He also provided specific rea-
    sons why the University of Chicago/RainDance license was
    not comparable. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial
    evidence supports Mr. Malackowski’s reasonable royalty
    opinions and the jury’s verdict.
    B. 10X’s Apportionment Argument
    Is Without Merit
    “When the accused technology does not make up the
    whole of the accused product, apportionment is required.
    The ultimate combination of royalty base and royalty rate
    must reflect the value attributable to the infringing fea-
    tures of the product, and no more.” Elbit Sys. Land & C4I
    Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, 
    927 F.3d 1292
    , 1301
    (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and alterations omit-
    ted). “[A] reasonable royalty analysis necessarily involves
    comparability of the Applera/Bio-Rad license. As discussed
    above, we do not think the district court abused its discre-
    tion in allowing the jury to hear testimony regarding that
    license.
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 33    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         33
    an element of approximation and uncertainty.” Lucent
    
    Techs., 580 F.3d at 1336
    (internal quotations omitted).
    10X challenges Mr. Malackowski’s testimony because
    of his alleged failure to apportion damages between the pa-
    tented and unpatented features of the accused products. In
    10X’s view, Mr. Malackowski claimed that his 15% royalty
    rate was already apportioned in the comparable licenses,
    but failed to provide any numerical value to support his
    analysis. 10X also argues that none of the other witnesses
    provided any testimony that could fill the gaps as to the
    technical contributions of any of the patents. We disagree.
    As Bio-Rad correctly points out, there is no blanket rule
    of quantitative apportionment in every comparable license
    case. In Elbit Systems Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes Network
    Systems, LLC, for example, we accepted “built in appor-
    tionment” for a comparable license 
    agreement. 927 F.3d at 1301
    (internal quotations omitted). 10X argues that Elbit
    is distinguishable because the license at issue in that case
    was the “closest” comparator and the expert in Elbit actu-
    ally made a quantitative adjustment to the comparator li-
    cense. Appellant’s Reply Br. 31. But this argument rests
    primarily on the faulty assumption that the Chi-
    cago/RainDance license (with the 1–3% royalty rate) is the
    most comparable license in this case. As discussed above,
    the jury was free to accept Bio-Rad’s evidence that this li-
    cense was not comparable.
    Here, Mr. Malackowski concluded that no quantitative
    adjustment of the royalty rate in the three agreements was
    required. He explained that his methodology involved
    looking at comparable license agreements between compet-
    itors for similar technologies and assessing whether the
    importance of that technology to the particular license was
    similar to the hypothetical negotiation. He also acknowl-
    edged that he relied on the reports, testimony, and conclu-
    sions of other witnesses to understand that the licenses
    were technologically comparable, and that the proportion
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 34       Filed: 08/03/2020
    34             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    of licensed/unlicensed features was comparable to the pre-
    sent case. Thus, under Mr. Malackowski’s reasoning, no
    adjustment of the 15% royalty rate in the comparable li-
    censes was required. His analysis could reasonably be
    found to incorporate the required apportionment. Our case
    law does not require more. See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco
    Sys., Inc., 
    767 F.3d 1308
    , 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e note
    that we have never required absolute precision in [applying
    the principles of apportionment]; on the contrary, it is well-
    understood that this process may involve some degree of
    approximation and uncertainty.”); see also Ericsson, 
    Inc., 773 F.3d at 1227
    (recognizing that, even though “[p]rior li-
    censes . . . are almost never perfectly analogous to the in-
    fringement action,” if accompanied by testimony
    accounting for the distinguishing facts, prior licenses may
    help the jury decide an appropriate royalty award).
    This is not a case in which an unsupported conclusory
    opinion leaves the jury with nothing but speculation. We
    thus agree with the district court that Mr. Malackowski’s
    testimony was properly admitted. We therefore affirm the
    damages award.
    D. INJUNCTION
    “According to well-established principles of equity, a
    plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a
    four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.” eBay
    Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 
    547 U.S. 388
    , 391 (2006). “A
    plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an ir-
    reparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
    as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
    that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
    between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
    warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
    disserved by a permanent injunction.”
    Id. The district court’s
    grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of dis-
    cretion. eBay 
    Inc., 547 U.S. at 391
    . We review the district
    court’s conclusion as to each eBay factor for abuse of
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 35    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.          35
    discretion and its underlying factual findings for clear er-
    ror. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 
    598 F.3d 831
    , 861
    (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 
    564 U.S. 91
    (2011). Only the first,
    third, and fourth factors are at issue on appeal.
    The district court found that Bio-Rad satisfied all four
    eBay factors. On appeal, 10X argues that Bio-Rad failed to
    justify its request for a permanent injunction because it did
    not show irreparable harm, and because neither the bal-
    ance of hardships nor the public interest support an injunc-
    tion. We address these arguments below.
    1. Irreparable Harm
    To prove irreparable injury, a patentee must show
    “that absent an injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm,
    and . . . that a sufficiently strong causal nexus relates the
    alleged harm to the alleged infringement.” Apple Inc. v.
    Samsung Elecs. Co., 
    695 F.3d 1370
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    The district court found that 10X and Bio-Rad are di-
    rect competitors, and Bio-Rad would suffer irreparable
    competitive harm absent an injunction. 10X argues, how-
    ever, that it was improper for the court to enjoin sales in
    the name of competition because 10X and Bio-Rad do not
    directly compete. 10X states that it is undisputed that Bio-
    Rad did not even claim to compete with four out of five of
    10X’s product lines. According to 10X, only one product
    line, 10X’s Single Cell 3’, potentially competes with Bio-
    Rad ddSEQ product. Even as to this product, however, 10X
    argues that there is no irreparable harm because Bio-Rad’s
    product is inferior, faces competition from at least ten other
    competitors, and Bio-Rad could not prove that it lost a sin-
    gle sale to 10X. Thus, in 10X’s view an injunction is un-
    likely to help Bio-Rad’s competitive position. Appellant’s
    Br. 73–74.
    Bio-Rad responds that 10X admitted that the Single
    Cell 3’ product, which accounts for over 80% of 10X’s reve-
    nue, competes directly with Bio-Rad’s ddSEQ product. Bio-
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 36       Filed: 08/03/2020
    36             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    Rad also contends that 10X’s allegations of commercially
    and technically superior products support Bio-Rad’s claim
    of irreparable harm. Bio-Rad explains that it was forced to
    market early in view of the head start 10X received from
    its willful infringement. Bio-Rad also explains that it “fell
    behind 10X in the droplet field because the 10X founders
    left Bio-Rad to start 10X with much of Bio-Rad’s droplet
    expertise and hired away even more droplet-experienced
    technologists.” Appellees’ Br. 58–59. In Bio-Rad’s view,
    the first mover advantage allowed 10X to capture many
    “sticky” customer relationships and secure a competitive
    lead. Finally, Bio-Rad contends that 10X’s argument that
    Bio-Rad did not lose any customers is inconsistent with the
    fact that the two company’s products are sold “head to
    head.”
    Id. at
    57–61.
    It is undeniable that Bio-Rad has suffered harm from
    10X’s first mover advantage and “sticky” customer rela-
    tionships. The district court found that Bio-Rad is being
    forced to compete with 10X’s products that incorporate the
    infringing technology. Based on its willful infringement—
    a finding 10X does not challenge on appeal—10X has es-
    tablished a strong market lead over Bio-Rad. The court
    also found that, based on 10X’s first mover advantage, Bio-
    Rad had to increase its marketing costs. Money damages
    will not be able to compensate Bio-Rad for the harms stem-
    ming from 10X’s first mover advantage.
    2. Balance of Hardships
    In considering the balance of hardships, courts may
    consider the “parties’ sizes, products, and revenue sources.”
    i4i Ltd. 
    P’ship, 598 F.3d at 862
    . “[E]xpenses . . . incurred
    in creating the infringing products” and “the conse-
    quences . . . of its infringement, such as the cost of rede-
    signing the infringing products” are “irrelevant.”
    Id. at
     863.
    The district court found that the balance of hardships
    weighed in favor of injunctive relief or, at minimum, was
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 37    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         37
    neutral. The court found that Bio-Rad’s hardship stems
    from the fact that it significantly invested in its droplet
    business. And the court found that 10X’s hardship is miti-
    gated because it could sell its new, non-infringing products.
    On appeal, 10X argues that the district court failed to con-
    sider that it does not have a new design for two of its prod-
    uct lines. 10X explains that it is a much smaller company
    than Bio-Rad and its entire business depends on the en-
    joined products.
    Bio-Rad contends that 10X’s argument that 10X does
    not have a new design for two of its product lines (Linked-
    Reads and CNV) is undermined by the fact that 10X’s
    Linked-Reads and CNV products are trivial to its econom-
    ics. Bio-Rad also points out that the district court gave 10X
    a fair amount of time to design around the patents-in-suit.
    We do not agree.
    We acknowledge that Bio-Rad, although a much larger
    company, will suffer considerable hardship absent an in-
    junction because it has invested almost half a billion dol-
    lars to develop its products, including acquisitions and tens
    of millions of dollars a year on research and development.
    But at the same time, 10X, a much smaller company, de-
    pends entirely on the sales of the enjoined products for its
    revenue. Although the district court concluded that the
    hardship to 10X is mitigated because it can sell its non-in-
    fringing alternatives, the district court failed to consider
    the lack of non-infringing products for two out of the five
    product lines. In the absence of non-infringing alternatives
    for the Linked-Reads and CNV products, we conclude it
    was an abuse of discretion for the district court to enjoin
    sales of these two product lines.
    3. Public Interest
    “[T]he touchstone of the public interest factor is
    whether an injunction, both in scope and effect, strikes a
    workable balance between protecting the patentee’s rights
    Case: 19-2255      Document: 58    Page: 38       Filed: 08/03/2020
    38             BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.
    and protecting the public from the injunction’s adverse ef-
    fects.” 
    i4i, 598 F.3d at 863
    .
    The district court carved out an exception for infringing
    products that were sold or in use before the effective date
    of the injunction (the “Historical Installed Base”). For
    these products, 10X can also continue to supply consuma-
    bles, and support, service, repair, and replace them under
    warranty. This exception is conditional on 10X paying a
    15% royalty on the net revenue 10X receives from the per-
    mitted Historical Installed Base sales until the expiration
    of the patents-in-suit. Despite this carve-out, 10X argues
    that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that scientists
    need 10X products to do important research, which weighs
    against injunctive relief. Appellant’s Br. 78–79.
    We see no abuse of discretion here. Under the district
    court’s injunction, 10X’s existing customers are not en-
    joined from using their installed systems, as long as 10X
    pays royalties. Thus, there is no basis for 10X’s argument
    that scientists will lose their years of research or be finan-
    cially precluded from working on existing projects. On-go-
    ing research projects will not be affected, and the scientist
    statements submitted by the amicus all presuppose that
    they will be required to give up their existing equipment.
    None of the letter writers, moreover, seem to be aware of
    10X’s replacement non-infringing design that supposedly
    works just as well as the Historically Installed Base.
    The district court carefully crafted an injunction that
    allows existing 10X customers to continue their important
    research but attempts to mitigate the harm to Bio-Rad
    from 10X’s first mover advantage. The court also provided
    10X with an opportunity to design non-infringing alterna-
    tives, which 10X has done for all but two infringing product
    lines. In these circumstances, we conclude that the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in granting Bio-Rad an
    injunction, except as to the Linked-Reads and CNV product
    lines. Accordingly, we vacate the injunction as to those two
    Case: 19-2255    Document: 58      Page: 39    Filed: 08/03/2020
    BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC.   v. 10X GENOMICS INC.         39
    product lines only, but conclude that the injunction should
    remain in place as to the other enjoined product lines.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
    and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
    affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, and vacate-in-part the dis-
    trict court’s decision denying 10X’s motion for JMOL. We
    vacate the district court’s injunction only with respect to
    10X’s Linked-Reads and CNV product lines.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
    VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED
    COSTS
    No costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2255

Filed Date: 8/3/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2020

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