Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. ( 2023 )

Filed 3/30/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MILLION SEIFU et al., B301774
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC712959)
v.
LYFT, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part with
directions.
Horvitz & Levy, Andrea L. Russi, Peder Batalden, Felix Shafir; Keker,
Van Nest & Peters, R. James Slaughter, Jo W. Golub, Erin E. Meyer and
Morgan E. Sharma for Defendant and Appellant.
Lichten & Liss-Riordan, Shannon Liss-Riordan for Plaintiff and
Respondent Million Seifu.
Respondent Million Seifu is a former driver for appellant Lyft, Inc. In
2018, he filed suit against Lyft under the Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).1 He alleged that Lyft misclassified
him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees,
thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Lyft moved to
compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the “Terms of
Service” (TOS) that it required its drivers to accept in order to offer rides
through Lyft’s smartphone application.
The trial court denied the motion, finding the PAGA waiver in the
arbitration provision unenforceable under then-controlling California law.
Lyft appealed, and in June 2021 we affirmed the denial of Lyft’s motion to
compel arbitration.
Lyft petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. In June 2022, the Court granted Lyft’s petition, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Viking
River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213
L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River). We recalled the remittitur, vacated our prior
decision, and requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the
application of Viking River to this case.
Seifu concedes that under Viking River his claim for civil penalties
based on alleged Labor Code violations he personally suffered (his individual
PAGA claim) is subject to arbitration. We agree, and therefore reverse the
denial of that portion of Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration.
The crux of the parties’ dispute here is the fate of Seifu’s remaining
claims for civil penalties based on alleged Labor Code violations suffered by
other employees (his non-individual PAGA claims). Lyft argues that Seifu
lacks standing to litigate the non-individual claims once his individual claims
are sent to arbitration, and the former claims therefore must be dismissed.
Seifu counters that, as a matter of state law, he retains standing to pursue
the non-individual PAGA claims in court.
1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
We conclude that we are not bound by the analysis of PAGA standing
set forth in Viking River. As Justice Sotomayor recognized in her concurring
opinion, PAGA standing is a matter of state law that must be decided by
California courts. Until we have guidance from the California Supreme
Court, our review of PAGA and relevant state decisional authority leads us to
conclude that a plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue non-individual
PAGA claims simply because his or her individual PAGA claim is compelled
to arbitration.
We therefore reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court’s order
denying Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration. We remand the matter to the
trial court with directions to: (1) enter an order compelling Seifu to arbitrate
his individual PAGA claim; and (2) conduct further proceedings regarding
Seifu’s non-individual claims consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lyft utilizes a smartphone application (app) that connects drivers with
riders seeking transportation services. In order to use the Lyft technology
platform and offer rides through the app, drivers must agree to the TOS,
which states that it “contains provisions that govern how claims you and Lyft
have against each other can be brought. . . . These provisions will, with
limited exception, require you to submit claims you have against Lyft to
binding and final arbitration on an individual basis, not as a plaintiff or class
member in any class, group, representative action, or proceeding.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
The arbitration provision in the TOS provided, “You and Lyft mutually
agree to waive our respective rights to resolution of disputes in a court of law
by a judge or jury and agree to resolve any dispute by arbitration. . . . This
agreement to arbitrate (‘Arbitration Agreement’) is governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act and survives after the Agreement terminates or your
relationship with Lyft ends. . . . Except as expressly provided . . . [¶] . . . all
disputes and claims between us . . . shall be exclusively resolved by binding
arbitration solely between you and Lyft.” (Capitalization omitted.) The
agreement further stated, “This Arbitration Agreement is intended to require
arbitration of every claim or dispute that can lawfully be arbitrated, except
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for those claims and disputes which by the terms of this Arbitration
Agreement are expressly excluded from the requirement to arbitrate.”
The arbitration provision also included a “Representative PAGA
Waiver” stating, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement or
the Arbitration Agreement, to the fullest extent permitted by law: (1) you
and Lyft agree not to bring a representative action on behalf of others under
the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), California Labor Code
§ 2698 et seq., in any court or in arbitration, and (2) for any claim brought on
a private attorney general basis, including under the California PAGA, both
you and Lyft agree that any such dispute shall be resolved in arbitration on
an individual basis only (i.e., to resolve whether you have personally been
aggrieved or subject to any violations of law), and that such an action may
not be used to resolve the claims or rights of other individuals in a single or
collective proceeding (i.e., to resolve whether other individuals have been
aggrieved or subject to any violations of law).”
Drivers who did not wish to be bound by the arbitration provision could
opt out in the 30-day period following their acceptance of the TOS. Those
who did not exercise this option during that period were bound by the
arbitration provision.
Lyft updated the TOS periodically and required drivers to agree to the
updated terms in order to continue offering rides through the Lyft platform.
Seifu agreed to the updated TOS in July 2017 and April 2018; he did not opt
out of the arbitration provision.
Seifu filed a complaint against Lyft in July 2018, alleging a single
PAGA claim on behalf of the state of California and other similarly situated
individuals who worked as drivers for Lyft in California.2 He alleged that
Lyft willfully misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, resulting in
numerous Labor Code violations. Seifu sought civil penalties under PAGA.
2 Seifu later amended his complaint to add three other drivers as named
plaintiffs, as well as additional claims. This appeal concerns only Seifu’s
PAGA claim, the thirteenth cause of action in the operative Third Amended
Complaint.
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Lyft petitioned to compel arbitration of Seifu’s PAGA claim and stay
proceedings in the trial court pending arbitration, arguing that the PAGA
waiver in the TOS was enforceable. Seifu opposed the petition to compel
arbitration. He argued that the PAGA waiver was unenforceable under
California law, relying on Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian).
Applying Iskanian, the trial court found that the PAGA waiver was
unenforceable and therefore denied Lyft’s petition to compel arbitration. Lyft
appealed.
In our prior opinion, a different panel of this court affirmed the trial
court’s decision. (Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. (June 1, 2021), B301774 [nonpub. opn.].)
We concluded that pursuant to Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 383-384,
“an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action is unwaivable,” and thus “where
. . . an employment agreement compels the waiver of representative claims
under the PAGA, it is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter
of state law.”
In June 2022, the United States Supreme Court decided Viking River,
abrogating Iskanian in part and holding that an employer could enforce an
agreement calling for arbitration of individual PAGA claims. That same
month, the United States Supreme Court granted Lyft’s petition for writ of
certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Viking River. We recalled the remittitur issued
September 13, 2021, vacated our prior opinion, and directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing the effect of Viking River on the issues
presented in this appeal. Both parties timely filed supplemental briefs.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law
A. Standard of Review
Where, as here, the trial court’s order denying a motion to compel
arbitration “rests solely on a decision of law,” we review that decision de
novo. (Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
1419, 1425.)
B. PAGA and Viking River
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“California’s Labor Code contains a number of provisions designed to
protect the health, safety, and compensation of workers. Employers who
violate these statutes may be sued by employees for damages or statutory
penalties. [Citations.] . . . . Several Labor Code statutes provide for
additional civil penalties, generally paid to the state unless otherwise
provided. [Citation.] Before PAGA’s enactment, only the state could sue for
civil penalties.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
73, 80 (Kim), citing Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 378.) The Legislature
enacted PAGA to allow aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys
general and recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. (Arias v.
Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980-981 (Arias); Villacres v. ABM
Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 578 (Villacres).) The
Legislature’s declared purpose in enacting PAGA was “to supplement
enforcement actions by public agencies, which lack adequate resources to
bring all such actions themselves.” (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.)
PAGA deputizes an “aggrieved” employee to bring a lawsuit “on behalf
of himself or herself and other current or former employees” to recover civil
penalties for Labor Code violations that would otherwise be assessed and
collected by the state. (§ 2699, subd. (a); Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.) An
“aggrieved employee” for purposes of bringing a PAGA claim is defined under
the statute as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and
against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (§ 2699,
subd. (c); see also Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) Although an aggrieved
employee is the named plaintiff in a PAGA action, an employee suing under
PAGA “‘does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement
agencies.’” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81, quoting Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th
at p. 986.) Thus, “[e]very PAGA claim is ‘a dispute between an employer and
the state,’ [citations]” and “[r]elief under PAGA is designed primarily to
benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action. [Citations.]”
(Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.)
In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held that “an employee's
right to bring a PAGA action is unwaivable.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
p. 383.) The court rejected the employer’s argument that the arbitration
agreement was enforceable because it allowed an individual PAGA claim,
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barring only “representative” (i.e., non-individual) PAGA claims, concluding
that an agreement waiving an employee’s right to bring representative PAGA
claims was “contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state
law.” (Id. at p. 384.)
In June 2022, the Supreme Court decided Viking River, addressing the
extent to which the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts the Iskanian
rule barring PAGA waivers. The Viking River court explained that PAGA
claims are “representative” in two ways: first, all PAGA claims are
“representative” because a plaintiff brings a PAGA claim as an agent or proxy
for the state. (Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1916.) Second, some PAGA
claims are “representative” because they are brought by employees to address
violations suffered by other employees, as well as themselves. (Ibid.) In light
of this distinction, the Supreme Court held that Iskanian’s “principal rule”
prohibiting “wholesale” waivers of all PAGA claims was not preempted by the
FAA. (Id. at pp. 1925-1926.)
However, the “secondary rule” of Iskanian, prohibiting the separation
of individual and non-individual PAGA claims, was preempted by the FAA.
(Id. at p. 1925.) As the Court explained, Iskanian’s “prohibition on
contractual division of PAGA actions into constituent claims unduly
circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine ‘the issues subject to
arbitration’ and ‘the rules by which they will arbitrate,’ [citation], and does so
in a way that violates the fundamental principle that ‘arbitration is a matter
of consent,’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 1923.) Accordingly, an arbitration
agreement compelling individual claims to arbitration was enforceable as to
the individual portion of a PAGA claim. (Id. at pp. 1924–1925 [“Viking was
entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of
Moriana’s individual PAGA claim.”].)
The Viking River court then dismissed the plaintiff’s non-individual
PAGA claims, reasoning that “PAGA provides no mechanism to enable a
court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has
been committed to a separate proceeding.” (Viking River, supra, at p. 1925.)
The Court continued, “When an employee’s own dispute is pared away from a
PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member of the general
public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit. See Kim, 9
7
Cal.5th at 90 (‘PAGA’s standing requirement was meant to be a departure
from the “general public” . . . standing originally allowed’ under other
California statutes). As a result, [the plaintiff] lacks statutory standing to
continue to maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct
course is to dismiss her remaining claims.” (Ibid.)
II. Analysis
A. Individual PAGA claim
In light of Viking River, we first assess the portion of Lyft’s motion to
compel arbitration of Seifu’s individual PAGA claim. The PAGA waiver in
the TOS contained two parts. First, the agreement waived the parties’ right
to bring PAGA claims “on behalf of others” in “any court or in arbitration.”
Second, the agreement required any individual PAGA claims to be resolved in
arbitration. For the purposes of the current appeal, the parties do not
dispute that the first clause, constituting a wholesale waiver of Seifu’s right
to bring non-individual PAGA claims in any forum, was unenforceable under
Iskanian. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 360 [“an arbitration agreement
requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to
bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public
policy”].) Nor do they dispute that Viking River left intact the portion of
Iskanian’s rule “prevent[ing] parties from waiving representative standing to
bring PAGA claims in a judicial or arbitral forum.” (Viking River, supra, 142
S.Ct. at pp. 1916, 1924-1925, italics omitted.) As such, the first part of the
PAGA waiver here is unenforceable under Iskanian and cannot bar Seifu
from bringing non-individual PAGA claims.
In addition, Seifu does not dispute that Viking River allows division of
his PAGA claim into individual and non-individual claims. Under the second
clause in the PAGA waiver, Seifu concedes that he must submit his
individual PAGA claim to arbitration.
B. Non-individual PAGA claims
We now turn to the question of what becomes of Seifu’s non-individual
PAGA claims, as they are not subject to arbitration. Seifu contends that he
maintains standing to pursue those claims in court. Lyft asserts that Viking
River compels the dismissal of the non-individual claims. As we explain, we
agree with Seifu.
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As an initial matter, we note that we are not bound by the United
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of California law. (See Nunez v.
Nevell Group, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 838, 847–848 [“Federal decisional
authority does not bind the California Courts of Appeal on matters of state
law.”]; Haynes v. EMC Mortg. Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 329, 335 [same];
Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Construction Co. (1998) 71
Cal.App.4th 38, 52 [“[F]ederal decisional authority is neither binding nor
controlling in matters involving state law”].) Indeed, in her concurrence in
Viking River, Justice Sotomayor noted that she was joining in the Court’s
opinion with the understanding that “if this Court’s understanding of state
law is wrong, California courts . . . will have the last word” regarding a
plaintiff’s standing under PAGA. (Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1925
[Sotomayor, J., concurring].) As such, we are not required to follow the
Court’s interpretation of PAGA and its standing requirements in Viking
River.3
We are not persuaded otherwise by Lyft’s contention that the Viking
River court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims for lack
of standing was part of a “federal rule of decision to implement its mandate
that the FAA applies to PAGA claims when a valid arbitration agreement
exists.” Lyft’s attempt to fold the Supreme Court’s interpretation of standing
requirements under PAGA, a state statute, into its federal preemption
analysis is unavailing, particularly where the Court interpreted Kim and
other California authority to reach its conclusion as to standing. By contrast,
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, the case relied upon
by Lyft, the Court expressly announced a “federal rule” after finding that the
standard of proof for libel under the relevant state law was constitutionally
3
The California Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue. The court
recently granted review in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., review granted
July 20, 2022, S274671, to consider “[w]hether an aggrieved employee who
has been compelled to arbitrate claims under [PAGA] that are ‘premised on
Labor Code violations actually sustained by’ the aggrieved employee
[citations] maintains statutory standing to pursue ‘PAGA claims arising out
of events involving other employees’ [citation] in court or in any other forum
the parties agree is suitable.”
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deficient. (Id. at pp. 279, 283.) Lyft has identified no such constitutional
concerns here.
We therefore independently assess the standing requirements for Seifu
to continue to pursue his non-individual PAGA claim in court. As discussed
above, PAGA provides that civil penalties recoverable by the state for Labor
Code violations “may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action
brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other
current or former employees.” (§ 2699, subd. (a).) Our Supreme Court
interpreted the plain language of PAGA to include “only two requirements for
PAGA standing. The plaintiff must be an aggrieved employee, that is,
someone ‘who was employed by the alleged violator’ and ‘against whom one or
more of the alleged violations was committed.’” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp.
83-84.) “Considering the remedial nature of legislation meant to protect
employees, we construe PAGA’s provisions broadly, in favor of this
protection.” (Id. at p. 83, citations omitted.)
In Kim, the plaintiff alleged claims for damages based on his
employer’s Labor Code violations, as well as a claim for civil penalties under
PAGA. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) After the plaintiff settled his non-
PAGA claims for individual relief, the defendant argued that the plaintiff lost
standing to pursue the remaining PAGA claim because he had received
redress for his own injuries and was therefore no longer “aggrieved” within
the meaning of the statute. (Id. at p. 84.) The California Supreme Court
rejected this argument, finding that “Kim became an aggrieved employee,
and had PAGA standing, when one or more Labor Code violations were
committed against him. (See § 2699(c).) Settlement did not nullify these
violations.” (Ibid.)
The court continued, “An employee has PAGA standing if ‘one or more
of the alleged violations was committed’ against him. (§ 2699(c).) This
language indicates that PAGA standing is not inextricably linked to the
plaintiff’s own injury. Employees who were subjected to at least one unlawful
practice have standing to serve as PAGA representatives even if they did not
personally experience each and every alleged violation. (§ 2699(c).) This
expansive approach to standing serves the state’s interest in vigorous
10
enforcement.” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85, citing Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th
at pp. 980-981.)
We conclude that Seifu has satisfied the standing requirements under
Kim to maintain his non-individual PAGA claims at this stage of the
proceedings. Seifu’s operative complaint alleged that he was employed by
Lyft and that one or more of Lyft’s alleged Labor Code violations was
committed against him. He is therefore an “aggrieved” employee within the
meaning of PAGA with standing to assert PAGA claims on behalf of himself
and other employees. (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 84-85.)
Further, the requirement that Seifu resolve his individual PAGA claim
in a different forum—arbitration—does not strip him of this standing. (See
Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 84; see also Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare
Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924, 930 (Johnson) [the fact that the
plaintiff’s individual claim was time-barred did not “strip [the plaintiff] of her
standing to pursue PAGA remedies”].) This interpretation is consistent with
PAGA’s remedial purpose, because revoking an employee’s standing to
pursue non-individual claims would “‘severely curtail[ ] PAGA’s availability
to police Labor Code violations.’” (Johnson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 930,
quoting Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 86–87; see also Viking River, supra, 142
S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. omitted [“An arbitration agreement thus does not alter or
abridge substantive rights; it merely changes how those rights will be
processed. And so we have said that ‘“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral . . . forum.”’”].)
We reject Lyft’s contention that, even apart from statutory standing,
PAGA requires that “the non-individual PAGA claims must be adjudicated
together with individual PAGA claims, or not at all.” The language of the
statute contains no such requirement. “‘“Where the words of the statute are
clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not
appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.”’” (Kim,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85, quoting Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697,
719.) Similarly, the cases Lyft cites simply reiterate the principle that a
“plaintiff asserting a PAGA claim may not bring the claim simply on his or
her own behalf but must bring it as a representative action and include ‘other
11
current or former employees.’” (Reyes v. Macy's, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
1119, 1123; see also Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 745, 756 [“an employee seeking to recover Labor Code penalties
[under PAGA] cannot do so in a purely individual capacity; the employee
must bring the action on behalf of himself or herself and others”].) Seifu
satisfied this requirement when he alleged his PAGA claim on behalf of
himself and other employees.
Lyft’s reliance on Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th
725 (Morehart) is similarly unavailing. Lyft contends that sending the
individual PAGA claim to arbitration “amounts to a form of severance that
yields two distinct actions in two distinct fora,” thereby ending Seifu’s
standing to represent non-individual PAGA claims in court. Morehart
involved an analysis of whether a judgment was appealable when it did not
resolve all of the plaintiff’s causes of action, but the appellant nevertheless
contended that the appealable claims had been severed from those still
pending. (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 731-732.) Morehart did not
assess or apply severance principles to issues of standing or arbitration of
PAGA claims. (Ibid.)
Finally, Lyft contends that if Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims are
not dismissed, they should be stayed pending the arbitration of the individual
PAGA claims. Lyft urges us to direct the trial court to impose a stay
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4, which provides that
where the court orders arbitration “of a controversy which is an issue
involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State,” the
court in which the action or proceeding is pending “shall, upon motion of a
party . . ., stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in
accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court
specifies.”
Here, the trial court has not had the opportunity to rule on Lyft’s stay
request, because it denied Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration outright. We
therefore remand the matter for the trial court to determine in the first
instance whether a stay of Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims would be
appropriate under the circumstances.
DISPOSITION
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The order denying Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration is reversed in
part and affirmed in part. The order is reversed as to Seifu’s individual
PAGA claim. The order is affirmed as to Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims.
The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a new order
requiring Seifu to arbitrate his individual PAGA claim and for further
proceedings regarding Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims consistent with
this opinion. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, ACTING, P.J.
STONE, J. *

Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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