v. Compos , 2019 COA 177 ( 2019 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
December 5, 2019
2019COA177
No. 16CA2086, People v. Compos — Criminal Law — Search and
Seizure — Custodial Interrogation — Miranda
A division of the court of appeals concludes for the first time in
Colorado that when an individual is interrogated in violation of
Miranda, and the response to the questioning is itself a criminal act
such as providing a false identity, Miranda’s exclusionary rule will
not bar admission of the statement at a subsequent trial involving
charges based on the criminal act.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA177
Court of Appeals No. 16CA2086
Pueblo County District Court No. 16CR254
Honorable Thomas B. Flesher, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Vincent Joseph Compos,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Harris and Márquez*, JJ., concur
Announced December 5, 2019
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Julia Chamberlin, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2019.
¶1 Defendant, Vincent Joseph Compos, appeals from a judgment
of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of criminal
impersonation and false reporting to authorities. As a matter of
first impression, we hold that when an individual is interrogated in
violation of Miranda, and the response to the questioning is itself a
criminal act such as providing a false identity, Miranda’s
exclusionary rule will not bar admission of the statement at a
subsequent trial involving charges based on the criminal act. We
therefore affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 According to the prosecution’s evidence, police arrested
Compos at the home of the victim, a woman whom Compos had
previously dated. Compos had previously been arrested and
charged with domestic violence crimes against the victim, which
had resulted in a protection order being issued against Compos. 1
On the night of his arrest, Compos appeared unexpectedly at the
victim’s home and, according to the victim, pointed a gun at her
1Among other things, the protection order prohibited Compos from
being at the victim’s home.
1
and one of her children, threatening to kill them. The victim called
the police and fled.
¶3 The victim reported to the police that Compos was at her home
in violation of the protection order and that he had assaulted her.
Two officers confronted Compos while he was inside the victim’s
home. At that time, he identified himself as “J.R.”
¶4 The officers arrested Compos. Later, as he was standing next
to a police car in handcuffs, a third officer asked Compos his name
and he replied, “John Rocha.” Compos also volunteered a date of
birth that matched John Rocha’s identity. Afterward, officers
discovered that Compos had provided a false name and date of birth
in response to the officer’s question.
¶5 Compos was charged with felony menacing, criminal
impersonation, violation of bail bond conditions, and violation of a
protection order. At Compos’s request, the trial court bifurcated the
proceedings, and Compos was first tried for felony menacing and
criminal impersonation. The jury found him not guilty of felony
menacing but guilty of criminal impersonation and the lesser
nonincluded offense of false reporting to authorities. Compos later
2
pleaded guilty to a single count of violating a protection order in
exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.
¶6 On appeal, Compos contends that the trial court erred by (1)
failing to suppress his post-arrest statement giving a false name
and (2) declining to grant a mistrial after the victim testified about
his prior bad acts.
II. Suppression of Statement
¶7 Before trial, Compos moved to suppress his statement to the
officer that his name was “John Rocha” on the ground that it had
been obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
concluding that the officer’s question was a “standard question of
identification” that was “consistent with when [Compos] would be
booked into jail.” Accordingly, the trial court found that the
question did not constitute “custodial interrogation.”
¶8 At trial, the prosecution relied on Compos’s statement to
support the charges of criminal impersonation and false reporting
to authorities.
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A. Standard of Review
¶9 When considering a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we defer to its findings of fact if they are supported by the
record but review its conclusions of law de novo. People v.
Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777, 780 (Colo. 1998); People v. Allen, 199
P.3d 33, 35 (Colo. App. 2007). However, “appellate courts have the
discretion to affirm decisions, particularly denial of suppression
motions, on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to
permit conclusions of law, even though they may be on grounds
other than those relied upon by the trial court.” Moody v. People,
159 P.3d 611, 615 (Colo. 2007).
B. Analysis
¶ 10 The United States Constitution provides that no person “shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. To protect
this right against self-incrimination, Miranda provides that a
“suspect’s statements made during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible unless the suspect received adequate advisement of
his constitutional rights.” People v. J.D., 989 P.2d 762, 768 (Colo.
4
1999). Therefore, Miranda’s protections apply only to a suspect
who is (1) in custody and (2) subject to interrogation. Id.
¶ 11 The trial court found, and the parties agree, that Compos was
in custody when the officer asked him his name. The parties
disagree as to whether Compos was subject to interrogation.
¶ 12 Under Miranda and its progeny, a person is interrogated when
he is subject to “either express questioning or its functional
equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980);
see also People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242 (Colo. 1999). In
other words, for Miranda purposes, interrogation includes not just
direct questioning, but also “any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301
(footnotes omitted).
¶ 13 The purpose of Miranda is to protect suspects from
investigative interrogation, which might bend a suspect’s will to that
of his examiner, and not from routine questions about basic
identifying information. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299. Accordingly, police
officers are not required to give Miranda warnings prior to asking a
5
“routine booking question” aimed at securing the “biographical data
necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.” Pennsylvania v.
Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990) (plurality opinion). But law
enforcement officers’ ability to inquire about basic identification and
biographical data is not unlimited. Even as it created the “routine
booking exception,” the Supreme Court cautioned, “[w]ithout
obtaining a waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights, the police may
not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit
incriminatory admissions.” Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14.
¶ 14 Compos contends that the officer’s request for his name was
“express questioning” and thus “interrogation”; that it did not fall
within Muniz’s booking exception to Miranda because it was not
asked during the administrative booking process; and that it was
likely to elicit an incriminating response, because his presence at
the victim’s home tended to show that he had knowingly violated
the protection order. The People respond that notwithstanding the
circumstances of the questioning, the trial court correctly treated
the officer’s inquiry as a noninvestigative, administrative question
covered by the booking exception.
6
¶ 15 We need not resolve that dispute. Even assuming the
question was asked in violation of Miranda, we conclude that the
trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress because
Compos’s false statement about his identity constituted a new
crime, not evidence of a prior crime, and thus the exclusionary rule
does not apply.
¶ 16 Generally, the prosecution is prohibited from admitting in its
case-in-chief statements acquired through custodial interrogation
in the absence of Miranda warnings. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492;
People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 889 (Colo. 1994). “However,
not all evidence obtained as a result of an illegal interrogation must
be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Breidenbach, 875 P.2d
at 889. For example, in Breidenbach, the Colorado Supreme Court
analyzed a prosecution claim that evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda should have nevertheless been admissible because of the
inevitable discovery exception. Id.
¶ 17 The theoretical and policy underpinnings of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule are different from those of the
Miranda exclusionary rule. See People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 328
(Colo. 2002) (Coats, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, the full
7
scope of the two exclusionary rules may not be coextensive.
However, as the supreme court made clear in Breidenbach, an
exception to suppression rooted in the Fourth Amendment may be
equally applicable in the Fifth Amendment context.
¶ 18 Another exception to the exclusionary rule is the new crime
exception. The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted this exception
in the Fourth Amendment context. People v. Doke, 171 P.3d 237
(Colo. 2007). In Doke, the supreme court held that “if, following an
illegal stop or attempted stop, the detained person’s response is
itself a new, distinct crime, then the police constitutionally may
arrest the person for that crime and the evidentiary fruit of that
arrest will not be suppressed.” Id. at 239 (quoting People v. Smith,
870 P.2d 617, 619 (Colo. App. 1994)); see also People v. Tomaske,
2019 CO 35, ¶ 18 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule applies “where police officers’ misconduct leads to
their discovery of evidence of a completed crime” but not where the
police misconduct “led to the commission of a new crime”)
(emphasis in original).
8
¶ 19 While no Colorado appellate court has addressed whether this
exception applies to the Miranda-based exclusionary rule, other
courts have.
¶ 20 In United States v. Kirk, 528 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1976), the
defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation without having
been advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at 1060. During the
interrogation, he told federal agents he was “going to blow the
[President’s] brains out.” Id.
¶ 21 Based on that statement, the defendant was indicted for a
single count of making threats against the President. Id. After
being convicted, the defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of
his motion to suppress the threatening statement. In affirming, the
court of appeals observed, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s prohibition
against self-incrimination relates to crimes alleged to have been
committed prior to the time when the testimony is sought.” Id. at
1061. The court declined to require suppression of the statement
because “no [F]ifth [A]mendment problem is presented when a
statement . . . in and of itself constitutes the crime charged.” Id. at
1062.
9
¶ 22 Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.
1987), abrogated on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), customs agents, who had information
that the defendant had made threats against the President, arrested
him. Id. at 1252. Without providing Miranda warnings, agents
from another law enforcement agency later questioned the
defendant and he reiterated his threat to kill the President. Id.
¶ 23 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. Id. at 1253. It
concluded that “[c]ommitting a crime is far different from making an
inculpatory statement, and the treatment we afford the two events
differs accordingly.” Id. The court reasoned that the exclusionary
rule was not “the proper vehicle for determining whether a crime
should be immunized from prosecution.” Id. at 1254.
¶ 24 The Seventh Circuit followed a similar approach in United
States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192 (7th Cir. 1994). There, after arresting
the defendant’s friend, an officer asked the defendant for his
identification. In response, the defendant provided a false name
10
and Social Security card. Id. at 1194. Defendant was later charged
with fraudulent use of a Social Security number. Id.
¶ 25 He challenged the admission of his false statements to the
officers, both as the fruit of an illegal detention and as a violation of
his Miranda rights. Id. at 1195. In rejecting the defendant’s claims,
the court of appeals declined to resolve several questions, including
whether the defendant had been detained and whether he had been
interrogated: “This is a nice list of questions, but none of the
answers matters. [The defendant] did not divulge evidence of some
prior crime during his few minutes in the office; instead he
committed a crime, which makes all the difference.” Id. The court
held that “to suppress the evidence would be to say that the
suspect is indeed free to commit the crime. The exclusionary rule,
whether under the [F]ourth or [F]ifth [A]mendment, does not reach
so far.” Id. at 1196.
¶ 26 In our view, the principle enunciated in Kirk, Mitchell, and
Pryor is both sound and consistent with our supreme court’s
announcement in Doke. We thus conclude that when an individual
is interrogated in violation of Miranda, and his response to
questioning is itself a crime, the exclusionary rule will not bar
11
admission of the response at any subsequent trial for charges based
on the criminal act committed in the response.2 As a result, albeit
on different grounds, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion
to suppress. See People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo.
2006) (holding that an appellate court may affirm the trial court on
any grounds supported by the record).
III. Mistrial
¶ 27 Compos next contends that the trial court violated his
constitutional right to a fair trial by denying his motions for a
mistrial after evidence of his prior bad acts was admitted. We are
not persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 28 We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an
abuse of discretion. People v. Van Meter, 2018 COA 13, ¶ 9. A trial
court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or it misapplies the law. Id. Where the
request for a mistrial is based on improper statements at trial, we
2 Of course, to be admissible, any statement must also be
voluntary. Compos does not challenge the voluntariness of his
statement.
12
must give the trial court considerable discretion because it “is in a
better position to evaluate any adverse effect of improper
statements or testimony on a jury . . . .” Id. (quoting People v.
Tillery, 231 P.3d 36, 43 (Colo. App. 2009)). The erroneous
admission or presentation of prior bad act evidence is not
constitutional error. Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 469 n.16
(Colo. 2009).
B. Law and Analysis
¶ 29 Evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or bad acts is generally
inadmissible to prove the character of a person to show that he
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. CRE 404(b).
However, the evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, intent, plan, identity, or absence of mistake. Id.
¶ 30 In determining the admissibility of evidence concerning prior
misconduct, a court should consider (1) whether the evidence
relates to a material fact; (2) whether the evidence is logically
relevant; (3) whether the evidence has logical relevance apart from
the inference that the defendant has a bad character and acted in
conformity therewith to commit the crime charged; and (4) whether
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
13
the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314,
1318 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 31 Even if prior bad act evidence is erroneously admitted,
however, a mistrial is “the most drastic of remedies.” People v.
Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 1984). Therefore, a court
abuses its discretion in denying a mistrial only when the
presentation of inadmissible evidence is likely to have substantially
prejudiced the jurors despite other remedies. Id. In considering
whether a trial court should have declared a mistrial, relevant
factors include the nature of the inadmissible evidence, the weight
of admissible evidence concerning the defendant’s guilt, and the
value of any cautionary instruction given. People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d
496, 505 (Colo. 1986).
¶ 32 Compos asserts that the victim made two prejudicial
statements at trial in violation of CRE 404(b).
¶ 33 First, when the prosecutor asked the victim to describe her
argument with Compos on the day of his arrest, she testified that
he was “[j]ust pushing me around, yelling at me like he always did.”
Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court
denied the motion.
14
¶ 34 Second, in response to the prosecutor’s questions about an
interview with a defense investigator, the victim testified that she
and the investigator had talked about her relationship with Compos
“and other pending cases.” Defense counsel renewed his motion for
a mistrial, and the court again denied the motion. However, the
trial court precluded the prosecutor from asking further questions
and offered to instruct the jury to disregard the statement about
pending cases. Defense counsel declined the court’s offer.
¶ 35 Even assuming the two statements were inadmissible under
Rule 404(b), we conclude that their admission did not warrant a
mistrial. The victim’s statement that Compos was “pushing her
around” and yelling “like he always did” did not unambiguously
indicate that Compos had previously subjected her to physical
abuse. True, her testimony could have been construed to mean
that he had pushed the victim on other occasions, but it could also
have been construed to mean that although he habitually yelled at
her, on this occasion, he also pushed her.
¶ 36 Likewise, when viewed in context, the second statement
referencing “other pending cases” did not clearly implicate Compos.
During cross-examination, defense counsel extensively questioned
15
the victim about criminal charges she incurred based on her
encounter with police on the night of Compos’s arrest. On redirect
examination, the victim acknowledged “other pending cases.” Given
that the victim had just discussed the charges filed against her, this
statement did not explicitly refer to any criminal conduct by
Compos.
¶ 37 An ambiguous reference to a defendant’s prior criminal
misconduct or other bad acts does not warrant a mistrial. People v.
Salas, 2017 COA 63, ¶ 12; People v. Lahr, 2013 COA 57, ¶¶ 24, 27.
Moreover, when a reference to improper conduct is fleeting, as it
was here with respect to both statements, the potential prejudice is
minimized. Lahr, ¶ 24.
¶ 38 Any prejudice created by the victim’s statements is especially
inconsequential in this case given the other evidence of Compos’s
prior misconduct, including evidence that the victim had obtained a
protection order against him. In other words, the jury was aware,
based on properly admitted evidence, that Compos had engaged in
prior misconduct with respect to the victim. We do not believe that
the victim’s fleeting statements about pushing and yelling or “other
pending cases” would have substantially altered the jury’s existing
16
impression of Compos. Nor, it appears, did defense counsel
perceive that the victim’s testimony was particularly prejudicial, as
he declined the court’s offer of a limiting instruction.
¶ 39 We note as well that the jury did not find Compos guilty of
felony menacing. The verdict of acquittal on some counts but not
others indicates that the jury was able to separate the facts and law
applicable to each charge and it did not blindly convict based on
prejudicial testimony. Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789, 795-96 (Colo.
1987) (concluding that the jury’s failure to convict on all counts was
an indication that it did not blindly convict the defendant based on
prejudicial evidence of a prior conviction).
¶ 40 Moreover, there was ample evidence that Compos repeatedly
misrepresented his identity to the police, and the jury was able to
rely on this evidence alone to convict Compos.
¶ 41 Accordingly, we do not perceive that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Compos’s motions for a mistrial.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 42 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE MÁRQUEZ concur.
17