People v. Schuyler Adonis Johnson ( 2022 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
June 30, 2022
2022COA68No. 18CA2337, People v. Johnson — Criminal Law —
Sentencing — Youth Offender System — Revocation
As a matter of first impression in this direct appeal concerning
the revocation of a youth offender’s sentence, a division of the court
of appeals determines the applicability and interplay of two
provisions under section 18-1.3-407(5), C.R.S. 2021, the Youth
Offender System (YOS) statute. Based on a plain reading of the
statute’s language, the division determines that subsection (5)(a)
applies to a YOS sentence revocation only when the offender poses
a danger to himself, herself, or others. Moreover, subsection (5)(c)
identifies those categories of offenders whose original sentence must
be reimposed for failing to successfully complete their YOS sentence
— including an offender returned to the district court under
subsection (5)(a).
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA68Court of Appeals No. 18CA2337
Arapahoe County District Court No. 11CR568
Honorable Jeffrey K. Holmes, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Schuyler Adonis Johnson,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Welling and Schutz, JJ., concur
Announced June 30, 2022
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul E. Koehler, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2021.
¶1 Defendant, Schuyler Adonis Johnson, appeals the district
court’s order that revoked his six-year youth offender sentence and
imposed a suspended sentence of eighteen years in the custody of
the Department of Corrections (DOC). He contends that the district
court erred by misapplying subsection (5)(c) of section 18-1.3-407,
C.R.S. 2021, the Youth Offender System (YOS) statute. Johnson
argues that because the district court did not return him to the
YOS within sixty days following his detention in the county jail, as
required by subsection (5)(a) of the YOS statute, the court
improperly revoked his YOS sentence, which he says should have
been deemed completed.
¶2 We conclude, however, based on a plain reading of the
statutory language, that the district court correctly applied section
18-1.3-407(5)(c) to revoke Johnson’s YOS sentence for failing to
comply with its terms and conditions. In addition, we reject
Johnson’s other challenges to the revocation and thus affirm.
I. Background
¶3 On August 24, 2012, after Johnson pleaded guilty to first
degree assault, a district court sentenced him to six years in the
YOS and an eighteen-year suspended sentence in the custody of the
1
DOC under section 18-1.3-407.1 At the time, Johnson was eighteen
years old.
¶4 About five years into his YOS sentence, Johnson started Phase
III — the community supervised release portion of the program.
Phase III allowed Johnson to live in his mother’s basement while
complying with certain terms and conditions. For example, the
program required that Johnson report to his community parole
officer to approve visitors, avoid using marijuana and alcohol, find
employment, maintain curfew, periodically submit to certain drug
tests, and continuously wear an ankle monitor.
¶5 However, because Johnson failed to comply with the terms
and conditions of his YOS sentence, YOS held a suitability hearing
and recommended that it be revoked; this decision was upheld by a
review panel. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-407(5)(c), the YOS warden
and the DOC executive director upheld the DOC’s decision.
Consequently, on August 29, 2018, the People moved to revoke
1 After being charged with multiple counts for shooting at two
victims, including attempted first degree murder, Johnson pleaded
guilty to first degree assault.
2
Johnson’s YOS sentence and impose the suspended prison
sentence.
¶6 Johnson’s counsel moved to dismiss the People’s complaint to
revoke Johnson’s YOS sentence. Defense counsel argued that
Johnson had committed only technical violations and the district
court had violated section 18-1.3-407(5)(a) by improperly holding
Johnson in county jail after not taking action within sixty days.2
¶7 In response, the People argued that subsection (5)(a) applies to
a YOS sentence revocation only when an offender poses a danger to
himself, herself, or others and that Johnson did not. Instead, the
People asserted, subsection (5)(c) applied to Johnson’s YOS
revocation because he failed to comply with the terms and
conditions of his YOS sentence.
¶8 On October 26, 2018, following a hearing, the district court
denied Johnson’s motion to dismiss.
¶9 Defense counsel further argued that if the court agreed to
revoke Johnson’s YOS sentence, it was not required to reinstate his
2We note, however, that police officers had already arrested and
detained Johnson in county jail on potential new charges for having
guns in his house.
3
original suspended sentence because it had discretion to choose
any alternative sentence authorized by statute.
¶ 10 Based on the People’s evidence, the district court found that
Johnson had violated the conditions of his YOS sentence, and the
statute required it to impose Johnson’s suspended sentence of
eighteen years in the custody of the DOC. The court further
explained that despite disagreeing that it had improperly held
Johnson in county jail longer than sixty days, it nonetheless
granted him additional presentence confinement credit (PSCC) in
the event that it erred in considering that offenders serving
“community supervision time” are ordinarily not entitled to PSCC.
See § 18-1.3-407(2)(b). Consequently, the district court revoked
Johnson’s YOS sentence and resentenced him to eighteen years in
DOC custody with PSCC and mandatory parole.
¶ 11 Johnson timely appealed.
II. Discussion
¶ 12 Johnson contends that the district court erred by
(1) misapplying section 18-1.3-407(5)(c) to revoke his YOS sentence
and thereby not acting within the required sixty days after his
detention in county jail; (2) improperly concluding that it was
4
statutorily required to reimpose his original suspended DOC
sentence; and (3) abusing its discretion when it revoked his YOS
sentence. We address and reject each of these contentions in turn.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 13 “Statutory interpretation involves questions of law, which we
review de novo.” Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20, ¶ 15, 392 P.3d
1198, 1202; see People v. Garcia, 2016 COA 124, ¶ 6, 382 P.3d
1258, 1260 (applying de novo standard to determine whether,
under section 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(I), a court may award a YOS offender
PSCC at his initial sentencing).
¶ 14 Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
legislative intent. People v. Vidauri, 2021 CO 25, ¶ 11, 486 P.3d
239, 242. “To do so, we look to the statute’s plain language and
‘give its words and phrases their ordinary and commonly accepted
meaning[s].’” Howard v. People, 2020 CO 15, ¶ 13, 458 P.3d 893,
897 (quoting People v. Hoskin, 2016 CO 63, ¶ 7, 380 P.3d 130,
133); see Mosley, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d at 1202 (“[A] statute must be read
and considered as a whole,” so that our interpretation provides a
“consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” (citing
People v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986))). We also avoid
5
interpreting a statute in a manner “that would render any words or
phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd
results.” People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 16, 459 P.3d 516, 519
(citing McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d 379, 389)). If
the statute’s language is clear, then “we apply it as written” and
look no further to other rules of statutory construction. Howard,
¶ 13, 458 P.3d at 897 (quoting Munoz v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,
2018 CO 68, ¶ 9, 425 P.3d 1128, 1130).
B. Analysis
1. Section 18-1.3-407(5)(c)
¶ 15 The YOS statute allows youthful offenders3 convicted of
felonies as adults to serve their sentences in a facility separate from
the DOC. People v. Miller, 25 P.3d 1230, 1231 (Colo. 2001)
(referring to the YOS statute in its previous location at section 16-
11-311, C.R.S. 2000). Youthful offenders under the YOS undergo
highly structured and monitored community supervision. Id.; see
3 The statute defines a “young adult offender” as a person who is at
least eighteen years of age but younger than twenty at the time of
the offense and under the age of twenty-one at the time of
sentencing. § 18-1.3-407.5(3), C.R.S. 2021.
6
People v. Martinez, 2015 COA 33, ¶ 16, 350 P.3d 986, 989 (The YOS
statute provides “a sentencing option for certain youthful offenders
[in] a controlled and regimented environment.” (quoting § 18-1.3-
407(1)(a))).
¶ 16 If an offender fails to comply with the terms and conditions of
his or her sentence, section 18-1.3-407(5) provides specific
procedures to revoke a YOS sentence.
¶ 17 Subsection (5)(a) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by paragraph (b)
of this subsection (5), the department of
corrections shall implement a procedure for
the transfer of an offender to another facility
when an offender in the system poses a danger
to himself or herself or others. The executive
director of the department of corrections shall
review any transfer determination by the
department prior to the actual transfer of an
inmate, including a transfer back to the
district court for revocation of the sentence to
the youthful offender system. A transfer
pursuant to this paragraph (a) shall be limited
to a period not to exceed sixty days, at which
time the offender shall be returned to the
youthful offender facility to complete his or her
sentence or returned to the district court for
revocation of the sentence to the youthful
offender system. In no case shall an offender
initially sentenced to the youthful offender
system be held in isolation or segregation or in
an adult facility for longer than sixty
7
consecutive days without action by the
sentencing court.
§ 18-1.3-407(5)(a) (emphasis added).
¶ 18 Subsection (5)(c) states:
The department of corrections shall implement
a procedure for returning offenders who
cannot successfully complete the sentence to
the youthful offender system, or who fail to
comply with the terms or conditions of the
youthful offender system, to the district court.
An offender returned to the district court
pursuant to subsection (5)(a) of this section or
because he or she cannot successfully
complete the sentence to the youthful offender
system for reasons other than a behavioral or
mental health disorder or an intellectual and
developmental disability, or because he or she
fails to comply with the terms or conditions of
the youthful offender system, shall receive
imposition of the original sentence to the
department of corrections.
§ 18-1.3-407(5)(c).
¶ 19 Johnson argues that his YOS sentence revocation is governed
by subsection (5)(a) because it requires that (1) the DOC’s executive
director review “any transfer determination by the department” and
(2) “[i]n no case shall an offender . . . be held . . . in an adult facility
8
for longer than sixty consecutive days without action by the
sentencing court.”4 We are not persuaded.
¶ 20 We conclude that the district court correctly applied
subsection (5)(c) to revoke Johnson’s YOS sentence, rather than
subsection (5)(a).5
¶ 21 A plain and ordinary reading of the first sentence of
subsection (5)(a) directs the DOC to implement a transfer procedure
to another facility when an offender in the system poses a danger to
4 Even if we assume that the DOC violated its statutory obligation to
ensure Johnson had a district court hearing before being detained
for more than sixty days, he received a remedy for such an alleged
violation when the trial court granted Johnson credit for ten
months of community supervision against his sentence that was
not otherwise permitted by statute. Thus, even though mootness is
usually jurisdictional, see Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70, ¶ 9, 444
P.3d 313, 316, we need not address the People’s contingent
mootness argument concerning Johnson’s requested relief for any
technical violations of section 18-1.3-407(5)(a).
5 Johnson’s counsel also argued, although incorrectly, that Johnson
had completed his YOS sentence on August 24, 2018, while being
held in county jail. That would only have been the case, however,
had he successfully completed his YOS sentence. See People v.
Martinez, 2015 COA 33, ¶ 18, 350 P.3d 986, 989 (Under
§ 18-1.3-407(5)(c), offenders who cannot complete a YOS sentence
“are not entitled to be discharged from YOS and their suspended
DOC sentences are not complete.”). Also, Johnson’s discharge date
was tolled after he was arrested and held in county jail for allegedly
violating the terms and conditions of his YOS sentence. Id. at ¶ 19,
350 P.3d at 989.
9
himself, herself, or others. Thus, for subsection (5)(a) to apply to an
offender’s YOS sentence revocation, an offender must exhibit a
danger to himself, herself, or others. It follows then that, when read
in context and as a whole, the additional provisions of subsection
(5)(a) referring to “any transfer determination” by the DOC are
limited to those offenders who pose a danger to themselves or
others. See Mosley, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d at 1202. The record does not
support the conclusion that Johnson posed a danger to himself or
others, and Johnson does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, we
reject Johnson’s contention that the last sentence of subsection 5(a)
applies to all YOS sentences, and we conclude it applies only to
transfers. Therefore, because subsection (5)(a) is inapplicable to
Johnson’s YOS sentence revocation, the district court did not
improperly hold Johnson in county jail for more than sixty days
when it concluded, instead, that subsection (5)(c) governed.
¶ 22 We also reject Johnson’s argument that subsections (5)(a) and
(5)(c) jointly apply to his YOS sentence revocation.6 Although we
6Because we have previously concluded that subsection (5)(a) of the
YOS statute does not apply to Johnson, we need not address his
argument that under section 18-1.3-407(5)(c), revocation of an
10
have previously determined that subsection (5)(a) does not apply to
Johnson’s YOS revocation, we clarify the interplay between
subsections (5)(a) and (5)(c). Section 18-1.3-407(5)(c) specifies
procedures to revoke a YOS sentence and return an offender to the
district court when the offender cannot successfully complete his or
her sentence. See Martinez, ¶ 18, 350 P.3d at 989; People v.
Efferson, 122 P.3d 1038, 1040 (Colo. App. 2005). Subsection (5)(c)
identifies three categories of offenders for whom the district court
must reimpose their original sentences to the DOC. The first
category concerns an offender returned to the district court under
subsection (5)(a). Under that subsection, after an offender has been
transferred to another facility for up to sixty days, the offender must
be returned to the youthful offender facility to complete his or her
sentence or to the district court for revocation of his or her sentence
to the YOS. The second category applies to an offender who cannot
successfully complete a YOS sentence for reasons other than a
behavioral or mental health disorder or an intellectual or
offender’s YOS sentence must also follow the procedures of section
18-1.3-407(5)(a).
11
developmental disability. The third category applies to offenders,
like Johnson, who fail to comply with the terms and conditions of
their YOS sentences. See People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588, 592
(Colo. 2009) (a criminal statute defined three categories of an
offense by using the word “or”); People v. Boling, 261 P.3d 503, 506
(Colo. App. 2011) (Each of a statute’s four provisions were
separated by a semicolon and “‘or,’ which is ordinarily assumed to
demarcate different categories.”).
¶ 23 Accordingly, because only the third category applies to
Johnson, the district court was required to reimpose his original
sentence to the DOC. As a result, Johnson was not returned to the
district court under subsection (5)(a), and the reference in
subsection (5)(c) to subsection (5)(a) is inapplicable to him.
2. Mandatory Sentence
¶ 24 Johnson argues that the district court erred by concluding
that it was required to reimpose his original suspended DOC
sentence. We disagree.
12
¶ 25 We conclude that the district court properly determined that
the YOS statute mandates reimposition of Johnson’s original prison
sentence.7
¶ 26 Johnson’s reliance on Fierro v. People, 206 P.3d 460, 465-66
(Colo. 2009), is misplaced. In that case, the provisions governing
probation revocation under section 16-11-205(5), C.R.S. 2021,
operated in conjunction with section 18-1.3-401(11), C.R.S. 2021,
thus permitting a district court to resentence a defendant to any
sentence that might originally have been imposed. Fierro, 206 P.3d
at 466. In this case, however, we agree with a prior division of this
court that section 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(II) requires the district court to
impose the offender’s original sentence after revoking his or her
YOS sentence under subsection (5)(c). See Martinez, ¶ 30 n.3, 350
P.3d at 992 n.3.
¶ 27 Fierro is further distinguishable because it concerned a
defendant’s probation revocation, whereas this case concerns
7In addition to the district court’s discretionary award of PSCC
under section 18-1.3-407(2)(b), we note that under section 18-1.3-
405, C.R.S. 2021, Johnson was entitled to PSCC for the period he
was confined pending his YOS revocation. See People v. Garcia,
2016 COA 124, ¶ 18 n.1, 382 P.3d 1258, 1262 n.1.
13
Johnson’s YOS revocation. The legislature’s use of the word “shall”
in section 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(II) signals a mandate to the district court
to reimpose Johnson’s original prison sentence upon revoking his
YOS sentence. See Garcia, ¶¶ 13-14, 382 P.3d at 1261 (reasoning
that using the words “shall” and “may” in the same statute
indicates the legislature’s intent that these words carry their
ordinary meanings); see also Howard, ¶¶ 23-24, 458 P.3d at 899-
900 (a defendant was ineligible for probation because the crime of
violence statute itself dictates that probation is not an option).
¶ 28 Moreover, if the General Assembly had intended the district
court to use its discretion to impose any sentence other than the
original prison sentence after a YOS revocation, it could have said
so.8 See Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, LLC, 2013 CO 33, ¶ 16,
302 P.3d 263, 267 (the legislature could have created remedies for
8 We recognize the harsh impact on Johnson by revoking his six-
year YOS sentence and imposing, instead, his original suspended
eighteen-year DOC sentence. However, it is up to the General
Assembly to amend the YOS statute to allow district courts to
exercise their discretion when reimposing the original (suspended)
prison sentence. See Lobato v. State, 2013 CO 30, ¶ 45, 304 P.3d
1132, 1144 (“It is not up to the court to make [public] policy or to
weigh policy.” (quoting Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture,
L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 38 (Colo. 2000)).
14
LLC creditors but did not); Howard, ¶ 27, 458 P.3d at 900 (The
legislature could have specifically included the probation statute
under the direct file statute if it intended probation to be an option;
“we will ‘not read into a statute language that is not there.’” (quoting
Marsh v. People, 2017 CO 10M, ¶ 62, 389 P.3d 100, 113)); see also
Cali, ¶ 17, 459 P.3d at 519 (we neither add to nor subtract words
from a statute); Beren v. Beren, 2015 CO 29, ¶ 11, 349 P.3d 233,
239 (“If different statutory provisions cannot be harmonized, the
specific provision controls over the general provision.”).
¶ 29 In sum, we see no error.
3. Revocation of Johnson’s YOS Sentence
¶ 30 Last, Johnson contends that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking his YOS sentence. We disagree.
a. Additional Background
¶ 31 On October 12, 2017, Johnson started Phase III, the
community supervision stage of his YOS sentence. About a month
later, Johnson began having trouble complying with the terms and
conditions of Phase III. At his suitability hearing on July 13, 2018,
Johnson’s community parole officer reported that Johnson had
failed to progress through the program. During a span of about
15
seven months, Johnson violated Phase III’s directives and lawful
orders as follows:
 Johnson failed to notify his probation officer about being
fired from his first job.
 He missed a total of nineteen urinalysis tests; of those he
took, Johnson tested positive nine times for alcohol or
marijuana, or both.
 Johnson violated curfew multiple times and once lied to
his probation officer about leaving his house in the
middle of the night.
 He failed to keep his ankle monitor continuously charged
and to check in with his supervisors; the DOC then
expended resources to make sure Johnson could be
properly monitored.
 He had associated with a known felon before contacting
his community parole officer to get permission to do so at
his home.
¶ 32 At the time, Johnson also refused offers made by his parole
officer and case manager to be driven to get tested and to find and
16
set up therapy and drug treatment. Johnson also testified at the
hearing and admitted that he “messed up.”
¶ 33 The DOC concluded that Johnson failed to progress through
the YOS program in violation of Phase III, it recommended that
Johnson’s YOS sentence be revoked, and the DOC’s executive
director affirmed the decision.
¶ 34 On October 26, 2018, the district court held a hearing to
determine whether to revoke Johnson’s YOS sentence. Johnson’s
community parole officer testified as to Johnson’s violations, and
the district court revoked Johnson’s YOS sentence based on the
evidence supporting the DOC’s decision to do so.
b. Analysis
¶ 35 We review a district court’s decision to revoke a YOS sentence
for an abuse of discretion. See Martinez, ¶ 29, 350 P.3d at 991 (a
district court retains discretion to dismiss a proceeding to revoke a
defendant’s YOS sentence). “A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Garcia,
¶ 21, 382 P.3d at 1262; People v. Fallis, 2015 COA 75, ¶ 4, 353
P.3d 934, 935 (We assess whether a district court abused its
17
discretion by determining whether its “decision fell within a range of
reasonable options.”).
¶ 36 Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his YOS sentence because he had already completed most
of the program and had only committed technical violations. We
are not persuaded.
¶ 37 Based on the record, we conclude that the district court
appropriately revoked Johnson’s YOS sentence after conducting a
hearing.9
¶ 38 The district court relied on the DOC’s findings that Johnson
had repeatedly violated Phase III’s terms and conditions, despite
being warned and had offered help to complete the program, which
he declined. Fallis, ¶ 4, 353 P.3d at 935. Johnson himself
admitted these violations. We also reject Johnson’s argument that,
as an adult, he could use alcohol and marijuana because they are
not illegal. By signing the terms and conditions of his supervised
release, Johnson agreed not to use these substances. See, e.g.,
9In conducting the hearing, the district court followed defense
counsel’s suggestion to proceed with Johnson’s revocation
determination in a manner “similar to a probation revocation.”
18
Efferson, 122 P.3d at 1039-40 (the district court retained
jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s YOS sentence for admittedly
using alcohol and marijuana in violation of its terms and
conditions).
¶ 39 Therefore, we see no error.
III. Conclusion
¶ 40 The district court’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.
19