Stedman v. Federal Communications Commision ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
RAYMOND STEDMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 22-3191 (BAH)
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS )
COMMISSION, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Raymond Stedman initiated the instant complaint in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia against defendant Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which
removed the action to this Court before filing the pending motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 4.1 For
the reasons discussed below, defendant’s motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that, over a 12- to 14-year period, his “home and property [have] been
commandeered or overrun by the government and other media entities.” Compl. at 3, ECF No.
1-1.2 He states that he “was the focal point of an ‘open forum’ (spygate Obamagate) cyber riots
and attacks, has direct contact with world leaders (Kim Jun Un [sic], Vlad Putin, Queen
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For purposes of resoling the pending motion, service of process is assumed to have been effected, obviating
the need to address defendant’s alternative argument that dismissal is warranted for insufficient service of process,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). See Def.’s Mem. at 12-13.
2
The page numbers cited are those applied by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing
(“CM/ECF”) system.
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Elizabeth, the prince of Arabia), terrorist organizations, and cults,” and has had his “intellectual
property . . . taken at will from the privacy of [his] own home.” Id. Over this time period,
plaintiff alleges, his “privacy and civil rights were violated beyond belief.” Id. According to
plaintiff, “bombers or army transport planes fly[] directly over [his] house,” id. at 3, and on one
occasion an “attack chopper with a red light was 75 feet over [his] driveway,” id. at 3-4.
“Besides the invasion of privacy, harassment, criminal negligence, wreck less [sic]
endangerment, and obstruction of justice,” plaintiff allegedly suffers “injury to [his] brain and
body caused by overwhelming signal, riots and ritual like attacks by media and government
entities as well as a victimized public and military and intelligence agencies.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiff appears to blame defendant for the physical and psychological harm he suffers,
citing the agency’s responsibility “for regulating Broadcast networks, Radios, and the internet in
it’s [sic] entirety.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, ECF No. 7; see Supp. Opp’n at 3, ECF No. 8. He describes
a “network of telepathy and pirated signal” and alleges “[e]very network had they’re [sic] own
signal malfunction, circle, and effects. Aimed directly at us.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. “The anxieties
[plaintiff has] developed, the hacking of [his] cyber identity, complications to [his] life and
actual physical harm are unforgiveable,” plaintiff alleges. Errata at 3, ECF No. 9. To
compensate for his injuries, plaintiff demands $45 million. Compl. at 1.
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that: (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See generally Def.’s Mem. of
P. & A. in Support of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 8-12, ECF No. 4. Defendant is
correct.
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
“Article III of the Constitution prescribes that ‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited
subject-matter jurisdiction’ and ‘ha[ve] the power to decide only those cases over which
Congress grants jurisdiction.’” Bronner ex rel. Am. Stud. Ass’n v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 602
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 317
(D.C. Cir. 2012)); see also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“‘Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute.’” (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994))).
Absent subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, the court must dismiss it. See Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506–07 (2006) (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)); FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim
at issue. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). When considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must determine jurisdictional questions by accepting as
true all uncontroverted material factual allegations contained in the complaint and “‘constru[ing]
the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff[s] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.’” Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 36 F.4th 278, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir.
2011)).
B. Rules 8 and 12(b)(6)
A plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he
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is] entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Ideally, “[e]ach allegation [of a complaint is] simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). At the same time, to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” VoteVets Action Fund v. McDonough, 992 F.3d 1097, 1104 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S.
744, 757–58 (2014). A facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not ‘“merely consistent
with’ a defendant’s liability” but that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556); see Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“Plausibility requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully[.]”).
In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the whole complaint must be considered, with
all factual allegations accepted as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see
also Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
The Court cannot, however, “assume the truth of legal conclusions, nor [does it] ‘accept
inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.’” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19(alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales,
477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (stating that conclusory
allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true”).
In applying these standards to pleadings filed by pro se litigants, the court must consider
the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.”
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Johnson v. District of Columbia, 927 F.3d 539, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Whole
Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In addition, a pro se complaint must “‘be liberally construed’ and ‘held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Bowman v. Iddon, 848 F.3d
1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from complying with applicable
procedural rules and “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the
mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567
F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678); see also Jones v. Horne, 634
F.3d 588, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s lawsuit must be dismissed on multiple grounds, whether plaintiff’s claims are
broadly construed as torts or violations of his civil rights, as explained further below.
A. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims
“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, . .
. and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain
the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted); United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent, and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). “A
waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed,’”
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4
(1969)), and absent an express waiver, “sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and
its agencies from suit,” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
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1. Tort Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act
Insofar as plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, defendant argues, Def.’s Mem. at 9-10, ECF
No. 4, they may proceed only under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see 28 U.S.C. §§
2671-80, which permits a civil suit for “personal injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).3 The FTCA waives sovereign immunity “‘under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.’” Hornbeck Offshore
Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1)). Thus, the FTCA renders the United States subject to suit for certain – but not all –
tort claims. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
To the extent plaintiff intends to bring negligence claims, such claims would proceed
under the FTCA, which in relevant part provides:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have
first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his
claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and
sent by certified or registered mail.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, claimants may not sue the United States
“in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies,” and claimants’
“fail[ure] to heed that clear statutory command” warrants dismissal of their claims. McNeil v.
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The United States of America is the only proper defendant to a suit under the FTCA. See, e.g., Hall v.
Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 496 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D.D.C. 2007). Even though this pro se plaintiff has not
named the United States as a party defendant, this pleading defect is overlooked and plaintiff’s claims are treated as
if he brought them against the United States directly.
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United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); see Henderson v. Ratner, No. 10-5035, 2010 WL
2574175, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of FTCA claim where
“[a]ppellant failed to demonstrate that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit
in the district court”); Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 F. App’x 445, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of unexhausted FTCA claim “for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction”).
Defendant notes that plaintiff has presented no factual allegations about compliance
“with the FTCA’s exhaustion of administrative remedy prerequisites” prior to bringing this
lawsuit. Def.’s Mem. at 9; Def.’s Reply in Support of its Mot. to Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 11.
Although plaintiff’s oppositions do not mention the FTCA, plaintiff produces a copy of a Claim
for Damage, Injury, or Death (SF-95), explaining the basis of his claim as follows:
For the past 12-15 years, cyber riots and unregulated signals have
harassed, endangered, and physically harmed me I was attached to
cult like network by my mind. I’ve lost any since [sic] of privacy or
security. The toll on my mind is monstrous anxieties, loss of
function, being actually converted telepathy. I’ve been a target of a
signal pirating cult, based on television on a completely unregulated
network . . . .
Errata, Ex. at 1, ECF No. 9-1. According to plaintiff, these events occurred on November 20,
2022, see id., long after his complaint, had already been filed, on April 28, 2022, ECF No. 1-1,
and shortly after defendant had filed the pending motion to dismiss, on November 16, 2022,
alerting plaintiff to the defect under the FTCA. As defendant notes, see Def.’s Reply at 2 n.1,
ECF No. 11, this belated effort to present an administrative claim does not demonstrate
compliance with the FTCA for purposes of this lawsuit, as plaintiff fails to show both
presentment of his claim to defendant and denial of “his claim . . . in writing and sent by certified
or registered mail,” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(d), prior to filing this civil action in Superior Court on
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April 28, 2022. “The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have
exhausted their administrative remedies.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. Thus plaintiff’s failure to
exhaust warrants dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
b. Constitutional Tort Claims
If plaintiff’s tort claims arise from an alleged violation of his civil rights, such claims are
barred by sovereign immunity. The “United States simply has not rendered itself liable under
§ 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.” Meyer, 510 U.S. 478; see Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons,
843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[T]he United States has not consented to be sued for
monetary damages based on a constitutional violation[.]”); Boling v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 290
F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2017) (“First, the law is well established that Congress has not
waived the United States’ immunity with respect to tort claims arising under the Constitution.”),
aff’d, No. 17-5285, 2018 WL 6721354 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2018).
2. Remaining Tort Claims
If plaintiff brings tort claims “based on the alleged, unspecified conduct of the invasion
of privacy, harassment, criminal negligence, reckless endangerment, and obstruction of justice,”
Def.’s Mem. at 12; see Compl. at 3, defendant argues such claims amount to intentional torts
barred by sovereign immunity as well, see Def.’s Mem. at 12; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(providing that FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply “[a]ny claim arising out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights”).
Given the vague and conclusory nature of the complaint, determining whether or what
intentional torts plaintiff intends to raise is difficult. That said, plaintiff’s allegations of having
“walked into a[n] assassination style shooting,” Compl. at 3, having military aircraft fly over his
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house, see id. at 3-4, and having suffered physical injury, see id. at 4, suggest assault and battery
claims. Any such assault and battery claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff responds with a request that this Court “wa[i]ve sovereignty.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3;
see Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n at 2; Errata at 3. Plaintiff considers his circumstances “unprecedented,”
Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, and to be “the actual cause of the Jan. 6, international riots and shootings,” id.;
see Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n at 2; Errata at 3. This request is beyond the power of this Court to grant
because only the United States Congress has the authority to waive sovereign immunity. See
Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text[.]”).
B. The Complaint Fails to State Claims Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
Defendant argues that “this Court cannot entertain jurisdiction over the patently
insubstantial pleading before it.” Def.’s Mem. at 8. The Court concurs.
A federal court is “without power to entertain claims otherwise within [its] jurisdiction if
they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial,
[or] obviously frivolous.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Mindful, however, that a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be liberally
construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Brown v. District of Columbia, 514
F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the Court finds plaintiff’s allegations, to include his direct
contact with world leaders, Compl. at 3, and injuries to his “brain and body caused by
overwhelming signal,” id. at 4, to be “patently insubstantial,” as they are “flimsier than doubtful
or questionable . . . [and] essentially fictitious,” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Court concludes that its lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tort claims
and that the complaint otherwise fails to state a viable legal claim. Accordingly, defendant’s
motion to dismiss will be granted. An Order consistent with this conclusion is issued separately.
DATE: May 23, 2023 /s/ Beryl A. Howell
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge
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