Guillermo Octavio Arbelaez v. State of Florida & Guillermo Octavio Arbelaez v. Ricky D. Dixon, etc. ( 2023 )

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2015-1628
____________
GUILLERMO OCTAVIO ARBELAEZ,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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No. SC2018-0392
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GUILLERMO OCTAVIO ARBELAEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICKY D. DIXON, etc.,
Respondent.
May 25, 2023
PER CURIAM.
Guillermo Octavio Arbelaez, a prisoner under sentence of
death, appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his
successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and 3.203. Arbelaez also
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
In 1991, a jury convicted Arbelaez of first-degree murder and
kidnapping. We affirmed Arbelaez’s convictions and sentence of
death on direct appeal. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez I), 626 So. 2d
169 (Fla. 1993). We upheld the denial of his initial motion for
postconviction relief on all but one claim, which we remanded for
an evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez II), 775 So. 2d
909 (Fla. 2000). We upheld the denial of his second postconviction
motion after the evidentiary hearing and denied his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez III), 898 So. 2d
25 (Fla. 2005).
In 2004, Arbelaez filed his third postconviction motion, in
which he raised an intellectual disability claim under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304(2002). We reversed the denial of his intellectual disability claim
and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez v. State
(Arbelaez IV), No. SC2005-1610 (Fla. order Nov. 14, 2006). We
upheld the denial of his fourth postconviction motion after an
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evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez V), 72 So. 3d 745(Fla. 2011). We also upheld the denial of his fifth postconviction
motion. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez VI), 88 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 2012).
In May 2015, Arbelaez filed his sixth postconviction motion
under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and 3.203. Within
his motion, Arbelaez sought relief based on Hall v. Florida (Hall),
572 U.S. 701 (2014), and Atkins. In June 2015, the circuit court
issued an order summarily denying Arbelaez’s intellectual disability
claim in light of this Court’s decision in Arbelaez V. This appeal
followed. While Arbelaez’s postconviction case was pending in this
Court, this Court permitted Arbelaez to file supplemental briefing in
light of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S 92 (2016), and Hall v. State (Hall v.
State), 201 So. 3d 628 (Fla. 2016). Arbelaez subsequently filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that
chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, created a substantive right that
must be retroactively applied under the United States and Florida
Constitutions.
First, Arbelaez is not entitled to postconviction relief based on
his intellectual disability claim. As this Court stated in Phillips v.
State, 299 So. 3d 1013, 1024 (Fla. 2020), Hall does not apply
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retroactively. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order
summarily denying Arbelaez’s successive motion for postconviction
relief.
Second, Arbelaez is not entitled to Hurst relief because the jury
unanimously found that Arbelaez was guilty of kidnapping Julio
Rivas. See State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 489, 508 (Fla. 2020) (“The jury
in Poole’s case unanimously found that, during the course of the
first-degree murder of Noah Scott, Poole committed the crimes of
attempted first-degree murder of White, sexual battery of White,
armed burglary, and armed robbery. Under this Court’s
longstanding precedent interpreting Ring v. Arizona [536 U.S. 584(2002)] and under a correct understanding of Hurst v. Florida, this
satisfied the requirement that a jury unanimously find a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Arbelaez I,
626 So. 2d at 174 (“[T]he jury found Arbelaez guilty of kidnapping
and the first-degree murder of Julio Rivas.”).
This Court has consistently rejected as without merit the claim
that chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, created a substantive right
that must be retroactively applied. See, e.g., Thomas v. Jones,
SC2017-2268, 2018 WL 3198373, at *1 (Fla. June 29, 2018)
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(unpublished order); Rodriguez v. Jones, SC2018-0352, 2018 WL
1673423, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished order); Hannon v.
State, 228 So. 3d 505, 513 (Fla. 2017); Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d
112, 113 (Fla. 2017); Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 703 (Fla. 2017).
Arbelaez’s arguments do not compel departing from our precedent.
Consequently, we deny Arbelaez’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
Any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
SASSO, J., did not participate.
LABARGA, J., dissenting.
In light of my dissent in Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla.
2020) (receding from Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016), and
holding that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), does not apply
retroactively), I dissent to the majority’s decision to the extent that
it affirms the summary denial of Arbelaez’s successive motion for
postconviction relief.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,
Diane Valentina Ward, Judge
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Case No. 131988CF0055460001XX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Todd
Scher, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern
Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T.
Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
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