Coppedge v. Coppedge , 298 Ga. 494 ( 2016 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 22, 2016
S15A1450. COPPEDGE v. COPPEDGE.
THOMPSON, Chief Justice.
Appellant Bradley Coppedge (husband) appeals from a trial court’s order
denying his petition for modification of child custody and visitation and holding
him in contempt of a final divorce decree. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
in part and reverse in part.
The record demonstrates that husband and appellee Catherine Coppedge
(wife) were divorced in December 2006 by a final judgment incorporating the
parties’ settlement agreement. At the time the final decree was entered, husband
and wife had two minor daughters who attended private school and summer and
after-school care at St. Luke School in Columbus, Georgia. The final decree
required husband to pay wife $2,000 in monthly child support and further
provided in a provision entitled “Educational Expenses: (1) Expenses Through
High School” that:
Included in the direct cash payment to Wife from Husband pursuant to
[the $2,000 child support calculation] are what the parties have
determined to be Husband’s proportional shares of a private school
education for each Child at St. Luke. In addition, the parties recognize
that also included in Husband’s direct cash payment to Wife from
Husband pursuant to [the child support calculation] are his proportional
shares for any amounts paid in connection with either after school or
summer care for either or both of the Children. Should the expenses
associated with St. Luke increase or decrease for either or both Children
for any reason, including the after school or summer care amounts, the
parties shall evenly divide (i.e. 50/50) the amount of any such increase or
decrease, and Husband’s direct cash amount pursuant to subparagraph
(“B”) above shall be adjusted accordingly . . . . Wife shall be responsible
for making all payments directly to the schools. Notwithstanding Wife’s
decision making-authority over the Children’s educations, if either or both
of the Children be removed from St. Luke and placed [in] another private
school that is more expensive than St. Luke, Husband’s obligation to pay
for private school expenses shall be limited to those amounts that he
would be charged by St. Luke for given grade level(s) in which the
Children are enrolled.
In the spring of 2010, wife decided to remove the children from St. Luke
summer care and hired a babysitter to provide summer and after-school child
care for the children in her home. In May 2010, husband filed a petition seeking
modification of the final decree’s child custody and visitation awards. Husband
subsequently reduced the amount of his monthly child support payments by the
amount of his share of the cost of sending the children to after-school and
summer care at St. Luke. Wife answered and counterclaimed for contempt,
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arguing, among other things, that husband had failed to pay approximately
$7,000 in child support, an amount determined by calculating what husband
would have been required to pay if the children were still attending after-school
and summer care programs at St. Luke.
After a hearing at which both parties presented evidence and argument, the
trial court entered a final order denying husband’s petition for modification and
holding him in contempt for his failure to pay his share of the children’s after-
school and summer care expenses and for his failure on one occasion to give
wife her court-ordered visitation. The trial court concluded as a matter of law
that the final divorce decree did not “confine these parties to St. Luke after care
or summer camp, and that [husband] was not entitled to reduce child support
without a Court order.” Husband’s motions for new trial and reconsideration
were denied.1 Husband now appeals from the trial court order holding him in
contempt of the final divorce decree as well as the denial of his petition for
1
Prior to entry of the trial court’s final order, husband filed a pleading styled as a
motion for reconsideration. He filed a second motion for reconsideration after the final order
was entered.
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modification of custody and visitation.2
1. Husband contends the trial court erred in holding him in contempt
based on his payment of the reduced child support amounts after the children
stopped attending St. Luke’s summer and after-school care. Specifically,
husband argues that he only agreed to pay his proportionate share of after-school
and summer care expenses incurred at St. Luke, and therefore, he was not
obligated to pay for any of the expenses associated with the in-home babysitter
hired by wife. He also contends that the decree permitted him to make an
adjustment to his payment for child care without court order. Wife asserts that
the cost of the babysitter is an after-school and summer child care expense
which husband is obligated to pay a portion of under the terms of the decree.
The threshold issue for determination then is the parties’ intent with
regard to husband’s obligation to pay a proportionate share of the children’s
after-school and summer care expenses. It is undisputed that
[a] settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is
construed according to the same rules that govern contractual
2
Husband filed an application for discretionary appeal in this Court which was
granted pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) because he was entitled to a direct appeal. See
OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11).
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interpretation in general, with the cardinal rule being to ascertain
the intention of the parties. Where any contractual term of a
settlement agreement incorporated into a decree is clear,
unambiguous, and capable of only one interpretation as written, the
provision's plain meaning must be strictly enforced.
(Footnotes omitted.) Hall v. Day, 273 Ga. 838, 839-840 (1) (546 SE2d 469)
(2001). The trial court found the language of the parties’ agreement, and thus
the final decree, did not as a matter of law confine husband’s obligation to pay
for after-school and summer care to care provided by St. Luke. Therefore, the
court concluded, husband was in violation of the divorce decree when, after wife
hired a babysitter to provide after-school and summer child care, he reduced the
amount of child support by the amount he would have otherwise paid for after-
school or summer care at St. Luke.
Applying general rules of contract construction, we cannot agree with the
trial court’s conclusion that the relevant language of the decree unambiguously
imposed upon husband an obligation to pay for a proportionate share of the cost
of the babysitter hired by wife. A careful review of the language of the decree
proves it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. For instance, the
decree says that “Husband’s direct cash payment” of $2,000 includes “his
proportional shares for any amounts paid in connection with either after school
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or summer care for either or both of the Children.” Read in isolation, this
proportional share provision reasonably could be interpreted as imposing upon
husband a general and unrestricted obligation to contribute to the cost of
after-school and summer care even if it is not provided by St. Luke, thus not
permitting him to deduct from his “direct cash payment” his proportional share
of child care provided by the babysitter in this case.
The very next sentence of the decree (the “adjustment provision”),
however, creates an ambiguity regarding this issue. It provides that the parties
shall evenly divide any increase or decrease in “the expenses associated with St.
Luke for either or both Children . . . , including the after school or summer care
amounts.” It also says that “Husband’s direct cash amount shall be adjusted”
according to the increase or decrease in “expenses associated with St. Luke.”
“[W]e generally accept that contractual terms carry their ordinary meaning,”
Archer Western Contractors, Ltd. v. Estate of Mack Pitts, 292 Ga. 219, 224 (735
SE2d 772) (2012), and “[w]ords, like people, are judged by the company they
keep,” Warren v. State, 294 Ga. 589, 590-591 (755 SE2d 171) (2014); accord
Anderson v. Anderson, 274 Ga. 224, 227 (552 SE2d 801) (2001). The word
“associated” means “join[ed] or connect[ed] together.” See Merriam-Webster
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Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/associated (Website
last accessed February 4, 2016). Giving it its ordinary meaning, the phrase “the
expenses associated with St. Luke for either or both Children” could reasonably
be interpreted to mean expenses (1) connected with St. Luke (2) that are
incurred for the parties’ children. The adjustment provision thus would appear
to give husband the right to deduct from his “direct cash payment” his
proportional share of expenses for child care provided by St. Luke once the
children’s child care was no longer provided by St. Luke. In such a case, there
would be a decrease in the expenses connected with St. Luke for the care of the
children.
Alternatively, the adjustment provision could be interpreted as setting a
benchmark for the cost of the children’s child care at the amount charged by St.
Luke, regardless of who was providing the child care, with the parties
monitoring St. Luke’s increases or decreases in the amount it charged for after-
school and summer care and dividing any increases or decreases. But the
ordinary meaning of the terms of the adjustment provision makes this reading
of the decree uncertain. Those terms describe the expenses as connected with
St. Luke for either or both children, so it is not clear that expenses provided by
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the babysitter would qualify.
Given the ambiguity in the divorce decree regarding husband’s obligation
to pay for after-school and summer care expenses provided by someone other
than St. Luke, we conclude the trial court abused it discretion by holding
husband was in contempt of the decree when he reduced the amount of child
support payments after wife withdrew the children from St. Luke’s after-school
program.3 See Morgan v. Morgan, 288 Ga. 417, 419 (1) (704 SE2d 764) (2011)
(party may not be held in contempt for violation of court order unless that order
informed him in definite terms of duties imposed upon him); Farris v. Farris,
3
Our ruling does not mean that husband may not be required to contribute to the cost
of the children’s after-school and summer care expenses regardless of the provider but simply
reflects our conclusion that the language of the divorce decree is insufficiently definite to
support a contempt finding based on the proposition that the decree is unambiguous on this
point. See Arnold v. Arnold, 236 Ga. 594, 595 (225 SE2d 30) (1976) (failure of the trial
court to hold husband in willful contempt for failure to pay child support does not relieve
husband of his obligation to make such payments under the original divorce decree). Nor
should our ruling be interpreted as expressing an opinion of the evidence admitted at the
hearing related to the parties’ intent at the time they entered into their settlement agreement.
The trial court’s ruling pertaining to husband’s failure to pay a share of the child care
expenses provided by the nanny was based solely on the language of the decree, and
therefore, the court made no credibility determinations or factual findings regarding other
evidence submitted by the parties. See Roca Properties, LLC v. Dance Hotlanta, Inc., 327
Ga. App. 700, 707-708 (761 SE2d 105) (2014) (explaining that “if the contract contains an
ambiguity that cannot be resolved through the rules of construction, the court may look
outside the written terms of the contract and consider parol evidence” and that “if the parol
evidence is in conflict, ‘the question of what the parties intended becomes a factual issue for
the jury’”) (citations omitted)). We, likewise, express no opinion regarding these matters in
this appeal.
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285 Ga. 331, 333 (1) (676 SE2d 212) (2009) (before a person may be held in
contempt of a court order, the order must inform him in express and definite
terms of the duties imposed upon him).
2. It is undisputed that in 2010 husband took the children out of town on
wife’s birthday, thereby denying wife her court-ordered custodial time on that
day. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to hold husband in contempt for the
denial of wife’s custodial time is supported by the record, and we find no abuse
of discretion in this ruling. See Horn v. Shepherd, 292 Ga. 14 (4) (732 SE2d
427) (2012) (trial court's contempt ruling will be affirmed on appeal if there is
any evidence to support it).
3. Husband also contends that the trial court erred in denying his request
to modify his visitation rights.
A trial court faced with a petition for modification of child custody
is charged with exercising its discretion to determine what is in the
children’s best interest. A trial court's decision regarding a change
in custody/visitation will be upheld on appeal unless it is shown that
the court clearly abused its discretion. Where there is any evidence
to support the trial court's ruling, a reviewing court cannot say there
was an abuse of discretion.
Vines v. Vines, 292 Ga. 550, 552 (2) (739 SE2d 374) (2013) (citations and
punctuation omitted).
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Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the trial court's
consideration of the children's best interest, we cannot say there was a clear
abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of husband’s request to modify
visitation. It was within the trial court’s discretion to credit wife’s evidence
showing that the children were thriving under the current visitation schedule and
to discredit the contrary evidence proffered by husband through witnesses who
had not seen the children for a number of years. See Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272
Ga. 548, 549 (1) (533 SE2d 80) (2000) (“‘[I]t is the duty of the trial judge to
resolve the conflicts in the evidence . . . .’ [Cit.]”). Moreover, we find no error
in the legal basis of the trial court’s visitation ruling. Contrary to husband’s
assertions, the reference in the final order to husband’s failure to show a change
of condition formed the basis of the trial court’s ruling on husband’s request for
modification of child custody, not visitation. See OCGA § 19-9-3 (b)
(providing that visitation rights may be subject to review and modification
without the necessity of any showing of a change in material conditions but trial
judge may modify custody “based upon a showing of a change in any material
conditions or circumstances of a party or the child”).
4. Finally, we find no merit in husband’s claim that the eight month delay
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between trial and entry of the final order denied him his right to procedural due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
the Georgia Constitution of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I. Keeping in mind that
“the requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands,” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209, 224 (IV) (125 SCt 2384, 162 LE2d 174) (2005) (citation and punctuation
omitted), we conclude that considering the nature and history of the proceedings
in this case, including husband’s decision to file a post-trial, pre-judgment
motion which required the trial court’s time and attention, the delay in the entry
of the final decree was not unreasonable and did not result in the deprivation of
husband’s due process rights. See Cobb County School Dist. v. Barker, 271 Ga.
35, 37 (518 SE2d 126) (1999) (“Neither the federal nor the state constitution’s
due process right guarantees a particular form or method of procedure, but is
satisfied if a party has ‘reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard, and to
present [its] claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the
proceedings and the character of the rights which may be affected by it.
[Cits.]’”). See generally Duggan v. Duggan-Schlitz, 246 Ga. App. 127, 128
(539 SE2d 840) (2000) (trial court has broad discretion in regulating and
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controlling the business and conduct of the court). But see OCGA § 19-9-3 (8)
(providing that “[i]f requested by any party on or before the close of evidence
in a contested hearing, the permanent court order awarding child custody shall
set forth specific findings of fact as to the basis for the judge’s decision . . . .
Such order shall be filed within 30 days of the final hearing in the custody case,
unless extended by order of the judge with the agreement of the parties.”)
(emphasis added).
Husband also argues that he was denied due process by the trial court’s
failure to consider the arguments proffered in his motions for reconsideration.
Although husband is correct that a trial court is obligated to “consider all facts
and conditions which present themselves up to the time of rendering a
judgment” on child custody, see Shore v. Shore, 253 Ga. 183, 184 (318 SE2d
57) (1984), he merely speculates, based on the absence in the final order of a
discussion of the information set forth in these motions, that the trial court failed
to consider his arguments. Husband’s counsel, however, conceded at an
October 23, 2012 hearing that the original motion for reconsideration did not
include any new information but was filed solely “to get some sort of ruling by
the court,” and there is nothing in the record to support his assertion that the trial
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court failed to consider the arguments set out in his second motion for
reconsideration. We find no authority, and husband offers none, imposing upon
a trial court when ruling on a petition for modification of child custody a due
process obligation to include in its ruling a discussion of every argument,
regardless of merit, raised by a party. Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing to allow husband to present to the
trial court orally the same information provided in his pre-judgment motion for
reconsideration.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur.
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