Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., D/B/A Oasis v. City of Doraville ( 2015 )


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  • 297 Ga. 513
    FINAL COPY
    S15A0146. OASIS GOODTIME EMPORIUM I, INC. et al. v. CITY OF
    DORAVILLE et al.
    NAHMIAS, Justice.
    Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., d/b/a Oasis, which describes itself as
    a “restaurant featuring nude dance entertainment and alcohol service,” appeals
    to this Court to preserve those two pillars of its business — nudity and alcohol.
    Oasis asserts that when its employees dance nude and serve alcohol, they are
    clothed with constitutional free speech protection, which the City of Doraville’s
    Code of Ordinances attempts to strip away. Oasis contends that it should not be
    subject to the Doraville Code at all because the legislation making its land a part
    of Doraville is void due to an alleged statutory notice defect, and that various
    portions of the Code are unconstitutional. We conclude, however, that Oasis is
    properly subject to Doraville’s Code and that the City’s regulations do not
    violate the club’s constitutional rights, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s
    order granting Doraville judgment on the pleadings.
    1.    Oasis has operated in DeKalb County since about 1990. Beginning
    in 2001, Oasis operated under a settlement agreement that resolved litigation
    between DeKalb County and Oasis and several other adult entertainment
    businesses. The agreement granted Oasis and the other businesses “adult
    nonconforming status,” meaning that they were “permitted to sell alcoholic
    beverages (subject to all other laws and regulation of alcohol) and to provide
    adult entertainment in the form of nude dancing or live nude performances.”1
    The City of Doraville is in DeKalb County. On March 29, 2012, the
    General Assembly passed Senate Bill (SB) 532, which amended the City’s
    charter by redefining Doraville’s boundaries, effective December 31, 2012; the
    new city limits encompass Oasis’s location. On October 1, 2012, Doraville
    enacted Ordinance No. 2012-18, which established a sexually oriented business
    (SOB) code, located at § 6-400 et seq. of the Doraville Code of Ordinances.2
    The SOB code defines a “sexually oriented business” to include an “adult
    1
    The 2001 agreement was originally set to expire after eight years, but then was amended
    to extend for another 15 years, with the option to renew for an additional 10 years. Under the
    agreement, Oasis was required to pay an annual fee to DeKalb County, which began at $55,000 and
    increased to $100,000 in 2007.
    2
    Although all of the city regulations at issue in this case are part of the Doraville Code of
    Ordinances, the parties frequently refer to the chapters dealing with sexually oriented businesses,
    alcohol, and zoning as individual “codes,” e.g., the “SOB code.” We generally follow that practice
    in this opinion, using “code” to refer to a specific chapter and “Code” to refer to the full Doraville
    Code of Ordinances.
    2
    cabaret,” which in turn is defined as “a nightclub, bar, juice bar, restaurant,
    bottle club, or similar commercial establishment that regularly features live
    conduct characterized by semi-nudity.                      No establishment shall avoid
    classification as an adult cabaret by offering or featuring nudity.” Code § 6-401.
    Under this definition, Oasis is a sexually oriented business.3 Employees of
    sexually oriented businesses are prohibited from appearing fully nude, but semi-
    nudity is permitted. See Code § 6-416 (a).4 Sexually oriented businesses are
    also prohibited from selling alcohol. See Code § 6-416 (d) (“No person shall
    possess, use, or consume alcoholic beverages on the premises of a sexually
    oriented business.”).
    3
    Although Oasis asserted at oral argument that it does not want to be classified as a sexually
    oriented business under the Code, Doraville is treating Oasis as such a business, and Oasis has made
    no argument that it does not meet the definition of a sexually oriented business.
    4
    Code § 6-416 (a) says: “No patron, employee, or any other person shall knowingly or
    intentionally, in a sexually oriented business, appear in a state of nudity or engage in a specified
    sexual activity.” Code § 6-401 defines the forbidden “nudity” as “the showing of the human male
    or female genitals, pubic area, vulva, or anus with less than a fully opaque covering, or the showing
    of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple and areola.” The
    permissible “semi-nudity” is defined as
    the showing of the female breast below a horizontal line across the top of the areola
    and extending across the width of the breast at that point, or the showing of the male
    or female buttocks. This definition shall include the lower portion of the human
    female breast, but shall not include any portion of the cleavage of the human female
    breast exhibited by a bikini, dress, blouse, shirt, leotard, or similar wearing apparel
    provided the areola is not exposed in whole or in part.
    3
    In December 2012, Oasis applied to Doraville for a 2014 alcohol license,
    and Oasis and its owners (collectively, “Oasis”) also filed a complaint against
    Doraville, its Mayor, the members of the City Council, and the City Clerk
    (collectively, “Doraville”), challenging provisions of the City’s SOB, alcohol,
    and zoning codes.5 On January 14, 2013, Doraville denied Oasis’s application
    for an alcohol license. Oasis later amended its complaint in this case twice, and
    Doraville filed answers to both amended complaints. Doraville also moved for
    judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court granted that motion on April 18,
    2014.6     Oasis now appeals to this Court, invoking our jurisdiction over
    constitutional questions. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1).
    5
    In addition, Oasis challenged Code § 11-125, found in the food service and entertainment
    chapter. At the time Oasis filed its complaint, § 11-125 (a) said: “It shall be unlawful for any person
    to display or permit the display of the human torso incidental to the dispensing of food, beverages
    or entertainment or otherwise unless the breast[s], genitals and buttocks are fully covered with
    nontransparent materials.” That section was repealed on April 15, 2013, and Oasis does not
    challenge the now-repealed section on appeal or allege that § 11-125 was ever applied to it. Oasis
    also alleged that Doraville is bound by the agreement between Oasis and DeKalb County granting
    Oasis “adult nonconforming use,” but Oasis appears to have abandoned that claim on appeal. See
    Trop, Inc. v. City of Brookhaven, 
    296 Ga. 85
    , 88-89 (764 SE2d 398) (2014) (rejecting another adult
    entertainment club’s attempt to enforce the same agreement with DeKalb County against the City
    of Brookhaven).
    6
    All of Doraville’s ordinances challenged by Oasis on appeal were attached as exhibits to
    one or more of Oasis’s complaints or Doraville’s answers, so the trial court could properly consider
    them in ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. See OCGA §§ 9-11-10 (c), 9-11-12
    (c); Trop, 296 Ga. at 89.
    4
    2.    Seeking to avoid the Doraville Code entirely, Oasis argues that SB
    532, which amended the City of Doraville’s charter by redefining the City’s
    boundaries to encompass the land on which Oasis operates, is invalid because
    the notice requirement of OCGA § 28-1-14 (b) was not satisfied. We conclude
    that Oasis lacks legal standing to pursue this claim.
    OCGA § 28-1-14 implements the provision of the 1983 Georgia
    Constitution stating that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide by law for the
    advertisement of notice of intention to introduce local bills.” Art. III, Sec. V,
    Par. IX. With regard to a local bill amending a municipal charter, the statute
    requires that notice must be given in two different ways before the bill becomes
    law. Subsection (a) of § 28-1-14, which applies to all local bills, requires that
    notice of the intention to introduce such a bill be advertised in the local
    newspaper for legal notices one time no later than the week before the bill is
    introduced. Subsection (b) imposes an additional requirement when the local
    bill would amend “the charter of a municipality or the enabling Act of the
    governing authority of a county or a consolidated government.” For these bills,
    a copy of the notice of the intention to introduce local legislation
    required by subsection (a) of this Code section [must be] mailed,
    transmitted by facsimile, or otherwise provided to the governing
    5
    authority of any county, municipality, or consolidated government
    referred to in the bill during the calendar week in which such notice
    is published as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section or
    during the seven days immediately following the date of publication
    of such notice.
    OCGA § 28-1-14 (b).7
    SB 532 amended Doraville’s incorporating act to revise the corporate
    7
    OCGA § 28-1-14 says in full:
    (a) No local bill shall become law unless notice of the intention to introduce
    such bill shall have been advertised in the newspaper in which the sheriff's
    advertisements for the locality affected are published one time before the bill is
    introduced. Such advertisement must be not more than 60 days prior to the convening
    date of the session at which the bill is introduced. After the advertisement has been
    published the bill may be introduced at any time during that session unless the
    advertisement is published during the session, in which event the bill may not be
    introduced before Monday of the calendar week following the week in which the
    advertisement is published.
    (b) No local bill amending the charter of a municipality or the enabling Act
    of the governing authority of a county or a consolidated government shall become
    law unless a copy of the notice of the intention to introduce local legislation required
    by subsection (a) of this Code section is mailed, transmitted by facsimile, or
    otherwise provided to the governing authority of any county, municipality, or
    consolidated government referred to in the bill during the calendar week in which
    such notice is published as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section or during
    the seven days immediately following the date of publication of such notice. A single
    notice sent by United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the governing
    authority of the county, municipality, or consolidated government at the official
    address of such governing authority shall satisfy the requirement of this subsection.
    If such notice is mailed, the notice requirement of this subsection shall be presumed
    to have been met by depositing the copy of the required notice in the United States
    mail. For purposes of this subsection, the copy of the notice provided to such
    governing authority may consist of an actual or photostatic copy of the published
    notice or a typed restatement of the contents of such notice.
    (c) A copy of the notice as it was advertised and an affidavit stating that the
    notice has been published as provided by this Code section and that the notice
    requirements of this Code section have been met shall be attached to the bill and shall
    become a part of the bill. Such affidavit shall be made by the author of the bill.
    6
    limits, so the bill was subject to both notice requirements. It is undisputed that
    the requirement in OCGA § 28-1-14 (a) was satisfied. On Thursday, March 8,
    2012, The Champion, DeKalb County’s newspaper for legal notices, published
    the following:
    NOTICE OF INTENTION TO INTRODUCE LOCAL
    LEGISLATION: Notice is given that there will be introduced at the
    regular 2012 session of the General Assembly of Georgia a bill to
    change the corporate limits of the city of Doraville and for other
    purposes.
    SB 532 was introduced two calendar weeks after that, on Tuesday, March 20;
    the bill passed on March 29.
    Oasis contends that the notice requirement in OCGA § 28-1-14 (b) was
    not satisfied. We need not decide this question, however, because Oasis lacks
    standing to challenge the validity of the notice of SB 532 that was required to
    be given to the City of Doraville.8 Oasis maintains that because it has been
    8
    Resolving the merits of this notice question might not be easy. Doraville argues that the
    local government notice requirement was met because the City Clerk averred that the City received
    a copy of The Champion every week in 2012 and because State Representative Elena Parent sent
    Doraville’s Mayor and City Council members an e-mail on February 29 discussing her plan to run
    the newspaper notice and another e-mail on March 11 saying that the notice had run and that she
    planned to have the bill finalized the next day. However, subsection (b) of OCGA § 28-1-14
    imposes a separate requirement that the notice required by subsection (a) be transmitted to the local
    government. It is clearly meant to give a local government whose charter or enabling act may be
    amended direct notice, rather than only the notice by publication that is given to the general public
    pursuant to subsection (a). If it sufficed simply to show that the governing authority, like the
    7
    injured by SB 532, which brought it within the domain of Doraville’s Code, it
    has an interest in ensuring compliance with all of the procedures required by
    members of the local public, received the newspaper in which the notice was published, subsection
    (b) would be rendered largely superfluous. See Berryhill v. Ga. Community Support & Solutions,
    Inc., 
    281 Ga. 439
    , 441 (638 SE2d 278) (2006) (“Courts should give a sensible and intelligent effect
    to every part of a statute and not render any language superfluous.”). Nor did either e-mail from Rep.
    Parent satisfy the statutory requirement, because the February 29 e-mail was not sent during the
    calendar week in which the notice was published in the newspaper or during the seven days after
    publication, and while the March 11 e-mail was sent within the statutorily required time and
    referenced the newspaper notice, it did not include a “copy of the notice” or a “restatement of the
    contents of such notice.” OCGA § 28-1-14 (b).
    Then again, the e-mails do show that Doraville’s governing authority had actual notice of SB
    532’s impending introduction, and it is possible that this substantial compliance with the objective
    of subsection (b) was enough. Compare OCGA § 1-3-1 (c) (“A substantial compliance with any
    statutory requirement, especially on the part of public officers, shall be deemed and held sufficient,
    and no proceeding shall be declared void for want of such compliance, unless expressly so provided
    by law.”), with Cook v. NC Two, L.P., 
    289 Ga. 462
    , 464-465 (712 SE2d 831) (2011) (“[W]here a
    statute is ‘plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, . . . the legislature’s
    clear intent . . . will not be thwarted by invocation of the rule of “substantial compliance.”’” (citation
    omitted)). Then again, OCGA § 28-1-14 (c) casts doubt on the proposition that any part of the
    statute can be satisfied by substantial compliance, by requiring that a copy of the notice as published
    and an affidavit by the author of the bill “stating that the notice has been published as provided by
    this Code section and that the notice requirements of this Code section have been met” be attached
    to the bill so it becomes part of the bill. This Court has said that if such an attachment is not made,
    the law is invalid – but we have also said that the attachment to the enrolled bill is controlling on the
    question of whether the required notice was provided. See Bleckley v. Vickers, 
    225 Ga. 593
    , 594
    (170 SE2d 695) (1969) (“‘When the enrollment of any local or special bill has incorporated therein
    the required proof of notice, and after it has been properly signed and filed with the Secretary of
    State, it will not only impute absolute verity as to its contents, but it will also conclusively show
    upon its face its validity with respect to the constitutional requirements as to proof of notice;
    whereas, if such enrollment fails to show the required proof of notice, it is upon its face invalid.’”
    (citation omitted)). In this case, SB 532 had attached to it a copy of the notice published on March
    8, 2012 and an affidavit from Senator Fran Millar, who was a sponsor of the bill, saying that notice
    of the bill “was published in the Champion which is the official organ of DeKalb County on March
    8, 2012, and that the notice requirements of Code Section 28-1-14 have been met.” Although the
    affidavit says nothing specifically about notice to the City, under our case law, the enrollment of the
    bill saying that the statutory “notice requirements” were met might be deemed to “conclusively”
    establish that fact. See Bleckley, 
    225 Ga. at 594
    .
    8
    OCGA § 28-1-14. But a party only has standing to assert a procedural right “so
    long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened
    concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Lujan v.
    Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 573, n. 8 (122 SCt 2130, 119 LE2d 351)
    (1992).9
    OCGA § 28-1-14 (a) is clearly designed to protect the interests of the
    public that may be affected by the amendment of a local law, by requiring notice
    to the local public of the introduction of such a bill. Oasis, as a business in the
    area that stood to be affected by SB 532, would have standing to complain had
    the notice required by subsection (a) not been given — but that notice was
    properly given. OCGA § 28-1-14 (b) is clearly designed to protect a different
    interest — the interest of a local government entity in notice of a potential
    amendment to its organic law. Subsection (b) does not require that anything be
    done with regard to the public, whose interest in notice is addressed by
    subsection (a). See, e.g., GE Capital Mortgage Svcs., Inc. v. Clack, 
    271 Ga. 82
    ,
    83 (515 SE2d 619) (1999) (holding that a party who was given notice of a tax
    9
    This Court has previously cited Lujan in assessing standing under Georgia law. See
    Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Roswell, 
    283 Ga. 417
    , 418 (658 SE2d 587) (2008).
    9
    sale as statutorily required “may not attack the sale on the ground of lack of
    notice to another party”); Ueal v. AAA Partners in Adoption, Inc., 
    269 Ga. App. 258
    , 260 (603 SE2d 672) (2004) (explaining that only the “person harmed by
    the lack of notice to him” may raise the issue); Ryder Automobile Leasing Co.
    v. Tates, 
    112 Ga. App. 18
    , 20 (143 SE2d 411) (1965) (“‘As a general rule, the
    question of defective service may be raised only by the one on whom attempted
    service was made, and one defendant is not entitled to urge defects in the service
    on a co-defendant.’” (citation omitted)).
    Nevertheless, citing cases like Brown v. Clower, 
    225 Ga. 165
    , 166 (166
    SE2d 363) (1969), Oasis argues that the purpose of the local legislation notice
    statute is to protect the interests of the public. See 
    id. at 166
     (“[T]he purpose of
    the advertisement as to local legislation . . . is to ‘protect the people against
    covert or surprise legislation.’” (citation omitted)). The cases Oasis cites,
    however, were decided at a time when the only notice required was by
    newspaper publication. See Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. XV
    (requiring that notice of intention to introduce a local bill be published in the
    newspaper in the affected area). This general notice requirement was meant to
    protect both the public and the affected local government. See Fleming v.
    10
    Daniell, 
    221 Ga. 43
    , 45 (142 SE2d 804) (1965) (explaining that one of the main
    purposes of the constitutional notice requirement was “to prevent duties and
    obligations being imposed on local governments without giving those in charge
    of such governments an opportunity to oppose their passage.”). This continued
    to be the law under the 1983 Constitution, with the notice requirement placed
    in OCGA § 28-1-14.
    In 1996, however, the government notice requirement was separated from
    the public notice requirement, with the addition to the statute of subsection (b).
    See Ga. L. 1996, p. 1198. The title of the 1996 act explained that OCGA § 28-
    1-14 was being amended “to provide that a notice of intention to introduce local
    legislation be provided to the governing authority of any county, municipality,
    or consolidated government affected by such legislation.” Id. And the language
    of OCGA § 28-1-14 (b) makes plain that the purpose of this additional notice
    requirement was not to provide a second way for people in general to learn
    about potential local legislation but rather to directly notify the local government
    so that it could respond.10
    10
    This understanding is supported by the original subsection (b) (3) of the 1996 statute,
    which said that direct notice to the local government was not required when the local bill was
    “requested by resolution or other written notification of the governing authority.” OCGA § 28-1-14
    11
    Thus, only the local government whose interest OCGA § 28-1-14 (b)
    protects — here, the City of Doraville — has standing to contest compliance
    with that notice requirement. Doraville has not complained about a lack of
    notice, or indeed about the enactment of SB 532. And Oasis has no legal
    entitlement to complain. Consequently, we need not, and do not, determine
    whether there was adequate compliance with OCGA § 28-1-14 (b) when SB 532
    was introduced and passed into law.
    3.      Having established that Oasis is subject to the Doraville Code of
    Ordinances, we turn next to the club’s constitutional challenges to the substance
    of the sexually oriented business code. Oasis is correct that the SOB code
    implicates constitutional freedom of expression. Erotic dancing — which
    includes the type of dancing while nude done by Oasis’s employees — is a
    form of expression protected by the free speech provisions of both the United
    States and Georgia Constitutions. See, e.g., Gravely v. Bacon, 
    263 Ga. 203
    , 205
    (b) (3) (1996). The governing authority’s making of such a request would not notify the public that
    the local law requested was actually going to be introduced, but it obviously would demonstrate that
    the governing authority was aware of the bill. This subsection was removed in 2002, when specific
    notice procedures for annexation through local acts were repealed, see Ga. L. 2002, p. 985, §§ 1, 3,
    but nothing in the repealing bill suggests that the purpose of the government notice requirement in
    OCGA § 28-1-14 (b) changed or that it was now meant to provide a second way for the public to be
    notified of impending local legislation.
    12
    (429 SE2d 663) (1993); Harris v. Entertainment Systems, 
    259 Ga. 701
    , 702 (386
    SE2d 140) (1989). See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
    501 U. S. 560
    , 566
    (111 SCt 2456, 115 LE2d 504) (1991) (plurality opinion) (“[N]ude dancing of
    the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer
    perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally
    so.”).11 But free speech protection only goes so far; protected expression may
    sometimes be restricted in limited ways when justified by sufficient government
    11
    The First Amendment to the United States Constitution says “Congress shall make no law
    . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V of the 1983 Georgia
    Constitution says, “No law shall be passed to curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press.
    Every person may speak, write, and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for
    the abuse of that liberty.” Although Oasis raised both federal and state constitutional claims in the
    trial court, on appeal it invokes only the free speech protection of the Georgia Constitution.
    Doraville argues that the Georgia Constitution provides less free speech protection than the
    First Amendment and that under a proper interpretation of our state constitution, nude dancing is not
    protected at all. Discussing the text and history of the state provision, Doraville asserts that cases
    such as Gravely and Harris, where this Court held that nude dancing is protected under the state
    constitution, should be abandoned because they relied primarily on federal precedent. However,
    “[a]s far back as 1932, this Court [has] looked to federal cases interpreting the First Amendment for
    guidance in applying Georgia’s free speech guarantee.” Grady v. Unified Government of
    Athens-Clarke County, 
    289 Ga. 726
    , 728 (715 SE2d 148) (2011). And in 1982, we said that “‘[i]n
    the absence of controlling state precedent this court has applied analogous First Amendment
    standards when construing the state constitution.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbee,
    
    250 Ga. 252
    , 255, n. 5 (297 SE2d 250) (1982)). Doraville’s argument – which Oasis heartily
    disputes – is interesting, and its position was once endorsed by two members of this Court. See
    Harris, 
    259 Ga. at 705
     (Weltner, J., joined by Marshall, C. J., dissenting) (“I cannot believe that our
    forebears, in writing these protections, intended to vest in each Georgian a constitutional right to
    dance naked for tips in a barroom. Nor do I think that the citizens of Georgia who ratified the
    Constitution of 1983 intended to preserve or to create any such ‘right.’”). But we see no need to
    reconsider our precedents on this point in this case, because as we explain below, even treating nude
    dancing as protected speech, Doraville’s regulations are constitutional.
    13
    interests, without violating the Constitution. See State v. Café Erotica, 
    269 Ga. 486
    , 488-489 (500 SE2d 574) (1998); Harris, 
    259 Ga. at 701-702
    .
    (a)   In considering whether the SOB code restricts free expression in a
    constitutionally permissible way, we first determine if the regulation is content-
    neutral and thus subject to intermediate, rather than strict, judicial scrutiny. See
    Café Erotica v. Peach County, 
    272 Ga. 47
    , 49 (526 SE2d 56) (2000); State v.
    Café Erotica, 
    269 Ga. at 489
     (explaining that regulations targeting the content
    of protected speech are subject to strict scrutiny and thus must be “‘necessary
    to serve a compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end’”
    (citation omitted)).
    [T]he principal inquiry in determining whether a legislative act is
    content-neutral is “whether the government has adopted a
    regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
    conveys.       The government’s purpose is the controlling
    consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
    content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
    effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” An ordinance
    designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of sexually
    explicit businesses is content-neutral. Before enacting an ordinance
    to combat undesirable secondary effects, a legislative body is
    required to consider specific evidence of the undesirable secondary
    effects that it reasonably believes relevant to the problems it seeks
    to address by passing the ordinance.
    Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 
    267 Ga. 683
    , 690 (482 SE2d 347) (1997)
    14
    (citations omitted). “‘“[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
    unconstitutionality of a statute” on the ground that “a punitive purpose in fact
    lay behind the statute,”’” and even statements by individual officials may not
    prove a government’s purpose because “what motivates one legislator to make
    a comment about a law is not necessarily what motivates fellow legislators to
    enact the law.” 
    Id. at 691-692
     (citations omitted).
    Oasis contends that the trial court erred in holding that the SOB code is
    content-neutral. The club argues that because the court granted Doraville
    judgment on the pleadings, the court was required to take as true the allegations
    in Oasis’s amended complaint stating that Doraville’s motive in passing the
    SOB code was to target Oasis and that the reason for the regulations offered by
    Doraville — targeting the negative secondary effects of sexually oriented
    businesses — was pretextual.
    The preamble to Ordinance No. 2012-18, which enacted the SOB code,
    recites the City Council’s findings that sexually oriented businesses “are
    frequently used for unlawful sexual activities, including prostitution and sexual
    liaisons of a casual nature”; that “there is convincing evidence that sexually
    oriented businesses, as a category of establishments, have deleterious secondary
    15
    effects and are often associated with crime and adverse effects on surrounding
    properties”; and that the Council “desires to minimize and control these adverse
    effects and thereby protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry.” The
    preamble specifies that Doraville’s intention is to regulate sexually oriented
    businesses “through a narrowly tailored ordinance designed to serve the
    substantial government interest in preventing the negative secondary effects of
    sexually oriented businesses.”
    Ordinance No. 2012-22, which was passed a month later, amended the
    SOB code to, among other things, “adopt[ ] and incorporate[ ] herein [the City
    Council’s] stated findings and legislative record related to the adverse secondary
    effects of sexually oriented businesses, including the judicial opinions and
    reports related to such secondary effects, that were before the City Council with
    Ordinance 2012-18.” The incorporated legislative record, which was also part
    of the record before the trial court, includes a bevy of studies, reports, and cases
    illuminating the dark underbelly of sexually oriented businesses and examining
    the negative secondary effects associated with those businesses. Doraville’s
    stated reliance on these materials was sufficient evidence that the City’s purpose
    in enacting the SOB code was to combat undesirable secondary effects. See
    16
    Goldrush II, 
    267 Ga. at 691-692
     (concluding that the evidence offered by the
    city, including the ordinance’s preamble and the transcript of the city council
    meeting showing a discussion of negative secondary effects, established that the
    “predominate intent” of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary
    effects).
    Oasis did not allege in its pleadings any facts to refute Doraville’s stated
    reliance on these materials in enacting the SOB code, and it has not alleged any
    facts to show that Doraville adopted the ordinance to target a certain message.
    Oasis did allege that it is the sole business affected by the SOB code. Even
    taking this factual allegation as true, however, the trial court was not required
    to take as true Oasis’s conclusion that because it is the only business affected at
    this time, Doraville was targeting Oasis’s expression and Doraville’s stated
    purpose of addressing negative secondary effects was pretextual. See Trop, Inc.
    v. City of Brookhaven, 
    296 Ga. 85
    , 87 (764 SE2d 398) (2014) (“While a trial
    court [ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings] is required to consider
    a non-moving party’s factual allegations to be true, it is not required to accept
    the legal conclusions the non-party suggests that those facts dictate.”). Oasis
    may be the only business currently affected by the SOB code, but that does not
    17
    establish that Doraville was targeting whatever message Oasis seeks to convey,
    as opposed to the risks of negative secondary effects associated with sexually
    oriented businesses in general. See Goldrush II, 
    267 Ga. at 691-692
    . We
    therefore conclude that the trial court correctly found the SOB code to be
    content-neutral. See Trop, 296 Ga. at 87 (holding that a similar sexually
    oriented business regulation was content-neutral).
    (b)     Content-neutral regulations that have an incidental effect on
    protected speech are reviewed under the three-part test established in Paramount
    Pictures Corp. v. Busbee, 
    250 Ga. 252
     (297 SE2d 250) (1982), which holds that
    the regulation is constitutionally permissible if (1) it furthers an important
    governmental interest; (2) it is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3)
    its incidental restriction of speech is no greater than essential to further the
    important governmental interest. See 
    id. at 255-256
    .12
    12
    Inverting Doraville’s argument that the Georgia Constitution provides less free speech
    protection than the First Amendment, see footnote 11 above, Oasis argues that the state Constitution
    provides more free speech protection than the federal Constitution, and in particular that the third
    part of the Paramount Pictures test should be replaced with the “least restrictive means” requirement
    adopted in Statesboro Publishing Co. v. City of Sylvania, 
    271 Ga. 92
    , 95-96 (516 SE2d 296) (1999).
    As we explained in Grady, however, this Court’s occasional statements suggesting that the 1983
    Georgia Constitution “provides even broader protection” than the First Amendment, which
    originated in State v. Miller, 
    260 Ga. 669
    , 671 (398 SE2d 547) (1990), have not been supported by
    “any discussion of the text, history, or case law regarding the protection of free speech provided in
    the 1983 or previous Georgia Constitutions.” Grady, 
    289 Ga. at 728-729
    . Grady also cast serious
    18
    Oasis first argues that the trial court erred in deciding at the pleadings
    stage that the SOB code actually furthers an important government interest,
    because the club must be permitted to present evidence challenging the studies
    and other materials on which the Doraville City Council relied in concluding
    that sexually oriented businesses cause negative secondary effects. For this
    argument, Oasis relies mainly on City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
    
    535 U. S. 425
     (122 SCt 1728, 152 LE2d 670) (2002), in which the U. S.
    Supreme Court said that a municipality cannot “get away with shoddy data or
    reasoning” in crafting ordinances regulating sexually oriented businesses:
    The municipality’s evidence must fairly support the
    municipality’s rationale for its ordinance. If plaintiffs fail to cast
    direct doubt on this rationale, either by demonstrating that the
    municipality’s evidence does not support its rationale or by
    furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality’s factual
    findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton [v.
    doubt on the provenance and validity of Statesboro Publishing and its limited progeny, which are the
    only cases in which the Miller dictum has become an actual holding. See Grady, 
    289 Ga. at 729-731
    .
    But in any event, we have held that the Statesboro Publishing test applies only to laws that directly
    regulate the time, place, and manner of protected expression (such as the ordinance in that case,
    which prohibited the distribution of free printed material in driveways and yards), as opposed to
    regulations that have only an incidental effect on protected speech. See Great American Dream, Inc.
    v. DeKalb County, 
    290 Ga. 749
    , 751-752 & n. 7 (727 SE2d 667) (2012). Neither the Doraville
    Code’s prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol (which is not protected expression) nor
    the prohibition of nudity (which is not itself protected expression) directly regulates protected
    speech. The Code restricts the protected expression of erotic dancing only incidentally by regulating
    the amount of clothing the dancers must wear and whether alcohol can be served in their vicinity.
    Accordingly, we will apply the Paramount Pictures test.
    19
    Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
    475 U. S. 41
     (106 SCt 925, 89 LE2d 29)
    (1986), to show that the ordinance is designed to serve a
    government interest]. If plaintiffs succeed in casting doubt on a
    municipality’s rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back to
    the municipality to supplement the record with evidence renewing
    support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.
    Alameda Books, 
    535 U. S. at 438-439
     (plurality opinion).
    Even as amended twice, however, Oasis’s complaint never alleged that the
    extensive materials on which Doraville expressly relied do not support the
    City’s rationale for the SOB code or were inaccurate. Thus, Oasis failed to cast
    direct doubt on Doraville’s proffered evidence supporting its interest in
    regulating sexually oriented businesses. See Alameda Books. at 442 (upholding
    a zoning ordinance restricting locations of sexually oriented businesses, and
    explaining that “our cases require only that municipalities rely upon evidence
    that is ‘reasonably believed to be relevant’ to the secondary effects that they
    seek to address” (citation omitted)); Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v.
    Manatee County, Florida, 630 F3d 1346, 1355-1360 (11th Cir. 2011) (granting
    summary judgment to the local government after finding that “the County has
    met its initial burden and that Peek-a-Boo has failed to cast direct doubt” on the
    studies the county relied on); Club Southern Burlesque, Inc. v. City of
    20
    Carrollton, 
    265 Ga. 528
    , 531 (457 SE2d 816) (1995) (holding that the city’s
    “unrebutted evidence” that it “relied on specific studies which it reasonably
    believed to be relevant to the problems addressed by the ordinance” was
    sufficient to prove that the ordinance was designed to further an important
    government interest).
    Oasis did allege that it has not caused any of the negative secondary
    effects Doraville seeks to avoid. But this Court and the United States Supreme
    Court have explained that it is not necessary for a local government to prove that
    the negative secondary effects it reasonably fears, based on evidence of
    problems experienced elsewhere, have already been experienced locally. See
    Café Erotica v. Peach County, 
    272 Ga. at 49
    ; Renton, 
    475 U. S. at 51-52
    . Put
    another way, the Constitution does not require governments to forestall
    reasonable regulation until the mess meant to be avoided is proved to have
    arrived and now needs to be cleaned up. Indeed,
    it was not incumbent upon the [City] to prove the efficacy of the
    studies. To the contrary, the [City] was only required to prove that
    it considered “specific evidence of the pernicious secondary effects
    of adult entertainment establishments which it reasonably believed
    to be relevant to the problems addressed by the ordinance.”
    Parker v. Whitfield County, 
    265 Ga. 829
    , 829-830 (463 SE2d 116) (1995)
    21
    (citation and punctuation omitted). Because Oasis’s pleadings did not challenge
    the materials on which Doraville relied or assert that the City’s reliance on them
    was unreasonable, the trial court was permitted to render a judgment on the
    pleadings on this issue and to properly conclude that Doraville’s SOB code
    furthers an important government interest.
    (c)   We next turn to applying the Paramount Pictures test to the two
    specific parts of the SOB code challenged by Oasis — the provision prohibiting
    sexually oriented businesses from serving alcohol, Code § 6-416 (d), and the
    provision prohibiting employees at sexually oriented businesses from appearing
    completely nude, Code § 6-416 (a).
    (1)   This Court has repeatedly upheld bans on alcohol in sexually
    oriented businesses against challenges under the Georgia Constitution. See, e.g.,
    Trop, 296 Ga. at 87; Goldrush II, 
    267 Ga. at 692-693
    ; Gravely, 
    263 Ga. at
    206-
    207. Regulations like Code § 6-416 (d) satisfy the first part of the Paramount
    Pictures test because they further the important government interest in reducing
    negative secondary effects. It does not come as a shock that mixing alcohol
    with sexually provocative activity can result in undesirable consequences. This
    is borne out by many of the materials on which Doraville relied, which show
    22
    that negative effects result from the combination of alcohol consumption and
    sexually oriented businesses.
    As for the second and third parts of the test, Code § 6-416 (d) is designed
    to alleviate negative secondary effects, not to suppress expression, and the
    incidental effect it has on the free expression of Oasis and its employees is
    minimal. Serving alcohol is not itself protected expression, and Code § 6-416
    (d) leaves Oasis’s employees free to express themselves as they wish through
    dance or otherwise. Moreover, like the similar ordinance we recently upheld in
    Trop, Doraville’s alcohol prohibition applies only to sexually oriented
    businesses, and “mainstream performance houses, museums, or theaters” are not
    affected. Trop, 296 Ga. at 88. See also Gravely, 
    263 Ga. at 206-207
     (explaining
    that the alcohol ban upheld there did not apply to private conduct or to
    “establishments [that] have not been shown to contribute to increased crime and
    neighborhood blight,” such as concert halls, museums, and educational
    institutions). Compare Harris, 
    259 Ga. at 703-704
     (striking down an ordinance
    that prohibited nudity at all establishments that served alcohol, including “at
    museums, at the opera, or at mainstream performance and movie theaters”).
    There remain ample opportunities and channels for dance and other free
    23
    expression in the City of Doraville.
    (2)    Whether a free-standing prohibition on full nudity in sexually
    oriented businesses meets the Paramount Pictures test is a closer question —
    and one that this Court appears not to have squarely addressed before. We
    conclude, however, that Doraville’s Code § 6-416 (a) passes the Paramount
    Pictures test.
    First, the ordinance furthers the asserted important government interest.
    Many of the materials considered by Doraville found a link between negative
    secondary effects and the presence of sexually oriented businesses of all
    varieties — not only strip clubs like Oasis but also businesses where alcohol is
    not served like adult book and video stores and movie theaters. One study, for
    example, showed that sexually oriented businesses attract predatory criminals
    because these businesses draw customers from a wide area and the patrons are
    “disproportionately male, open to vice overtures, [and] reluctant to report
    victimizations to the police,” making them “soft targets.” And several of the
    studies specifically address negative secondary effects — including illegal
    sexual activity — that proliferate in and around strip clubs. Because the
    intention of Doraville Code § 6-416 (a) is to mitigate these negative effects, and
    24
    not to suppress speech, it passes the first two parts of the Paramount Pictures
    test.
    As for the third part of the test, it is true that dictating the type of costume
    an individual must wear while dancing — or, as the case here, dictating that the
    dancer wear at least some minimal kind of costume — imposes more of a
    restriction on protected expression than prohibiting alcohol in the vicinity.
    Code § 6-416 (a), however, strikes a constitutionally permissible fit between the
    objective of reducing undesirable secondary effects and the need to protect free
    speech.
    To begin with, like the alcohol prohibition, the SOB code’s proscription
    of full nudity applies only to sexually oriented businesses as defined in the code
    — not to private conduct; mainstream performance houses, museums, theaters,
    and other artistic, entertainment, and educational venues not regularly featuring
    live conduct characterized by semi-nudity or nudity; or the many other types of
    businesses that do not qualify as sexually oriented businesses. See Trop, 296
    Ga. at 88. And although the City’s regulation prohibits full nudity, it permits
    “semi-nudity,” which means that a female dancer may choose to wear only
    pasties covering her areolae and a G-string covering her genital area and anus,
    25
    and a male dancer need only wear a G-string.
    Oasis argues that this level of regulation is not sufficiently linked with the
    asserted government interest, and it is true that the materials on which Doraville
    relied do not make explicit a link between full nudity, as opposed to almost full
    nudity, and negative secondary effects. One study, for example, notes that
    sexually oriented businesses that “provide on-site entertainment” increase the
    opportunities for vice crime and customer-employee assaults, but that study does
    not specifically address the degree of nudity as a factor leading to those negative
    secondary effects. Similarly, the studies that focus specifically on strip clubs
    include reports of nude dancers engaging in illegal acts like public masturbation
    and prostitution, but do not evaluate whether such conduct would be mitigated
    if the dancers had to wear pasties and G-strings.
    Although this Court has never directly addressed whether a full nudity
    ban, distinct from a ban on alcohol along with nudity, violates the Georgia
    Constitution, we can look to the relevant First Amendment precedent for
    guidance, as we often have done before. See Harris, 
    259 Ga. at 702
    ; Paramount
    Pictures, 
    250 Ga. at 255, n. 5
    . In 1991, the United States Supreme Court held
    that requiring employees at a sexually oriented business to wear at least pasties
    26
    and G-strings does not violate the First Amendment. See Barnes, 
    501 U. S. at 565-566
     (plurality opinion).
    The Court addressed the issue again, and reached the same conclusion, in
    City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 
    529 U. S. 277
     (120 SCt 1382, 146 LE2d 265)
    (2000). The controlling plurality opinion found that the city’s “asserted
    interests of regulating conduct through a public nudity ban and of combating the
    harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing are undeniably
    important.” 
    529 U. S. at 296
    . Moreover,
    [b]ecause the nude dancing at [issue] is of the same character as the
    adult entertainment at issue in Renton, Young v. American Mini
    Theatres, Inc., 
    427 U.S. 50
     [(96 SCt 2440, 49 LE2d 310)] (1976),
    [which both dealt with movie theaters,] and California v. LaRue,
    
    409 U. S. 109
     [(93 SCt 390, 34 LE2d 342)] (1972), [which dealt
    with live entertainment,] it was reasonable for [the city] to conclude
    that such nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary
    effects.
    City of Erie, 
    529 U. S. at 296-297
     (plurality opinion). The Court then
    explained:
    To be sure, requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not
    greatly reduce these secondary effects, but O’Brien requires only
    that the regulation further the interest in combating such effects.[13]
    13
    City of Erie (and Barnes) applied the three-part First Amendment test for reviewing
    content-neutral regulations that was developed in United States v. O’Brien, 
    391 U. S. 367
     (88 SCt
    27
    Even though the dissent questions the wisdom of [the city’s] chosen
    remedy, the “‘city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
    experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.’” It also
    may be true that a pasties and G-string requirement would not be as
    effective as, for example, a requirement that the dancers be fully
    clothed, but the city must balance its efforts to address the problem
    with the requirement that the restriction be no greater than
    necessary to further the city’s interest.
    City of Erie, 
    529 U. S. at 301
     (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). In addition,
    while a nudity ban may have “some minimal effect on the erotic message by
    muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped,
    the dancers . . . are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings. Any effect on
    the overall expression is de minimis.” 
    Id. at 294
    . In sum, “[t]he requirement
    that dancers wear pasties and G-strings is a minimal restriction in furtherance
    of the asserted government interests, and the restriction leaves ample capacity
    to convey the dancer’s erotic message.” 
    Id. at 301
    .
    We agree with this reasoning. The pasties and G-string dress (or lack of
    dress) code required by § 6-614 (a) of the Doraville Code is a constitutionally
    1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968) – which is the test this Court adopted in Paramount Pictures for analysis
    of this sort of free speech issue under the Georgia Constitution. See 
    250 Ga. at
    256 (citing O’Brien,
    
    391 U. S. at 377
    ). Under O’Brien, government regulation of protected expression is constitutional
    if it furthers an important government interest; if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
    expression; and if the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
    essential to the furtherance of that interest. See 
    391 U.S. at 377
    .
    28
    valid balance between the City’s desire to eliminate the negative secondary
    effects of sexually oriented businesses and the need to protect free expression.
    The Paramount Pictures test requires that an incidental restriction of protected
    speech be no greater than essential to further the important government interest,
    not no lesser. See 
    250 Ga. at 256
    . A local government may appropriately
    choose to adopt a content-neutral regulation that furthers its important interest
    in a slightly less restrictive way, thereby permitting more expression, even if that
    also slightly reduces the beneficial effects of the policy — for example, by
    allowing almost-nude but not fully-nude conduct in sexually oriented
    businesses.14
    4.      In addition to challenging Doraville’s SOB code, Oasis seeks to
    challenge Code § 3-31, the provision of the City’s alcohol code that prohibits
    the sale of alcohol in establishments that feature nudity.15 The trial court
    14
    Oasis also raises a generalized claim that the SOB code is overbroad, but the only
    argument made on this point is that the code is too broad in prohibiting nudity even where alcohol
    is not served. As just explained, such a restriction on full nudity in sexually oriented businesses –
    even teetotaling ones – is constitutional.
    15
    At the time Oasis applied for an alcohol license, Code § 3-31 prohibited nudity at any
    establishment that served alcohol. The code has since been amended to add an exception for nude
    “conduct in theaters, concert halls, art centers, museums, or similar establishments that are primarily
    devoted to the arts or theatrical performances.”
    29
    concluded that Oasis does not have standing to challenge any part of the alcohol
    code because it does not have a Doraville alcohol license. That holding was too
    broad. Oasis does not have a Doraville alcohol license because Doraville
    actually applied to Oasis a provision of the City’s alcohol code. In denying
    Oasis’s request for an alcohol license, Doraville noted several technical
    problems with the application but explained clearly that the “singular” reason
    for the denial was that Oasis qualified as a sexually oriented business and thus
    was prohibited from serving alcohol under § 6-416 (d) of the SOB code.
    Accordingly, the application was denied under alcohol code § 3-21 (3),
    which says that an alcohol license will not be issued when “the granting of such
    license would constitute a violation of federal, state or local law . . . .” Because
    Oasis was denied a license under § 3-21 (3), the club would have standing to
    challenge that provision as unconstitutional. See Bo Fancy Productions, Inc. v.
    Rabun County Bd. of Commrs., 
    267 Ga. 341
    , 344 (478 SE2d 373) (1996).
    Compare Trop, 296 Ga. at 86, n. 1 (explaining that the trial court was correct in
    concluding that the Pink Pony did not have standing to challenge the
    Brookhaven alcohol code because the club had never applied for an alcohol
    license). To the extent Oasis raises such a challenge to § 3-21 (3), however, that
    30
    claim lacks merit. As discussed in Division 3 above, § 6-416 (d) of the SOB
    code is constitutionally valid in prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented
    businesses, and § 3-21 (3) serves only to make the alcohol code consistent with
    the SOB code in this respect.
    But the trial court was correct to the extent it held that Oasis lacks
    standing to challenge § 3-31 of the alcohol code. The first sentence of § 3-31
    says: “It is the purpose of this section to regulate establishments licensed to sell,
    serve, or dispense alcoholic beverages . . . .” If Oasis possessed an alcohol
    license, it might be subject to penalties under § 3-31 for selling alcohol. But
    Oasis does not have an alcohol license, and its application for a license was not
    — and could not have been — denied based on § 3-31, which regulates only
    establishments that have already been “licensed to sell, serve, or dispense
    alcoholic beverages.” Indeed, the City’s letter denying the club’s license
    application never mentions § 3-31. Consequently, Oasis lacks standing to
    challenge Code § 3-31. See Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of
    Roswell, 
    283 Ga. 417
    , 421 (658 SE2d 587) (2008) (explaining that Georgia law
    does not “permit a party denied a permit based on the noncompliance with a
    constitutionally permissible provision to attack other provisions by which it was
    31
    not injured in any manner whatsoever” (footnote omitted)).
    5.    Oasis raises three other constitutional challenges to Doraville’s
    Code, which may be quickly rebuffed. Oasis first argues that it has a vested and
    thus constitutionally protected interest in providing alcohol and nudity as it
    always has, so it is entitled to grandfathered status and should be permitted to
    operate without regard to the SOB and alcohol codes. As this Court has
    explained, however, while vested rights may, under certain circumstances,
    preclude “retroactive application of a zoning ordinance, the same is not
    applicable to licenses to conduct a business.” Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 698
    (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
    Those who hold licenses that expire annually act at their peril and
    assume the risk that their licenses might not be renewed
    notwithstanding they have “committed their lives and their capital
    to building their businesses” which need licenses to operate.
    Id. (citation omitted). See also Trop, 296 Ga. at 88 (rejecting “Pink Pony’s
    erroneous arguments that it had some vested right to continue operation as a
    nude dancing club that serves alcohol” based on the club’s prior agreement with
    DeKalb County).
    Oasis next challenges Doraville’s zoning ordinance on the grounds that
    32
    the City Council did not follow the City’s requirements for passing an ordinance
    and that the zoning scheme does not leave sufficient locations available for
    sexually oriented businesses. On December 31, 2012, the day the expansion of
    Doraville’s city limits became effective, the City Council enacted a zoning
    ordinance covering its new territory. The land on which Oasis sits was included
    in zoning category C-1 (neighborhood commercial), the same designation the
    land had under DeKalb County’s zoning scheme. Although Doraville’s zoning
    code restricts sexually oriented businesses to areas zoned M-2 (heavy
    manufacturing), the City’s attorney has consistently represented in this litigation
    that Oasis is not required to move, and there is no allegation that the City has
    sought to apply its zoning code to affect Oasis. Thus, Oasis has not been injured
    by Doraville’s zoning code and does not have standing at this time to challenge
    it. See Granite State, 283 Ga. at 420-421. See also Manlove v. Unified Govt.
    of Athens-Clarke County, 
    285 Ga. 637
    , 638 (680 SE2d 405) (2009) (finding no
    standing where the plaintiffs failed to show that the challenged ordinance had
    been enforced against them or that there was an imminent threat of
    33
    enforcement).16
    Finally, Oasis contends broadly that many of the other provisions of the
    SOB and alcohol codes are unconstitutional as applied to the club. Oasis
    maintains that with regard to its as-applied challenges, judgment on the
    pleadings was necessarily improper because a trial court cannot rule on such
    challenges unless and until a factual record has been developed. However, the
    cases Oasis cites for this proposition actually say only that to present a
    justiciable claim, an as-applied challenge requires factual allegations showing
    how the challenged law actually has been (or is credibly threatened to be)
    applied to the plaintiff. See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F3d
    1244, 1255, n. 20, 1261, n. 34 (11th Cir. 2012). Oasis failed to allege any facts
    supporting an as-applied challenge to these other provisions of the Doraville
    Code, so the trial court’s judgment on the pleadings rejecting those claims was
    proper.
    Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
    16
    Because Doraville has not tried to apply its zoning code to Oasis, we also need not decide
    whether Oasis would be entitled to grandfathered status under the zoning code.
    34
    Decided June 15, 2015 – Reconsideration denied July 13, 2015.
    Business Code; constitutional question. DeKalb Superior Court. Before
    Judge Jackson.
    Begner & Begner, Alan I. Begner, Cory G. Begner; Linda I. Dunlavy; G.
    Brian Spears, for appellants.
    Scott D. Bergthold, Bryan A. Dykes, for appellees.
    35