State v. Torres. ICA s.d.o., filed 05/23/2018, 142 Haw. 355. , 439 P.3d 234 ( 2019 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
10-APR-2019
09:21 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAII,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RINALDO J. TORRES, JR.,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CR. NO. 14-1-1376)
APRIL 10, 2019
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
Under our precedents, a defendant in a criminal case
relinquishes fundamental constitutional rights only when the
rights are knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived. To
protect against the wrongful deprivation of these important
rights, we require trial courts to conduct on-the-record
colloquies prior to accepting such waivers, thereby ensuring
that defendants understand the nature and consequences of their
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decisions and make their choices freely. We now reaffirm that
the colloquy must be conducted so as to demonstrate that the
waiver is a product of the defendant’s free will, undertaken in
the absence of duress or other undue influence.
Our precedents also firmly establish that a
defendant’s right to testify is of equal constitutional stature
to the defendant’s corresponding right to refrain from
testifying. Despite our recognition of this symmetry, our
current procedures require that a trial court engage a defendant
in an on-the-record colloquy only when the defendant waives the
right to testify--and not when the defendant waives the
reciprocal right not to testify.
We hold that, because the two constitutional rights
are of equal importance, they should be afforded equal levels of
protection. Accordingly, trial courts must engage the defendant
in an on-the-record colloquy regarding the right to testify and
to not testify when either right is waived, effectively making
such a colloquy necessary in every trial. Because we apply our
holding only prospectively, however, and the circumstances and
strength of the evidence in this case render any error on the
part of the trial court harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we
affirm the defendant’s convictions.
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Pretrial
On August 27, 2014, a grand jury of the Circuit Court
of the First Circuit (circuit court) indicted Rinaldo J. Torres,
Jr. on one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of
Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-840(1)(b)(i) and/or 708-
840(1)(b)(ii)1 and one count of terroristic threatening in the
first degree in violation of HRS § 707-716(1)(e).2 At his
arraignment, Torres entered pleas of not guilty.
1
HRS § 708-840(1)(b) (2014) provides the following:
(1) A person commits the offense of robbery in the first
degree if, in the course of committing theft or non-
consensual taking of a motor vehicle:
. . . .
(b) The person is armed with a dangerous instrument
or a simulated firearm and:
(i) The person uses force against the person of
anyone present with intent to overcome that
person’s physical resistance or physical power
of resistance; or
(ii) The person threatens the imminent use of
force against the person of anyone present with
intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of
or escaping with the property[.]
2
HRS § 707-716 (2014) provides in relevant part the following:
(1) A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening
in the first degree if the person commits terroristic
threatening:
. . . .
(e) With the use of a dangerous instrument or a
simulated firearm.
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Five days before trial was scheduled to begin, Torres
submitted a Waiver of Indictment/Trial by Jury form to the
court. The form stated “I, the above named defendant, charged
with violation of the indicated statute have been advised of my
rights,” and it contained a box for the waiver of the right to
an indictment and a box for the waiver of the right to a jury
trial. Torres checked the box that said “I waive my right to
trial by jury and consent to a trial by the COURT without a
jury” and signed the bottom of the form.
The trial began on March 23, 2015.3 Before opening
statements, the court indicated that defense counsel had
communicated Torres’s desire to waive his right to a jury trial.
The circuit court engaged in the following colloquy with Torres:
THE COURT: Your lawyer has provided the Court with a waiver
of trial by jury form. And it appears to have your
signature. Is this your signature?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you go over this form with your lawyer
before you signed it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And did you read and understand it before you
signed it?
THE DEFENDANT: I believe I did. Yeah.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about this form?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
. . .
3
The Honorable Dexter D. Del Rosario presided.
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THE COURT: Knowing the[] penalties [of robbery in the first
degree and terroristic threatening in the first degree], do
you still want to go by way of a bench trial? That is, a
waiver of your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I feel that you will be fair in
weighing the evidence against me. Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you do have a right to a
jury trial in this case?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. Thank you.
THE COURT: And you understand that in a jury trial, you and
your lawyer may participate in selecting twelve citizens
who would serve as jurors in this case and decide whether
you are guilty or not guilty of these crimes?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you understand that you and your lawyer, or
you through your lawyer, will be able to ask questions of
the jurors to determine whether they can be fair and
impartial? Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you understand that your lawyer will be
given three peremptory challenges. In other words, you and
your lawyer will be permitted to excuse up to three jurors,
without giving any reason for it. . . . Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I understand that.
THE COURT: And you understand that before you can be found
guilty of these crimes, all twelve jurors must agree that
you are guilty. In other words, their verdict must be
unanimous.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I understand that.
THE COURT: And you understand that by giving up your right
to a jury trial, you will be giving up all these rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you also understand that by giving up your
right to a jury trial, I--that is the judge--will decide
whether you are guilty or not guilty of these crimes?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
. . .
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THE COURT: Do you have any questions about what I have told
you?
THE DEFENDANT: No. Still we still go through the same
procedures as what my defense is and all that, right?
THE COURT: Yes. We will have a trial. The only difference
is between a jury--
THE DEFENDANT: We won’t have a jury.
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I understand that.
THE COURT: I will decide.
THE DEFENDANT: Right, Your Honor. Yes. I requested that.
. . .
THE COURT: Do you want to waive your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. The Court finds that Mr. Torres has
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Also have
done so knowingly and intelligently.
B. Trial
Prior to trial commencing, the court did not advise
Torres of his right to testify or of his right not to testify.
1. State’s Case
The State first called Satoshi Tokunaga who testified
that he was visiting from Japan in the summer of 2014 when the
incident with Torres occurred. He explained that on July 18,
2014, while he was sitting on a bench in the Waikiki Shopping
Plaza, a stranger approached him with a gun and pointed it at
his head. Tokunaga testified that the man hit him, he hit the
man back, and the man unsuccessfully attempted to take his bag.
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During the incident, Tokunaga said, they were hitting each other
and eventually the individual’s gun fell to the floor and both
of them tried to grab it. Tokunaga stated that after the man
retrieved the gun, the man walked toward the nearby escalator,
security arrived, and the incident ended.4
Tokunaga testified that after the incident, he spoke
with detectives and identified a person in a photo lineup that
“show[ed] the face of the suspect” and that looked like the
stranger who had approached him. Tokunaga was also shown a
series of videos during his testimony that depicted the events
as he had described. Tokunaga identified the person in the
videos as the person that approached him. Tokunaga then made an
in-court identification of Torres as the person that assaulted
him.
Elliot Aki, a security guard who responded to the
incident at the shopping plaza, testified that when he arrived
at the scene he saw one person “breaking away” from a group of
people and starting to leave. He explained that he began
pursuing this person because “this individual might have been
the instigator” of the incident. Aki said that the pursuit
continued to the escalator and when he came close, the person
“pivoted towards his right and pulled out this black object”
4
The magazine from a pellet gun was recovered from the scene, and
a photograph of it was entered into evidence.
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that “looked like a firearm” and pointed it at him. Aki
explained that he then turned around and ran back up the
escalator and warned others in the area that the person on the
escalator had a gun. Aki said that he observed the individual
continue down the escalator in a rushed manner with “his hands
in the air with the weapon.” Aki was shown the security camera
video of the incident on the escalator, and he described the
events again as the video was being played.
2. Defense’s Case
Prior to Torres being called as a witness, the court
did not engage in a colloquy with Torres regarding his right to
testify or his right not to testify.
Torres testified that he was at the shopping plaza on
July 18, 2014, and that he approached Tokunaga and offered to
sell him marijuana. Torres explained that when he opened the
bag of marijuana in front of Tokunaga’s face, Tokunaga grabbed
him and punched him in the eye.5 After he fell to the ground and
stood back up, an altercation ensued, Torres testified. Torres
admitted that he had a pellet gun on the day of the incident but
said that it was in his bag and he never held it in the
confrontation with Tokunaga. He testified that the pellet gun
likely fell out of his bag when he fell to the floor. Torres
5
Tokunaga denied that Torres ever offered to sell him marijuana.
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also stated that the pellet gun’s magazine, which was found on
the ground at the scene, was never loaded in the pellet gun.
When security arrived, Torres testified that he picked
up the pellet gun and his bag, and he walked away from the scene
still holding his pellet gun at his side as he approached the
escalator. Torres testified that while he was on the escalator,
he tried to put the pellet gun in his pocket but it fell to the
ground as he turned to look behind him. Torres acknowledged
that the person in the video “look[ed] like [him]” and that he
had the pellet gun out while going down the escalator, but he
denied that he pointed it at anyone. After Torres’s testimony,
the defense rested.
3. Verdict and Sentencing
The circuit court found Torres guilty of both counts.6
Torres was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for the robbery
charge and 5 years imprisonment for the terroristic threatening
charge; the sentences were imposed concurrently with each other.
Torres filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
II. ICA PROCEEDINGS
On appeal, Torres argued that the circuit court erred
by failing to advise him of his right not to testify before the
trial. Torres contended that this alone was reversible error
6
The court found Tokunaga’s testimony credible and Torres’s
testimony not credible.
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and that there is no requirement that the defendant show he was
prejudiced by the lack of a colloquy. But even if he was
required to show prejudice, Torres asserted, he was prejudiced
because the court’s error and his subsequent testimony
eliminated the defense of proof of identity.
Torres also asserted that the circuit court
erroneously determined that his waiver of jury trial was
voluntary. The colloquy was deficient, Torres maintained,
because the court did not ask him whether the decision to waive
a jury trial was his own decision or made under the influence or
duress of another person. Torres concluded that the failure of
the circuit court to ask this specific question meant that the
court had no basis for its finding that the waiver was
voluntary.7
In its decision, the Intermediate Court of Appeals
(ICA) held that when a trial court fails to provide a pretrial
advisement, the defendant must show that the lack of the
advisement caused actual prejudice. The ICA reasoned that
Torres’s testimony was essential to his defense of self-defense,
and because he was the only witness that the defense called at
trial, Torres would have been required to testify even if he was
7
Torres also argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in
denying the defense’s motion for judgment of acquittal and that his trial
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Neither issue is raised
before this court, and thus they are not addressed.
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given a pretrial advisement. Thus, the ICA concluded that
Torres was not prejudiced by the lack of a pretrial advisement.
The ICA further held that the circuit court did not
err in finding that Torres’s waiver of his right to a jury trial
was voluntary. The ICA explained that not only did Torres sign
a Waiver of Trial by Jury form, but Torres also participated in
an “extensive dialogue” with the circuit court in which he
stated “I feel that you will be fair in weighing the evidence
against me.” The ICA concluded that under the totality of the
circumstances test, these facts demonstrated that Torres waived
his right to a jury trial knowingly and voluntarily.
Thereafter, Torres’s application for certiorari was accepted by
this court.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The validity of a defendant’s waiver of constitutional
rights in a criminal case is a question of law under the state
and federal constitutions. See State v. Celestine, 142 Hawaii
165, 169, 415 P.3d 907, 911 (2018); State v. Sprattling, 99
Hawaii 312, 316, 55 P.3d 276, 280 (2002). “We answer questions
of constitutional law by exercising our own independent
constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case. Thus,
we review questions of constitutional law under the right/wrong
standard.” Sprattling, 99 Hawaii at 316, 55 P.3d at 280
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(quoting State v. Hanapi, 89 Hawaii 177, 182, 970 P.2d 485, 490
(1998)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Torres Voluntarily Waived the Right to a Jury Trial
It is well established that Hawaii law recognizes the
right to a jury trial as a fundamental right.8 State v. Ibuos,
75 Haw. 118, 120, 857 P.2d 576, 577 (1993). This right cannot
be relinquished absent a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver. State v. Friedman, 93 Hawaii 63, 68, 996 P.2d 268, 273
(2000). A waiver is knowing and intelligent when it is made
with “full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). A waiver is
voluntary when “it was the product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id.When determining whether the waiver of a jury trial is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, we have “advised the trial
courts to conduct Duarte-Higareda’s suggested colloquy[.]”9
8
Defendants charged with a non-petty crime have a constitutional
right “to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the district
wherein the crime shall have been committed[.]” Haw. Const. art. I, § 14;
see also State v. Wilson, 75 Haw. 68, 73, 856 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1993) (“[A]
defendant charged with a petty crime does not have a constitutional right to
a jury trial.”).
9
Notwithstanding this advisement, “we have rejected the argument
that such a colloquy is required in every case.” Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaii at
470, 312 P.3d at 902.
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State v. Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaii 465, 470, 312 P.3d 897, 902
(2013) (citing Friedman, 93 Hawaii at 69, 996 P.2d at 274). In
a Duarte-Higareda colloquy, the trial court informs the
defendant “that (1) twelve members of the community compose a
jury, (2) the defendant may take part in jury selection, (3) a
jury verdict must be unanimous, and (4) the court alone decides
guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial.”
United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir.
1997). Here, the circuit court engaged Torres in a colloquy
that essentially tracked the suggested Duarte-Higareda model.
However, the Duarte-Higareda colloquy does not address whether a
waiver is voluntary.
Torres argues that the circuit court was required to
specifically ask him whether the waiver was his own decision or
“based upon duress or the influence of another person or other
factors that might cause him to waive his rights against his
will.” Without conducting this inquiry, Torres asserts, the
circuit court had no basis for its finding that the jury waiver
was voluntary.
This court has evaluated the voluntariness requirement
of a waiver of a jury trial on several occasions. In Friedman,
the trial court asked the defendant during the colloquy, “Is
your decision to waive your right to jury trial something you
thought about and decided to do yourself voluntarily[?]” and the
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defendant answered, “Yes.” 93 Hawaii at 66, 996 P.2d at 271.
We found the defendant’s waiver to be voluntary because the
defendant “affirmatively indicated to the trial court that his
waiver of the right to a jury trial was voluntary and a result
of his own reflection.” Id. at 70, 996 P.2d at 275.
In State v. Baker, the defendant signed his initials
next to each paragraph on a form indicating that he intended to
waive a jury trial except the paragraph stating that his waiver
was not induced by promises or threats. 132 Hawaii 1, 3-4, 319
P.3d 1009, 1011-12 (2014). The trial court then engaged the
defendant in a brief colloquy about the form. Id. at 4, 319
P.3d at 1012. On appeal, this court explained that even when
the defendant signs a written jury trial waiver form, the trial
court is still required to conduct an oral colloquy to establish
the validity of the waiver. Id. at 6, 319 P.3d at 1014. We
concluded that the defendant’s waiver of jury trial was not
voluntary because the defendant failed to initial next to the
paragraph on the waiver form that addressed voluntariness and
“none of the court’s questions were directed towards determining
the voluntariness of [the defendant’s] waiver.” Id. at 7, 319
P.3d at 1015.
This court also evaluated voluntariness in the context
of the right to testify in State v. Eduwensuyi, 141 Hawaii 328,
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409 P.3d 732 (2018). In that case, the trial court conducted a
colloquy pursuant to Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai‘i 226, 237, 900
P.2d 1293, 1304 (1995), informing the defendant of the right to
testify and the right not to testify. Eduwensuyi, 141 Hawaii at
330-31, 409 P.3d at 734-35. We held that the Tachibana colloquy
was deficient because the trial court failed to inform the
defendant that no one could prevent him from testifying. Id. at
333-34, 409 P.3d at 737-38. This advisement “is critical,”
explained the Eduwensuyi court, because it is “the only
Tachibana advisement that emphasizes that the waiver of the
right to testify must be voluntary[.]” Id. at 334, 409 P.3d at
738.
In State v. Solomon, this court evaluated
voluntariness in the context of a guilty plea. 107 Hawaii 117,
127, 111 P.3d 12, 22 (2005). To determine voluntariness, we
stated that “the trial court should make an affirmative showing
by an on-the-record colloquy between the court and the
defendant” that it was the defendant’s decision to waive all of
the constitutional rights associated with a guilty plea. Id.(quoting State v. Vaitogi, 59 Haw. 52, 602, 585 P.2d 1259, 1265
(1978) (internal quotations omitted)). Similarly, for a waiver
of the right to counsel to be “voluntarily and freely made,” we
have emphasized that the trial courts must ensure that “the
record is complete” so as to show that the defendant understands
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the risks and disadvantages of waiving counsel. State v. Phua,
135 Hawaii 504, 512, 517, 353 P.3d 1046, 1054, 1059 (2015).
This court’s case law clearly demonstrates that when a
defendant waives a fundamental right, there must be an
affirmative, on-the-record showing that the waiver of the right
is voluntary. It is thus incumbent on the trial court to have a
basis to conclude that a waiver is voluntary. Unless
voluntariness is gleaned from the defendant’s responses, the
trial court must inquire into the voluntariness of the waiver.
See Baker, 132 Hawaii at 7, 319 P.3d at 1015 (holding that there
was no basis for concluding the defendant’s waiver of jury trial
was voluntary when the court failed to include questions
regarding voluntariness in its colloquy). Accordingly, a direct
question about voluntariness is required when the defendant’s
statements in the colloquy do not indicate that the decision to
waive a jury trial is the defendant’s own free and deliberate
choice.
Thus, because the circuit court did not ask a direct
question addressing whether Torres’s waiver was voluntary, his
responses to the court must demonstrate that his waiver was his
own decision without influence of duress or coercion. To
determine whether the waiver was voluntary, we evaluate “the
totality of facts and circumstances” of the record in this case.
Friedman, 93 Hawai‘i at 68-69, 996 P.2d at 273-74.
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During the colloquy, Torres asked whether, during a
non-jury trial, “we still go through the same procedures as what
my defense is and all that, right?” After the circuit court
explained that the difference between a jury trial and non-jury
trial is that the court decides guilt or innocence, Torres said,
“Right, Your Honor. Yes. I requested that,” indicating that it
was Torres’s own decision to waive a jury trial. Additionally,
when asked if he still wanted to proceed with a bench trial
knowing the penalties that he was facing, Torres expressed his
sentiment that “I feel that you will be fair in weighing the
evidence against me.” This also evidences that Torres perceived
a bench trial to be beneficial to him and that he made the
decision based on this conclusion.
We conclude from the record, based on the totality of
the circumstances, that Torres voluntarily waived his right to a
jury trial. See Friedman, 93 Hawaii at 68-69, 996 P.2d at 273-
74. Torres’s responses “affirmatively indicated” that his
waiver of a jury trial was “a result of his own reflection” and
free will. Id. at 70, 996 P.2d at 275. Thus, the ICA did not
err in holding that Torres’s waiver of his right to a jury trial
was voluntary.
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B. Lewis/Monteil Pretrial Advisement
1. The Circuit Court Erred by Failing To Give a Pretrial
Advisement
Torres also argues that the circuit court’s failure to
provide a pretrial advisement regarding his right not to testify
was error under State v. Lewis, 94 Hawaii 292, 12 P.3d 1233(2000).
In Lewis, this court held that trial courts must
inform defendants of the right not to testify in a pretrial
advisement. Id. at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238. There, the defendant
testified at trial but was given neither a pretrial advisement
that he had the right not to testify nor an advisory during
trial about this right before he testified. Id. at 294, 12 P.3d
at 1235. The Lewis court determined that there were positive
effects to be obtained “in all cases from a trial court
addressing a defendant” before trial about the defendant’s right
not to testify. Id. at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238. Thus, we mandated
that “trial courts ‘prior to the start of trial, [shall] []
inform the defendant of his or her personal right to testify or
not to testify[.]’” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting
Tachibana, 79 Hawai‘i at 237 n.9, 900 P.2d at 1304 n.9); see also
State v. Monteil, 134 Hawaii 361, 373, 341 P.3d 567, 579 (2014)
(affirming Lewis and adopting a prospective rule that trial
courts are required to inform defendants during the Lewis
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advisement that the decision not to testify cannot be used by
the fact finder to decide the case).
Here, the circuit court clearly violated the mandate
of Lewis: Torres was not given a pretrial advisement regarding
his right not to testify nor was he advised that the exercise of
this right may not be used by the fact finder to decide the
case. This was clear error by the circuit court.
This error may have been remedied if the circuit court
had engaged in a colloquy with Torres before he testified and
informed him of his right not to testify. See Monteil, 134
Hawaii at 372, 341 P.3d at 578. But the circuit court also
failed to conduct a colloquy before Torres testified. Thus, at
no point in the trial proceedings did the circuit court inform
Torres of his constitutional right not to testify. Under Lewis,
Torres was entitled to a colloquy regarding the right not to
testify. The circuit erred by not informing him of this right,
and the record does not demonstrate a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver.
2. The Lack of a Pretrial Advisement Was Harmless Error
When the violation of a constitutional right has been
established, “the conviction must be vacated unless the State
can prove that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable
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doubt.”10 Tachibana, 79 Hawaii at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307. Under
the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, this court must
determine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that error
might have contributed to [the] conviction.” State v.
Eduwensuyi, 141 Hawaii 328, 336, 409 P.3d 732, 740 (2018)
(quoting State v. Han, 130 Hawaii 83, 93, 306 P.3d 128, 138
(2013)). If such reasonable possibility exists, then “the
judgment of conviction on which it may have been based must be
set aside.” State v. Pulse, 83 Hawaii 229, 248, 925 P.2d 797,
816 (1996). When assessing whether the error was harmless, “[a]
crucial if not determinative consideration . . . is the strength
of the prosecution’s case on the defendant’s guilt.” State v.
10
The State argues that the ICA was correct in holding that a Lewis
violation must satisfy the “actual prejudice” standard. Lewis stated that,
“[b]ecause we view this prior-to-trial advisement as incidental to the
‘ultimate colloquy,’ any claim of prejudice resulting from the failure of the
trial court to give [the pretrial advisement] must meet the same ‘actual[]
prejudice[]’ standard” espoused in Tachibana. 94 Hawaii at 297, 12 P.3d at
1238 (third and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Tachibana explained that a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice when
“a defendant asserts his or her right to testify during a colloquy conducted
after the defense has rested and the trial is reopened to allow the defendant
to testify[.]” 79 Hawaii at 237, 900 P.2d at 1304. In such a situation, a
defendant’s constitutional right to testify is not violated. Rather, a court
must determine whether there was actual prejudice to the defendant as a
result of the delay in engaging in the colloquy. In contrast, Tachibana
stated that the failure of the court to give the ultimate colloquy is subject
to harmless error review. Id. at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307. We thus interpret
Lewis to establish that a court’s failure to properly deliver the pretrial
advisement is subject to the actual prejudice standard so long as the trial
court subsequently engages the defendant in the ultimate Tachibana colloquy.
When the ultimate colloquy is not given, however, a Lewis violation is
evaluated under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Because
here Torres received neither the pretrial Lewis advisement nor the ultimate
Tachibana colloquy, we apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
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Tetu, 139 Hawaii 207, 226, 386 P.3d 844, 863 (2016) (quoting
State v. Fukusaku, 85 Hawaii 462, 482-83, 946 P.2d 32, 52-53
(1997)).
Even had Torres been advised of his right not to
testify and chosen to exercise this right, the sum effect would
be that Torres’s trial testimony would not have been elicited.
If Torres’s trial testimony is thus not considered, the evidence
presented by the State with respect to the charges in this case
is nonetheless overwhelming. To convict Torres of robbery, the
State was required to prove that Torres was armed with a
“dangerous instrument or a simulated firearm”11 and either used
force with the intent to overcome Tokunaga’s physical resistance
or threatened the use of imminent force with the intent to
compel Tokunaga’s acquiescence to the taking of his property.
HRS §§ 708-840(1)(b)(i), (ii). Tokunaga’s testimony described
the events of his encounter with Torres in great detail.
Tokunaga testified that he was sitting alone on a bench in a
shopping mall and had a clear view of Torres approaching.
Tokunaga stated that he observed Torres wearing a blue shirt,
glasses, and “short pants.” When Torres arrived at the bench,
Tokunaga testified, he saw Torres’s face and then saw Torres
11
HRS § 708-840(2) defines “simulated firearm” as any object that
“(a) Substantially resembles a firearm; (b) Can reasonably be perceived to be
a firearm; or (c) Is used or brandished as a firearm.”
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point a gun at the right side of his head. Torres hit him in
the face and tried to take his bag, Tokunaga stated, at which
point he hit Torres back and a physical encounter ensued.
Tokunaga further testified that at the conclusion of the
encounter, he “saw his face” again as Torres stood up and walked
to the nearby escalator.
Tokunaga’s testimony was verified by video evidence
that shows Torres approach Tokunaga with a pellet gun, punch
Tokunaga multiple times in the face while Tokunaga is still
sitting on the bench, and continue to punch Tokunaga while
Tokunaga was pinned on the ground. Tokunaga unequivocally
identified Torres during trial as the person who attacked him.
The evidence also demonstrated that the pellet gun was a
“simulated firearm”; both Tokunaga and Aki testified that the
pellet gun resembled a real firearm, and it plainly appears to
be a real firearm in the video. Further, a photograph of the
magazine from the pellet gun recovered from the scene was
entered into evidence.12
As to the terroristic threatening charge, the State
needed to prove that Torres threatened Aki with a simulated
12
It is noted that if Torres had not testified, there would not
have been any evidence of self-defense, which was the defense asserted by
Torres at trial to the robbery charge. At the ICA, Torres contended that he
could have presented an identification defense. However, as described, the
State presented overwhelming evidence that Torres was the assailant appearing
in the video.
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firearm with the intent to terrorize him or in reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing him. HRS §§ 707-715(1),
707-716(1)(e).13 Aki testified that during his pursuit of a man
leaving the scene of the incident, the man pointed “what looked
like a firearm” at him while the man was descending down the
escalator. Aki’s testimony was substantiated by video evidence.
These videos document Torres’s movements from three different
camera angles from the time that Torres stood up at the end of
the encounter with Tokunaga to when he stepped off of the
escalator. They show Torres carrying the pellet gun in his
right hand to the escalator, turning to face Aki while Torres
was on the escalator, and getting off the escalator with the gun
in his right hand pointed upwards. And, as explained, the
testimony and video demonstrate that the pellet gun was a
“simulated firearm.”
Because of the strength of the State’s evidence
adduced from Tokunaga and Aki and the corroborating videos, the
circuit court’s error in not advising Torres of his right not to
testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tetu, 139
Hawaii at 226, 386 P.3d at 863 (video footage and witness
testimony presented “compelling” evidence of defendant’s guilt
13
HRS § 707-715 (2014) defines “terroristic threatening” as a
threat “by word or conduct, to cause bodily injury to another person or . . .
to commit a felony . . . [w]ith the intent to terrorize, or in reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing, another person[.]”
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and thus trial court error was harmless); State v. Rivera, 62
Haw. 120, 128, 612 P.2d 526, 532 (1980) (where there was a
“wealth of overwhelming and compelling evidence” tending to show
defendant’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt the error was
harmless). Because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, we affirm Torres’s convictions.
C. Prospectively, a Tachibana Colloquy Must Be Given in All
Trials
A defendant in a criminal case “has an absolute right
not to testify.” Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 184 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 433 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting)). In
Hawaii, the right not to testify has been recognized since as
early as the nineteenth century. See The King v. McGiffin, 7
Haw. 104, 113 (Haw. Kingdom 1887) (holding that a comment by the
prosecution about the defendant’s failure to testify was “highly
improper, and contrary to the statute” although not prejudicial
in the particular case).
This right is explicitly guaranteed by the United
States Constitution under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and by the Hawaii Constitution under article I, section 10.14
14
The United States Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const.
amend. V. It further provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
(continued . . .)
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Monteil, 134 Hawaii at 369, 341 P.3d at 575. The Fifth
Amendment’s protection is “fulfilled only when an accused is
guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his own will. The choice of
whether to testify in one’s own defense is an exercise of the
constitutional privilege.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53
(1987) (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971))
(internal quotations and alterations omitted). Additionally,
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
secures “the right of a criminal defendant to choose between
silence and testifying [o]n his own behalf.” Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring); see
also Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 (“Every criminal defendant is
privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do
so.”).
Under our current procedures, however, the right not
to testify does not receive protection equivalent to the
corresponding right to testify in one’s own defense--a
foundational constitutional right of equivalent stature. That
is, one fundamental right (the right to testify) is more greatly
(. . . continued)
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Hawaii Constitution states that “[n]o
person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
oneself.” Haw. Const. art. I, § 10.
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protected than the equally fundamental parallel right (the right
not to testify).
As discussed, we held in Lewis that courts must advise
a defendant prior to the start of trial of both the right to
testify and the right not to testify. 94 Hawai‘i at 297, 12 P.3d
at 1238. This advisement supplements the “ultimate colloquy”
regarding the right to testify that we held in Tachibana must be
given at the close of the defendant’s case if the defendant has
not testified. 79 Hawai‘i at 237 n.9, 900 P.2d at 1304 n.9. Yet
we have thus far declined to require trial courts to engage the
defendant in a corresponding colloquy regarding the right not to
testify when a defendant elects to take the stand. See Lewis,
94 Hawai‘i at 295-96, 12 P.3d at 1236-37. In other words, we
have required courts to confirm that a defendant’s waiver of the
right to testify is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, but we
have not required a similar confirmation regarding a defendant’s
waiver of the fundamental right not to testify.
This disparate treatment makes it easier for a
defendant in a criminal case to waive the right not to testify
than to waive the right to testify because there is no “ultimate
colloquy” from the court regarding the right not to testify and
its consequences. By contrast, when a defendant waives the
right to testify, the defendant must make an on-the-record,
affirmative choice by answering questions from the court
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confirming such a decision. This case demonstrates why the
right not to testify deserves protection that is equal to that
of the right to testify.
In Tachibana, this court recognized that there was a
necessary balance between the right to testify and the right not
to testify. 79 Hawaii at 235, 900 P.2d at 1302. We noted the
risk that advising the defendant of the right to testify could
influence the defendant’s decision on whether to waive the right
not to testify, which was a “constitutionally explicit and more
fragile right.” Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 883
F.2d 750, 760 (9th Cir. 1989)). Thus, the Tachibana court
advised trial courts to advise defendants of both the right to
testify and the right not to testify in order to “reduce the
possibility that the trial court’s colloquy could have any
inadvertent effect on either the defendant’s right not to
testify or the attorney-client relationship.” Id. at 237 n.9,
900 P.2d at 1304 n.9.
This court reiterated the importance of this “even
balance” between a defendant’s right to testify and the right
not to testify in Monteil.15 134 Hawai‘i at 370, 341 P.3d at 576.
15
In Monteil, the defendant testified after the trial court
informed him prior to trial that he had the “right to remain silent and the
right against self-incrimination” and that if he chose to testify that the
State would be able to cross-examine him and the court would consider his
testimony in deciding guilt or innocence. 134 Hawaii at 362-63, 365, 341
P.3d at 568-69, 571.
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We explained that “Hawaii has historically protected both the
right to testify and the right not to testify.” Id. at 369, 341
P.3d at 575. The danger in providing an “imbalance in
information” between the right to testify and the right not to
testify, we explained, was that the “more fragile right” not to
testify would be threatened because defendants that choose to
testify would not be informed of the “relevant circumstances” of
their decision from the beginning of the trial. Id. at 372, 341
P.3d at 578. Specifically, the court reasoned that the failure
to advise a defendant that the exercise of the right not to
testify “could not be used against him in deciding the case,”
undermined the purposes of the pretrial advisement: to limit
post-conviction challenges and to avoid “inadvertently
influenc[ing]” the defendant’s decision-making process in
deciding whether to testify. Id.
These repeated statements of the importance of
properly balancing the constitutional right to testify with the
equally important right not to testify are at odds with our
current practice of not requiring a Tachibana colloquy when a
defendant waives the right not to testify. The disparity is
even more striking when we consider other parallel contexts in
which our precedent requires trial courts to conduct an on-the-
record colloquy to ensure that a waiver of a constitutional
right is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
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For example, in State v. Ibuos, the trial court
accepted a jury trial waiver from the defendant’s counsel. 75
Haw. 118, 118, 857 P.2d 576, 577 (1993). Because the defendant
had a constitutional right to a jury trial, this court held that
the trial court erred when it failed to conduct an on-the-record
colloquy to ensure that the defendant waived the right to a jury
trial knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 120, 857 P.2d at 577.
Similarly, in State v. Murray, defense counsel stipulated that
the defendant had previously been convicted of abuse of a family
or household member, which was an element of the charged
offense. 116 Hawaii 3, 5, 169 P.3d 955, 957 (2007). The
stipulation was accepted by the trial court without a colloquy
between the court and the defendant. Id. On appeal, this court
held that defendants in a criminal case have a constitutionally
and statutorily protected right to have each element of an
offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 10, 169 P.3d
at 962. Thus, the court in Murray held that trial courts must
engage in a colloquy with a defendant when the defendant seeks
to waive, via stipulation, the right to have the State prove
each element of an offense. Id. at 12, 169 P.3d at 964. And in
State v. Phua, the defendant appeared at a sentencing hearing
without an attorney and the trial court conducted a brief
colloquy informing the defendant of the right to counsel. 135
Hawaii 504, 508-09, 353 P.3d 1046, 1050-51 (2015). This court
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held that because the right to counsel was guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and the Hawaii Constitution, a
defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary, as insured by an adequate on-the-
record colloquy. Id. at 512, 353 P.3d at 1054.
Tachibana, as explained, held that the right to
testify is a fundamental right and that a trial court is
required to engage in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that
waiver of the right is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 79
Hawaii at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303. Tachibana recognized that the
right to testify derives partly from the right not to testify as
provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. at 231, 900 P.2d at 1298. Thus, this court
held that the decision whether to testify or not testify was a
decision that was required to be decided by the defendant, not
by defense counsel, and that trial courts had a duty to ensure
that the waiver of the right to testify was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. See id. at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303(quoting Hurn v. State, 872 P.2d 189, 198 (Alaska App. 1994)
(“[T]he decision to testify or not rests with [the
defendant.]”)).
Ibuos, Murray, Phua, and Tachibana all involved the
waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, which is also the
circumstance in this case. Like other fundamental rights, the
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waiver of the right not to testify should require a trial court
to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant to
ensure that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
This is necessary to protect the “constitutionally explicit and
more fragile right,” Tachibana, 79 Hawaii at 235, 900 P.2d at
1302, that has been “historically protected” by Hawaii law.
Monteil, 134 Hawaii at 369, 341 P.3d at 575. Additionally,
adopting such an approach would be consistent with some of the
important purposes of the colloquy requirement; it would protect
a defendant from testifying based upon belief or advice that to
do otherwise would result in an inference of guilt, it would
reduce the possibility that the trial court’s colloquy could
“inadvertent[ly] effect” the defendant’s right not to testify,
and it would reduce appeals (as exemplified in this case) and
post-conviction challenges based on the defendant’s asserted
lack of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the
right not to testify. See Murray, 16 Hawaii at 11-12, 169 P.3d
at 963-64; Tachibana, 79 Hawaii at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303. Thus,
we hold that trial courts are required to engage in an on-the-
record colloquy with a defendant when the defendant chooses to
testify to ensure that a waiver of the right not to testify is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.16 The implication of such a
16
Relying on People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 124 (Colo. 1986) (en
(continued . . .)
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requirement merely requires the trial court to give the
Tachibana colloquy to a defendant whether or not the defendant
elects to testify. That is, we are providing equal treatment to
two fundamental constitutional rights that merit equivalent
protection. This requirement will be effective in trials
beginning after the filing date of this opinion.
(. . . continued)
banc), Lewis identified three rationales as to why such a colloquy was not
required. First, Lewis stated that a defendant has likely received one or
more Miranda advisements from law enforcement officials during the course of
the criminal investigation. 94 Hawaii at 296, 12 P.3d at 1237. However,
Miranda warnings are not given upon every arrest; they are only required
prior to conducting custodial interrogation of the defendant. See State v.
Kazanas, 138 Hawaii 23, 34-35, 375 P.3d 1261, 1272-73 (2016). And, even if
the Miranda warnings are administered, there is an extended lapse of time
between when they are given and when the defendant exercises or waives the
right not to testify at trial.
Second, the Lewis court stated that a colloquy was not required when a
defendant testifies because the defense counsel likely would not allow the
defendant to take the stand without explaining to the defendant the right to
remain silent and the possible consequences of waiving the right. 94 Hawaii
at 296, 12 P.3d at 1237. This rationale has been effectively rejected by
subsequent cases of this court that have held that speculation about a
defense counsel’s privileged, off-the-record conversation with the defendant
cannot replace the trial court’s duty to conduct an on-the-record colloquy
with a defendant. See, e.g., State v. Eduwensuyi, 141 Hawaii 328, 336, 409
P.3d 732, 740 (2018)(“[A] court may not rely upon an off-the-record
discussion between counsel and a defendant to establish a valid waiver of a
constitutional right.”).
Finally, Lewis reasoned that a colloquy was not required when a
defendant testifies because “any defendant who testifies would expect to be
cross-examined.” 94 Hawaii at 296, 12 P.3d at 1237. However, a defendant’s
knowledge that the State has the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant
is not equivalent to knowledge of the constitutional right not to testify,
nor to knowledge of the protections afforded to the defendant when waiving
the right to testify, such as the fact that the defendant’s silence cannot be
used as an inference of guilt in deciding the case. See Monteil, 134 Hawaii
at 372-73, 341 P.3d at 578-79.
Accordingly, none of the reasons cited by the Lewis court provide a
persuasive basis to justify the disparate treatment that is accorded to the
defendant’s fundamental right to not testify at trial.
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V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the ICA’s judgment on appeal
is affirmed.
Emmanuel G. Guerrero /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Chad M. Kumagai
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
33