Flubacher v. State. , 414 P.3d 161 ( 2018 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-15-0000363
21-MAR-2018
08:10 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
ROBERT FLUBACHER,
Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI#I,
Respondent/Respondent-Appellee.
SCWC-15-0000363
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-15-0000363; S.P.P. NO. 14-1-00004)
MARCH 21, 2018
RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.,
WITH NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING SEPARATELY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
Robert Flubacher pled guilty to various offenses in
multiple cases, and was sentenced to extended term sentences,
which became final in 2003. In 2014, Flubacher filed a petition
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for post-conviction relief pursuant to Hawai#i Rules of Penal
Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40, arguing that his sentence was illegal
because a judge, not a jury, found a relevant fact used to
enhance his sentence in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000). The Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit
court)1 denied the petition, and the Intermediate Court of
Appeals (ICA) affirmed. On certiorari, Flubacher argues that his
extended term sentences were imposed in an illegal manner, and
requests that this court vacate and remand for resentencing.
This appeal requires us to revisit our prior decisions
which addressed whether Hawaii’s extended term sentencing scheme
was invalid under Apprendi and subsequent Supreme Court cases
including Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Cunningham v.
California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). This court initially held that
certain features of Hawaii’s scheme (specifically, that the facts
determined by the judge were “extrinsic” to the charged offense)
meant that Hawaii’s statute was not invalidated by the rule
announced in Apprendi. State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai#i 1, 72 P.3d 473
(2003).
Our initial application of Apprendi in Kaua was
rejected by both the United States District Court for the
1
The Honorable Richard K. Perkins presided.
2
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District of Hawai#i and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. See Kaua v. Frank, 436 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006);
Kaua v. Frank, 350 F. Supp. 2d 848, 849–50, 855-56 (D. Haw.
2004). Then, commencing after the decision in Blakely, our own
decisions reflected disagreement as to whether our sentencing
scheme was unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 106
Hawai#i 146, 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Gomes, 107 Hawai#i
308, 113 P.3d 184 (2005); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai#i 399,
114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I). Nevertheless, it was not
until after the decision in Cunningham that a majority of the
court determined that our scheme was invalid. State v.
Maugaotega, 115 Hawai#i 432, 168 P.3d 562 (2007) (Maugaotega II).
It is against this backdrop that we consider
Flubacher’s appeal, and conclude that our sentencing scheme was
invalid based on the holding in Apprendi. As set forth below,
Apprendi plainly stated that a sentencing scheme was invalid when
it allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to determine facts that
resulted in extended sentences. In concluding that Apprendi
invalidated our sentencing scheme, we note that the State has now
conceded that the scheme was unlawful based on Apprendi, and that
accordingly, Flubacher is entitled to relief. While that
concession is not binding on us, we conclude, for the reasons set
forth below, that it is well founded.
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Thus, we conclude that Flubacher’s extended term
sentences were imposed in an illegal manner. Accordingly, we
vacate the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal, and remand this case to
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. Background
Flubacher was charged with: Unauthorized Control of
Propelled Vehicle (Count I), Driving Without License (Count II),
and Theft in the Fourth Degree (Count III) in Cr. No. 01-1-2788;
Robbery in the First Degree (Count I), Assault in the First
Degree (Count II), Assault in the First Degree (Count III),
Assault in the Second Degree (Count IV), and Unauthorized Control
of Propelled Vehicle (Count V) in Cr. No. 01-1-2789; and Robbery
in the First Degree in Cr. Nos. 02-1-0089, 02-1-0090, and
02-1-0125. Flubacher pled guilty to all counts in each case.
The State filed a motion for extended term of
imprisonment pursuant to Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 706-
6612 and 706-662(4)(a),3 as follows: (1) in Cr. No. 01-1-2788,
2
HRS § 706-661 (Sentence of imprisonment for felony; extended
terms) (Supp. 1999) provided, in pertinent part:
In the cases designated in section 706-662, a person
who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to
an extended indeterminate term of imprisonment. When
ordering such a sentence, the court shall impose the
maximum length of imprisonment which shall be as
follows:
(continued...)
4
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from a five year term of imprisonment to ten years for Count I;
(2) in Cr. No. 01-1-2789, from a twenty year term of imprisonment
to life with the possibility of parole for Count I, from ten year
terms of imprisonment to twenty years for Counts II and III, and
from five year terms of imprisonment to ten years for Counts IV
and V; and (3) in Cr. Nos. 02-1-0089, 02-1-0090, and 02-1-0125,
from twenty year terms of imprisonment to life with the
possibility of parole.
The circuit court4 granted the State’s motion, and
2
(...continued)
(1) For murder in the second degree--life without the
possibility of parole;
(2) For a class A felony--indeterminate life term of
imprisonment;
(3) For a class B felony--indeterminate twenty-year
term of imprisonment; and
(4) For a class C felony--indeterminate ten-year term
of imprisonment.
3
HRS § 706-662(4)(a) (Criteria for extended terms of imprisonment)
(Supp. 2001) provided:
A convicted defendant may be subject to an extended
term of imprisonment under section 706-661 if the
convicted defendant satisfies one or more of the
following criteria:
(4) The defendant is a multiple offender whose
criminal actions were so extensive that a
sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is
necessary for protection of the public. The
court shall not make this finding unless:
(a) The defendant is being sentenced for
two or more felonies or is already under
sentence of imprisonment for felony[.]
4
The Honorable Michael A. Town presided.
5
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sentenced Flubacher to pay restitution, and to serve the
following terms of imprisonment concurrently, with credit for
time served: (1) in Cr. No. 01-1-2788, as to Count I, ten years’
incarceration with a mandatory minimum of one year and eight
months; as to Counts II and III, thirty days’ incarceration; (2)
in Cr. No. 01-1-2789, as to Count I, life incarceration with the
possibility of parole, with a mandatory minimum of six years and
eight months; as to Counts IV and V, ten years’ incarceration
with a mandatory minimum of one year and eight months; as to
Counts II and III, twenty years’ incarceration with a mandatory
minimum of three years and four months; (3) in Cr. Nos.
02-1-0089, 02-1-0090, and 02-1-0125, life incarceration with the
possibility of parole with a mandatory minimum of six years and
eight months.
Flubacher did not appeal any of his convictions or
sentences, and they became final on October 13, 2003.
In 2005, Flubacher filed an HRPP Rule 405 petition for
5
HRPP Rule 40(a) (Proceedings and Grounds) (2003) provides in
relevant part:
The post-conviction proceeding established by this
rule shall encompass all common law and statutory
procedures for the same purpose, including habeas
corpus and coram nobis; provided that the foregoing
shall not be construed to limit the availability of
remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal. Said
proceeding shall be applicable to judgments of
conviction and to custody based on judgments of
conviction, as follows:
(continued...)
6
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post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, and arguing that his sentence was illegal because the
court cited criteria not in the extended term statute, which the
circuit court denied.
In 2014, Flubacher filed another petition for post-
conviction relief (Petition), alleging that his sentence was
illegal under Apprendi because the judge, not a jury, found that
his extended term sentences were necessary for the protection of
the public. The State countered that Flubacher’s arguments were
waived because he did not raise them on direct appeal, and that
Apprendi and Cunningham may not be retroactively applied.
Flubacher amended his Petition, alleging three
additional grounds for relief, including that the sentencing
judge: (1) considered “false facts,” i.e., that Flubacher had
hit one of his victims in the face with a hammer; (2)
demonstrated bias against Flubacher because of Flubacher’s prior
5
(...continued)
(1) From Judgment. At any time but not prior to final
judgment, any person may seek relief under the
procedure set forth in this rule from the judgment of
conviction, on the following grounds:
(i) that the judgment was obtained or sentence
imposed in violation of the constitution of the United
States or of the State of Hawai#i;
(ii) that the court which rendered the judgment
was without jurisdiction over the person or the
subject matter;
(iii) that the sentence is illegal;
(iv) that there is newly discovered evidence; or
(v) any ground which is a basis for collateral
attack on the judgment.
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history with the court; and (3) took judicial notice of his
presentence report and other documents in determining his
sentence.
The circuit court denied Flubacher’s Petition, stating
in pertinent part in its Conclusions of Law:
1. HRPP Rule 40(a)(3) provides as follows:
Inapplicability. Rule 40
proceedings shall not be available
and relief thereunder shall not be
granted where the issues sought to
be raised have been previously ruled
upon or were waived. Except for a
claim of illegal sentence, an issue
is waived if the petitioner
knowingly and understandingly failed
to raise it and it could have been
raised before the trial, at the
trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus
proceeding or any other proceeding
actually conducted, or in a prior
proceeding actually initiated under
this rule, and the petitioner is
unable to prove the existence of
extraordinary circumstances to
justify the petitioner’s failure to
raise the issue. There is a
rebuttable presumption that a
failure to appeal a ruling or to
raise an issue is a knowing and
understanding failure.
2. Flubacher’s claim that his sentence was in
violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 . . . (2000), is a claim of
illegal sentence which, although arguably
raised in his prior Rule 40 petition, was
not ruled upon.
3. With respect to the illegal sentence
claim, the [ICA] has determined that a
defendant sentenced to an extended term
that became final after Apprendi but prior
to the United States Supreme Court rulings
in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 . .
. (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 . . . (2005), is not entitled to
relief on collateral attack. Loher v.
8
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State, 1[1]8 Haw[ai#i] 522, 538
(Haw.[]App. 2008), cert. dismissed (August
5, 2009).
4. Flubacher’s sentence became final on
October 13, 2003 -- that is, after
Apprendi and prior to both Blakely and
Booker. Therefore, pursuant to Loher,
Flubacher’s sentence was not illegal under
Apprendi and he is not entitled to
retroactive application of the
post-Apprendi line of cases.6
5. Flubacher’s remaining claims were waived
as he could have but did not raise them on
direct appeal or in S.P.P. No. 05-1-0081
and has failed to demonstrate the
existence of extraordinary circumstances
to justify his failure to raise them as
required by HRPP Rule 40(a)(3).
6. Assuming arguendo that the claims relating
to the factors considered by the
sentencing court in determining
Flubacher’s sentence were not waived, they
are wholly without merit, patently
frivolous, and without a trace of support
in the record.
Flubacher appealed to the ICA, reiterating the claims
in his Petition. Flubacher additionally argued that Loher was
not the controlling authority in his case because he was not
requesting retroactive application of Blakely or Booker, and that
6
With respect to this Conclusion of Law, the circuit court stated
in a footnote:
Loher is the controlling precedent for Hawai#i trial
courts determining issues like the instant one. While
it appears that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kaua
v. Frank, 436 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, Frank v. Kaua, 549 U.S. 1245 . . .
(2007), regarding a defendant whose sentence was final
on or about June 1, 2001, holds that the sentencing
court’s public protection finding was a violation of
Apprendi, the rulings of the federal district and
circuit courts are not controlling authority, but
merely persuasive authority, even on a federal
constitutional question.
9
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he was only requesting application of Apprendi, Cunningham, and
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
The State responded that Flubacher’s sentences were not
illegal under Apprendi and the post-Apprendi line of cases
because the “legal landscape” only became clear after Apprendi,
Blakely, and Booker, “taken together,” established that a
“sentencing scheme in which the maximum possible sentence is set
based on facts found by a judge is not consistent with the Sixth
Amendment.” The State additionally contended that Flubacher’s
remaining claims were waived, and that he had failed to
demonstrate the existence of extraordinary circumstances to
justify his failure to raise them.
In a summary disposition order, the ICA determined that
Flubacher’s case was similar to Loher, where the defendant’s
conviction was also finalized in 2003, and thus, Blakely and
Booker did not apply retroactively on collateral review, and it
did not need to decide whether Cunningham applied. With respect
to Flubacher’s contention that the circuit court erroneously
considered that he hit one of his victims with a hammer, the ICA
determined that the argument was waived, and that even if the
argument was not waived, there was evidence in the record that
supported the circuit court’s conclusion.
Accordingly, the ICA affirmed the circuit court’s
10
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying
Flubacher’s Petition. The ICA filed its Judgment on Appeal on
October 13, 2016.
II. Standard of Review
With respect to the denial of a HRPP Rule 40 petition
without an evidentiary hearing, HRPP Rule 40(f) provides, in
relevant part:
(f) Hearings. If a petition alleges facts that if
proven would entitle the petitioner to relief, the
court shall grant a hearing which may extend only to
the issues raised in the petition or answer. However,
the court may deny a hearing if the petitioner’s claim
is patently frivolous and is without trace of support
either in the record or from other evidence submitted
by the petitioner. The court may also deny a hearing
on a specific question of fact when a full and fair
evidentiary hearing upon that question was held during
the course of the proceedings which led to the
judgment or custody which is the subject of the
petition or at any later proceeding.
As a general rule, a trial court should hold an
evidentiary hearing on a HRPP Rule 40 petition for
post-conviction relief if the petition states a colorable claim
for relief. Dan v. State, 76 Hawai#i 423, 427, 879 P.2d 528, 532
(1994). To establish a colorable claim, a petitioner must allege
facts that, if taken as true, would change the verdict. Id.
This court has stated that:
Where examination of the record of the trial court
proceedings indicates that the petitioner's
allegations show no colorable claim, it is not error
to deny the petition without a hearing. The question
on appeal of a denial of a Rule 40 petition without a
hearing is whether the trial record indicates that
Petitioner’s application for relief made such a
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showing of a colorable claim as to require a hearing
before the lower court.
Barnett v. State, 91 Hawai#i 20, 26, 979 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1999)
(emphasis omitted, quoting State v. Allen, 7 Haw. App. 89, 92-93,
744 P.2d 789, 792-93 (1987)).
“[T]he appellate court’s determination of ‘whether the
trial record indicates that Petitioner’s application for relief
made such a showing of a colorable claim as to require a hearing
before the lower court’ is a question of law, [and thus] the
trial court’s decision is reviewed de novo.” Id. (brackets and
ellipsis omitted; emphasis in original) (citing Dan, 76 Hawai#i
at 427, 879 P.2d at 532).
III. Discussion
In his application for writ of certiorari, Flubacher
presents the following issues:
A. Appellant[’]s extended sentences are illegal
because they violate the United States Supreme
Court cases “Apprendi v. New Jersey” and “Ring
v. Arizona” and the Hawai#i ICA’s “Loher v.
State” case decision is not controlling in
Appellant[’s] case and does not foreclose
Appellant[’]s claim[.]
B. Appellant[’]s claim that the sentencing judge
erroneously found that Appellant ‘Bashed’ a
woman with a hammer and then relied on that
erroneous finding in extending Appellant[’]s
sentences was not waived under Haw. R. Penal P.
40(2)(3)-1[.]
In supplemental briefing requested by this court, the
State changed its prior position regarding the first issue, and
conceded that Flubacher’s sentence was illegal. Specifically,
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the State now concedes that “any extended term sentence imposed
after June 26, 2000, in which the court, not a jury, found the
fact of ‘necessary for protection of the public’ is in violation
of Apprendi.”
As set forth below, the State’s concession is well-
founded, and accordingly, we remand for resentencing.7 See State
v. Hoang, 93 Hawai#i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 502 (2000).
At issue in Apprendi was a New Jersey “hate crime”
statute, which provided for the imposition of an enhanced
sentence based upon a finding, by the sentencing judge by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had committed
an offense “with a racially biased purpose.” 530 U.S. at 468-70.
Apprendi fired several shots into the home of an African-American
family who had recently moved into a previously all-white
neighborhood. Id. at 469. Apprendi subsequently entered into a
plea agreement, under which he pleaded guilty to two counts of
the second-degree offense of possessing a firearm with an
unlawful purpose and one count of the third-degree offense of
unlawfully possessing an antipersonnel bomb, but reserved the
7
The dissent contends that Flubacher’s second issue is waived. See
Dissent at 15-17. Because we conclude that Flubacher’s sentence is illegal
and remand for resentencing, we do not address Flubacher’s remaining issue
raised on appeal and whether that remaining issue was waived. Further, any
analysis of waiver must be made in light of HRPP Rule 40(a)(3), which
specifically exempts illegal sentence claims from being waived. See also HRPP
Rule 35 (“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time . . .”).
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right to challenge any hate crime sentencing enhancement as
violating the Constitution. Id. at 469-70. After the plea was
accepted by the court, the prosecutor filed a motion for an
extended term sentence. Id. at 470. The court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on Apprendi’s purpose for the shooting, and
held that the hate crime enhancement applied, finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the crime was motivated by
racial bias,” and Apprendi’s actions were taken “with a purpose
to intimidate” as provided by the hate crime statute. Id. at
470-71. Apprendi appealed, and a divided New Jersey Supreme
Court ultimately upheld his sentence, rejecting his challenge to
the constitutionality of the enhanced sentencing procedure. Id.
at 471-72.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
reversed. Id. at 474. The Court stated that the constitutional
protections at stake were of “surpassing importance,” including:
the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without
“due process of law,” Amdt. 14, and the guarantee that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury,” Amdt. 6. Taken together, these
rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to “a
jury determination that [he] is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 476–77 (emphasis added).
The Court discussed its past jurisprudence, noting that
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), it first coined
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the term “sentencing factor” to “refer to a fact that was not
found by a jury but that could affect the sentence imposed by the
judge.” Id. at 485. The Court in McMillan held that a
Pennsylvania sentencing scheme was valid because it operated
“solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a
penalty within the range already available to it without [a]
special finding,” while also noting that “a state scheme that
keeps from the jury facts that expose defendants to greater or
additional punishment, may raise serious constitutional concern.”
Id. at 486 (internal quotations, citations, and brackets
omitted).
The Apprendi Court stated that the relevant inquiry
should not be one of form, but instead of effect: “does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Id. at 494.
Thus, the Court rejected the “constitutionally novel and elusive
distinction between ‘elements’ and ‘sentencing factors’”8 Id.
8
The Court noted that it did not suggest that the term “sentencing
factor” was devoid of meaning, stating:
The term appropriately describes a circumstance, which
may be either aggravating or mitigating in character,
that supports a specific sentence within the range
authorized by the jury’s finding that the defendant is
guilty of a particular offense. On the other hand,
when the term “sentence enhancement” is used to
describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized
statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of
an element of a greater offense than the one covered
(continued...)
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(citation omitted). The Court reasoned that the effect of New
Jersey’s sentencing enhancement “unquestionably . . . turn[ed] a
second-degree offense into a first degree offense,” and that the
potential doubling of Apprendi’s sentence from ten years to
twenty years was “unquestionably of constitutional significance”
both in terms of years of absolute imprisonment and because of
the “more severe stigma attached.” Id. at 494-95. Therefore,
the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. In so holding,
the Court also endorsed the following rule: “[I]t is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is
equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citations omitted).
Following Apprendi, this court repeatedly considered
whether Hawaii’s extended term sentencing scheme comported with
Apprendi. Until 2007, we concluded that it did so, on the ground
8
(...continued)
by the jury’s guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits
squarely within the usual definition of an “element”
of the offense.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19 (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
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that Hawaii’s scheme only required the judge to determine
“extrinsic” facts, rather than facts that were “intrinsic” to the
offense. See Kaua, 102 Hawai#i 1, 72 P.3d 473; Rivera, 106
Hawai#i 146, 102 P.3d 1044; Maugaotega I, 107 Hawai#i 399, 114
P.3d 905; State v. White, 110 Hawai#i 79, 129 P.3d 1107 (2006).
It was not until Maugaotega II, that this court acknowledged that
the United States Supreme Court, in Cunningham, rejected the
validity of our intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, which formed the
basis of these decisions. 115 Hawai#i at 442-47, 168 P.3d 572-
77.
In State v. Kaua, the defendant was indicted in
connection with a 1999 hostage standoff, and while the jury
acquitted him of attempted murder in the first degree, it found
him guilty of several other offenses. 102 Hawai#i at 2-3, 72
P.3d at 474-75. The State moved for an extended term sentence
pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4)(a). Id. at 3-4, 72 P.3d at 475-76.
At the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court followed the two-
step process required at that time, determining first that Kaua
was a multiple offender subject to an extended term sentence,
i.e., Kaua was being sentenced for two or more felonies at that
time, and had already been under sentence of imprisonment for a
felony; and second, that the extended term sentence was necessary
for the protection of the public. Id. at 4-7, 72 P.3d at 476-79.
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In determining that the extended term sentence was
necessary for the protection of the public, the circuit court
cited Kaua’s history of substance abuse, his substance abuse
shortly before the hostage incident, his history of assaultive
behavior, his inability to control his behavior while under the
influence or under stress, his access to firearms and lack of
experience with the firearm used to perpetrate the standoff, and
the strong possibility that he could have injured minors and
innocent bystanders during the incident because of his
inexperience. Id. at 4-6, 72 P.3d at 476-478. Accordingly, the
circuit court granted the State’s motion, and sentenced Kaua to
several extended term sentences. Id.
Kaua appealed, and this court affirmed Kaua’s judgment
of conviction and sentence.9 Id. Kaua subsequently filed a
motion for correction of illegal sentence under HRPP Rule 35,10
9
Kaua appealed to this court on February 28, 2000, Apprendi was
decided on June 26, 2000, and this court issued its summary disposition order
on May 1, 2001. State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai#i at 6, 72 P.3d at 478. Although
Apprendi had been decided prior to this court’s State v. Kaua decision, Kaua
did not raise any Apprendi issues in his direct appeal. Kaua v. Frank, 436
F.3d at 1059.
10
HRPP Rule 35(a) (Correction or Reduction of Sentence) (2003)
provides:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time
and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner within the time provided herein for the
reduction of sentence. A motion made by a defendant
(continued...)
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arguing that the two-step process for determining a defendant’s
status as a multiple offender should be determined by the jury in
a separate sentencing hearing, according to Apprendi. Id. at 6,
72 P.3d at 478. The circuit court denied Kaua’s motion, finding
that his extended term sentence was proper, and that the “facts
of conviction which exposed Kaua to an extended term of
imprisonment were not in the nature of ‘elements’ of the offenses
charged or of a separate legal offense.” Id. at 6-7, 72 P.3d at
478-79.
This court upheld the process followed by the
sentencing court, reasoning:
Specifically, the facts at issue in rendering an
extended term sentencing determination under HRS
§§ 706–662(1),(3), and (4)[11] implicate
10
(...continued)
to correct an illegal sentence more than 90 days after
the sentence is imposed shall be made pursuant to Rule
40 of these rules. A motion to correct a sentence
that is made within the 90 day time period shall
empower the court to act on such motion even though
the time period has expired.
11
HRS § 706-662 (Supp. 2001) provided, in relevant part:
A convicted defendant may be subject to an extended
term of imprisonment under section 706–661, if the
convicted defendant satisfies one or more of the
following criteria:
(1) The defendant is a persistent offender whose
imprisonment for an extended term is necessary
for protection of the public. The court shall
not make this finding unless the defendant has
previously been convicted of two felonies
committed at different times when the defendant
was eighteen years of age or older.
(continued...)
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11
(...continued)
(2) The defendant is a professional criminal
whose imprisonment for an extended term is
necessary for protection of the public. The
court shall not make this finding unless:
(a) The circumstances of the crime show
that the defendant has knowingly engaged
in criminal activity as a major source of
livelihood; or
(b) The defendant has substantial income
or resources not explained to be derived
from a source other than criminal
activity.
(3) The defendant is a dangerous person whose
imprisonment for an extended term is necessary
for protection of the public. The court shall
not make this finding unless the defendant has
been subjected to a psychiatric or psychological
evaluation that documents a significant history
of dangerousness to others resulting in
criminally violent conduct, and this history
makes the defendant a serious danger to others.
Nothing in this section precludes the
introduction of victim-related data in order to
establish dangerousness in accord with the
Hawaii rules of evidence.
(4) The defendant is a multiple offender whose
criminal actions were so extensive that a
sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is
necessary for protection of the public. The
court shall not make this finding unless:
(a) The defendant is being sentenced for
two or more felonies or is already under
sentence of imprisonment for felony; or
(b) The maximum terms of imprisonment
authorized for each of the defendant's
crimes, if made to run consecutively would
equal or exceed in length the maximum of
the extended term imposed, or would equal
or exceed forty years if the extended term
imposed is for a class A felony.
(5) The defendant is an offender against the
elderly, handicapped, or a minor under the age
of eight, whose imprisonment for an extended
term is necessary for the protection of the
public. The court shall not make this finding
unless:
(a) The defendant attempts or commits any
(continued...)
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considerations completely “extrinsic” to the elements
of the offense with which the defendant was charged
and of which he was convicted; accordingly, they
should be found by the sentencing judge . . . . The
facts at issue for purposes of HRS §§ 706–662(5) and
(6), however, are, by their very nature, “intrinsic”
to the offense with which the defendant was charged
and of which he has been convicted; accordingly, they
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier
of fact in order to afford the defendant his
constitutional rights to procedural due process and a
trial by jury.
Id. at 12–13, 72 P.3d at 484–85 (citations omitted).12
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(...continued)
of the following crimes: murder,
manslaughter, a sexual offense that
constitutes a felony under chapter 707,
robbery, felonious assault, burglary, or
kidnapping; and
(b) The defendant, in the course of
committing or attempting to commit the
crime, inflicts serious or substantial
bodily injury upon a person who is:
(i) Sixty years of age or older;
(ii) Blind, a paraplegic, or a
quadriplegic; or
(iii) Eight years of age or younger;
and
(c) Such disability is known or reasonably
should be known to the defendant.
(6) The defendant is a hate crime offender whose
imprisonment for an extended term is necessary
for the protection of the public. The court
shall not make this finding unless:
(a) The defendant is convicted of a crime
under chapter 707, 708, or 711; and
(b) The defendant intentionally selected a
victim or, in the case of a property
crime, the property that was the object of
a crime, because of hostility toward the
actual or perceived race, religion,
disability, ethnicity, national origin, or
sexual orientation of any person.
12
In 2003, Kaua filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai#i, requesting that the district court
vacate his sentence. Kaua v. Frank, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 849–50, 855-56. In
his petition, Kaua challenged this court’s conclusion that a judge, rather
than a jury, was permitted to satisfy the second stage of HRS § 706-662(4)’s
sentencing process, regarding the necessity of protecting of the public. Id.
(continued...)
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Respectfully, our analysis in Kaua erroneously
concluded that despite the Court’s clear holding in Apprendi,
this court’s intrinsic/extrinsic factor analysis still remained
valid.13 102 Hawai#i at 12-13, 72 P.3d at 484-85. Specifically,
12
(...continued)
at 850-53, 855-56. The district court granted Kaua’s petition, holding that
this court’s affirmance of his extended sentence was “contrary to, and
involved an unreasonable application of Apprendi.” Id. at 861. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, rejecting this court’s “intrinsic[/]extrinsic” analysis as a
“variant of the ‘element-sentencing factor’ distinction that Apprendi
explicitly rejected.” Kaua v. Frank, 436 F.3d at 1062.
Although the analysis of the federal courts in Kaua is consistent
with our conclusions here, we are not bound by those decisions and accordingly
analyze the issues independently.
13
The Dissent states, “I agree with several federal courts of appeal
that the date should be placed after the Supreme Court decided Blakely and
Booker.” Dissent at 18-19. It is important to note that, when evaluating
state court decisions, federal courts address this issue under a higher
standard than state courts. Federal courts are making a determination whether
a state court’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of
established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court.
[A] state court decision is contrary to clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court, when the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a
question of law, or when the state court confronts
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a
result opposite to the Supreme Court.
A state court decision is an unreasonable application
of clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States when the state
court identifies the correct governing legal rule from
Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to
the facts of the particular case, or when the state
court either unreasonably extends a legal principle
from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend
that principle to a new context where it should apply.
The unreasonable application clause requires the state
court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous.
The state court’s application of clearly established
law must be objectively unreasonable.
(continued...)
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we characterized Apprendi as stating the following:
[A] finding that the defendant committed the charged
offense with a biased purpose, of necessity, required
an assessment of the ‘elemental’ facts upon which the
indictment was based. That being the case, the
Apprendi Court held that findings that implicated
‘elemental’ facts requisite to imposing an enhanced
sentence must be charged in the indictment, submitted
to the jury, and proved by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 12, 72 P.3d at 484 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we asserted that the “facts at issue in
rendering an extended term sentencing determination under HRS
§ 706-662(1), (3), and (4) implicate considerations completely
‘extrinsic’ to the elements of the offense with which the
defendant was charged . . . . [and thus] fell outside the
Apprendi rule.” Id. at 12-13, 72 P.3d at 484-85.
In reaching that conclusion about the importance of
facts being “elemental” rather than “extrinsic,” this court
appeared to rely on language in Apprendi that responded to the
State of New Jersey’s argument that a finding of racial bias
under the hate crime statute involved nothing more than the
“traditional ‘sentencing factor’ of motive.” Id.; see Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 492-93. Specifically, the Court in Apprendi
13
(...continued)
Kaua, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 855–56 (brackets, ellipses, quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Even under this higher standard, the federal district court and
the Ninth Circuit concluded that our decision in Kaua was contrary to
Apprendi. See supra n.12.
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disagreed with the State’s suggestion that the hate crime statute
required “simply an inquiry into ‘motive,’” noting that “[t]he
defendant’s intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as
one might hope to come to a core criminal offense ‘element.’”
530 U.S. at 492-93.
However, the Court in Apprendi immediately went on to
explain that the characterization of the required finding did not
matter, and to repeat the holding of the case:
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the New Jersey
Supreme Court correctly recognized that it does not
matter whether the required finding is characterized
as one of intent or of motive, because “[l]abels do
not afford an acceptable answer.” That point applies
as well to the constitutionally novel and elusive
distinction between “elements” and “sentencing
factors.” Despite what appears to us the clear
“elemental” nature of the factor here, the relevant
inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty
verdict?
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Therefore, we hold that the line of demarcation is
Apprendi, not Booker or Cunningham, in determining whether
extended term sentences imposed without jury findings are subject
to collateral attack. Accordingly, we correct the conclusion in
Loher and subsequent opinions that the “legal landscape only
became clear after Apprendi (2000), Blakely (2004), and Booker
(2005), [were] taken together.” Loher v. State, 118 Hawai#i 522,
538, 193 P.3d 438, 454 (App. 2008). To the extent that our prior
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opinions and the ICA’s prior opinions are contrary to our
holding, they are now overruled.14 Here, a judge, and not a
jury, made the required finding that Flubacher’s extended term
sentence was necessary for the protection of the public. That
“required finding expose[d] the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict.” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 494. Therefore, Flubacher’s extended term sentences
were imposed in an illegal manner because they violate Apprendi.
The Dissent suggests that the rule in Apprendi “was not
clear” because the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari
in Blakely and Booker. Dissent at 5-9. Respectfully, the issues
addressed in those cases were not needed to clarify the
invalidity of this court’s extrinsic/intrinsic analysis. Blakely
involved the distinct question of whether Apprendi applied to an
extended sentence which did not exceed the statutory maximum in a
state court proceeding, while Booker addressed a similar issue in
the context of the federal sentencing guidelines. Accordingly,
cases addressing whether those decisions announced “new” rules
for purposes of retroactivity analysis are irrelevant to
assessing the validity of Hawaii’s sentencing scheme.
14
These cases include Kaua, 102 Hawai#i 1, 72 P.3d 473; Rivera, 106
Hawai#i 146, 102 P.3d 1044; Maugaotega I, 107 Hawai#i 399, 114 P.3d 905; White,
110 Hawai#i 79, 129 P.3d 1107; Loher, 118 Hawai#i 522, 193 P.3d 438; and, for
example, Mara v. State, 139 Hawai#i 414, 420 n.8, 391 P.3d 1236, 1242 n.8
(App. 2017) (citing ICA opinions).
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Flubacher’s
extended term sentences were imposed in an illegal manner.
Therefore, we vacate the ICA’s October 13, 2016 Judgment on
Appeal, the circuit court’s April 2, 2015 Order Denying Petition,
the portion of the circuit court’s September 12, 2003 Judgments
and Sentences in Cr. Nos. 01-1-2788, 01-1-2789, 02-1-0089,
02-1-0090, and 02-1-0125 that imposed extended term sentences,
and the circuit court’s Order Granting Motion for Extended Term
of Imprisonment filed September 22, 2003. We remand this case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.15
John M. Schum /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Stephen K. Tsushima
for respondent /s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
15
Flubacher maintained that his sentence should be vacated, and that
he should be resentenced without being subject to extended term sentencing.
However, based on the reasoning in Jess, we reject that argument. See Jess,
117 Hawai#i at 406-15, 184 P.3d at 158-67 (finding that upon remand, the State
may move for an extended term sentence, and the circuit court may empanel a
jury to make the necessary findings to determine petitioner’s sentence).
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