Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois v. Hutchings , 427 Ill. Dec. 931 ( 2018 )

2018 IL 122973
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Docket Nos. 122973, 122985, 122986, 122987, 122988, 122989, 122992, 122993,
122994, 122996, 122997, 122998, 122999, 123000, 123001, 123002, 123003,
123004, 123005, 123006, 123007, 123008, 123009, 123011, 123012, 123013,
123014, 123015, 123016, 123017, 123018, 123019, 123020, 123021 cons.
AMEREN TRANSMISSION COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
RICHARD L. HUTCHINGS et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed October 18, 2018.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Burke, Theis, and Neville concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
Justice Garman specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Kilbride concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 To facilitate the construction of a high-voltage transmission line, Ameren
Transmission Company of Illinois (ATXI) filed eminent domain complaints
against several landowners located in Edgar County, Illinois (Landowners). The
Landowners filed a traverse and motion to dismiss, and the circuit court dismissed
every complaint on the grounds that section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act (220
ILCS 5/8-406.1 (West 2016)), as it existed at the time, is unconstitutional both on
its face and as applied to the Landowners. This direct appeal followed. Ill. S. Ct. R.
302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011).
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The Public Utilities Act (Act) (220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2010)) requires
a public utility to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) before transacting business or
beginning new construction within Illinois. Section 8-406 of the Act sets forth the
requirements for obtaining a certificate. Id. § 8-406. Effective July 28, 2010, the
legislature enacted section 8-406.1 of the Act (id. § 8-406.1), which permits a
public utility to apply for a certificate using an expedited procedure when seeking
to construct a new high-voltage electric service line and related facilities.
¶4 On November 7, 2012, ATXI petitioned the Commission for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity that would authorize ATXI “to construct, operate
and maintain a new 345 kV electric transmission line *** and related facilities,
including certain new or expanded substations, within *** Illinois.” ATXI’s
proposed plan was designated the Illinois Rivers Project (Project), and portions of
the Project were to be located within several Illinois counties, spanning 375 miles
across the state. ATXI elected to file its petition pursuant to the expedited process
set forth in section 8-406.1.
¶5 ATXI’s proposal included both a primary route and an alternate route, and the
Commission sent notice of the impending proceedings to several thousand
potentially impacted landowners. After the notices went out, certain interested and
affected parties sought and were granted leave to intervene. Some of these
-2­
intervenors then proposed alternative routes of their own for certain segments of
the Project. One such alternative was proposed by an intervening group named Stop
Coalition, and it involved the “Kansas-Indiana State Line” segment of the Project.
In the end, the Commission approved the Project and granted ATXI a certificate of
public convenience and necessity, based on a route that included Stop Coalition’s
alternative proposal for the Kansas-Indiana State Line segment.
¶6 Shortly thereafter, several landowners from the Kansas-Indiana State Line
segment of the Project filed a petition to intervene. The petition alleged that,
although these landowners owned property that was either on or directly adjacent to
the alternative route proposed by Stop Coalition, they did not receive notice of that
fact until after the Commission had entered its decision approving the Project.
Accordingly, along with their petition to intervene, these landowners filed both a
motion to strike the Commission’s proceedings relating to the Kansas-Indiana State
Line segment of the Project and an application for rehearing. The Commission
denied both the motion to strike and the application for rehearing, but it then
granted the petition to intervene for the limited purpose of accommodating
appellate review.
¶7 A direct appeal to the appellate court followed (see 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a)
(West 2016)), and the landowners impacted by the Kansas-Indiana State Line
segment of the Project were among the parties to that appeal. Adams County
Property Owners & Tenant Farmers v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2015 IL App
(4th) 130907. In a lengthy opinion, the appellate court affirmed the Commission’s
decision approving the Project and granting the certificate of public convenience
and necessity. Id. ¶ 102. In the course of doing so, the appellate court considered
and rejected the affected landowners’ argument that their due process rights were
violated because they never received notice of Stop Coalition’s alternative route
proposal. Id. ¶¶ 78-80.
¶8 Following disposition of the direct administrative appeal, ATXI attempted
unsuccessfully to negotiate easement rights with the Landowners. Consequently, in
early 2016, ATXI sought and secured from the Commission authority to obtain the
necessary easements by eminent domain. Thereafter, ATXI filed a total of 35
eminent domain complaints against the Landowners. The Landowners, in turn,
filed a traverse and motion to dismiss. Although the Landowners asserted
-3­
traditional traverse claims, they ultimately did not develop or defend those claims
in the subsequent proceedings. 1 Instead, the Landowners focused on their motion to
dismiss, which argued that ATXI’s eminent domain complaints must be dismissed
because the Landowners’ due process rights were violated during the proceeding in
which the Commission granted the certificate of public convenience and necessity.
More specifically, the Landowners argued that their due process rights were
violated because they were never notified that their property would be affected by
the route that the Commission ultimately approved.
¶9 On September 25, 2017, the circuit court of Edgar County entered a 24-page
written order granting the Landowners’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
applicable version 2 of section 8-406.1 was unconstitutional both on its face and as
applied to the Landowners. In support of its conclusion that section 8-406.1 was
unconstitutional on its face, the circuit court explained:
“220 ILCS 5/8-406.1 as it existed at the time of these proceedings was facially
unconstitutional. It failed to require personal notice by registered mail or other
means which would ensure notice to any landowner whose property may be
considered for primary or alternate routes proposed throughout the certification
process.
By requiring such notice only to landowners identified in the application
and at public hearing, it deprived landowners whose property was proposed in
alternate routes later suggested by the utility or any intervenor, of the same
opportunity to participate or object.”
1
At the hearing on the Landowners’ traverse and motion to dismiss, counsel for the Landowners
conceded that ATXI had established a prima facie case for the propriety of the taking, that the
Landowners had made no attempt to rebut that presumption, and that consequently, if the
Landowners’ motion to dismiss were denied, their traverse would also have to be denied. Likewise,
in its order granting the Landowners’ motion to dismiss, the circuit court stated that, “[a]lthough the
[Landowners] refused to concede their claims contained in the Traverse were not supported by the
record, they presented no evidence at the hearing in that regard.” That being said, the trial court’s
order concludes by stating, “[h]aving granted the Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not need to
address the Traverse.”
2
Section 8-406.1 has since been amended. See Pub. Act 99-399 (eff. Aug. 18, 2015) (amending
220 ILCS 5/8-406.1).
-4­
Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed all 35 of ATXI’s eminent domain
complaints.
¶ 10 ATXI appealed the circuit court’s decision directly to this court. Ill. S. Ct. R.
302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011).
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 We need not reach the merits of the circuit court’s due process analysis, as the
circuit court clearly lacked the necessary jurisdiction to review the legality and
constitutionality of the Commission’s administrative proceedings.
¶ 13 Illinois courts are courts of general jurisdiction and enjoy a presumption of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’
Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 14. That presumption is inapplicable,
however, where administrative proceedings are involved. Id. Illinois courts are
empowered to review administrative actions only “as provided by law.” Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, § 6 (appellate court), § 9 (circuit court). When the legislature has,
through law, prescribed procedures for obtaining judicial review of an
administrative decision, a court is said to exercise “special statutory jurisdiction”
when it reviews an administrative decision pursuant to that statutory scheme.
People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2014 IL 116642, ¶ 10.
Special statutory jurisdiction is limited by the language of the act conferring it. Id.
A court has no powers from any other source. Id. A party seeking to invoke a
court’s special statutory jurisdiction must therefore comply strictly with the
procedures prescribed by the statute. Id. If the mode of procedure set forth in the
statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court. Id.
¶ 14 This court has held that “[r]eview of final decisions of the Commission ***
involves the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction and is constrained by the
provisions of the Public Utilities Act.” Illinois Landowners Alliance, NFP v.
Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2017 IL 121302, ¶ 29; see also People ex rel.
Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, 387 (2008). The relevant
provision of the Act is section 10-201, and it states that a party affected by a rule,
regulation, order, or decision of the Commission has 35 days to “appeal to the
appellate court of the judicial district in which the subject matter of the hearing is
-5­
situated *** for the purpose of having the reasonableness or lawfulness of the rule,
regulation, order or decision inquired into and determined.” 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a)
(West 2016). Section 10-201 goes on to state that, in such cases, the appellate court
“shall reverse a Commission rule, regulation, order or decision, in whole or in part,
if it finds that *** [t]he proceedings or manner by which the Commission
considered and decided its rule, regulation, order or decision were in violation of
the State or federal constitution or laws, to the prejudice of the appellant.” Id.
§ 10-201(e)(iv)(D). Thus, under the plain language of the Act, the power to review
a final decision of the Commission, including whether “[t]he proceedings or
manner by which the Commission considered and decided its rule, regulation, order
or decision were in violation of the State or federal constitution or laws,” is a power
conferred on the appellate court by the special statutory jurisdiction established in
section 10-201. Absent such jurisdiction, a court has no power to review the
legality or constitutionality of Commission proceedings.
¶ 15 The problem here is that the circuit court below was not exercising the special
statutory jurisdiction conferred by section 10-201 when it determined that the
Commission’s proceedings in relation to the Project were in violation of due
process. Rather, it was sitting as a court of general jurisdiction charged with
adjudicating the merits of ATXI’s eminent domain complaints. As such, the circuit
court below had no authority whatsoever to review either the Commission’s
decision itself or whether the proceedings leading up to that decision “were in
violation of the State or federal constitution or laws.” Section 10-201 specifically
reserves such questions for the appellate court exercising its statutory power of
direct administrative review, which is exactly what the Adams County court was
doing back in 2015 when it considered and rejected the very same due process
challenge at issue here. Adams County, 2015 IL App (4th) 130907, ¶¶ 78-80. In
other words, there is an explicit statutory scheme in place for reviewing the legality
and constitutionality of the Commission’s administrative proceedings, and the
subsequent eminent domain litigation forms no part of it.
¶ 16 Given this, we agree with ATXI that the circuit court’s decision granting the
Landowners’ motion to dismiss must be reversed. As discussed above, the circuit
court’s sole rationale for granting those motions was its conclusion that the
Commission’s proceedings were in violation of due process. As the legality and
constitutionality of the Commission’s proceedings was a question beyond the
-6­
circuit court’s power to decide, its answer to that question cannot form the basis for
dismissing the complaints in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit
court is hereby reversed.
¶ 17 CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Edgar County is
reversed, and we remand the cause for further proceedings.
¶ 19 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 20 JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:
¶ 21 Defendants are a group of landowners who claim that the Public Utilities Act
instructed the Illinois Commerce Commission and the circuit court to transfer their
property rights to plaintiff Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois (ATXI)
without affording them due process of law. The majority does not address the
substance of defendants’ complaint but instead finds that the circuit court could not
consider their argument because it lacked jurisdiction. I disagree with this
reasoning, but I agree with the conclusion to reverse the circuit court’s order.
¶ 22 A. The Circuit Court’s Jurisdiction
¶ 23 The Illinois Constitution of 1970 grants circuit courts general subject-matter
jurisdiction over “all justiciable matters.” Ill. Const., art. VI, § 9. One such
justiciable matter is eminent domain (735 ILCS 30/10-5-10(a) (West 2010)). ATXI
cannot plausibly claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over these
proceedings; after all, ATXI is the plaintiff. In the course of those eminent domain
proceedings, the circuit court found that section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act
(220 ILCS 5/8-406.1 (West 2012)) and the Commission proceedings under that
statute violated the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. Section 8-406.1 established the Commission expedited procedure
for granting certificates of public necessity, which in turn created the “rebuttable
-7­
presumption” that ATXI relied on in its eminent domain petition. Id.; 735 ILCS
30/5-5-5(c) (West 2014).
¶ 24 The majority finds that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to find that section
8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act and the Commission proceedings violated the
due process clause. The majority certainly is correct that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to review a challenge to the Commission’s certificate of public
necessity. The Illinois Constitution states that Illinois’s circuit courts and appellate
court have jurisdiction to review administrative action only “as provided by law.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§ 6, 9. Section 10-201(e)(iv)(D) of the Public Utilities Act
grants the appellate court jurisdiction to reverse a “Commission rule, regulation,
order or decision, in whole or in part, if it finds that *** [t]he proceedings or
manner by which the Commission considered and decided its rule, regulation, order
or decision were in violation of the State or federal constitution or laws, to the
prejudice of the appellant.” 220 ILCS 5/10-201(e)(iv)(D) (West 2016). No
comparable provision grants the circuit court jurisdiction to review a Commission
rule, regulation, order, or decision. If the circuit court had held merely that the
Commission failed to follow the Public Utilities Act, this would have been “review
of [an] administrative action,” which only the appellate court could exercise.
¶ 25 However, the circuit court did not conclude that only the Commission’s
decision was unconstitutional. It also held that section 8-406.1 of the Public
Utilities Act was unconstitutional.
¶ 26 The majority finds either that section 10-201(e)(iv)(D) instructs the appellate
court to consider the constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act in addition to the
Commission certificate or that this distinction between the Act and the Commission
decision is irrelevant. The majority’s analysis is brief and does not elaborate on its
reasoning.
¶ 27 If the majority finds that the appellate court’s authority to review the
Commission certificate of public necessity included the authority to review the
Public Utilities Act, it is mistaken for two reasons. First, section 10-201(e)(iv)(D)
does not state this. Section 10-201 directs the appellate court to reverse a
“Commission rule, regulation, order or decision, in whole or in part, if it finds that
*** [t]he proceedings or manner by which the Commission considered and decided
its rule, regulation, order or decision were in violation of the State or federal
-8­
constitution or laws, to the prejudice of the appellant.” Id. Nothing in the plain
language of this statute strips the circuit court of jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act, which is not a “Commission rule,
regulation, order or decision” but a General Assembly statute.
¶ 28 Second, if section 10-201(e)(iv)(D) was intended to deprive the circuit courts of
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act and give
jurisdiction exclusively to the appellate court, then section 10-201(e)(iv)(D) would
be unconstitutional. The Illinois Constitution does not allow the General Assembly
to remove matters from circuit courts’ general jurisdiction. Circuit courts’
jurisdiction derives from the Illinois Constitution, and the General Assembly may
not extend or reduce it. McCormick v. Robinson, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 23.
¶ 29 One exception to circuit courts’ constitutional general jurisdiction is that
“Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided
by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. Similarly, the appellate court has jurisdiction
to review administrative action as provided by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6.
Under these provisions, review of administrative action is considered “special
statutory jurisdiction” that exists only through a grant from the General Assembly.
People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2014 IL 116642, ¶ 10. If the
General Assembly has not provided the circuit court with jurisdiction to review a
certain administrative action, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to review that
action. The majority claims that this exception allows the Public Utilities Act to
grant the appellate court, not the circuit court, the power to review the
constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act.
¶ 30 I disagree with the majority’s interpretation, which dramatically expands the
General Assembly’s power to reduce circuit courts’ jurisdiction. No Illinois court
has ever considered reviewing the constitutionality of a statute to be “review [of]
administrative action” simply because that statute implicates an agency’s
procedural rules. The majority cites only a few cases in its short analysis. In Illinois
State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, the
court concluded that the statutory requirements for appealing a decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Commission had not been met. That case was a direct
appeal of a decision of an administrative agency. Unlike this case, there was no
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois
-9­
Commerce Comm’n, 231 Ill. 2d 370 (2008), and People ex rel. Madigan, 2014 IL
116642, also involved direct review of Commission orders and questions about the
statutory requirements for jurisdiction. Illinois Landowners Alliance, NFP v.
Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2017 IL 121302, was a direct appeal of a Commission
order granting a certificate of public necessity. The court concluded that the
Commission had applied the Public Utilities Act incorrectly. None of these cases
involve a court lacking jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of a statute.
¶ 31 Nor does ATXI cite any precedent that deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction
to conduct judicial review of the constitutionality of a statute. ATXI relies on
Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, in which the court
considered whether a 35-day filing period to appeal an administrative order created
a jurisdictional bar. 109 Ill. 2d 202, 209 (1985). There is no indication that any
party in Fredman Brothers challenged the constitutionality of the Retailers’
Occupation Tax Act or the Administrative Review Act, which created the
administrative framework for the litigation. The question was whether the
plaintiff’s failure to follow the statutory requirements deprived the circuit court of
jurisdiction over an appeal of the agency’s decision. ATXI also relies on
Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees,
218 Ill. 2d 175 (2006); People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2014
IL 116642; Illini Coach Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 408 Ill. 104 (1951);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local Union No. 15, 961 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1996). None of these cases deny
circuit courts’ jurisdiction in constitutional challenges to state statutes.
¶ 32 The majority’s error results from its misunderstanding of what claims the
General Assembly may constitutionally assign to the appellate court. Only appeals
challenging an agency’s final determination itself are reserved for appellate courts.
For example, in ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 286 Ill. App. 3d 325
(1997) a landowner applied for permits to operate a landfill, but the Illinois
Pollution Control Board denied his application. On his direct appeal to the Third
District, the landowner argued that the board’s decision was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Id. at 330, 336. This is the sort of challenge that section
5/10-201(e)(iv)(D) directs to appellate courts. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(e)(iv)(D) (West
2016). Once the case reached the appellate court, that court could consider the
- 10 ­
landowner’s constitutional challenge to the statute. ESG Watts, Inc., 286 Ill. App.
3d at 334.
¶ 33 Although not squarely on point, this court’s decision in Board of Education of
Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staff,
Security/Policeman’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 114, 2013 IL 114853
supports my conclusion that “review of administrative action” does not include
assessing the constitutionality of a General Assembly statute. In that case a statute
removed jurisdiction over certain labor disputes from one administrative agency
and placed those disputes under the authority of a different agency. The plaintiffs
filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that this statute was unconstitutional
special legislation. This court found that the circuit court had jurisdiction to
consider the constitutional challenge. We explained that “the parties cite no case
with comparable facts, i.e., a constitutional challenge to a statute that would
potentially divest one labor board (the IELRB) of jurisdiction, with specified
dispute resolution procedures, and confer it upon another (the ILRB), with different
procedures. Disposition of the constitutional issue dictates which of the two boards
has jurisdiction of this matter. That decision is properly one for the courts, and, in
the first instance, the circuit court.” Id. ¶ 37.
¶ 34 Admittedly Board of Education of Peoria concerned whether the courts or an
administrative agency had jurisdiction, not which level of state court had
jurisdiction. However, if reviewing the constitutionality of a statute constitutes
“review [of] administrative action,” as the majority concludes, then administrative
agencies themselves would be capable of considering this question. For example, if
reviewing the constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act is review of
“administrative action” under article VI, section 9, then the Commission’s
administrative law judge should be capable of considering the constitutional
challenge. But this court in Board of Education of Peoria expressly disavowed this
conclusion, stating that “administrative agencies have no authority to declare
statutes unconstitutional or even to question their validity.” Id. ¶ 38. Instead, the
courts, and specifically the circuit courts, have jurisdiction over such questions. Id.
¶ 37.
¶ 35 In its brief opinion, the majority justifies this expansion of the General
Assembly’s power simply by citing article VI, section 9, but that text does not
- 11 ­
support the majority’s claim. Article VI, section 9 states only that “Circuit Courts
shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.” Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. It is not obvious why the phrase “administrative action”
should include a statute passed by the General Assembly simply because that
statute governs an administrative agency’s procedures, and the majority provides
no justification for this strained interpretation.
¶ 36 One might argue that, regardless of the circuit court’s jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act, my distinction between the Public
Utilities Act and the Commission order is irrelevant. Even if the circuit court could
strike down the Public Utilities Act as unconstitutional, the objection might say, the
court would still need to consider the Commission’s order itself. But the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to review this order.
¶ 37 Because the majority disregards the distinction between the Public Utilities Act
and the Commission certificate of public necessity, it fails to explain why the
circuit court should continue to apply the Commission certificate even after the
court invalidated the underlying statute. It is not self-evident that the circuit court
should acknowledge the Commission certificate after finding that the statute that
created it was unconstitutional. Moreover, even if the Commission’s certificate of
public necessity survives the invalidation of the statute that produced it, that
invalidation could still have effects in the eminent domain proceeding based on that
certificate. The circuit court was required, under section 5-5-5(c) of the Eminent
Domain Act, to afford a rebuttable presumption of public necessity to a
Commission certificate of public necessity. 735 ILCS 30/5-5-5(c) (West 2014).
The circuit court reasonably considered the constitutionality of the statute that
produced the certificate. It might conclude that defendants had overcome that
presumption by showing that the Public Utilities Act denied them due process of
law, or it might conclude that affording a rebuttable presumption to a
constitutionally deficient certificate also denied defendants due process of law.
Admittedly, the circuit court’s order does not explore these possibilities. The
majority’s dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction, however, forecloses these
possibilities entirely and without any discussion.
¶ 38 The majority’s flawed analysis raises significant threats to individual rights.
The majority’s approach would allow for the following possibility: a utility
- 12 ­
petitions the Commission for a certificate of public necessity to acquire two lots
owned by Alice and Brian. Alice is not notified of the Commission proceedings and
does not participate in them. Brian is notified of the proceedings and challenges
them, including appealing the decision to the appellate court. The appellate court
rejects Brian’s challenge and upholds the Commission’s order. The utility initiates
eminent domain proceedings against both Alice and Brian. Alice argues that the
statute that allowed the utility to petition for a certificate without notifying her
unconstitutionally deprived her of due process of law. Under the majority’s
approach, the circuit court would lack jurisdiction to hear this argument but would
retain jurisdiction over the eminent domain proceedings. Assuming for the moment
that Alice had the right to participate in the Commission proceedings, the circuit
court would authorize the utility to seize Alice’s land even though Alice never had
the opportunity to participate in those proceedings, regardless of the Public Utility
Act’s constitutionality.
¶ 39 If defendants were deprived of property rights during the Commission
proceedings and if they did not participate in Adams County Property Owners &
Tenant Farmers v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2015 IL App (4th) 130907, then
these eminent domain proceedings represent their first opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act. The majority finds that the circuit court
had jurisdiction to take away defendants’ property but lacked jurisdiction to
consider defendants’ constitutional challenge to that taking. The majority’s opinion
would leave some defendants without any opportunity to assert their constitutional
rights.
¶ 40 B. Issue Preclusion
¶ 41 I find the majority’s approach especially problematic because we can reach the
same result without issuing an opinion that has the potential to be so broadly
applicable without being adequately explained. This case differs from the
hypothetical with Alice and Brian because these eminent domain proceedings were
not defendants’ first opportunity to assert their challenge to the Public Utilities Act.
They raised the same arguments in Adams County, and the appellate court rejected
those arguments. Id. ¶ 76.
- 13 ­
¶ 42 Issue preclusion bars a litigant from raising an argument that the litigant has
already raised in a prior case. Issue preclusion applies when there is (1) a final
judgment on the merits from a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of the
party to be bound by the prior litigation, and (3) an identical issue to the prior
litigation. Gumma v. White, 216 Ill. 2d 23, 38 (2005). The issue must have been
actually litigated and necessary for judgment. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197
Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2001).
¶ 43 After the Commission issued the certificate of public necessity to ATXI, a
group of landowners—named Edgar County Citizens Are Entitled to Due Process
(ECCDP)—participated in the appeal of that certificate to the Fourth District.
Adams County, 2015 IL App (4th) 130907, ¶ 69. Although the appellate court
discussed some procedural problems with ECCDP’s petition to intervene, the court
also found that the Commission had impliedly given ECCDP permission to
intervene, so ultimately it concluded “we find it appropriate to address the merits of
[ECCDP’s] appeal.” Id. ¶¶ 76, 78. This was a final adjudication on the merits.
¶ 44 ECCDP argued that the Commission had failed to notify them of the pending
proceedings regarding the routing of the Illinois Rivers Project. Specifically they
argued “that the lack of a clear notice requirement in section 8-406.1 of the Utilities
Act renders the statute unconstitutional.” Id. ¶ 69. The Adams County court rejected
this argument, finding that the Commission proceedings did not convey any
property rights, so no process was due to ECCDP. Id. ¶¶ 51, 69, 80. This argument
was identical to the argument that defendants raised before the circuit court here.
¶ 45 ECCDP’s due process rights argument was actually litigated. The appellate
court expressly considered the same arguments that defendants raise in this case. It
was also necessary for the judgment against ECCDP. The Adams County court
moved past the factual disagreement over whether notice was actually mailed
because it found that no notice was necessary. Id. ¶ 76. The majority opinion here
seems to acknowledge all of this when it comments that the Adams County court
“considered and rejected the very same due process challenge at issue here.” Supra
¶ 15.
¶ 46 The only remotely contestable component of issue preclusion here is the
“identity of the parties” prong. ATXI concedes that, although the majority of
defendants here participated in the Adams County decision, some of the defendants
- 14 ­
in this eminent domain proceeding were not named parties in Adams County.
Nevertheless, defendants here stipulated to be treated as parties to that earlier
litigation. The stipulation states that “the defendants—appearing under the title
‘Edgar County Citizens are Entitled to Due Process’—filed a motion to strike the
certificate proceedings” in Adams County. This stipulation indicates that
defendants here considered themselves to have at least an identity of interests with
the ECCDP in Adams County, which is all that is required to satisfy this component
of issue preclusion. Agolf, LLC v. Village of Arlington Heights, 409 Ill. App. 3d
211, 220 (2011).
¶ 47 All of the components of issue preclusion are satisfied in this case. Rather than
rely on this basis to resolve the appeal, the majority adopts a controversial and
unwarranted approach to the circuit court’s jurisdiction to conduct judicial review
of a statute of the General Assembly. It adopts this unwarranted approach with
insufficient discussion. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis, but for
the reasons stated I would also reverse the circuit court’s decision.
¶ 48 JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 49 I partially concur with the majority’s conclusion to reverse the circuit court’s
order, but I disagree with its reasoning, and in that respect, I join Part A of Justice
Garman’s special concurrence on the circuit court’s jurisdiction. I agree with
Justice Garman that the majority’s flawed jurisdictional analysis raises significant
threats to individual rights. Supra ¶ 38 (Garman, J., specially concurring). I
disagree, in part, with Part B of Justice Garman’s special concurrence and her
conclusion that all of the landowners are barred from challenging the
constitutionality of section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/8-406.1
(West 2016)), based on the appellate court rejecting the same arguments in Adams
County Property Owners & Tenant Farmers v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2015
IL App (4th) 130907, ¶ 76. I would hold that issue preclusion does not bar those
landowners who were not parties to Adams County from challenging the
constitutionality of section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act in the eminent
domain proceedings.
¶ 50 I agree with Justice Garman that the landowners’ due process rights argument
was actually litigated in Adams County. Unfortunately, this court denied the
- 15 ­
landowners’ petition for leave to appeal in that case. Justice Garman notes in her
special concurrence, “[t]he only remotely contestable component of issue
preclusion here is the ‘identity of the parties’ prong.” Supra ¶ 46. The special
concurrence acknowledges that “some of the defendants in this eminent domain
proceeding were not named parties in Adams County.” Supra ¶ 46. However,
Justice Garman concludes that the landowners who were not named in Adams
County “have at least an identity of interests with the ECCDP in Adams County,
which is all that is required to satisfy this component of issue preclusion,” based on
the landowners stipulating to be treated as parties to the Adams County litigation.
Supra ¶ 46. Nevertheless, I would hold that the requirements of due process
prohibit the application of res judicata and issue preclusion to bar a claim by the
landowners who were not parties in Adams County because the right sought to be
enforced is personal in nature.
¶ 51 In Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 794-95 (1996), the United States
Supreme Court considered whether an action challenging the validity of a tax was
barred by a judgment upholding the validity of the tax in a previous suit involving
different taxpayers. The Supreme Court held that application of res judicata was
inconsistent with principles of due process where the taxpayers in the former action
“did not sue on behalf of a class; their pleadings did not purport to assert any claim
against or on behalf of any nonparties; and the judgment they received did not
purport to bind any *** taxpayers who were nonparties.” Richards, 517 U.S. at
801. The Supreme Court specifically noted that the underlying right asserted by the
taxpayers was “personal in nature.” Richards, 517 U.S. at 802 n.6. Here, it is
undisputed that many of the landowners in this eminent domain action were not
parties in the Adams County appeal. Because the rights of the landowners who did
not participate in Adams County are “personal in nature,” I believe that applying the
doctrine of res judicata to them results in a denial of due process. Res judicata is an
equitable doctrine and “will not be applied where it would be fundamentally unfair
to do so.” Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2001). In my view it
would be fundamentally unfair and inequitable to apply res judicata in a manner
that results in the denial of due process for the landowners who did not participate
in Adams County.
- 16 ­
¶ 52 For these reasons, I believe the court should address the claim by the
landowners who were not parties in Adams County that section 8-606.1 of the
Public Utilities Act is unconstitutional both facially and as applied.
- 17 ­