Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Katherine Linton-Waltman ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Aug 09 2012, 9:02 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
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case. of the supreme court,
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
FRANCES BARROW
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
INDIANA BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1203-MI-237
)
KATHERINE LINTON-WALTMAN, )
)
Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Louis F. Rosenberg, Judge
Cause No. 49C01-1111-MI-44462
August 9, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) appeals the trial court’s order
denying BMV’s “Intervenor’s Motion For Relief From Judgment” in an action involving
the grant to Katherine Linton-Waltman (“Linton-Waltman”) of a restricted driver’s
license because of hardship (“a hardship license”).1
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court’s order can be reviewed under the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine.
FACTS
On September 26, 2011, the BMV suspended Linton-Waltman’s driving privileges
until December 28, 2011 for a chemical test failure. Previously, on July 13, 2006, the
BMV had suspended Linton-Waltman’s driving privileges for failure to appear at a
hearing pertaining to a seat belt violation. This suspension ended on September 25, 2006.
On December 16, 2011, Linton-Waltman filed a verified petition for issuance of a
hardship license for commercial and business purposes. On the same day, the trial court
granted the petition, ordering the BMV to “issue a [hardship license] to [Linton-
Waltman] . . . immediately upon receipt of this order.” (Tr. 15). The trial court also
ordered that Linton-Waltman’s “driving be limited to commercial or business purposes or
1
We note that no Appellee’s brief was filed.
2
other employment-related driving, to court as required by court order, and for any
rehabilitation programs.” Id.
On February 21, 2012, approximately two months after Linton-Waltman’s
suspension had ended, BMV filed a motion to intervene and an attached “Motion For
Relief From Judgment.” (App. 6-19). On February 24, 2012, the trial court issued an
order granting BMV’s motion to intervene. On the same day, the trial court issued its
“Order on Intervenor’s Motion For Relief From Judgment” denying BMV’s motion for
relief from judgment.
DECISION
In general, Indiana Code section 9-24-15-1 et seq. permits the issuance of a
hardship license when a hardship occurs after a driver’s license has been suspended.
Indiana Code section 9-24-15-1(a)(3), however, states that a person whose license has
been suspended cannot obtain a hardship license if the person has a prior suspension.
In its order denying BMV’s motion for relief from judgment, the trial court noted
that even though Indiana Code section 9-24-15-1(a)(3) states that a hardship license
cannot be issued to a person who has a prior suspension, Indiana Code section 9-24-15-3
states in part that a person’s petition for a hardship license must include information that
the petitioner has never been “suspended for a similar reason.” The court also noted that
this information requirement has been incorporated into Indiana Code section 9-24-15-
6.5, which states that the trial court “shall grant a petition for a [hardship license] filed
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under [Chapter 15]” if, among other things, “[t]he person filing the petition for a
[hardship license] shall include in the petition the information . . . required by sections 3
and 4 of this chapter.” The trial court further noted that “the only prior suspension of
Petitioner’s license was in 2006 for ‘failure to appear’ in Hendricks County, clearly not a
suspension ‘for a similar reason’ under I.C. 9-24-15-3.” (App. 24). The court then
reasoned that Indiana Code section 9-24-15-6.5, which incorporates Indiana Code section
9-24-15-3, is a more detailed section than Indiana Code section 9-24-15-1, and that the
detailed section mandating the grant of the hardship license applied because it could not
be reconciled with the more general section prohibiting the same.
BMV contends that the trial court misinterpreted the interplay among Indiana
Code sections 1, 3, and 6.5 in its order granting Linton-Waltman’s petition for a hardship
license and in its order denying BMV’s motion for relief from judgment. BMV
recognizes that Linton-Waltman’s suspension has already expired; therefore, the question
is moot as to this particular controversy. BMV argues, however, that the public interest
exception applies “because the issue is likely to recur, given the frequency of driver’s
license suspensions, and because granting a [hardship] license to a driver who has
violated the law involves public safety concerns.” BMV Br. at 4 n.1 (citing Silverman v.
Fifer, 837 N.E.2d 186, 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that licensing issues, though
moot, should be addressed because the issue is “liable to recur and involves issues related
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to public safety”). “In such cases, we may, at our discretion, make an exception to the
mootness doctrine and address the merits of the case.” Id.Our research discloses that Indiana Code section 9-24-15-3 has been amended, and
now reads in part that a person’s petition for a hardship license must include information
that the petitioner has never been “previously suspended.” This version of the statute
became effective on July 1, 2012. See P.L. 125-2012 § 217. While the issue raised is
related to public safety, the specific issue is not liable to recur because the change in the
statute’s language is significant. We will not address the merits of the moot issue of this
case.2
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
2
BMV also alleges that its motion for relief from judgment was erroneously denied on a second basis
pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-24-15-6.5. Our reading of the trial court’s order does not support
BMV’s allegation.
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