State of Iowa v. Jeffrey Dana Kurth , 813 N.W.2d 270 ( 2012 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0525
Filed May 11, 2012
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY DANA KURTH,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A.
Price, Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, arguing the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C.,
Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Parrott, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and David M.
Porter, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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MANSFIELD, Justice.
This case presents the question whether an officer is justified in
activating his emergency lights and blocking a driver into a parking
space under the “community caretaking function” exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment based solely upon his
knowledge that the vehicle has just struck an object in the roadway and
suffered minor damage not affecting the drivability of the car. We
conclude that under these circumstances, the community caretaking
exception is inapplicable, and the seizure was impermissible. For this
reason, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this
case.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History.
On November 28, 2010, at about 2:00 a.m., Officer Adam Jones
and Officer Trent Weiler of the Clive Police Department had parked their
vehicles and were talking in the lot of a grocery store near 8700 Hickman
Road in Clive. Officer Jones was working a special traffic enforcement
detail funded by the Governor’s Traffic Safety Bureau. Officer Jones
heard a loud crash, which sounded like metal-on-metal contact, coming
from nearby on Hickman Road. He testified at the suppression hearing
that when he looked over toward the direction of the sound he saw an
Infiniti sedan approximately 50 yards away, traveling east, and
“enveloped in a cloud of dust or smoke.” The defendant, Jeremy Kurth,
was driving the vehicle.
Believing that the vehicle might have struck a road sign, Officer
Jones proceeded after the vehicle and observed a road sign down in the
left eastbound lane of Hickman Road. He then pulled behind the vehicle,
which was stopped at a red light in the left-turn lane and waiting to turn
north onto 86th Street. Officer Jones testified that at this time he was
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still unsure whether the vehicle had knocked down the sign or if the sign
had already been down in the roadway when the vehicle struck it.
However, he also stated that Kurth’s vehicle could not have knocked the
sign down from the median because his car was at all times in its own
lane. Officer Jones further testified that at this time, traffic was light,
and no other cars were in the vicinity. The vehicle turned left onto 86th
Street, circled around a strip mall, and entered the parking lot of a
restaurant. While Officer Jones followed the vehicle, the following
conversation took place between him and Officer Weiler over their radios:
Officer 73 (Jones): Did he just hit a sign or something?
Officer 78 (Weiler): Don’t know, he was just in the
lane.
Officer 78 (Weiler): Yeah, he did.
Officer 73 (Jones): Well, there’s a sign down here, I
don’t know if he knocked it down, but he hit it.
Officer 78 (Weiler): I don’t think he hit it, I think it was
already there, in the roadway.
Officer 73 (Jones): 78?
Dispatch: Go 73.
Officer 73 (Jones): I’m still behind that guy, what do
you think?
Officer 78 (Weiler): I would say it’s your call depending
on how he’s driving. He was driving down Hickman, and it
was like he was just in his lane, then he just hit the sign
laying there.
Officer 73 (Jones): Copy. Yeah, he’s going into
Perkin’s. Westcom copy a plate traffic stop.
Dispatch: Go ahead.
Officer 73 (Jones): [Reading the license plate number
aloud], he has damage to his front end from hitting the
sign—I don’t know if he’s aware of it.
Dispatch: 10–4.
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Kurth pulled into a parking space at the restaurant and lawfully
parked the vehicle of his own volition; Officer Jones did not attempt to
stop the vehicle. Officer Jones testified that he never observed Kurth
commit any traffic violations and that he had no reason to suspect that
any occupant of the vehicle (including its female passenger) was engaged
in any type of criminal activity. Officer Jones confirmed that the vehicle
was drivable at all times.
Once the vehicle was parked, Officer Jones pulled around Kurth
and saw that the vehicle had sustained damage to the front fascia which
he characterized as not significant. At that point he activated his
emergency lights and blocked in Kurth’s vehicle. Officer Jones testified
that from this time forward the vehicle and its occupants were not free to
go. Officer Jones approached Kurth and proceeded to have a
conversation with him about the damage to the front of his vehicle.
According to Officer Jones, when he showed Kurth the damage, Kurth
became very upset and said he did not know how the damage had
occurred.
During this conversation, Officer Jones detected an odor of an
alcoholic beverage, Kurth’s speech was slurred, and his eyes were glossy
and bloodshot. Kurth admitted that he was driving from a bar where he
had consumed alcohol. Kurth agreed to participate in standardized field
sobriety testing. Three field sobriety tests indicated Kurth was
intoxicated, as did a preliminary breath test. Officer Jones placed Kurth
under arrest. A subsequent Datamaster breath test showed a blood
alcohol content of .222%, nearly three times the legal limit.
On January 5, 2011, the State filed a trial information charging
Kurth with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol
(OWI), a serious misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2
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(2011). Kurth filed a timely motion to suppress asserting the stop of his
vehicle had been unlawful. The State resisted the motion to suppress on
the grounds that the warrantless seizure of Kurth’s vehicle was justified
under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.
Following a hearing at which Officer Jones testified and the recording of
his conversation with Officer Weiler was played, the district court denied
Kurth’s motion to suppress. The matter proceeded to trial on the
minutes of testimony the same day, and the district court found Kurth
guilty of OWI. Kurth was sentenced to one year in jail with all but two
days suspended, probation, and a fine. Kurth now appeals, urging the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
II. Standard of Review.
Kurth argues the stop of his vehicle violated his constitutional
rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. “In
considering alleged violations of constitutional rights, our standard of
review is de novo.” State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 2011)
(citing State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 873 (Iowa 2010)). “ ‘[W]e make
an independent evaluation [based on] the totality of the circumstances as
shown by the entire record.’ ” Id. at 522–23 (quoting State v. Brooks, 760
N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2009)). “ ‘Each case must be evaluated in light of
its unique circumstances.’ ” Id. at 523.
III. Analysis.
Kurth challenges the warrantless stop of his vehicle. He maintains
there was no reason to believe he had violated any traffic regulation or
any other law at the time of the stop and, accordingly, his constitutional
rights were violated. The State responds that the stop of Kurth’s vehicle
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was justified under the community caretaking exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
The community caretaking exception can be traced to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 714–15 (1973). That case
involved a warrantless search of the trunk of a damaged car that had
been towed from the scene of an accident to a private facility. Cady, 413
U.S. at 442–43, 93 S. Ct. at 2528–29, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 715. Local
Wisconsin law enforcement believed that the intoxicated and comatose
driver, a Chicago police officer, was required to carry his service revolver
at all times, and they had not found the revolver on his person. Id. at
436–37, 93 S. Ct. at 2525–26, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 711–12. Therefore,
following a standard procedure, they searched the trunk of the
impounded vehicle to protect the public from the possibility that the
revolver would fall into someone else’s hands. Id. at 443, 93 S. Ct. at
2529, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 716. During that search, local police did not find
the revolver, but obtained other evidence that was later used to convict
the driver of first-degree murder. Id. at 434, 437, 93 S. Ct. at 2525,
2526, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 710, 712.
The Supreme Court held the warrantless search in Cady was
lawful as a “caretaking” search based upon “concern for the safety of the
general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a
revolver from the trunk of a vehicle.” Id. at 447, 93 S. Ct. at 2531, 37
L. Ed. 2d at 718. The Court explained that local police officers frequently
“engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as
community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute.” Id. at 441, 93 S. Ct. at 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 714–15.
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The Court concluded that searches made in the performance of
community caretaking functions do not require warrants and are subject
to “only the general standard of ‘unreasonableness’ as a guide in
determining” constitutionality. Id. at 448, 93 S. Ct. at 2531, 37 L. Ed. 2d
at 718. The Court also stated that “[t]he fact that the protection of the
public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’
means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.” Id. at 447,
93 S. Ct. at 2531, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 718 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970)).
Since Cady was decided nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court
has continued to address warrantless seizures and searches in
numerous contexts but has said relatively little to clarify the scope of the
community caretaking exception. As one commentator has observed,
“The core of the community-caretaking doctrine . . . —where police act to
protect or assist the public—has been left with little doctrinal guidance
from the Supreme Court other than the vague command of
reasonableness.” Michael R. Dimino, Police Paternalism: Community
Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1485, 1490 (2009); see also
Tinius v. Carroll Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 (N.D.
Iowa 2004) (observing that “[i]n community caretaking cases, as
elsewhere, reasonableness has a fluid quality”). Elaboration of the
doctrine has been left to other courts, especially state courts. This latter
development is not surprising in light of the fact that community
caretaking is generally the role of local police rather than federal officers.
See Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S. Ct. at 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 714.
In a number of decisions, our court has also recognized the
community caretaking function as a valid exception to the Fourth
8
Amendment’s warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 609 N.W.2d
502, 503–04 (Iowa 2000) (holding that a park ranger properly exercised a
public safety function when he stopped the defendant’s vehicle to warn
him that his speed posed a danger to park campers even in the absence
of a criminal violation); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 139–40, 143
(Iowa 1996) (holding that the warrantless entry of an officer into a home
to investigate a missing person’s report was justified under the “totality
of the circumstances” based on the related emergency aid exception
where the defendant gave conflicting stories about the disappearance of
his live-in girlfriend and had a history of domestic abuse); State v.
Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 693–94 (Iowa 1993) (holding that a trooper had
a legitimate public safety responsibility to stop defendant to inform him
of burned-out taillight even though it was not a traffic violation at the
time). As we said recently in State v. Wilkes:
In the event evidence was obtained pursuant to a
seizure prior to reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense
may have been committed, the police may have acted
properly if the seizure amounted to a “community caretaking
activity.” Such seizures have been held not to violate the
Fourth Amendment if the interest in community welfare
outweighs any invasion of privacy that accompanies the
seizure. If, however, the conduct of Wood and the reserve
officer amounted to a seizure and their actions do not
amount to a valid community welfare check, a violation of
the Fourth Amendment is present and the evidence obtained
pursuant to the unlawful conduct must be suppressed.
756 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 2008) (citations omitted).
Our most extensive discussion of the community caretaking
exception appears in State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 2003).
There we upheld a stop under that exception, finding that an officer’s
decision to pull over the defendant’s truck in the interest of public safety
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and emergency aid was justified. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543–44. The
officer in that instance had received a report informing him that a man
had taken “some pills” either before going to sleep or after
waking up. When he awoke he was agitated and was
“physically aggressive” to a woman in her apartment. The
man was confused, stating that he did not know where he
was and that he wanted the police to take him home. The
man abruptly left in a Ford flatbed truck.
Id. at 543. The officer also knew that the man might have been driving
the truck. Id. Under these circumstances, we concluded that the
officer’s action “was model police conduct, deserving of commendation,
and not condemnation.” Id. (quoting Carlson, 548 N.W.2d at 143). We
also noted “that the community caretaking exception encompasses three
separate doctrines: (1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the automobile
impoundment/inventory doctrine, and (3) the ‘public servant’ exception
noted in Cady.” Id. at 541.
Crawford was decided under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 543.
In State v. Tague, on the other hand, we found a violation of article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution where a 2 a.m. traffic stop was based
only on an “isolated incident of [the driver] briefly crossing an edge line of
a divided roadway.” 676 N.W.2d 197, 205–06 (Iowa 2004). 1 The State
argued that the stop was justified because of reasonable suspicion the
driver was intoxicated or, alternatively, as a community caretaking effort
to assist a potentially fatigued driver. Id. at 204. We acknowledged that
the “State charges local police officers with duties that go beyond
investigating and enforcing the criminal laws.” Id. (citing Cady, 413 U.S.
at 441, 93 S. Ct. at 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 714–15). However, we
1Although we based our decision in Tague on the Iowa Constitution, we cited
considerable precedent under the United States Constitution. We also did not explain
how, if at all, the analysis would have differed under the Fourth Amendment. Tague,
676 N.W.2d at 204–05.
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concluded that under the totality of the circumstances the warrantless
stop of the driver could not be justified by the community caretaking
function. Id. at 205–06. We noted that many circumstances could lead
to a vehicle momentarily crossing the center line other than intoxication
or fatigue. Id. at 205.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also
applied the community caretaking exception in cases involving vehicle
stops. In Winters v. Adams, a civil claim was brought alleging
unreasonable seizure and excessive use of force in violation of Fourth
Amendment rights. 254 F.3d 758, 760 (8th Cir. 2001). The officers
there had responded to a report that an unknown person “was possibly
intoxicated and was observed exiting and reentering a vehicle that was
parked on a dead-end street” in a residential area. Id. When the officers
arrived to investigate, they observed Winters “seated behind the wheel of
a car parked in the location matching the described location of the
vehicle.” Id. As they approached the vehicle, Winters “raised the car
window, locked the door and stated that he wished to be left alone.” Id.
Winters appeared “agitated” and “extremely hyper.” Id. at 761.
Thereafter, he “began moving ‘wildly’ about the car” and yelled at the
officers. Id.
Although the officers had not observed any criminal activity, they
“began to suspect that [Winters had] ‘ingested or used some type of
illegal drug and maybe used too much and was overdosing.’ ” Id.
Eventually, the officers broke a window to gain access to the vehicle and,
after a struggle, took Winters into custody. Id. at 761–62. The Eighth
Circuit held that the officers’ conduct in forcibly seizing Winters was
justifiable because the “ ‘officers [we]re not only permitted, but expected,
to exercise what the Supreme Court has termed “community caretaking
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functions.” ’ ” Id. at 763 (citations omitted). The court explained that the
officers “would have been derelict in their duties had they not detained”
Winters. Id. at 764 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In reaching its conclusion in Winters, the Eighth Circuit relied on
the reasoning set forth in United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560
(10th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th
Cir. 1992). In King, an officer responded to the scene of a traffic accident
to find a driver in the resulting traffic jam honking incessantly. 990 F.2d
at 1555. The Tenth Circuit held that the officer was “clearly exercising
her ‘community caretaking function’ when she approached Defendants’
car during the course of her investigation” because the driver’s conduct
“created [a] specific, articulable basis for [the officer] to believe that he
might cause a second accident.” Id. at 1560–61.
The King court elaborated:
In the course of exercising [the community caretaking,]
noninvestigatory function, a police officer may have occasion
to seize a person, as the Supreme Court has defined the
term for Fourth Amendment purposes, in order to ensure the
safety of the public and/or the individual, regardless of any
suspected criminal activity.
Id. at 1560. However, the court went on to note that there are limits to
an officer’s authority under the community caretaking function. Id. “[A]
person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not eviscerated simply because a
police officer may be acting in a noninvestigatory capacity . . . .” Id.
Whether the seizure of a person by a police officer acting in
his or her noninvestigatory capacity is reasonable depends
on whether it is based on specific articulable facts and
requires a reviewing court to balance the governmental
interest in the police officer’s exercise of his or her
“community caretaking function” and the individual’s
interest in being free from arbitrary government interference.
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Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct.
2574, 2578, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 614–15 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879–80, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905–06 (1968)).
In Rideau, the Fifth Circuit upheld the stop of a pedestrian, who
was possibly drunk, wearing dark clothing, and stumbling in the road at
night in a high-crime area, on the grounds he presented a potential
hazard to himself and others. 969 F.2d at 1573. In concluding that the
officers were justified in detaining the individual, the Fifth Circuit relied
on the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard § 1–2.2, at 31–32
(2d ed. 1980), which states that “officers must ‘aid individuals who are in
danger of physical harm,’ ‘assist those who cannot care for themselves,’
and ‘provide other services on an emergency basis.’ ” U.S. v. Rideau, 949
F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by Rideau, 969
F.2d at 1575.
In United States v. Collins, the Eighth Circuit again found that
police conduct to protect the community did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 321 F.3d 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2003). There, two police
officers responding to a “shots fired” call came upon a parked car in the
area where the shots had been heard. Id. at 693. The officers observed
two men slumped over in the front seat and leaned into the vehicle to
determine whether it “was a crime scene or if [anyone] had been shot.”
Id. At that point, one officer observed a firearm and arrested the
suspect. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that under the circumstances, “it
was entirely reasonable for [an officer] to lean into the vehicle to confirm
that the men were not injured.” Id. at 695. The court explained that a
failure by the officers to find out whether one of the men was in need of
immediate aid “would have been irresponsible and, quite possibly, a
basis for civil liability had the individuals in fact been injured.” Id.
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While the court in Collins did not explicitly state that it was relying
on the community caretaking function exception, the court’s reasoning
was based on a recognition that one of a police officer’s responsibilities is
“to respond to emergency situations.” Id. at 694–95. Furthermore, the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion acknowledged the community caretaking
function exception and cited applicable precedents under it. Id. (citing
United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled
by Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403–04, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947–
48, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, 657–58 (2006); United States v. Selberg, 630 F.2d
1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1980)).
In another Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Smith, an officer’s
conduct was again found not to violate the Fourth Amendment. 162
F.3d 1226, 1226–27 (8th Cir. 1998). There, the officer had been
dispatched to the scene of a single car accident around midnight. Id. at
1226. When the officer arrived, the defendant “was standing beside his
car, which was partially in a ditch and partially in the roadway.” Id.
While the defendant was retrieving the papers needed by the officer to
prepare an accident report, the officer observed a gun pouch on the floor
of the car. Id. The officer searched the car and seized the gun; the
defendant was then charged with being a “felon in possession of a
firearm.” Id. The court cited King and Cady in concluding that the
“officer lawfully approached [the defendant’s] vehicle to investigate the
traffic accident in the officer’s community caretaking capacity.” Id.
(citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S. Ct. at 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 715;
King, 990 F.2d at 1560–61).
Our court has employed a three-step analysis in evaluating
community caretaking cases:
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(1) was there a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?; (2) if so, was the police conduct bona fide
community caretaker activity?; and (3) if so, did the public
need and interest outweigh the intrusion upon the privacy of
the citizen?
Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543 (citing State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411,
414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).
Every community caretaking case must be assessed according to
its own unique set of facts and circumstances because reasonableness is
not a term that can be usefully refined “in order to evolve some detailed
formula for judging cases.” Cady, 413 U.S. at 448, 93 S. Ct. at 2531, 37
L. Ed. 2d at 718; accord United States v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1989) (stating that “what is reasonable in one type of situation may not
be reasonable in [an]other”). “To establish ‘reasonableness,’ the state has
the burden of ‘showing specific and articulable facts that indicate their
actions were proper.’ ” Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 542 (quoting Carlson,
548 N.W.2d at 142). We have previously stated that we apply an
objective standard considering “the circumstances confronting the police
officer.” Id.; see also Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204; Carlson, 548 N.W.2d at
142; Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d at 693.
We now turn to the three-part analysis.
A. Seizure. “Implicit in any community caretaking case is the fact
that there has been a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Otherwise there would be no need to apply a community
caretaking exception.” Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543. Here, once Kurth
parked his vehicle, Officer Jones pulled in behind, blocked him in, and
activated his emergency lights. Officer Jones testified that at this time
the driver was not free to go. The State does not dispute that there was a
seizure.
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B. Bona Fide Community Caretaking Activity. Next we turn to
the question whether Officer Jones’s conduct constituted bona fide
community caretaking activity. As noted, we have previously recognized
three categories of such conduct: “(1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the
automobile impoundment/inventory doctrine, and (3) the ‘public servant’
exception noted in Cady.” Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 541.
This case did not involve an automobile impoundment or
inventory. Therefore, only the emergency aid or the public servant
doctrine could conceivably apply. “The two doctrines . . . are closely
related.” Id. As we noted in Crawford, assisting a motorist with a flat
tire might be an example of the public servant doctrine, whereas
“providing first aid to a person slumped over the steering wheel with a
bleeding” head gash would fall under the emergency aid doctrine. Id. at
541–42 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Jones testified that he heard a
loud crash suggesting metal-on-metal contact and saw the vehicle driven
by Kurth “enveloped in a cloud of dust or smoke.” Believing that the
vehicle might have struck a road sign, Officer Jones proceeded after the
vehicle and noticed that a road sign was down in the left eastbound lane
of Hickman Road. However, by the time Officer Jones decided to stop the
vehicle, he and his fellow officer had concluded that the sign had been in
the road before the driver struck it. Furthermore, Officer Jones testified
that he never observed Kurth commit any traffic violations and that he
had no reason to suspect any type of criminal activity. Additionally, the
vehicle was completely drivable the entire time, and Officer Jones
described the damage to the front end of the vehicle as not significant.
By the time Officer Jones activated his emergency lights and blocked in
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Kurth’s car, Kurth had already driven the vehicle into the restaurant
parking lot without incident and lawfully parked it in a parking space.
Upon our review, we find that Officer Jones’s decision to activate
his emergency lights and block in Kurth’s parked vehicle exceeded the
scope of bona fide community caretaking activity. We have previously
emphasized that actions under that exception “ ‘must be limited to the
justification thereof, and the officer may not do more than is reasonably
necessary to determine whether a person is in need of assistance, and to
provide that assistance.’ ” Id. at 542–43 (quoting Carlson, 548 N.W.2d at
142).
While Officer Jones might have been justified in stopping Kurth’s
moving vehicle immediately after the incident to advise him that he had
struck a road sign and needed to inspect his car for damage, that is not
what happened here. See Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d at 694 (holding that an
officer was justified in stopping a vehicle under the community
caretaking exception to advise the driver that his taillight was out); see
also State v. Harrison, 533 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Ariz. 1975) (holding a state
patrol officer could properly stop a vehicle in the exercise of his public
safety duties when the vehicle was weaving somewhat on the highway
and the left rear tire was “bouncing”); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224
(Me. 1989) (upholding a stop of a moving motor vehicle to advise the
driver “to fix the headlights before getting stranded in the dark” where
the vehicle approached the officer with its headlights blinking on and off,
and the officer “reasonably suspected that [the defendant] may have been
in trouble”).
Rather, after Kurth had already parked his drivable vehicle, and
after Officer Jones had ascertained that the damage was not significant,
Officer Jones activated his emergency lights and blocked him in. We
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believe the detention of Kurth, his passenger, and his vehicle at that
point exceeded the scope of reasonably necessary community caretaking
activity. Even if the officer wanted to tell Kurth to examine his parked
vehicle for damage, it was not necessary to block in the vehicle to do so.
All he needed to do was to park next to him and approach him. Compare
United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the community caretaking exception did not justify an officer’s
decision to park his squad car directly behind a legally parked vehicle
and activate his spotlights when that car was in the parking lot of a
housing complex, with the engine running, no apparent driver, and a
barely-visible individual slumped down in the passenger seat, and
further noting that “any purported community-caretaking function in
this instance could have been accomplished through a consensual
encounter rather than an investigative stop”), with Crawford, 659 N.W.2d
at 543 (upholding a stop after noting that the officer “did no more than
was reasonably necessary”). 2
The absence of sufficient facts to support the detention of Kurth
and his vehicle is further demonstrated by Officer Weiler’s recorded
advice to Officer Jones. Officer Weiler told Officer Jones he should make
the call on whether to initiate a traffic stop depending on how Kurth was
driving: “[I]t’s your call depending on how he’s driving.” But Kurth was
driving appropriately. It thus appears that Officer Weiler did not perceive
any danger to public safety. Additionally, according to the recording,
2The Supreme Court said in Cady, “The fact that the protection of the public
might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by
itself, render the search unreasonable.” 413 U.S. at 447, 93 S. Ct. at 2531, 37 L. Ed.
2d at 718. However, this is not the same as saying that less intrusive alternatives are
irrelevant. In Cady, the only alternative that was mentioned would have required “the
posting of a police guard during the night”—i.e., something that was costly and
impractical. Id. Here the State does not dispute that Officer Jones could have just as
effectively approached Kurth’s vehicle without seizing it.
18
Officer Jones called in the license plate on Kurth’s vehicle before making
the stop. That action seems inconsistent with a public safety purpose
but is certainly consistent with an investigative purpose.
The State argues that the officers’ subjective intent was irrelevant,
i.e., that it matters not whether their motive for stopping Kurth was to
check on whether he had been drinking rather than to see if he needed
their help. However, these officers’ perceptions as to the possible need
for a stop as reflected in their radio communications are certainly
evidence of what a reasonable officer would have thought was
necessary. 3
3We have previously maintained that the availability of the community
caretaking exception “requires an objective analysis of the circumstances confronting
the police officer.” Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 542; see also Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204
(referring to “an objective standard”); Carlson, 548 N.W.2d at 141–42 (stating that “the
subjective part of the analysis should now be abandoned when applying the emergency-
aid doctrine” and that reasonableness should be tested “only on the basis of the
objective circumstances”). At first glance, the term “bona fide” could be read as
implying that law enforcement must have made the stop or seizure for actual
community caretaking purposes. Indeed, the Wisconsin case from which we borrowed
that term indicates that a stop will not be sustained under the community caretaking
exception if the alleged community caretaking function was a “subterfuge.” Anderson,
417 N.W.2d at 414. In Cady, the Supreme Court apparently deemed it significant that
protection of the community was the actual motive for the police officer’s actions. 413
U.S. at 443, 93 S. Ct. at 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 716 (noting “the findings with respect to
Officer Weiss’ specific motivation and the fact that the procedure he followed was
‘standard’ ”). As one commentator has pointed out, there is some logic to applying a
purely objective test when the issue is whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion
exists to believe a crime has been committed, but not when the community caretaking
exception is involved. Mary Elisabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaking Doctrine:
Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 325, 359–60 (1999). In
the former instance, the probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) itself is the legal
justification for the officer’s actions, so the subjective motivation of the officer is
irrelevant. Id. However, in the latter example, it is the officer’s activity (i.e., his or her
engagement in community caretaking) that justifies the actions, so it may be
appropriate to require both objective reasonableness and subjective good faith. Id. at
365. One can also argue that a subjective good faith component is needed to keep the
community caretaking exception within its own confines and prevent it from becoming a
way to expand other types of warrantless searches and seizures. After all, the Supreme
Court suggested in Cady that legitimate community caretaking activity should be
“totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute.” 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S. Ct. at 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at
715. However, subsequent Supreme Court precedent has clarified that the
19
In sum, even based upon a purely objective appraisal of the
evidence, we cannot sustain Officer Jones’s seizure of Kurth after Kurth
parked his car as “bona fide community caretaking activity” within the
meaning of our precedents.
C. Balancing. Because we have concluded that the detention of
Kurth and his vehicle does not qualify as community caretaking activity,
we are not required to reach the third prong of this analysis, that is, to
consider whether “the public need and interest outweigh the intrusion
upon the privacy of the citizen.” Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543.
Nonetheless, we believe some discussion of this element would be
appropriate.
We agree with the State that the intrusion upon Kurth’s privacy
was somewhat diminished because he was not being pulled over; his
vehicle was already at a standstill. Nonetheless, the fundamental point
remains that it was a seizure. And for reasons already discussed, the
State’s public safety concern based on the damage to Kurth’s vehicle
seems marginal at best. The car was drivable; Officer Jones had
inspected the front of the car and determined the damage was “not
significant”; and Kurth, having parked at a restaurant, was in a position
to address that damage. Assuming that Kurth needed a friendly
____________________________
constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop or an emergency aid entry does not
depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. See, e.g., Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–05, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, 658–59
(2006) (noting, however, that an inquiry into programmatic purpose is sometimes
appropriate); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135
L. Ed. 2d 89, 98 (1996); cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, __ U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2623,
177 L. Ed. 2d 216, 220 (2010) (finding a warrantless search of a public employee’s
pager to be reasonable because it was “motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose”
and “was not excessive in scope”). In light of the United States Supreme Court’s
precedents, and our own, we reiterate that the relevant test for determining whether the
community caretaking exception applies is an objective one based on the information
available at the time of the stop and does not depend upon the subjective motivations of
the individual officers involved.
20
reminder to take a look at the front end of his vehicle, this could have
been provided without activating the patrol car’s emergency lights and
blocking him in. A balancing of public interest and privacy
considerations does not favor the State. 4
We acknowledge some similarities between the present case and
People v. Laake, 809 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), where a driving-
under-the-influence arrest and subsequent conviction were upheld.
There, a sheriff’s deputy, who had received a report of a possible
intoxicated driver, came upon a vehicle parked on the side of the road
around 3 a.m. with its brake lights on. Laake, 809 N.E.2d at 770–71.
The deputy pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his patrol car’s
overhead emergency lights, later testifying that his purpose in stopping
behind the vehicle was to check on the welfare of its driver and that the
lights were activated “as a precaution to alert other motorists of his
squad car” in an area that was not well lighted. Id. at 771. It turned out
that the motorist had a flat tire and was intoxicated, although neither
fact was previously known to the deputy. Id. Also, the court
acknowledged that once the emergency lights were activated, “a
reasonable person in [the defendant’s position] would have felt compelled
to stay put.” Id. at 772. Nonetheless, after accepting the trial judge’s
finding that the deputy’s purpose was to check on the driver’s welfare
and not to conduct an investigation, the appellate court found the
4The United States Supreme Court has cautioned in a somewhat different
context that “the balancing of interests must be conducted with an eye to the generality
of cases.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1303, 143 L. Ed.
2d 408, 418 (1999). But even viewed from a broader perspective, this case involves a
seizure of the driver of a parked car based on the fact that the vehicle had sustained
limited property damage with no indications of improper (or even unusual) driving. The
State cites no example to us of a seizure in comparable circumstances being upheld
under the community caretaking exception.
21
community caretaking exception applicable and sustained what it viewed
as a “technical detention.” Id. at 773.
We think Laake is distinguishable, although the differences are not
great. Here, Kurth was not on the shoulder of the road, but in the safer
territory of a parking lot of an open restaurant. Also, here the officer
could not and did not argue that he activated his emergency lights for his
own protection; this was an actual seizure, not merely a “technical” one.
While the officer here had specific knowledge that Kurth had hit a sign
that had fallen into the road, he also had specific knowledge that the
damage was “not significant” and that the car remained drivable. Cf.
State v. Montgomery, Nos. A–0705–06T4, A–1926–06T4, 2009 WL
2365336, *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. August 3, 2009) (holding that an
officer who had received a report about a disabled van and then stopped
that van when he saw it start moving could not rely on the community
caretaking exception, despite his claim that “it is not uncommon for a
vehicle to break down again after it has malfunctioned”); State v.
DeArman, 774 P.2d 1247, 1249–50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting
community caretaking grounds for a stop where the vehicle initially
stopped for 45–60 seconds at a stop sign but then moved forward and
further noting that the officer “himself testified that he realized the
vehicle was not disabled but proceeded with the stop because he had
become ‘suspicious’ ”).
Finally, because we have concluded that Officer Jones’s conduct
violated Kurth’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, it is unnecessary for us to reach Kurth’s arguments under
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
22
IV. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the denial of Kurth’s motion to
suppress as well his conviction and sentence and remand for further
proceedings.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED.
All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially.
23
#11–0525, State v. Kurth
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
The result in this case is based solely on the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. It is not based upon article I, section 8 of
the Iowa Constitution. The sole reliance on federal law is not
unreasonable because, as is demonstrated by the majority opinion, there
is a large body of federal law that provides a clear path to deciding this
case. When a party raises both federal and state constitutional issues,
we have held that this court has the discretion to proceed first with
either the federal or state issue. See State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 772
(Iowa 2011); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010).
I note, however, the community caretaking exception embraced by
a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), is an amorphous
doctrine. When the term “reasonable” is coupled with a balancing test to
determine the scope of the exception, there is little basis for principled
decision making and a substantial risk that the exception may engulf
search and seizure law. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370,
105 S. Ct. 733, 757–58, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 753 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court has an obligation to provide a
framework to resolve cases beyond conclusory recitation of the results of
a balancing test); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83, 70 S. Ct.
430, 443, 94 L. Ed. 653, 669 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is no
criterion of reason to say that the district court must find [a search]
reasonable.”), overruled on other grounds by Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 768, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2042–43, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 696–97
(1969).
24
It has been suggested that, in light of the risk of abuse inherent in
the community caretaking exception, the exclusionary rule should apply
to evidence seized that is unrelated to the community caretaking purpose
of the stop. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community
Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1485, 1557–58 (2009) (citing 5
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 10.1(c), at 20 n.67 (4th ed. 2004)). At least one court in
Utah has adopted a slightly different approach, namely, that in
nonemergency community caretaking searches, the exclusionary rule
would apply. Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), aff’d 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). We are, however, not required
today to decide any questions that may be posed regarding the existence
of or scope of any community caretaking exception under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. We decide only the federal
constitutional question under the Fourth Amendment.
Nothing in the majority opinion should be misconstrued to suggest
that we have affirmatively adopted the federal framework as the proper
search and seizure framework under the Iowa Constitution in all cases.
In State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 205–06 (2004), this court, as
correctly noted by the majority, cited Fourth Amendment cases in
resolving a case involving “community caretaking” under the Iowa
Constitution, article I, section 8. The parties in Tague, however, did not
suggest that the Iowa constitutional provision required a standard
different than the federal approach. Indeed, the parties did not cite the
Iowa Constitution. When the parties do not advocate a different
standard under the Iowa Constitution, we ordinarily adopt the federal
standard, but reserve the right to apply it in a different manner, or “with
25
teeth.” See State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 649–50 (Iowa 2012) (citing
with approval State v. Breugger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 880, 883 (Iowa 2009));
Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 771–72; Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675
N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Iowa 2004). Of course, when the parties suggest that we
depart from the federal approach to search and seizure issues under the
Iowa Constitution, we are free to do so. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 291
(rejecting under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution the approach
of Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d
250 (2006), which authorized suspicionless searches of homes of
parolees under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277,
292 (Iowa 2000) (rejecting under article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution the holding of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.
Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), which recognized a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 & n.2
(Iowa 2001). Indeed, we “jealously” guard our right to take an
independent approach under the provisions of the Iowa Constitution.
Zaber v. City of Dubuque, 789 N.W.2d 634, 654 (Iowa 2010); State v.
Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2006).
Under the circumstances of Tague, where the parties did not
advocate an independent standard, we cited cases using the federal
standard under our state constitution not to make a deliberate choice
between Fourth Amendment and other potential state constitutional
approaches but because of the limited advocacy of the parties. See In re
Det. of Hennings, 744 N.W.2d 333, 338–39 (Iowa 2008) (declining to
consider substantive independent state standards when parties did not
suggest how state standard should be different from federal model).
Whether we would develop different doctrine under the Iowa Constitution
26
for the community caretaking exception when presented with a
persuasive argument is an open question that has not been addressed by
the court.