State of Iowa v. Dashaun Avery Redmond ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1505
Filed August 30, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DASHAUN AVERY REDMOND,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Michelle M. Wagner, District Associate Judge.
Dashaun Redmond appeals his conviction for carrying weapons.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Dashaun Redmond appeals his conviction for one count of carrying
weapons. He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the
search of his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution, as well as his rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
We determine the search was valid as a Terry pat-down and do not address other
arguments urged by either Redmond or the State.1 We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Officer Woodward, senior detective of the Waterloo Violent Crime
Apprehension Team, began his shift on November 7, 2020, armed with the
knowledge that two “reports of shots fired” had been received by local law
enforcement. The most recent report was received two days prior, the first report
about a week before. Both incidents involved a black male driving an early 2000s
tan Chevy Impala. During his shift that night, Officer Woodward observed a tan
2003 Chevy Impala with a defective license plate light pull into a parking lot of a
liquor store known as a site for homicides, weapons violations, drug use, and drug
sales. This location was about one mile from one of the previous shooting reports.
The vehicle parked, and the driver appeared to be watching the officer. The driver
of the vehicle then exited back onto the street without entering the store. Officer
Woodward observed that the driver of the vehicle, a black male later identified as
Dashaun Redmond, appeared to be avoiding him.
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
3
Officer Woodward followed the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop based on
the defective license plate light. When he approached the vehicle, he saw an open
bottle of tequila in the front passenger seat and smelled the odor of marijuana.
The officer recognized the driver as he had previous encounters with Redmond,
knew him to have gang affiliations, and also had knowledge that Redmond
previously was in vehicles where drugs and weapons were recovered.2 Redmond
immediately lit a cigarette, which the officer believed was an attempt to cover the
smell of the marijuana. Officer Woodward testified that Redmond appeared
nervous. Redmond’s hands were shaking when he looked for his license and
insurance, and he stammered when answering questions. Redmond denied
avoiding the officer.
When Officer Woodward asked Redmond to step out of the vehicle to show
him the equipment defect, Redmond initially refused. He later exited at Officer
Woodward’s insistence and assurance that he would not receive a ticket for the
defective license plate light. Officer Woodward had Redmond place his hands on
the roof of the vehicle and conducted an “officer safety pat down.” During this pat
down, Officer Woodward discovered a Glock 43, a smaller handgun, which had
been reported as stolen.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Woodward testified that his basis for the
pat down was:
[A]ll the prior knowledge that I know of him and people he associates
with, his ties to known gangs known for several weapons violations
and guns, this vehicle and the driver matched the description to a T
2 Officer Woodward testified that in his work with the team in the last six years, 400
firearms have been seized in Waterloo, and that they primarily deal with the “local
hybrid gang guys here in the city of Waterloo.”
4
in reference to two shootings that happened two days prior and about
a week, week and a half before. Also his nervousness to signs. He
never was nervous before. I’ve gotten him out numerous times
obviously to search his vehicle and search him. He never
hesitated. . . . At that point I believed that there was much more than
just a simple marijuana possession or a liquor bottle. I believe that
he was armed at that time due to not wanting to exit the vehicle.
Redmond was arrested and later charged with one count of carrying
weapons and one count of theft in the fourth degree. See Iowa Code §§ 724.4(1),
714.1(4), 714.2(4) (2020). Redmond pled not guilty and moved to suppress
evidence, claiming that the search and seizure conducted by Officer Woodward
violated his Fourth Amendment Rights, as well as his state constitutional rights.3
The district court denied the motion. Redmond waived his right to a jury trial and
stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes of testimony. Redmond was found guilty
of carrying weapons in violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1), an aggravated
misdemeanor, but was acquitted on the theft charge. Redmond timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right, our
standard of review is de novo.” State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa
2018) (quoting State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017)). “We examine
the whole record and ‘make an independent evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 144 ). “Each case must be
evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.” Id. (quoting State v. Kurth, 813
N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 2012)).
3 See U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Iowa Const. art. I, § 8.
5
III. Analysis
Redmond challenges the application by the district court of two exceptions
to a warrantless search: the automobile exception and the exception established
in Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. The State raises the search-incident-to-arrest exception,
claiming that the probable cause arising from the open liquor bottle and marijuana
odor justified Officer Woodward’s search. We conclude this search to be valid as
a Terry pat-down and do not address other arguments urged by either Redmond
or the State.4
The district court found the search of Redmond’s person to be valid under
the Terry exception. “In Terry, the Supreme Court emphasized that even a frisk
for weapons, which takes only a few seconds, is ‘a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment.’” State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 775 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Terry, 692
U.S. at 17). But the Terry court also recognized the weighty interest of a police
officer in “taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
As the Terry court explained:
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
4 The district court relied on the automobile exception, but since that doctrine does
not extend to the search of a person, it does not apply. See State v. Stevens, 970
N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 2022) (stating that the probable cause that justifies the
search of the car does not extend to the passenger); see also State v. Horton, 625
N.W.2d 362, 365 (Iowa 2001); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999).
We also note that the only argument addressed by the State in their briefing is the
search incident to arrest exception. But because the Terry pat-down was
addressed by Redmond and the district court, we rely on such in this opinion.
6
presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary
measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
Id. at 24.
But it is clear from Terry’s companion case, Sibron v. New York, that “[t]he
police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the
street or of whom he makes inquiries.” 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). Before an officer
“places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have
constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so.” Id. The Sibron court
then said: “In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, [the officer] must
be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the
individual was armed and dangerous.” Id.Our supreme court has encountered a similar fact pattern to the instant
proceedings. In State v. Bergmann, the supreme court noted an officer may have
reasonable suspicion to justify a pat-down based on the defendant’s presence in
a known narcotics-dealing area “coupled with other factors like flight upon seeing
police, nervousness, evasiveness or lying, past experience with the suspect, etc.”
633 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Iowa 2001). In Bergmann, the officer observed the
defendant parked in an alleyway in “an area notorious for drug activity” with “a well-
known narcotics dealer . . . standing next to the passenger side of the car.” Id. at
330. The drug dealer immediately left upon noticing the officer, and the defendant
began to drive away, at which point the officer noticed the defendant’s license plate
light was not lit and decided to pull him over. Id. Upon making contact with the
defendant, the officer recognized him from an arrest he made a few years prior
7
involving possession of a handgun and marijuana. Id. The officer asked the
defendant to step out of the car to show him the unlit license plate, and the officer
noticed the defendant “was acting anxious and impatient.” Id. The defendant
declined to give consent to search the vehicle, so the officer called the canine unit.
Id. at 330–31.
While the officer waited for the canine unit to arrive, he patted down the
defendant for weapons and looked under the driver’s seat for a weapon, which is
where he had found a weapon in his prior arrest of the defendant, but the officer
found nothing. Id. at 331. The canine unit arrived “within minutes,” and the dog
indicated it smelled a controlled substance, leading the officers to search the entire
vehicle and find marijuana inside. Id. The supreme court determined the officer
had reasonable suspicion to pat-down the defendant for weapons based on the
combination of the defendant’s presence in a known drug area alongside a drug
dealer, the defendant’s flight upon seeing the police when he was parked, the
defendant’s nervousness and evasiveness, and the officer’s past experience with
him. Id. at 333.
Our supreme court also highlighted Bergmann in a recent decision,
concluding it was instructive, which led the court to find an officer had reasonable
suspicion to order the defendant out of the vehicle. State v. Price-Williams, 973
N.W.2d 556, 563 (Iowa 2022) (discussing Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d at 333); see also
State v. Riley, 501 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Iowa 1992) (“[A]n officer may [also] make a
protective, warrantless search of a person when the officer, pointing to specific and
articulable facts, reasonably believes under all the circumstances that the
suspicious person presents a danger to the officer or to others.”).
8
We likewise determine similar facts justify this Terry pat-down, including
Redmond’s similarity to the description from two previous shootings that had
occurred in the area, Redmond’s association with a gang known for dealing drugs
and weapons, and Redmond’s nervousness during the stop.5 Officer Woodward
testified that the area where Redmond parked was a high crime area. See Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972) (finding that suspicious behavior paired
with a high crime area contributed to the officer’s fear for his safety); see also
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (also citing a high crime area as a
consideration in the officers’ analysis when paired with fleeing). While Redmond
argues that these factors identified by Officer Woodward were not specific to him,
we disagree.
We conclude Officer Woodward was justified in believing that Redmond,
who was at close range, may be armed and could be presently dangerous to
himself. And we also conclude it would be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer
the power to take necessary measures to determine whether Redmond was in fact
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. The Terry pat-
down did not violate Redmond’s constitutional rights, state or federal, and we affirm
the denial of the motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
5 We eliminate the positioning of Redmond’s body relied on in part by the district
court from our analysis. The positioning of the body occurred during the search.
As such, it cannot be used to create the reasonable belief that must be present
before the search. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“We have
had frequent occasion to point out that a search is not to be made legal by what it
turns up.”)