City of Sioux City v. Michael Jon Jacobsma , 862 N.W.2d 335 ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–1502
Filed February 20, 2015
CITY OF SIOUX CITY,
Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL JON JACOBSMA,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,
Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.
The defendant seeks discretionary review of a district court ruling
affirming a magistrate’s order that found the defendant responsible for a
citation issued to him for a speeding violation under an automated traffic
enforcement ordinance. AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Jacobsma of Jacobsma & Clabaugh PLC, Sioux Center,
pro se.
Justin R. Vondrak, Nicole Jensen-Harris, and Amber L. Hegarty,
Assistant City Attorneys, for appellee.
2
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, the defendant challenges a citation issued to him for
an alleged speeding violation under an automated traffic enforcement
ordinance enacted by the City of Sioux City. The defendant sought
dismissal of the citation on constitutional grounds, claiming enforcement
of the ordinance violated the Due Process Clauses of the Iowa and
Federal Constitutions, the inalienable rights clause of the Iowa
Constitution, and the Iowa municipal home rule amendment that
prohibits cities from enacting ordinances that conflict with state law. A
magistrate refused to dismiss the charge and found the defendant
responsible for the violation. The district court affirmed. The defendant
filed an application for discretionary review, which we granted. We now
affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A. Sioux City’s Automated Traffic Enforcement Ordinance. In
February of 2011, Sioux City enacted an automated traffic enforcement
(ATE) ordinance. Sioux City, Iowa, Mun. Code § 10.12.080 (2011). 1
Section 1 of the ATE ordinance generally authorizes the Sioux City chief
of police to deploy an automated traffic speed enforcement system to
provide automated images of vehicles that fail to obey the speed limits on
roadways within the city. Id. § 10.12.080(1). While the ATE ordinance
provides that the automated system shall be operated by a private
contractor, the police department receives the digital images and
determines which “vehicle owners are in violation of the city’s speed
1However, the Sioux City ordinance is entitled “Automated speed enforcement.”
For purposes of clarity and consistency, we will refer to this ordinance, as well as other
like ordinances or statutes in this opinion, as “automated traffic enforcement”
ordinances or systems.
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enforcement ordinance and are to receive a notice of violation for the
offense.” Id. Section 2(b) of the ATE ordinance defines “vehicle owner” as
“the person or entity identified by the Iowa Department of
Transportation, or registered with any other state vehicle registration
office, as the registered owner of a vehicle.” Id. § 10.12.080(2)(b).
A violation of the ATE ordinance is defined in section 3. Under
section 3(a), “[a] violation occurs when a vehicle traveling on a public
roadway exceeds the applicable speed limit.” Id. § 10.12.080(3)(a).
The ATE ordinance next considers who is liable for a violation.
Under section 3(b), the “vehicle owner or nominated party shall be liable
for a civil penalty” imposed by the ordinance. Id. § 10.12.080(3)(b). The
ATE ordinance does not define or further elaborate on the term
“nominated party,” nor does it expressly provide a specific procedure for
a vehicle owner to identify a nominated party. See id. § 10.12.080.
Section 3(c) of the ATE ordinance further provides that a violation of the
ordinance “may be rebutted by showing that a stolen vehicle report was
made on the vehicle encompassing the period in question.” Id.
§ 10.12.080(3)(c). The ATE ordinance does not expressly provide any
other way to rebut a violation of the ordinance. See id. § 10.12.080.
Section 4 of the ATE ordinance establishes a civil penalty for
violations and provides a right of appeal. Id. § 10.12.080(4). Under
section 4(a), the civil penalty assessed is equivalent to the scheduled fine,
including all surcharges and costs, established by Iowa Code section
321.285 for excessive speed over the posted speed limit. Id.
§ 10.12.080(4)(a). Sections 4(b) and (c) of the ATE ordinance provide an
avenue of appeal. Under section 4(b), a recipient of an ATE citation “may
dispute the citation by requesting a review by the chief of police or his
designee.” Id. § 10.12.080(4)(b). After such a review has been requested,
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“[t]he chief of police or his designee shall act as [a] hearing officer.” Id.
§ 10.12.080(4)(c). The hearing officer is then required to render a written
decision within three business days of the hearing “as to whether the
owner of the vehicle is guilty of an . . . infraction.” Id. An appeal from
the hearing officer’s decision may be perfected by filing a written notice
with the hearing officer. Id.
Under section 4(d) of the ATE ordinance, if an appeal of the
hearing officer’s decision is sought, a municipal infraction citation is
issued by the police department. Id. § 10.12.080(4)(d). After the filing of
an appeal request, a required court appearance and the scheduling of a
trial before a judge or magistrate results. Id.
B. Alleged Violation of the ATE Ordinance. On August 6, 2012,
a vehicle registered to Michael Jacobsma was detected by ATE equipment
maintained by Sioux City traveling northbound on I-29 near Sioux City
at a speed of sixty-seven miles per hour in a fifty-five miles-per-hour
zone. As a result, Sioux City issued a citation to Jacobsma. The front
page of the citation is entitled “Notice of Violation-Mobile Speed.” On the
front page, information is presented related to images recorded by the
ATE equipment, including photos of the front and back of the vehicle
involved in the alleged infraction. The alleged violator is further advised
that video of the infraction is available for viewing on a webpage for sixty
days from the date of the violation. The front page of the citation
contains a note stating that as the registered owner of the vehicle
described in the notice, the recipient is responsible for paying the civil
penalty unless a timely hearing is requested.
The back page of the citation is entitled “Instruction Page” and
presents additional information. It indicates that a recipient has three
choices. First, the recipient could simply pay the civil penalty. Second,
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the recipient could present an affidavit identifying another driver or
indicating the vehicle had been sold or stolen. The instruction states
that if the affidavit option is chosen, specific information including a copy
of the transfer of sale or a copy of a police report of a stolen vehicle must
be presented. If the recipient asserts that another person was driving,
the notice states that “liability can only be transferred if the nominated
driver accepts the responsibility.” Finally, the recipient may request a
hearing on the matter. If the hearing does not resolve the matter, the
recipient is advised that an appeal may be taken to the district court.
C. Appeal of the Alleged Violation. Upon receiving the citation,
Jacobsma chose to dispute the violation. After he was unsuccessful in
the administrative review hearing under section 4(b) and 4(c) of the ATE
ordinance, he elected to pursue an appeal. As a result, the City filed a
civil municipal infraction citation with the Clerk of Court and the matter
was placed on the small claims docket.
Jacobsma moved to dismiss the citation on three grounds. First,
he claimed sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the ordinance were an unreasonable
exercise of police power and therefore in violation of article I, section 1 of
the Iowa Constitution. Second, Jacobsma asserted section 3(b) of the
ordinance created an irrational and unfair presumption in violation of
the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
Third, he asserted sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the ordinance violated the
limited home rule provision of article III, section 38A of the Iowa
Constitution because they were impliedly preempted by various sections
of Iowa Code chapter 321, which provide the laws of the road in Iowa.
The City filed a resistance. After a hearing and considering the
briefs of the parties, the magistrate declined to dismiss the citation. The
magistrate ruled that the ordinance “does not create strict liability” but
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allows a nominated party to be liable in lieu of the registered owner.
With respect to the preemption argument, the magistrate held that this
court had previously upheld a similar ordinance in City of Davenport v.
Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 545 (Iowa 2008).
As a result of the ruling on the motion to dismiss, the matter
proceeded to a hearing before the magistrate. Jacobsma stipulated that
he was the registered owner of the vehicle photographed exceeding the
speed limit and that the vehicle was traveling at sixty-seven miles per
hour when it was photographed by the ATE system. The hearing
consisted solely of the stipulations and the oral arguments of the parties.
Based on these stipulations, the magistrate entered an order finding
Jacobsma liable for the violation.
Jacobsma appealed the magistrate’s ruling to district court. On
appeal, Jacobsma reprised the three arguments raised in his motion to
dismiss before the magistrate.
The district court rejected the arguments made by Jacobsma and
affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. In a detailed discussion, the district
court concluded the ATE ordinance was not preempted by the provisions
of Iowa Code chapter 321. The district court also rejected the due
process arguments raised by Jacobsma, concluding the statute merely
imposed vicarious liability through a rebuttable presumption that the
registered owner committed the infraction.
In its original order, the district court did not rule upon
Jacobsma’s claim that sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the ordinance violated
article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. Jacobsma filed a timely
motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) seeking expanded
findings. In response, the district court expressly rejected Jacobsma’s
argument under article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution, concluding
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that the ordinance is rationally related to the public welfare, is a
reasonable regulation of traffic, and a valid exercise of the City’s police
power.
II. Standard of Review.
“A trial court’s determination of whether a local ordinance is
preempted by state law is a matter for statutory construction and is thus
reviewable for correction of errors at law.” Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 537.
Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. See Hensler v. City of
Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569, 578 (Iowa 2010).
III. Substantive Due Process.
A. Introduction. The United States Supreme Court has identified
two separate but related due process concepts. The first, generally
referred to as substantive due process, prevents government from
“interfere[ing] with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 697, 708 (1987) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325,
58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292 (1937), overruled in part on other
grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2062,
23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 715–16 (1969)). The second concept is procedural due
process. Id. Procedural due process requires a government action
impinging upon a protected interest to be implemented in a fair manner.
See id.
With respect to substantive due process, the United States
Supreme Court has developed a two-step analytical process. See Santi v.
Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2001). The first step is to identify the
nature of the individual interest involved. Id. If the interest is found to
be fundamental, strict scrutiny applies. Id.; see also Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 301–02, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1, 16 (1993).
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Alternatively, if the interest is not fundamental, the government action is
subject to a rational basis test. Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 317. Under the
rational basis test, the government must have a legitimate interest in the
regulation and there must be a reasonable fit between the government
interest and the means utilized to advance that interest. Id.
Jacobsma argues the Sioux City ordinance offends substantive due
process under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution and under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that state courts may interpret
parallel state constitutional provisions differently than federal courts.
See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6, 101 S.
Ct. 715, 722 n.6, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659, 667 n.6 (1981) (“A state court may, of
course, apply a more stringent standard of review as a matter of state
law under the State’s equivalent to the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses.”). Even though the Due Process Clauses are similarly phrased
in both constitutions, we have stated that we are not bound by United
States Supreme Court due process decisions, but look to them for “such
light and guidance as they may afford.” Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa
State Commerce Comm’n, 190 N.W.2d 583, 593 (Iowa 1971), superseded
on other grounds by statute, Iowa Code § 17A.19(7) (1975), as stated in
Interstate Power Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 463 N.W.2d 699,
702 (Iowa 1990); see Putensen v. Hawkeye Bank of Clay Cnty., 564
N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa 1997) (same). Because the Due Process Clauses
of the Iowa and Federal Constitutions are similar, we often look to federal
cases when interpreting the state due process clause. See Gooch v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp., 398 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Iowa 1987).
Although Jacobsma cites both state and federal constitutional
provisions, he does not assert that the standards for an Iowa
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constitutional claim are different from those established under federal
law. As a result, for the purposes of this case, we apply the federal
standard related to substantive due process with respect to his claim
under the Iowa Constitution, reserving the right to apply the standard in
a fashion different from federal caselaw. See State v. Halverson, 857
N.W.2d 632, 635 (Iowa 2015); King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa
2011); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 878 n.6 (Iowa 2009); Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa
v. Fitzgerald (RACI), 675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2004).
Jacobsma’s substantive due process claim is based upon his
assertion that the Sioux City ordinance creates an arbitrary presumption
that the vehicle’s owner was the violator of the ordinance and the only
way to rebut such a presumption is to show that the owner of the vehicle
filed a stolen vehicle report. Jacobsma views this approach as
fundamentally unfair and constitutionally deficient.
In support of his argument, Jacobsma cites Hensler, 790 N.W.2d
at 569. In Hensler, we considered a substantive due process challenge to
an ordinance that imposed a rebuttable presumption that a parent failed
to exercise control over a minor child when that child engaged in
“occurrences” that amounted to unlawful acts. Id. at 576, 578. We
found the rebuttable presumption was arbitrary and irrational in light of
the multiple factors that could cause juveniles to engage in behavior
contrary to the ordinance. Id. at 587–88. Jacobsma argues that the
presumption in the ATE ordinance is just as arbitrary or irrational. He
argues the ordinance limits the ability of a vehicle owner to rebut liability
only by showing a stolen vehicle report was made, which does not
provide a fair opportunity to be heard and is a denial of due process.
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The City responds by emphasizing that the ordinance imposes civil
penalties. When civil penalties are imposed, the City argues a
presumption satisfies due process if there is “a reasonable fit between
the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.”
State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Iowa 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In support of its argument that the presumption in the
ordinance satisfies due process, the City extensively cites Agomo v.
Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. 2007). In Agomo, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals upheld an ATE ordinance which provided that the
registered owner was liable for any violation unless the vehicle was stolen
or unless the vehicle owner provided the name, driver’s license number,
and address of the actual driver. Id. at 185–86, 194.
B. Caselaw Related to Substantive Due Process Challenges to
ATE Ordinances or Other Presumptions.
1. Caselaw related to presumptions in ATE ordinances. We have
not had an opportunity to consider a due process challenge to the
validity of an ATE system on the ground that it employs impermissible
presumptions. There have, however, been a number of due process
challenges in other jurisdictions to ATE ordinances that employ
presumptions.
A leading ATE case focusing primarily on due process under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is Agomo, 916 A.2d
at 181. In Agomo, the District of Columbia court considered whether an
ordinance that established a rebuttable presumption impermissibly
shifted the burden of proof to the alleged violator in a fashion that
offended federal due process. Id. at 193. Under the challenged
ordinance, the owner of a vehicle was liable for moving violations
generated by an ATE system “unless the owner . . . furnish[ed] evidence
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that the vehicle was, at the time of the infraction, in the custody, care, or
control of another person.” Id. at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Agomo court first concluded as a matter of statutory
interpretation that the ordinance imposed vicarious liability through the
use of a rebuttable presumption. Id. at 192. According to the Agomo
court, the system of imposing vicarious liability through the use of a
rebuttable presumption did not affect a requirement in the D.C. Code
that infractions be proved by clear and convincing evidence because the
vicarious liability provisions simply established a mechanism for
assessing liability once an infraction had been established. Id. at 192–
93.
Moreover, the Agomo court emphasized that the presumption of
innocence has no place in a civil proceeding. Id. at 193–94. Instead of
applying the relatively strict requirements that might apply in a criminal
setting, the Agomo court noted that the trial court ruled the basic
procedural requirements of due process established in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), were
satisfied here, a claim the challengers waived on appeal. Id. at 191 &
n.7.
The Agomo court then noted that when legislation provides that
proof of one fact constitutes prima facie evidence of the main fact at
issue, it is not a denial of due process so long as there is some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. Id.
at 194. The Agomo court found that “[i]t is entirely rational to presume
that a vehicle is in the care, custody, or control of its registered owner.”
Id. Agomo thus stands for the proposition that at least when an ATE
system creates a rebuttable presumption that the owner is the driver of
the vehicle, such a rebuttable presumption satisfied federal due process.
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Because of its interpretation of the underlying statute, the Agomo
court did not confront the validity of an ATE system that created an
irrebuttable presumption that the registered owner of a vehicle was the
violator.
A federal due process challenge to a Chicago ATE system was
considered in Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009). In
Idris, a Chicago ordinance imposed vicarious liability on an owner of a
motor vehicle for red light and illegal turn violations. Id. at 565.
With respect to substantive due process, the Idris court first noted
that a traffic fine of $90 did not give rise to a fundamental interest. Id. at
566. As a result, the provision of the Chicago ordinance imposing
vicarious liability on vehicle owners was subject only to a rational basis
test under substantive due process. Id. Applying the rational basis test,
the Idris court concluded that the ordinance passed constitutional
muster. Id. The Irdis court stated that “[a] system of photographic
evidence reduces the costs of law enforcement and increases the
proportion of all traffic offenses that are detected [and that] these
benefits can be achieved only if the owner is held responsible.” Id. The
Idris court observed that vicarious liability is rational because it
encourages owners to “take more care when lending their cars, and often
they can pass the expense on to the real wrongdoer.” Id.
The Idris court considered the claim that because the only defense
to vicarious liability expressly provided for in the ordinance related to
theft of a vehicle, other defenses “have been wiped out.” Id. at 567. The
city contended that other defenses were in fact available notwithstanding
the omission of express language in the ordinance allowing additional
defenses to be raised. Id. The Idris court refused to address the claim on
the merits, noting that “[n]one of the plaintiffs has offered such a defense
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and had it rejected; federal courts do not issue advisory opinions on
situations that do not affect the litigants.” Id.
The take away point in Idris is that even if an ordinance imposes
liability on registered owners without an opportunity to show that
someone else was driving the vehicle at the time of the infraction, such
an ordinance would satisfy substantive due process under the United
States Constitution. Idris thus went beyond Agomo, which considered an
ordinance with a rebuttable presumption.
Like Agomo and Idris, most state and federal cases have upheld
challenges to automated traffic systems from a variety of due process
attacks. See, e.g., Fischetti v. Village of Schaumburg, 967 N.E.2d 950,
959–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (holding civil statute imposing liability on
owner without exception did not violate substantive due process);
Morales v. Parish of Jefferson, 140 So. 3d 375, 395 (La. Ct. App. 2014)
(holding civil ATE ordinance imposing strict liability on owner does not
violate substantive due process under Federal Constitution); Krieger v.
City of Rochester, 978 N.Y.S.2d 588, 600–04 (Sup. Ct. 2013)
(emphasizing civil nature of statute in concluding vicarious liability
provision consistent with substantive due process under Idris and
Agomo); City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 338–39 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding civil ATE ordinance that makes owner of vehicle
responsible regardless of who was driving does not violate substantive
due process); see also Gardner v. City of Cleveland, 656 F. Supp. 2d 751,
760–61 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (citing Idris in rejecting substantive due process
challenge to ordinance that imposes liability upon owner unless owner
identifies driver who accepts liability); Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson, 621 F.
Supp. 2d 373, 379–80, 383–84, 385–87 (E.D. La. 2009) (holding that if
ordinance is criminal, it survives a due process challenge because the
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presumption of liability is rebuttable and the plaintiff made no argument
that the permissive presumption was unconstitutional as-applied). 2
2. Iowa caselaw regarding substantive due process challenges to
presumptions. We have not had occasion to consider a substantive due
process challenge to an ATE ordinance. See Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at
544–45 (recognizing statutory and constitutional issues not presented on
appeal, including due process challenges). We have recently, however,
considered a federal substantive due process challenge to the validity of a
presumption in a local ordinance in Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 587. We
have also considered the validity of a presumption that the owner of a
vehicle committed a parking infraction under an ordinance imposing
criminal penalties in Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102, 103–05 (Iowa
1976).
In Hensler, the City of Davenport enacted an ordinance that
provided that after a second “occurrence” of an alleged delinquent act
involving a child, a parent was presumed negligent in supervising the
child and that the negligence caused the occurrence. 790 N.W.2d at
576. Under the Davenport ordinance, an occurrence was defined as
arising when “ ‘a law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe a
particular child engaged in a delinquent act and has filed a delinquency
complaint with the court based upon such probable cause or has
2In State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. 2007), the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that a local ATE ordinance impermissibly shifted the burden
of proof. The rationale in Kuhlman, however, was not based upon a due process attack
but rather the theory that shifting the burden of proof in an ATE ordinance that
imposed criminal penalties was in conflict with state law related to criminal violations.
Id. at 583–84. The fact that the ordinance imposed criminal sanctions was a critical
feature in creating the conflict with state law. Id.
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otherwise taken said child into custody.’ ” Id. (quoting Davenport, Iowa,
Mun. Code § 9.56.020(E) (2006)).
In Hensler, we concluded that “rather than finding negligence and
causation based on facts,” the Davenport ordinance was “arbitrary and
irrational in light of the multiple factors that can cause [an] occurrence.”
Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted). We surveyed at length the
academic literature, noting that experts disagreed on the causes of
juvenile delinquency with causes cited including biological and social
factors, family dysfunction, poverty, and interrelated factors such as
school, housing, employment, recreation, community life, and even the
juvenile justice system itself. Id. at 588. Because of the complexity of
both the negligence and causation prongs of the ordinance’s
presumption, we concluded the ordinance “was arbitrary and irrational”
in light of the multiple factors that can cause an occurrence. Id.
In contrast to Hensler, we upheld a rebuttable presumption
against a due process challenge in Nolan, 239 N.W.2d at 102. In Nolan,
the registered owner of a motor vehicle challenged the constitutionality of
three Iowa City parking ordinances which made the registered owner of a
vehicle prima facie responsible for violation of the ordinances. Id. at
102–03. At trial, the owner stipulated the vehicle was registered to him
and that it was illegally parked. Id. at 109 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
Like this case, the owner offered no further evidence regarding the
identity of the operator at the time of the infraction. Id. at 102 (majority
opinion).
The Nolan court first noted that traffic regulations were public
welfare offenses. Id. at 105. Under the public welfare doctrine, the city
may impose “prima facie strict criminal responsibility” upon proving the
existence of an illegally parked vehicle registered in the name of the
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defendant and the inability to determine the actual operator. Id. The
Nolan court stressed that this prima facie responsibility means “at first
view” or “on its face” or “without more.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Importantly, the Nolan court emphasized:
The inference created by [the ordinance] does not deny due
process to the defendant by placing the burden of proof upon
him, but rather merely shifts to him the burden of going
forward with evidence that the vehicle was not operated by
one who the City has a right to presume was operating the
automobile with its owner’s consent.
Id. at 106.
Our approach in Nolan is not an outlier. Other parking
enforcement cases have taken a similar approach. See, e.g., City of
Chicago v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 375 N.E.2d 1285, 1288,
1293–94 (Ill. 1978) (upholding ordinance which provided that the
registered owner shall be prima facie responsible for parking violations);
City of Birmingham v. 48th Dist. Ct. Judge, 255 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1977) (same); City of Kansas City v. Hertz Corp., 499 S.W.2d
449, 452–54 (Mo. 1973) (same).
C. Analysis. As indicated above, the first step in federal
substantive due process analysis is consideration of the claimed
protected interest. Here, Jacobsma claims that he has a liberty interest
at stake. He claims his liberty interest is the “right to be free from being
found civilly liable for an act or event without [the City] proving a causal
connection . . . or, at least a special relationship between the defendant
and the person committing the wrongful act.”
The United States Supreme Court has stated that liberty interests
for purposes of due process include “the rights to marry, to have
children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to
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marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to
abortion.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S. Ct.
2258, 2267, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 787 (1997) (citations omitted). A liberty
interest also arises in the context of the right to worship, the right to
contract, and the right to engage in the common occupations of life. See
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 92 S. Ct. 2701,
2706–07, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 558 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923). As is apparent
from the preceding authorities, a threat of incarceration presents a type
of liberty interest but is not a necessary element of it. See Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 719, 117 S. Ct. at 2267, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 787.
Jacobsma does not appear to have a conventional liberty interest.
He can drive his car anywhere he wants, subject to the laws of the road.
He can loan his car to anyone he wants. His right to self-fulfillment or
his right to be left alone do not seem implicated by the Sioux City ATE
ordinance in any meaningful sense.
Jacobsma is, however, certainly subject to being fined for traffic
violations under Sioux City’s ATE system. While Jacobsma may not have
a liberty interest, he certainly has a property interest in not being subject
to irrational monetary fines rather than a liberty interest impairing some
right of self-fulfillment. See Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d
702, 709 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (concluding a $50 fine resulting from an ATE
system constitutes a legitimate property interest for purposes of due
process); Daily v. City of Sioux Falls, 802 N.W.2d 905, 911 & n.7 (S.D.
2011) (noting “[n]umerous courts have recognized that the assessment of
a civil fine deprives an individual of a protected property interest”);
Matthew S. Maisel, Slave to the Traffic Light: A Road Map to Red Light
Camera Legal Issues, 10 Rutgers J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 401, 416 (2013)
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[hereinafter Maisel] (“The payment or threatened imposition of a
monetary penalty under a red light camera ordinance or statute is a
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
We do not believe we should decline to consider Jacobsma’s
challenge merely because he may have used the wrong label. Moreover,
in its brief, the City does not challenge the existence of a protectable due
process interest. As a result, we assume for the purposes of this case
that a protected interest is present.
While the parties agree that a protected interest is present,
Jacobsma makes no claim that his interest, however characterized, is
“fundamental,” thereby triggering strict scrutiny under conventional
federal due process analysis. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.
Ct. at 2267, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 787 (noting the Due Process Clause
“provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests”). As a result, the
parties agree that the appropriate test of the statute under due process is
the rational basis test. See id. at 767 n.9, 117 S. Ct at 2283 n.9, 138 L.
Ed. 2d at 817 n.9.
Before we address the merits of Jacobsma’s due-process rational
basis challenge to the ordinance, we must first examine the nature of the
factual record before the magistrate to determine the precise contours of
the fighting issue raised in this case. The parties stipulated Jacobsma
was the registered owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was speeding
when photographed by the ATE system. Jacobsma offered no evidence
beyond the stipulations at trial. Specifically, he offered no evidence
tending to show that he was not the driver of the vehicle at the time of
the alleged violation. He did not deny he was the driver. He simply
19
asserted that the City’s case failed because of what he claimed was an
invalid presumption.
Given the factual posture of this case, the sole due process issue
before the magistrate, the district court, and before us on appeal is
whether due process under the United States or Iowa Constitutions is
offended by the irrational or unreasonable imposition of liability on
Jacobsma when (1) the evidence established that he was the owner of the
vehicle, (2) the evidence established that the vehicle was speeding at the
time of the alleged infraction, and (3) no evidence or offer of proof was
made tending to show that Jacobsma was not driving the vehicle when
the violation occurred. In other words, the issue actually joined in this
case is whether an ATE ordinance, consistent with concepts of due
process, may rationally impose liability on a defendant when the
defendant concedes he is the registered owner of a vehicle, that he owns
the vehicle involved in the infraction, and he offers no evidence that he
was not driving the vehicle when the infraction occurred.
We think the issue must be so narrowed because Jacobsma must
show under the facts that he has suffered a concrete injury because of
an alleged constitutional defect. In State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306,
311 n.1 (Iowa 2000), we noted that “[i]f a statute is constitutional as
applied to a defendant, the defendant cannot make a facial challenge
unless a recognized exception to the standing requirement applies.”
Jacobsma has not claimed such exception. In this case, had Jacobsma
offered evidence that he was not driving the vehicle, the magistrate may
well have interpreted the statute to allow such evidence in order to meet
constitutional concerns. See Simmons v. State Pub. Defender, 791
N.W.2d 69, 73, 88 (Iowa 2010) (noting “[o]rdinarily, we construe statutes
to avoid potential constitutional infirmity if we may reasonably do so”).
20
But because Jacobsma offered no evidence beyond the stipulations that
he was the owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was involved in an
infraction, the questions of whether and how a defendant may rebut a
city’s case and whether the ordinance comports with due process when
faced with evidence that someone other than the registered owner was
operating the vehicle at the time of the infraction, pose purely academic
questions that are not before the court.
Both of the leading ATE cases refused to consider such academic
issues. In Agomo, the court declined to consider the situation of a
“truthful alibi” when a defendant does not know who was driving the
vehicle but demonstrates that it was not him or her, when the issue was
not properly raised in the case. 916 A.2d at 194 n.10. Similarly, in Idris,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held it would not issue an
advisory opinion on whether the ordinance eliminates all defenses when
the party did not offer a defense that was rejected below. 552 F.3d at
567. We follow the approach of Agomo and Idris.
Thus the only question properly raised in this case, based upon
the record developed below, is whether the stipulation offered by the
parties provides a sufficient basis to impose liability upon Jacobsma
without the introduction of evidence that he was not the operator. We
think the answer to this question is yes under Nolan. Indeed, the case is
even stronger here, when only civil penalties are involved, rather than in
Nolan, in which the challenged ordinance imposed criminal penalties.
See 239 N.W.2d at 103.
We do not think our due process holding in Hensler is controlling.
In Hensler, the alleged connection between a parent’s supervision and
the subsequent commission of juvenile acts was simply too attenuated to
meet a rational basis test. 790 N.W.2d at 587–89. The inferences under
21
the ordinance in Hensler—that a parent was negligent and that such
negligence caused the juvenile behavior—involved a double-barreled
blast of complex factual issues that, when combined, dramatically
reduced the relationship between the established fact of a parent–child
relationship and the presumed result of delinquency. See id. The
presumption was simply unfair to parents and had little justification.
In contrast, the presumption in this case that, absent proof to the
contrary, the registered owner was the driver of the vehicle at the time of
the infraction is not very complicated and is eminently reasonable. It is
quite rational to employ a Nolan-type inference that a registered owner
who offers no evidence that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of
the infraction was, in fact, the operator. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. City of
Akron, 374 Fed. App’x 598, 600 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding vehicle owners
strictly liable for the violation and only permitting them to shift
responsibility to the actual driver in certain circumstances does not
violate due process); Brown, 284 S.W.3d at 338–39 (holding city
ordinance regarding red light camera program did not violate due process
rights of owner of motor vehicle photographed running red light by
creating an impermissible rebuttable presumption that owner was guilty,
as the ordinance made the owner of a vehicle responsible for a red light
violation regardless of who was driving and ordinance only permitted an
owner to shift the responsibility for a red light violation to the actual
driver in certain circumstances); Maisel, 10 Rutgers J. L. & Pub. Pol’y at
416 (noting “[c]hallenges to red light cameras under federal law have
been fruitless so far”); Paul McNaughton, Comment, Photo Enforcement
Programs: Are They Permissible Under the United States Constitution?, 43
J. Marshall L. Rev. 463, 470 (2010) (noting “challenges [to ATE
ordinances/systems] under both state and federal [due process and
22
equal protection] laws have been wholly unsuccessful”). Based on these
authorities and our own application of applicable law, we conclude that
under the facts of this case, Jacobsma has failed to show that the
presumption is sufficiently arbitrary and unreasonable to give rise to a
federal due process violation.
We briefly turn to the Iowa Constitution. In recent years, there has
been a movement among some academics to tighten rational basis review
to avoid what is seen by some as extreme results. See Jeffrey D.
Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving
Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth
Amendment, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 491, 530 (2011) (noting that for lower
federal and state courts “the extreme deference created by the rational
basis test, combined with the extreme strictness of the strict scrutiny
test, almost guarantees that their decision will be skewed against the
claimant”); Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with
Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1055, 1060 (2014) (noting that
“[e]xcept in the most extreme instance, the over- or under-inclusiveness
of a statute or regulation—which is fatal when a fundamental right is
constrained—does not mean it lacks a rational basis”).
In this case, however, we have not been asked to develop a
substantive standard under the Iowa due process clause different than
the applicable federal standard. Although we could apply the rational
basis standard more stringently than, say, the extraordinarily deferential
version of the rational basis test applied in Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., we would not reach a different result under the Iowa
Constitution, particularly in light of the narrow issue presented. See 348
23
U.S. 483, 488, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572 (1955) 3 (The Court
applied a highly deferential standard and stated “[i]t is enough that there
is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). Even if
we were to employ a more rigorous rational basis review, we think it is
permissible under the Iowa due process clause for an ATE ordinance to
allow a city to make a prima facie case of liability based upon vehicle
ownership and photographic evidence that the vehicle was involved in a
violation of the ordinance. The asserted governmental interest in public
safety is certainly “ ‘realistically conceivable’ ” with “a basis in fact.” See
RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 4 (quoting Miller v. Boone Cnty. Hosp., 394 N.W.2d
776, 779 (Iowa 1986)). Jacobsma has developed no record suggesting
that the asserted City interest is insubstantial or empirically
unsustainable. As presented in this case, this means the chosen
methods used by the City to advance the public interest in safety, clearly
reasonably fit the City’s legitimate objective in public safety. Cf. Idris,
552 F.3d at 566; Agomo, 916 A.2d at 193. We therefore conclude there
is no due process violation under article I, section 9 of the Iowa
Constitution even if we apply a somewhat more stringent rational basis
review than generally is employed by the federal precedents. We reserve
3The United States Supreme Court has historically employed a number of
different formulations of the rational-basis due process test. See, e.g., County of Porage
v. Steinpreis, 312 N.W.2d 731, 740 n.4 (Wis. 1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing
several cases which note various formulations for the rational basis test used by the
United States Supreme Court). In some due process and equal protection cases, the
Supreme Court seems to employ a rational basis test with greater bite than that
afforded in Williamson. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S 620, 634–35, 116 S. Ct.
1620, 1628–29, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855, 867–68 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3258–60, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 325–27 (1985);
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 2826, 37 L. Ed. 2d
782, 788 (1973).
24
for another day the question of whether an ordinance that strictly
imposes vicarious liability in all circumstances offends the due process
clause of the Iowa Constitution.
IV. Inalienable Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution.
A. Introduction. Article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution,
sometimes referred to as the “inalienable rights” clause, provides:
All men and women are, by nature, free and equal, and have
certain inalienable rights—among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety
and happiness.
Iowa Const. art. I, § 1.
As is apparent, the language in the inalienable rights clause is
largely derived from Virginia’s Declaration of Rights drafted by George
Mason and largely incorporated by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration
of Independence. See Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_right
s.html; Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to
Happiness and Safety, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 5–19 (1997)
[hereinafter Grodin].
Notably, such language was omitted from the United States
Constitution, no doubt in order to avoid controversy with the slave states
over the meaning of the ringing phrase “All men are created equal.” See
Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 Temple L.
Rev. 361, 362–63, 370–74 (1993). The absence of language styled after
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights and the Declaration of Independence in
the United States Constitution has been noted by Justice Scalia, who
stated that “there is no such philosophizing in our [the Federal]
25
Constitution.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts
and the Law 134 (1997). But such language is expressly found in the
Iowa Constitution. The question is: what does it mean?
There is no single simple answer. Like the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the inalienable rights clause of article I,
section 1 has a number of distinct provisions. It provides that all men
and women are by nature “free and equal.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 1. It
further describes three distinct classes of “inalienable rights,” namely, (1)
the right of “enjoying and defending life and liberty,” (2) the right of
“acquiring, possessing and protecting property,” and (3) the right of
“pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” Id. Thus, article I
section 1 does not present a single interpretive problem, but instead a
series of interpretive problems.
In pressing his argument that the presumption in the Sioux City
ordinance violates the inalienable rights clause of the Iowa Constitution,
Jacobsma relies on Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 175–79
(Iowa 2004), a case which considered the application of the “acquiring,
possessing[,] and protecting property” provision of the inalienable rights
clause. He notes that in Gacke, we declared that the inalienable rights
clause “ ‘is not a mere glittering generality without substance or
meaning.’ ” Id. at 176 (quoting State v. Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 693, 154
N.W. 294, 300 (1915)). In Gacke, the plaintiffs relied upon a 1950 case,
which stated that the inalienable rights clause “was intended to secure
citizens’ pre-existing common law rights (sometimes known as ‘natural
rights’) from unwarranted government restrictions.” Id. (citing May’s
Drug Stores v. State Tax Comm’n, 242 Iowa 319, 328–29, 45 N.W.2d 245,
250 (1950)).
26
Jacobsma asserts he has a “liberty interest” in being free from civil
liability for an act or event when there is no proof of a causal connection
between the defendant or the act or event or, in the alternative, a special
relationship between the defendant and the person committing the
wrongful act. While conceding the ordinance makes reference to a
“nominated party,” Jacobsma notes the ordinance does not provide a
definition of a nominated party. Further, Jacobsma argues that because
the ordinance states “the vehicle owner or nominated party shall be
liable,” Sioux City, Iowa, Mun. Code § 10.12.080(3)(b), it is not clear the
nominated party is liable “in lieu of” the vehicle owner. While conceding
that vicarious liability for acts of another based upon a special
relationship predates our state’s constitution, such vicarious liability was
based only on a principal–agent relationship. Jacobsma concludes that
the presumption does not require evidence of a causal connection to the
wrongful act by the vehicle owner, which amounts to an unreasonable
exercise of police power in violation of article I, section 1 of the Iowa
Constitution.
The City responds by agreeing that article I, section 1 is not “a
mere glittering generality without substance and meaning,” but notes
that any right under the constitutional provision is “subject, of course,
. . . to such reasonable regulations as the peace, comfort and welfare of
society may demand.” Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Iowa 1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Benschoter v. Hakes, 232
Iowa 1354, 1362, 8 N.W.2d 481, 486 (1943). Citing Agomo, the City
maintains that even if a liberty interest is involved in this case, the
presumption found in the Sioux City ordinance is a reasonable
regulation that withstands Jacobsma’s article I, section 1 challenge.
27
B. Caselaw in Other States on State Constitutional Inalienable
Rights Clauses. Language similar to article I, section 1 appears in the
state constitutions of California, Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 1;
Colo. Const. art. II, § 3; Nev. Const. art. I, § 1; N.J. Const. art. I, § 1;
N.M. Const. art. II, § 4; N.D. Const. art. I, § 1; Ohio Const. art. I, § 1; Vt.
Const. ch. I, art. 1. A number of other state constitutions have
variations on the inalienable rights language. See Grodin, 25 Hastings
Const. L.Q. at 3–4.
Some states with inalienable rights clauses similar to Iowa’s have
found them to be merely hortatory. See Sepe v. Daneker, 68 A.2d 101,
105 (R.I. 1949) (The court declared that the clause was “addressed . . . to
the general assembly by way of advice and direction, [rather] than to the
courts, by way of enforcing restraint upon the law-making power.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)); G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions 76 (1998) (characterizing inalienable rights clauses as
“statements of political principle not susceptible to judicial
enforcement”); see also Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of
Classical Legal Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty Over Law
and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1499, 1504 n.18
(2007) (characterizing inalienable rights clauses as the original “inkblot”
amendments). One scholar has suggested the more nuanced view that
some provisions of inalienable rights clauses such as the right to defend
life and property may be judicially enforceable while the provisions
related to the pursuit of happiness and safety are not. Eugene Volokh,
State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property, 11
Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 399, 412–13 (2007). Some courts, however, have held
that inalienable rights clauses in state constitutions are judicially
28
enforceable in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487, 501–02 (Ky. 1992) (holding inalienable rights provision
protected private sexual conduct); Commonwealth v. Masden, 175 S.W.2d
1004, 1008 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943) (enforcing inalienable rights provision to
allow property owner to kill wild animals damaging or threatening to
damage property); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 387 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1909) (holding right to use liquor for one’s own comfort, with no
injury to other citizens, is within the inalienable rights clause); Planned
Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sunquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 13, 25 (Tenn. 2000)
(striking down abortion restrictions on state constitutional grounds
relying in part on inalienable rights provision of Tennessee Constitution).
But see Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ind. 2005)
(sustaining eighteen-hour waiting period and counseling requirement
from attack under inalienable rights clause of Indiana Constitution).
On the specific question posed in this case, however, the parties
have not cited, and we have not found, any authority from other
jurisdictions on the question of whether the inalienable rights clause of a
state constitution prevents the enforcement of presumptions in an ATE
ordinance similar to that presented in this case. In general, however, the
cases hold that liberty or property rights enumerated in the inalienable
rights clauses of state constitutions are subject to reasonable regulations
in the public interest. See, e.g., Concerned Dog Owners of Cal. v. City of
Los Angeles, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 789 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding
ownership of domestic animals is subject to reasonable government
regulation); Ikuta v. Ikuta, 218 P.2d 854, 855–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)
(noting “[t]he rights to enjoy liberty, to acquire, possess and protect
property, which are secured to the individual by [article I] section 1 [of
the California Constitution], are not absolute but are ‘circumscribed by
29
the requirements of the public good’ ” and further,“[l]ike the protection
accorded to personal rights and privileges by the requirement of due
process of law, the guarantees of [article I,] section 1 cannot operate as a
curtailment upon the basic power of the legislature to enact reasonable
police regulations” (quoting In re Moffett, 64 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1937)); State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 920–21 (N.D. 1943)
(holding right to engage in business subject to reasonable regulation).
C. Iowa Approach to Inalienable Rights Clause. We have
considered the meaning of the inalienable rights clause in a number of
cases. We have not, however, engaged in any substantial analysis of the
historical or philosophical origins of the clause, its function and purpose
as the first section of the Bill of Rights in the Iowa Constitution, or the
meaning of its generous text in contrast to the rights language in the
Federal Constitution. See Bruce Kempkes, The Natural Rights Clause of
the Iowa Constitution: When the Law Sits Too Tight, 42 Drake L. Rev. 593,
632 (Iowa 1993) [hereinafter Kempkes] (noting that our cases have done
“virtually nothing” in charting the ebbs and flows of the provision and
that no case examines the text or reasons for inclusion). Our cases tend
to be fragmentary and incremental.
We have, however, stated two general principles. We have noted
that because the inalienable rights clause appears at the very threshold
of the Iowa Bill of Rights, the “constitutional safeguard is thereby
emphasized, and shown to be paramount.” Hoover v. Iowa St. Highway
Comm’n, 207 Iowa 56, 58, 222 N.W. 438, 439 (1928). We have also
declared the inalienable rights clause “is not a mere glittering generality
without substance and meaning.” Osborne, 171 Iowa at 693, 154 N.W.
at 300. These principles, however, tell us little about the substance of
30
the constitutional guarantees or how they should be applied in a given
case.
It is clear, however, that article I, section 1 has at least some
constitutional bite. The first article I, section 1 case is Coger v.
Northwest Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873). In that case, we rested
our conclusion, that an African American was entitled to “the same
rights and privileges” in riverboat transportation, upon the “free and
equal” language of the inalienable rights clause. Id. at 153–55. Since
Coger, we have enforced article I, section 1 in a number of varied
contexts. For instance, in State v. Ward, 170 Iowa 185, 189, 152 N.W.
501, 502 (1915), we held the right of defense of person and property
under article I, section 1 was sufficient to provide justification for killing
deer engaged in the destruction of property on the premises of the
defendant. A few months later, in Osborne, 171 Iowa at 692–93, 154
N.W. at 300, we struck down a state regulation requiring licensing of
transient merchants in part on the ground that oppressive legislation
cannot so burden harmless business activity as to render the right to life,
liberty, and the use and enjoyment of property embraced in article I,
section 1 to be valueless.
More recently, relying on the doctrine of necessity as articulated in
Ward, we held in State v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863, 866–67 (Iowa 1978),
that under the inalienable rights clause, a prisoner who alleged he was
threatened by physical harm or rape if he remained in prison has a right
to the defense of necessity in a case involving a prison escape. In Gibb,
286 N.W.2d at 188, we held the inalienable rights clause permits
witnesses to limit their cross-examination if the witness makes an
adequate evidentiary record that demonstrates that continuing to testify
would jeopardize their safety or that of their family. In Gacke, 684
31
N.W.2d at 185, we held an immunity provision of Iowa law relating to
feed lot operations violated article I, section 1.
Where liberty or property rights are allegedly infringed by a statute
or ordinance, our inalienable rights cases have held that, even if the
plaintiff’s asserted interest is within the scope of the inalienable rights
clause, the rights guaranteed by the provision are subject to reasonable
regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power. See Gacke, 684
N.W.2d at 178 (property interest); Gibb, 286 N.W.2d at 186 (liberty
interest); Benschoter, 232 Iowa at 1361–63, 8 N.W.2d at 486 (property
interest). This formulation, of course, is virtually identical to the
rational-basis due process test or equal protection tests under the
Federal Constitution. See Vilas v. Iowa State Bd. of Assessment &
Review, 223 Iowa 604, 612, 273 N.W. 338, 342 (1937) (noting that article
I, section 1 and article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution “contain
practically the same guarantees found in the ‘due process clause’ and
‘equal protection of the law’ clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”);
McGuire v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R., 131 Iowa 340, 348–49, 108
N.W. 902, 905 (1906) (same).
Our approach to review of claims under article I, section 1 has not
escaped criticism. As noted by Kempkes, 42 Drake L. Rev. at 633, such
an approach, though perhaps convenient for courts also facing
Fourteenth Amendment questions, “should . . . raise a few eyebrows.”
Kempkes notes the inalienable rights clause predated the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment by eleven years; the Iowa drafters placed a due
process clause five clauses away in article I, section 6, which cannot be
considered redundant; and the text of article I, section 1 is
fundamentally different than either the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 634. If article I, section 1 is
32
to have some independent meaning, Kempkes suggests it cannot simply
be a redundant provision with the same substantive scope of the due
process clause of article I, section 6 given the significant difference in the
text. Id. at 634–35.
Nonetheless, Jacobsma’s only argument advanced in this case is
that the Sioux City ordinance offends article I, section 1 of the Iowa
Constitution because it is not a reasonable regulation and is an arbitrary
restraint. We consider his argument below.
D. Discussion. We find Jacobsma’s challenge under the
inalienable rights clause in this case, like his due process claim, without
merit. We think there is no doubt that the regulation to control speeding
on state highways gives rise to a public interest generally. Despite the
best efforts of many dedicated professionals in our departments of
transportation and law enforcement, traffic accidents give rise to a
terrible toll of fatal and nonfatal injuries. We are not regulating conduct
that is purely or even largely private. The conduct at issue presents an
increased risk to public safety on the open roads of the City.
The question then arises as to whether the regulation is arbitrary
or unreasonable. As with the due process claim, however, the posture of
the case limits the scope of Jacobsma’s claim. The only question
Jacobsma has standing to raise in this case is whether an ATE ordinance
that creates prima facie liability based on ownership and photographic
evidence is so arbitrary or unreasonable as to offend article I, section 1.
The overwhelming majority of cases considering due process challenges
to such a framework in civil ATE ordinances have concluded they are not
so arbitrary or irrational to offend due process. See Idris, 552 F.3d at
566; Agomo, 916 A.2d at 194; Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 600–04. Under
the rational basis framework adopted by the parties in this case, we
33
come to the same conclusion under article I, section 1 of the Iowa
Constitution, even if we apply a somewhat more stringent rational basis
test than would ordinarily result under federal due process caselaw.
V. Preemption.
A. Introduction. Under Iowa’s home rule amendment, a
municipality cannot enact an ordinance that expressly or impliedly
conflicts with state law. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A; Seymour, 755
N.W.2d at 537–38. Jacobsma asserts that the Sioux City ordinance
conflicts with Iowa Code sections 321.285, 321.493, and 321.484 (2013).
Iowa Code section 321.285 is a criminal statute relating to speed
restrictions. Jacobsma argues that the Sioux City ATE ordinance is
preempted because nothing in Iowa Code section 321.285 expressly
authorizes a city to enact an ATE ordinance that imposes civil penalties
on registered owners who might not be actual drivers of the vehicle.
Iowa Code section 321.493 relates to an owner’s potential civil
liability in cases in which damage occurs due to the negligence of a driver
of the vehicle. While this provision authorizes vicarious liability on
owners in certain circumstances, Jacobsma points out that it does not
authorize holding a registered owner responsible for a speeding
infraction.
Iowa Code section 321.484 imposes criminal liability upon an
owner for a driver’s moving violation if the vehicle owner requires or
knowingly permits the operation of the vehicle upon a highway in any
manner contrary to law. Jacobsma notes that under the Sioux City ATE
ordinance, a registered owner may be responsible for speeding violations
without showing a comparable state of mind.
The City responds by emphasizing that there is no express
preemption of the Sioux City ATE ordinance. In order for implied
34
preemption to be triggered, the City contends that a local law must be
“irreconcilable with state law.” Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d
486, 500 (Iowa 1998) (noting “[a] local ordinance ‘is not inconsistent with
a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law’ ” (quoting Iowa
Code § 331.301(4))). The City notes that we upheld an ordinance similar
to the Sioux City ATE ordinance from preemption attack in Seymour, 755
N.W.2d at 545. In Seymour, we emphasized that while provisions of Iowa
Code chapter 321 imposed criminal sanctions for traffic violations, Iowa
Code section 321.235 authorized municipalities to “ ‘adopt additional
traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this
chapter’ ” and that municipal ordinances imposing civil liability for
infractions are not preempted. 755 N.W.2d at 539–44 (quoting Iowa
Code § 321.235).
B. Discussion. We agree with the City that Seymour is controlling
here, and that as a result, Jacobsma’s preemption claims must fail.
While Jacobsma correctly notes that his contention the Sioux City
ordinance violates Iowa Code sections 321.493 and 321.494 was not
specifically considered in Seymour, his contention that they preempt the
Sioux City ordinance is without merit. Iowa Code section 321.493,
relating to an owner’s liability for damages resulting from a driver’s
negligence, is not “irreconcilable” with the Sioux City ATE ordinance,
which deals with civil liability for speeding infractions. Cf. Seymour, 755
N.W.2d at 541 (noting in order to be considered irreconcilable, the
“conflict must be unresolvable short of choosing one enactment over the
other” and as here, “[n]o such bitter choice is presented”). Nor does Iowa
Code section 321.484, which imposes criminal penalties in certain
situations, provide a basis for preempting civil penalties for speeding
violations that are consistent with substantive state law related to
35
speeding. See id. at 541–42 (noting “[n]othing in Iowa Code chapter 321
. . . addresses the question of whether a municipality may impose civil
penalties on owners of vehicles through an ATE regime”). Compare Iowa
Code § 321.484(4) (noting a violation is a simple misdemeanor), with
Sioux City, Iowa, Mun. Code § 10.12.080(4) (establishing a civil penalty
for violations).
VI. Conclusion.
For all the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.