Douglas Michael Knutson v. Kaytlyn Oellrich ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1675
Filed March 29, 2023
DOUGLAS MICHAEL KNUTSON,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
KAYTLYN OELLRICH,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County, Laura Parrish,
Judge.
The mother challenges a ruling entered in one county after entry of an order
transferring venue to another county. REVERSED AND VACATED.
Alexander S. Momany of Howes Law Firm, PC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Luke Meinholz of Swartz Law Firm, PLLC, Waukon, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.
This interlocutory appeal concerns a ruling made by the Allamakee County
District Court after that court transferred venue to Linn County. Relying on case
law that dates nearly to the founding of our state, we find the Allamakee court
lacked authority to act after transferring venue to Linn. We therefore reverse and
vacate, voiding all action taken after the order changing venue.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A child was born to father Douglas Knutson and mother Kaytlyn Oellrich in
2016. The parties were not married. In 2018, the parties filed, and the Allamakee
District Court approved, a stipulation for shared legal custody and physical care of
the child. By December 2021, the mother had moved to Cedar Rapids, and she
filed a motion in the Allamakee case to change venue to Linn County. The motion
for change of venue was properly served on the father’s counsel of record and
uncontested. The Allamakee court granted the motion for change of venue on
December 30, 2021.
In February 2022, a case file was opened in Linn County and the transcript
of Allamakee proceedings was filed pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.807. Despite this, the father filed a petition to modify in the original Allamakee
case, which also included a request to return venue to Allamakee. The mother
responded with a pre-answer motion to dismiss. The mother asserted that “this
Court [in Allamakee County] is currently precluded from entering any orders” and
“without any means or authority to enter an order purporting to remove venue from
another Court where venue has previously been granted.” The mother also filed
a “motion to determine schooling” in the Allamakee case number, but the district
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court ordered that filing rescinded on the same date. Meanwhile, in Linn County,
the mother filed a petition for modification hours after the father filed his petition in
Allamakee County.
In September 2022—after the academic year began—a contested hearing
was held in Allamakee County and the parties presented evidence on the
schooling issue. The district court denied the mother’s motion to dismiss and
ordered that the child attend school in Allamakee County for the current school
year. The mother filed a notice of appeal, which our supreme court treated as an
application for interlocutory appeal and granted. The case was transferred to our
court for resolution.
II. Our Review
The supreme court’s pre-transfer order granted an “interlocutory appeal.”
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.108 (providing that, when a party seeks the wrong form of
review, “and the appellate court determines another form of review was the proper
one, the case shall not be dismissed, but shall proceed as though the proper form
of review had been requested.”). We recognize this action could be recast as a
petition for writ of certiorari challenging the district court’s jurisdiction or venue.
See Ostergren v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 863 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 2015) (“Certiorari
proceedings are leveled at the tribunal, board, or officer alleged to have exceeded
the jurisdiction or authority conferred by law.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). We decline to quibble with the supreme court’s verbiage or re-
caption the case. That said, if tasked with doing so, we would grant the petition
for writ of certiorari and sustain it, for the reasons expressed in this opinion. See
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Iowa Code § 602.5103 (2021) (on the authority of the court of appeals to issue
writs in transferred cases).
III. Jurisdiction and Authority1
In her appellate brief, the mother primarily asserts that the Allamakee court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Though we disagree with the vocabulary used
by the mother, we find she has the substance of the matter right. On our de novo
review, we reverse, vacate, and void the district court’s ruling. See Iowa R. App.
P. 6.907. If this case were before us on a petition for writ of certiorari, we would
review for corrections of errors at law. See Crowell v. State Pub. Def., 845 N.W.2d
676, 687 (Iowa 2014). There is no difference between these standards given the
purely legal issue presented.
As to the mother’s initial framing of the question—regarding subject matter
jurisdiction—we find this misses the mark. “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power
of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the
court’s attention.” Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Iowa Code chapter 600B (2022) vests the
district court with subject matter jurisdiction over the general class of child custody
and paternity matters for unwed parents. See Iowa Code §§ 600B.9, .10, .31. The
mother’s subject-matter challenge lacks merit.
1 In her reply brief, the mother seeks sanctions against the father, apparently
unhappy that he chose to organize the issues in his brief in a different sequence
than she did. We often find it helpful when responsive briefs mirror organization
of the opening brief, but this is not required by our rules. See Iowa R. App. P.
6.903(2), (3), (4). We deny the request for sanctions.
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Although not cited by the parties, we have found in our own research
nineteenth-century cases that refer to a particular district court losing “jurisdiction”
over a case after change of venue. See Carroll Cnty. v. Am. Emigrant Co., 37
Iowa 371, 374 (1873) (holding “that the Carroll county district court lost its
jurisdiction over the case” after change of venue to Polk); Brown v. Thompson, 14Iowa 597, 597–98 (1863) (“The venue of this cause was changed from Monona to
Greene County, from the fourth to the fifth judicial district. At a succeeding term
the District Court of Monona County, on motion of plaintiff, re-docketed the cause
and ordered the same to be set down for a hearing as though no change had been
made. In this there was error.”); Farr v. Fuller, 12 Iowa 83, 84 (1861) (“The order
for the change of venue was unconditional. After this the District Court of Story,
and not that of Polk, was the proper tribunal to apply to for any order or relief. The
District Court of Polk county had no longer jurisdiction of the cause.”); Campbell v.
Thompson, 4 Greene 415, 415 (Iowa 1854) (“After granting the change of venue,
the district court of Marion county had no further jurisdiction over the subject matter
or the parties.”).
We have considered whether these old cases were implicitly abrogated by
our adoption of a unified trial court system in 1973. See 1972 Iowa Acts ch. 1124
(Unified Trial Court Act); see also Iowa Code § 602.6101 (“A unified trial court is
established.”). We believe this precedent remains good law until the supreme
court indicates otherwise. The cases do not involve a transfer between inferior
statutory courts (like justice of the peace, police, or mayoral courts), but rather
transfers within our constitutional court of general jurisdiction: the district court.
See Iowa Const. art. V, § 6.
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While still good law, the cases involve some outdated vocabulary. In our
modern lexicon, we would say these old cases involve “authority” rather than
“jurisdiction.” As the supreme court has put it more recently,
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the authority of a court to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the
court’s attention. A court may have subject matter jurisdiction but for
one reason or another may not be able to entertain a particular case.
In such a situation we say the court lacks authority to hear that
particular case.
Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co. v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 874–75
(Iowa 2007) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
It is not uncommon for parties “to conflate jurisdiction with authority.” See
In re Est. of Burge, No. 19-1881, 2021 WL 1017139, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 17,
2021). Because we find authority—not jurisdiction—is at issue, we must decide
whether the mother consented to the court’s action, waived her objection, or is
estopped from the challenge she makes on appeal. See State v. Mandicino, 509
N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 1993) (elaborating on the distinction between “authority”
and “jurisdiction,” and discussing consent, waiver, and estoppel in that context).
The most unusual fact in favor of waiver or consent is the mother’s “motion
to determine schooling” filed in Allamakee County after venue had been
transferred to Linn County. But that motion was rescinded by order of a district
judge and the caption suggests it was filed in the wrong case number. We do not
find waiver or estoppel based on the apparently misfiled document.
Having dealt with the rescinded filing, we are left to decide whether the
mother adequately raised the authority issue such that we can reach it. The
mother’s filings below, as well as her filings on appeal, do not cite the old cases
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we discuss above, but they did consistently argue the Allamakee court was legally
precluded from entering the order after venue change. See Gunn v. Wanger, 48
N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 1951) (“A court will not litigate matters finally determined
in another court nor interfere with proceedings therein nor process therefrom.”).
We conclude the mother adequately raised the claim.
Although they are dated and use somewhat outmoded language, we find
the supreme court’s decisions on this issue are controlling and on-point. See
Emigrant Co., 37 Iowa at 374; Brown, 14 Iowa at 597–98; Farr, 12 Iowa at 84;
Campbell, 4 Greene at 415. We also agree with the cases’ underlying rationale.
It would undermine the integrity of the judicial system and squander resources to
permit litigants to pursue simultaneous actions in multiple district courts. And it
could pit district judges against one another, either on the merits or in a race to
issue a ruling. See Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm’n v. Pate, 950 N.W.2d
1, 8 (Iowa 2020) (“Our court system works through a system of appeals, which
would be undermined if parties could travel to another district court to try to undo
what one district court has already done.”). This is antithetical to our unified court
system.
In light of controlling case law, we conclude the Allamakee County District
Court lacked authority to decide any substantive issue in the original case number
after the change of venue to Linn County. The ruling on the school issue is
therefore voidable if a party raises a challenge to authority, and the mother has
done so. See Klinge, 725 N.W.2d at 16. We hold that all substantive rulings
entered in the Allamakee County District Court after the change of venue to Linn
are void.
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To conclude, we repeat an observation made by the district judge in
Allamakee County, which is that the jurisdiction-and-authority thicket in this case
is a product of “the parties’ refusal to communicate openly with one another or to
be proactive in addressing obvious disagreements.” We, like the district court, are
concerned by the parties’ failure to get along and the ongoing damage they inflict
upon the child as they maneuver through the court system. We regret that our
opinion today may lead to further disruption for the child, but we are compelled to
enforce existing case law, and the supreme court’s decisions do not permit one
court to usurp power after transferring venue to another.
REVERSED AND VACATED.