ANAIS J. ROSARIO v. CARING BEES HEALTHCARE, INC., & Another. ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    21-P-728
    ANAIS J. ROSARIO
    vs.
    CARING BEES HEALTHCARE, INC., & another.1
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    In this case we address whether statements made to private
    individuals by a person alleging sexual harassment constitute
    petitioning activity protected by G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the
    "anti-SLAPP" statute.       Anais Rosario claimed that she worked
    briefly for Caring Bees Healthcare (Caring Bees) until being
    assaulted by her supervisor, Jean Karangwa.            Rosario made
    statements about Karangwa to private individuals.              Nine months
    later, she filed a civil action against Caring Bees and
    Karangwa, and Karangwa filed counterclaims for defamation and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon
    Rosario's statements to the private individuals.              Rosario filed
    a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims under G. L.
    1   Jean Paul Karangwa.
    c. 231, § 59H, and asserted that her statements qualified as
    petitioning activity.   A Superior Court judge concluded that her
    statements did not constitute petitioning activity and denied
    the special motion to dismiss.   We agree and affirm.
    Background.   We summarize the facts from "the pleadings and
    supporting and opposing affidavits."   G. L. c. 231, § 59H.
    In October of 2017, Caring Bees hired Rosario as a payroll
    and scheduling clerk.   Over the next several weeks, Rosario
    allegedly suffered recurrent sexual harassment.   According to
    Rosario, Karangwa, who was her supervisor, repeatedly made
    sexual comments to her, sent her an inappropriate video, and
    ultimately assaulted her by "grab[bing] her vaginal area."
    Rosario reported these events to three private individuals.
    The day after receiving the video, she told a co-worker that
    Karangwa sent her a "sexually explicit and inappropriate video."
    On the same day of the alleged sex assault, Rosario texted the
    co-worker that "Karangwa had just grabbed her vaginal area."
    Also on that day, Rosario told her mother "what had happened."
    Later that day, Rosario told a second co-worker that Karangwa
    was a "pervert" and a "molester."
    Rosario also reported these events to the government.      On
    the day of the alleged assault, November 15, 2017, Rosario filed
    an incident report with the Boston Police Department and
    reported that Karangwa sent her sexually charged text messages,
    2
    shared the video, and assaulted her.       On January 19, 2018,
    Rosario filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission
    Against Discrimination (MCAD) and reported the assault, the
    video, and sexual comments made by Karangwa and others.       In May
    2018, Rosario withdrew the MCAD complaint and indicated that she
    intended to file a civil action.       On July 2, 2018, Rosario filed
    a complaint (later amended) under G.L. c. 151B in the Superior
    Court and alleged Karangwa repeatedly made sexual comments to
    her, sent her an inappropriate video, and ultimately assaulted
    her.   Rosario also alleged that she told a co-worker about the
    video and told her mother and a co-worker about the assault.
    On August 20, 2018, Karangwa filed counterclaims.    He
    alleged that the following statements by Rosario to co-workers
    and her mother constituted defamation and subjected him to
    emotional distress:    (1) Karangwa sent her a "pornographic"
    video; (2) Karangwa was a "molester" and a "pervert"; and (3)
    Karangwa "grabbed her vaginal area."
    Rosario filed a special motion to dismiss Karangwa's
    counterclaims under G. L. c. 231, § 59H.       That statute protects
    a party's constitutional right to petition the government by
    providing a process "to dispose expeditiously of merit less
    lawsuits that may chill petitioning activity."       Duracraft Corp.
    v. Holmes Prod. Corp., 
    427 Mass. 156
    , 166 (1998) (Duracraft).
    Rosario argued that the counterclaims constituted such an effort
    3
    to chill her petitioning activity.    The Superior Court judge
    "[a]ssum[ed] without deciding" that Rosario's pre-litigation
    statements constituted petitioning activity, but the judge
    denied the motion to dismiss because the counterclaims were not
    primarily brought to chill those activities.    Rosario appealed.
    In an unpublished memorandum and order, a panel of this
    court vacated the order and remanded the matter to enable the
    judge to assess whether the statements constituted petitioning
    activity.   Rosario v. Caring Bees Healthcare, Inc., 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1122
     (2020).   See Duracraft, 
    427 Mass. at
    167–168,
    quoting G. L. c. 231, § 59H (a party filing a special motion to
    dismiss must first "make a threshold showing through the
    pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are 'based
    on' the petitioning activities alone").    On remand, the judge
    concluded that none of Rosario's statements to private
    individuals constituted petitioning activity under the statute
    and again denied Rosario's special motion to dismiss.    Rosario
    now appeals this second denial.
    Discussion.     Rosario bears the burden of demonstrating that
    her conduct constitutes petitioning activity.    Duracraft, 
    427 Mass. at 167-168
    .   The governing statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H,
    sixth par. Defines "a party's exercise of its right of petition"
    as follows:
    4
    "[1] any written or oral statement made before or submitted
    to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
    governmental proceeding; [2] any written or oral statement
    made in connection with an issue under consideration or
    review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or
    any other governmental proceeding; [3] any statement
    reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of
    an issue by legislative, executive, or judicial body or any
    other governmental proceeding; [4] any statement reasonably
    likely to enlist public participation in an effort to
    effect such consideration; or [5] any other statement
    falling within constitutional protection of the right to
    petition government."
    Rosario contends that her statements to private individuals
    constitute petitioning activity, or are at least reasonably
    likely to encourage consideration and to enlist public
    participation in her claims to the police, MCAD, and the
    Superior Court.   Based upon our "de novo" review of the record
    in this case, we conclude that Rosario has not met her burden of
    demonstrating that her statements to private individuals
    constitute petitioning activity.       Haverhill Stem LLC v.
    Jennings, 
    99 Mass. App. Ct. 626
    , 631 (2021).      See Reichenbach v.
    Haydock, 
    92 Mass. App. Ct. 567
    , 572 & n.14 (2017) (explaining
    rationale for standard of review).
    "The right to petition a governmental body for redress of a
    grievance is the very essence of petitioning activity."        North
    Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 
    452 Mass. 852
    ,
    863 (2009) (North American).   "The typical mischief that the
    legislation intended to remedy was lawsuits directed at
    individual citizens of modest means for speaking publicly
    5
    against development projects."    Duracraft, 
    427 Mass. at 161
    .
    The objective of SLAPP suits is not to win them, but to
    intimidate people for "reporting violations of law, writing to
    government officials, attending public hearings, testifying
    before government bodies, circulating petitions for signature,
    lobbying for legislation, campaigning in initiative or
    referendum elections, filing agency protests or appeals, being
    parties in law-reform lawsuits, and engaging in peaceful
    boycotts and demonstrations."     
    Id. at 161-162
    , quoting Pring,
    SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 
    7 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 3
    , 5 (1989).     While broadly written, the anti-
    SLAPP statute "has its limits."       Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 
    443 Mass. 327
    , 336 (2005).    In order to determine if statements constitute
    petitioning activity under the statute, courts "consider them in
    the over-all context in which they were made."       North American,
    
    452 Mass. at 862
    .
    At the time she made her statements to her co-workers and
    her mother, Rosario was not engaged in petitioning activity
    under the statute because her statements lacked the "essence of
    petitioning activity" –- contact with the government -- or at
    the very least efforts to "reach governmental bodies" (citation
    omitted).   North American, 
    452 Mass. at 862, 863
    .      See Kobrin,
    
    443 Mass. at 330
     (petitioning involves "seeking from the
    government any form of redress for a grievance"); Garabedian v.
    6
    Westland, 
    59 Mass. App. Ct. 427
    , 433 (2003) (petitioning
    involves "supplication to higher authority").   Rosario's private
    statements "lacked the characteristics of petition" contemplated
    by G. L. c. 231, § 59H.    Garabedian, supra at 432.
    Characteristics of petitioning activity typically include a
    statement, report, complaint, request, or demand to a government
    entity.    See, e.g., Benoit v. Frederickson, 
    454 Mass. 148
    , 153
    (2009) ("reporting of a rape to police"); Dever v. Ward, 
    92 Mass. App. Ct. 175
    , 179 (2017) ("appeals to the police and to
    the courts"); O'Gara v. St. Germain, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 490
    , 497
    (2017) (reporting "suspected criminal activity to the police").
    Petitioning may also take the form of filing a lawsuit or taking
    other court action.   See, e.g., 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE
    Boston, LLC, 
    477 Mass. 162
    , 165-167 (2017) (filing complaint
    seeking declaratory judgment, petition for injunctive relief,
    application for criminal complaint); Van Liew v. Stansfield, 
    474 Mass. 31
    , 36 (2016) ("application for a harassment prevention
    order").   Petitioning activity may also include statements to
    the government "made outside any formal governmental
    proceedings,"   North American, 
    452 Mass. at 862
    , see, e.g.,
    Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 
    437 Mass. 113
    , 122 (2002) (statements
    to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regarding proposed sale
    of property); Baker v. Parsons, 
    434 Mass. 543
    , 545–551 (2001)
    (letter and statements to Federal and State environmental
    7
    agencies), or "statements made by one participant in a pending
    governmental proceeding to another in an effort to settle the
    controversy."    Plante v. Wylie, 
    63 Mass. App. Ct. 151
    , 159
    (2005).   Rosario has not cited, and we have not found, any
    appellate decision where statements lacking a "supplication to
    higher authority," Garabedian, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 433, or
    efforts to at least "reach governmental bodies," North American,
    
    452 Mass. at 862
    , qualify as petitioning activity under G. L.
    c. 231, § 59H.
    Rosario contends that her statements to co-workers and her
    mother constitute petitioning activity because they "were
    inextricably connected to the [subsequent] filing of her police
    report, her MCAD charge and, ultimately, this litigation."     She
    argues that her statement to a co-worker reporting the assault
    was part of the sexual harassment complaint process under G. L.
    c. 151B; that her statements to another co-worker about the
    video and the touching were calculated to enlist public
    participation and to encourage government review of her claim;
    and that her statement to her mother resulted in her mother
    advising her to file a police report.   We conclude that
    Rosario's statements to her co-workers and her mother were
    independent from her subsequent complaints to the government and
    fell outside the scope of petitioning activity under G. L.
    c. 231, § 59H.
    8
    Rosario suggests that her petitioning activity began before
    her formal report to the MCAD because she attempted to report
    sexual harassment to the co-worker she believed was responsible
    for such complaints pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 3A (b) (1) (v)
    (requiring employers to adopt process for filing sexual
    harassment complaint).    Private actions taken in anticipation of
    contacting the government do not automatically constitute
    petitioning activity.    See, e.g., Giuffrida v. High Country
    Investor, Inc., 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 225
    , 243 (2008) ("letter
    notifying the defendant of intent to take legal action");
    Maxwell v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 
    72 Mass. App. Ct. 685
    , 694
    (2008) (insurance company investigation); Kalter v. Wood, 
    67 Mass. App. Ct. 584
    , 587 (2006) (complaint letter to health
    insurance company).     Even if we assume that an internal
    complaint of harassment could in some circumstances be
    petitioning, the record does not support Rosario's suggestion
    that she was making a report in connection with c. 151B.     To the
    contrary, the undisputed record shows that the co-worker, an
    office assistant, simply reached out to Rosario after she quit.
    There is nothing in the record indicating that the office
    assistant had any responsibility with respect to sexual
    harassment.   Thus, viewing the statements in context, we agree
    with the judge that Rosario did not meet her burden of showing
    9
    that she was engaged in petitioning activity when speaking with
    the office assistant.
    The private conversation between Rosario and her co-worker
    about the video and the alleged sex assault cannot reasonably be
    construed as an effort to "enlist public participation" or to
    "encourage consideration or review of an issue" in Rosario's
    subsequent petitioning activities.   G. L. c. 231, § 59H.    The
    same is true for the private conversation between Rosario and
    her mother about the alleged assault.     Conduct aimed at
    enlisting public participation or encouraging government action
    requires, at a minimum, a broad appeal or a call to action.
    See, e.g., Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 
    477 Mass. 141
    , 150-151 (2017) (statements to newspaper while hospital
    under investigation by Department of Mental Health); Cardno
    ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 
    476 Mass. 479
    , 485 (2017) (blog post
    part of "ongoing efforts to influence governmental bodies by
    increasing the amount and tenor of coverage around the
    environmental consequences of the [oil] spill"); Office One,
    Inc., 
    437 Mass. at 117, 122
     (leaflets distributed to condominium
    unit owners urging calls to government officials); Wynne v.
    Creigle, 
    63 Mass. App. Ct. 246
    , 253 (2005) (statements to fire
    department and newspaper); MacDonald v. Paton, 
    57 Mass. App. Ct. 290
    , 295 (2003) (interactive website designed to generate
    interest on issues of concern in town).     Rosario's discreet
    10
    statements to her mother and co-workers lacked both a broad
    appeal and a call to action.       Rosario contends that the nature
    of her statements (sexual harassment and assault) is sufficient,
    by itself, to satisfy the requirements for enlisting public
    participation and encouraging government review.         "That a
    statement concerns a topic that has attracted governmental
    attention, in itself, does not give that statement the character
    contemplated by the statute."       Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New
    England, Inc., 
    63 Mass. App. Ct. 600
    , 605 (2005).
    While we agree with Rosario that conferring with loved ones
    (like her mother) can be of critical importance to sexual
    assault victims, we disagree that such conversations necessarily
    constitute petitioning activity.         In support of the argument
    that the conversation with her mother is petitioning activity,
    Rosario cites Benoit, 
    454 Mass. at 153
    .         In that case, a minor
    child reported a rape allegation to her parents, and the parents
    assisted her in reporting the allegation to the police.            
    Id. at 149-150, 153
    .   Criminal charges followed and were ultimately
    dismissed.   
    Id. at 150
    .   The alleged assailant then sued the
    child and her parents.     
    Id.
        The Supreme Judicial Court
    concluded that the child's report to the police as well as the
    parents' "involvement in their minor daughter's reporting of
    crime to the police plainly comes within the scope of
    petitioning."   
    Id. at 153
    .      Thus, the petitioning activity in
    11
    Benoit was the report to the police, not the conversation
    between the child and her parents.
    Unlike the situation in Benoit, Karangwa's counterclaims
    did not infringe on any petitioning activity.   Karangwa's
    counterclaims expressly limited allegations to Rosario's
    conversations with private individuals and lacked any nexus to
    her appeal to the government.   Compare Haverhill Stem, LLC, 99
    Mass. App. Ct. at 628-629, 634 (petitioning activity in Land
    Court and zoning proceedings not implicated by complaint based
    on extortion); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. 290 Auto Body, Inc.,
    
    95 Mass. App. Ct. 515
    , 518 (2019) (petitioning activity in civil
    action regarding insurance claim not implicated by counterclaim
    "involving alleged unruly assaultive behavior"); Reichenbach, 92
    Mass. App. Ct. at 570, 574 (petitioning activity in opposing
    construction of oceanfront home not implicated by claim of
    "threats, intimidation, [and] coercion"); Garabedian, 59 Mass.
    App. Ct. at 432 (petitioning activity in opposing airport
    expansion not implicated by claim of "harassing" contractor and
    engaging in "intrusive surveillance"); Ayasli v. Armstrong, 
    56 Mass. App. Ct. 740
    , 748 (2002)(petitioning activity in opposing
    addition to home not implicated by claim based on "intentionally
    interfering" with right to use property).   Because the
    counterclaims here are based on "private interaction" rather
    than an effort to "influence, inform, or even reach a government
    12
    body," the judge properly denied the special motion to dismiss.
    Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 518.
    Rosario's private statements to individuals do not
    transform into petitioning activity merely because she
    republished some of those statements in a report to the police,
    a complaint to MCAD, and a civil action.    "Individuals who
    petition the government are not necessarily free to engage in
    gratuitous publication of the petition elsewhere without
    consequence."   Kalter, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 588.   See, e.g.,
    Blanchard, 
    477 Mass. at 153
     (email to hospital staff not
    petitioning activity though related government investigation
    underway); Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 
    448 Mass. 242
    , 254 (2007)
    (statements about an adversary not petitioning activity though
    published during litigation); Burley v. Comets Community Youth
    Ctr., Inc., 
    75 Mass. App. Ct. 818
    , 822-824 (2009) (statement to
    private individuals not petitioning activity though similar no-
    trespass letter sent to police and court); Ehrlich v. Stern, 
    74 Mass. App. Ct. 531
    , 540-542 (2009) (posting on website not
    petitioning activity though related to class action lawsuit);
    Global NAPS, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 601, 607 (statement to
    reporter not petitioning activity though communicated during
    pending arbitration appeal).   In Kalter, a patient sent
    identical letters to an insurance company, the police, and the
    Division of Professional Licensure (DPL).    Kalter, 67 Mass. App.
    13
    Ct. 585.   The chiropractor, who was the subject of the letters,
    filed a claim against the patient, and the patient claimed the
    letters were protected petitioning activity.    Id.   We agreed
    that the letters sent to the police and DPL constituted
    petitioning activity, but the identical letter sent to the
    insurance company did not.   Id. at 587.   The same reasoning
    holds true here.   Rosario may have made similar statements to
    private individuals and the government.    As in Kalter,
    statements to the government constitute petitioning activity,
    but statements to private individuals, in the "over-all context"
    here, do not.   North American, 
    452 Mass. at 862
    .
    Conclusion.    The anti-SLAPP statute "provides its own
    express" definition of petitioning activity Commonwealth v.
    Exxon Mobil Corp., 
    489 Mass. 724
    , 727 n.3 (2022).     We are bound
    to review Rosario's statements with reference to the plain
    language of the statute, and the "over-all context" in which the
    statements were made.   North American, 
    452 Mass. at 862
    .     Based
    upon that governing standard and the record here, Rosario has
    not met her burden of proving that her statements to private
    individuals constituted petitioning activity under G. L. c. 231,
    § 59H.   The order denying the special motion to dismiss is
    14
    affirmed.    The parties' requests for appellate attorney fees and
    costs are denied.
    Order denying special motion
    to dismiss affirmed.
    By the Court (Neyman, Shin &
    Hodgens, JJ.2),
    Clerk
    Entered:    April 5, 2023.
    2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    15