Commonwealth v. Daniel P. Green. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
20-P-503
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
DANIEL P. GREEN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A grand jury twice issued indictments against the defendant
for assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily
injury (AB child-SBI) and permitting serious bodily injury on a
child (permitting); the victim was the defendant's infant son.1
After the defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court on the
second set of indictments, he moved unsuccessfully to dismiss
them. Later, after a jury-waived trial, a judge convicted the
defendant of the battery and acquitted him of the other offense.
Because we are satisfied that the evidence presented to the
grand jury adequately supported the indictment on which the
defendant was ultimately convicted, that the evidence at trial
was sufficient to allow the trial judge to convict the
1 As we explain in more detail below, the Commonwealth dismissed
the first set of indictments.
defendant, and that the trial judge acted within her discretion
in denying the defendant's motion for new trial, we affirm.
Discussion. 1. Motion to dismiss the indictments.2
A. Adequacy of the evidence presented to the grand jury in the
2014 case. The defendant challenges the adequacy of the
evidence presented to the grand jury to establish probable cause
to believe that the defendant, and not someone else, committed
the assault and battery on his child that resulted in the
child's severe injuries.3
"Although, in general, a court will not inquire into the
competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand
jury, . . . [a]t the very least, the grand jury must hear
enough evidence to establish the identity of the accused
and to support a finding of probable cause to arrest the
accused for the offense charged. . . . Probable cause is a
considerably less exacting standard than that required to
support a conviction at trial. . . . It requires
sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution
2 As we have noted, the defendant was indicted twice. The first
presentment took place in early 2013; the grand jury indicted
the defendant of AB child-SBI and permitting (2013 indictments).
After the defendant moved to dismiss those indictments, alleging
deficiencies in the presentment, see Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392
Mass. 445 (1984); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160(1982), the Commonwealth dismissed those indictments. The
Commonwealth re-presented the case to a new grand jury in 2014,
calling only one live witness (Trooper Joshua Ulrich) and
otherwise relying on the transcripts from the first presentment
(with the exception of the transcript of the defendant's
mother's testimony, which the Commonwealth opted not to rely
upon at the second presentment) and a selection of documentary
exhibits and interview recordings. The second grand jury, too,
indicted the defendant for AB child-SBI and permitting (2014
case). We focus on the 2014 case here.
3 As we have noted, at trial the defendant was acquitted of the
crime of permitting.
2
in believing that an offense has been committed, not proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Reyes, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 801 (2020) (and
cases cited, quotations omitted). Reviewing the grand jury
evidence de novo, id., and in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Buono, 484 Mass. 351, 362
(2020), we are satisfied that the evidence presented to the
grand jury was adequate to establish probable cause to believe
that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.
The defendant's contention that the Commonwealth's expert
testimony about the timing of the crime rules out the defendant
as the perpetrator is incorrect. The evidence established that
the victim was brought to the Beverly Hospital emergency room at
approximately 10:30 P.M. on November 27. The Commonwealth's
expert, Dr. Alice Newton, testified that the severe traumatic
brain injury and retinal hemorrhaging with which the child was
diagnosed were the result of the child's having suffered
"abusive head trauma or violent shaking" within thirty minutes
to four hours prior to his arrival at the hospital.4 The
4 Dr. Newton also testified before the grand jury, mistakenly,
that the victim was first seen in the Beverly Hospital emergency
room at "around 7:30 or eight" on November 27. As we will
explain, however, the evidence showed that the defendant was
with the child from 5 P.M. until the child arrived at Beverly
Hospital, including being alone with him for over two hours.
The error therefore does not undermine the grand jury's
indictments.
3
evidence from the defendant's wife and the record of telephone
calls between the defendant and his wife in the hours before
they brought the victim to the Beverly Hospital emergency room
established that the victim was in the defendant's care during
the afternoon and evening of November 27, 2012, and further,
that the defendant and the victim were alone for much of the
period between 5 P.M. and 7:17 P.M. Regardless of whether the
child arrived at the hospital at 10:30 P.M. or, as Dr. Newton
mistakenly testified, three hours earlier, where the child was
in the father's care within four hours of his admission to the
Beverly Hospital emergency room, the evidence was adequate to
provide probable cause that the abuse took place during the time
the defendant was caring for the child.5
The evidence was likewise adequate to establish probable
cause to believe that the defendant, rather than someone else,
was the victim's abuser. See Buono, 484 Mass. at 365 (evidence
before grand jury must be sufficient to establish identity of
accused). The defendant had the opportunity to commit the abuse
within the window of time identified by the Commonwealth's
expert, as he was at home with the child for much of the
afternoon and evening, and alone with him for at least part of
5 Had the grand jury accepted Dr. Newton's testimony about the
child's arrival time at the emergency room, the result would be
the same.
4
that time.6 See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 482 (2014)
(jury could have considered defendant's sole opportunity to
commit crime as evidence he was perpetrator). The defendant
also had a motive for abuse given the financial and marital
pressures he was experiencing, exacerbated by the victim's
persistent need for medical attention and the father's being
"very stressed" by the victim's crying. See Commonwealth v.
Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 165 (2021) (evidence of motive may bolster
proof of perpetrator's identity). Additionally, the grand
jurors could have discerned, in both the defendant's scattershot
efforts to shift the blame for the child's injuries away from
himself and onto an array of possible other actors and his
attempts to portray himself to the police and medical personnel
as a doting father despite his repeated complaints about the
victim, evidence of a guilty conscience. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Porter, 384 Mass. 647, 653 (1981) (evidence that
defendant "embarked on a series of actions consciously designed
to deflect attention from himself" combined with other
inferences may prove guilt). The Commonwealth was required only
to establish probable cause that the defendant was the
perpetrator; it was not required to rule out all other
6 We do not suggest that the defendant could not have abused the
victim when other people were in the room, but recognize it is
less likely that he would have done so.
5
possibilities. See Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 401
n.6 (2003). We are satisfied that the evidence was adequate to
meet "the 'decidedly low standard' of probable cause to indict"
the defendant.7 Reyes, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 801, quoting
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 675 (2017).
B. Improper character evidence. The defendant's
alternative ground for dismissal of the 2014 indictments -- that
the grand jury minutes from the first presentment that were
introduced as evidence before the second grand jury were tainted
by improper character evidence -- fails adequately to identify
his challenge on appeal. Without more specific guidance, we do
not consider the defendant's argument further. See Cameron v.
7 Assuming the defendant's argument that Trooper Ulrich's live
testimony included outdated information about the victim's
injury-related deficits is properly before us, see Boxford v.
Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 458 Mass. 596, 605 n.21 (2010)
(argument raised for first time in reply brief is not properly
before appellate court); Allen v. Allen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 295,
302 n.11 (2014) ("Any issue raised for the first time in an
appellant's reply brief comes too late, and we do not consider
it" [quotation omitted]), it is not persuasive. We note that
the medical records on which the defendant relies to attack
Ulrich's testimony on this basis are dated after the second
grand jury presentment was made. Cf. Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 72
Mass. App. Ct. 589, 608 (2008) (in assessing sufficiency of
evidence, appellate court does not consider evidence that became
available after time of trial). Further, the records on which
the defendant relies do not refute the evidence showing that the
child suffered substantial injury as a result of the defendant's
abuse. Indeed, to the contrary, the records explicitly refer to
the child's history of "traumatic brain injury" and include
references to problems with his vision and, on at least one
visit, his ability to walk normally.
6
Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-86 (1995) (declining to
address argument not properly supported in appellant's brief);
Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), (e), as appearing in 481 Mass.
1628 (2019). See also Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Med.,
461 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2011) (where party failed to support
claims with legal argument or factual detail, "[a]s both a legal
and a practical matter, [party's] submissions provide[d] an
insufficient basis for this court reasonably to consider his
claims").
2. Motion for new trial. As part of the investigation in
this case, Trooper Ulrich seized the defendant's cell phone.
Later, after obtaining a warrant to do so, the police searched
the phone and extracted text messages and call logs the
Commonwealth introduced into evidence during the second grand
jury presentment. After his conviction, the defendant moved for
a new trial claiming that the police (1) lacked probable cause
to seize the phone and (2) failed in their warrant affidavit to
establish the necessary nexus between the crime and the phone,
and that trial counsel was thus ineffective for failing to move
to suppress the warrantless seizure of the telephone. The judge
denied the defendant's motion. On review, we discern neither an
abuse of discretion nor other error of law in the judge's
ruling. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 489 Mass. 37, 51 (2022).
7
Under the familiar Saferian test, to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that
his attorney's performance fell "measurably below that which
might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer," and that,
as a result, counsel "likely deprived the defendant of an
otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). The
defendant has failed to carry this burden.
First, the defendant has not shown that his motion to
suppress was likely to succeed, and so has not satisfied the
first prong of the Saferian test. See Commonwealth v. Melendez,
490 Mass. 648, 657 (2022). As to the warrantless seizure of the
defendant's phone, evidence of the defendant's voluntary display
to Trooper Ulrich of the videorecording of himself and the child
as part of his effort to portray himself as a loving father; the
fact that, as the police were aware, the defendant and his wife
had communicated by telephone in the afternoon and evening of
November 27, shortly before taking the victim to Beverly
Hospital; and the trooper's awareness that the defendant's step-
daughter had been overheard at the hospital asking, "why did
Daddy make the baby bleed?" were, taken together, enough to
establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had
injured the victim and then used the phone to communicate with
his wife about the situation. That was adequate to justify the
8
trooper's seizure of the defendant's phone. See Commonwealth v.
White, 475 Mass. 583, 588-589 (2016) (police may seize item as
evidence where government can demonstrate nexus between crime
alleged and item seized); Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass.
496, 502-504 (2016) (same). The subsequent search was also
proper where, for essentially the same reasons we have just
discussed, the affidavit supporting the application for the
relevant warrant established probable cause to believe that
there was a nexus between the call information on the phone and
the abuse on which the criminal charges against the defendant
were based.
Second, even if that were not the case, the motion judge,
who also presided over the trial in this case, was clear in her
memorandum of decision on the defendant's motion for new trial
that she did not rely on the evidence taken from the defendant's
phone in convicting him.8 See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471
Mass. 664, 672-673 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Lane, 462
Mass. 591, 597 (2012) (appellate court accords "special
deference" to ruling on motion for new trial where motion judge
8 Even apart from the judge's explicit statement in this regard,
we note that because the police obtained copies of the text
messages and information about the timing of the defendant's
calls to his wife on November 27 from the other parties to those
communications, his former girlfriend and his wife, much of the
relevant evidence extracted from the defendant's phone was
admitted at trial through other sources and without objection.
9
also presided over trial). The judge's denial of the
defendant's motion for new trial was proper.
3. Sufficiency of trial evidence. The defendant's
somewhat cursory challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at
trial again turns on the defendant's interpretation of the
timeline of events immediately preceding the victim's arrival at
the Beverly Hospital emergency room. It is not persuasive.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as we are required to do, see Commonwealth v.
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), we conclude that Dr.
Newton's testimony to the effect that the victim's injuries were
the result of abuse inflicted as early as 6:30 P.M. on November
27 -- a time when he was in the defendant's sole care, see
Commonwealth v. Alammani, 439 Mass. 605, 608-609
(2003) -- together with other evidence of the mechanism and
seriousness of the injuries the victim suffered was sufficient
to prove the defendant's guilt of the battery against the victim
beyond a reasonable doubt. That there may have been evidence to
the contrary does not change the analysis or our conclusion that
the evidence was sufficient. See Commonwealth v. Lugo, 89 Mass.
App. Ct. 229, 232 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470
Mass. 24, 30 (2014) ("We take this view of the evidence
notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary presented by the
defendant").
10
Conclusion. The defendant's conviction of assault and
battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury and the
order denying his motion for new trial are affirmed.9
Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion for new
trial affirmed.
By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand &
D'Angelo, JJ.10),
Clerk
Entered: May 15, 2023.
9 The Commonwealth's motion to strike footnote 2 of the
defendant's brief is denied. We note, however, that in reaching
our decision, we have not considered any information outside the
record.
10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
11