State of Maine v. Miranda G. Hopkins , 2018 ME 100 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 100 Docket: Wal-17-516
Argued: June 12, 2018
Decided: July 17, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
MIRANDA G. HOPKINS
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] Miranda G. Hopkins appeals from a judgment of conviction of
manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2017), entered in the trial
court (Waldo County, R. Murray, J.) following a jury trial. Hopkins contends that
the court erred in (1) denying her motion to suppress statements she made to
law enforcement officers during five different interviews and (2) giving the jury
an allegedly confusing instruction on concurrent causation. Hopkins also
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s conclusion,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hopkins caused the death of her infant son.
We affirm the judgment.
2
I. FACTS AND PRETRIAL HISTORY
[¶2] This statement of the facts and pretrial history includes reference
to five different statements that Hopkins made to law enforcement officers at
various times. Those statements were subject to a motion to suppress and are
at issue in this appeal. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, the jury, at the trial, and the court, at the motion hearing, rationally could
have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Nobles,
2018 ME 26, ¶ 2, 179 A.3d 910; State v. Gerry, 2016 ME 163, ¶ 2, 150 A.3d 810.
[¶3] On the morning of January 11, 2017, Miranda Hopkins sent two of
her three children—her eight-year-old son and six-year-old son—to school.
Hopkins, with her seven-week-old son, then joined a friend and the friend’s son
for coffee and some shopping. Hopkins, her friend, and their children returned
to Hopkins’s home that afternoon to wait for Hopkins’s older sons to return
home from school.
[¶4] While waiting for the older boys, Hopkins and her friend drank shots
of Fireball whiskey and smoked marijuana. The older boys arrived home
around 3:30 p.m. After the boys arrived home, Hopkins and her friend each had
a couple more shots of Fireball whiskey. Around 5:30 p.m., Hopkins’s cousin
3
and her cousin’s daughter arrived at Hopkins’s home for dinner. About twenty
or thirty minutes later, Hopkins’s friend and her son left Hopkins’s home.
[¶5] Hopkins had “a few more shots” of Fireball whiskey with her cousin.
Hopkins “wasn’t counting” but estimated that between 2:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.
she consumed roughly seven shots of Fireball whiskey, smoked marijuana, and
took a Benadryl.
[¶6] Around 8:00 p.m., Hopkins’s cousin and her cousin’s daughter left,
and Hopkins began her nighttime routine by getting her older boys ready for
bed. While she was helping the older boys, she put the baby in a bouncy seat in
the living room. Hopkins got the boys into their bed and began feeling very
“spinny” and “not feeling well at all.” Hopkins lay down at the foot of the older
boys’ bed and “fell asleep big time.” She awoke much later that night due to a
“gall bladder attack.” Hopkins got an ice pack and then lay down in her own
bed. She “wasn’t paying attention to anything” as she walked from the older
boys’ room, into the kitchen, and then into her bedroom.
[¶7] Hopkins dozed off and then woke up again. Upon waking up, she
reached over and felt the baby’s “ice cold” hand. She testified that the baby was
4
in his “boppy”1 in an unnatural position and that his head was “wrong.” She
immediately jumped out of bed, turned on the lights, and grabbed her phone to
dial 9-1-1.2
[¶8] At around 1:47 a.m., Hopkins called 9-1-1 and reported that the
baby was not breathing, was cold to the touch, and had a big bruise on him. She
told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that one of her older boys must have jumped on the
baby in the night, but that she had not heard him cry or any other noises. The
dispatcher instructed Hopkins to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR).
[¶9] At around 2:06 a.m., a Waldo County Sheriff’s deputy arrived at
Hopkins’s home. She found Hopkins performing CPR on the baby on the floor
in her bedroom. The deputy took over CPR and noticed that the baby had a
“significant amount of bruising” on his forehead and chest, had scratches on his
face and neck, and was stiff and cold. While performing CPR, the deputy
contacted her dispatch center and requested that a detective come to
investigate.
1 During the trial, a “boppy” was described as “one of those U-shaped pillows similar to the type
of pillow that you will see airline passengers use during their travels.”
2 This version of events was the version Hopkins told for the first time at trial. Hopkins gave
several different accounts of what happened on the night of January 11, 2017, and the early morning
of January 12, 2017, to law enforcement officers during several different interviews.
5
[¶10] Around 2:16 a.m., emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived
at the home and took over CPR from the deputy. The EMTs brought in an
automatic external defibrillator (AED), which is able to sense any cardiac
rhythm that is shockable, and attached the paddles to the baby. There was no
shockable rhythm, and the EMTs pronounced the baby dead.
[¶11] While the EMTs were working on the baby, the deputy left the
bedroom and went into the living room to speak with Hopkins. The deputy
advised Hopkins that her baby was dead. Hopkins said that she knew he was
gone, mentioned the bruising, and said that she didn’t know how the baby got
the bruises, but believed that one of the older boys had been responsible. She
pointed out her eight-year-old son, sleeping on the couch, to the deputy, then
took the deputy down the hall to see her six-year-old son, who was still sleeping
in his bed.
[¶12] The deputy explained to Hopkins that, in all child death cases, it
was standard procedure to call a detective and that a detective would be
arriving shortly. Hopkins then told the deputy about her day, which ended with
her and the baby going to bed around 9:00 p.m. As they spoke, the deputy
smelled alcohol on Hopkins’s breath. The deputy asked Hopkins if she had
anything to drink that night. Hopkins told her that she woke up around
6
11:30 p.m. with gall bladder pain and had a “couple of shots” of Fireball whiskey
to help with the pain. Hopkins said that she then went back to bed. She said
that she woke up a few hours later, reached over to the baby, and found him
cold, stiff, and unresponsive, at which point she called 9-1-1. Hopkins told the
deputy that she thought that her oldest son must have killed the baby, but she
admitted that she had not heard the baby cry out or felt the bed moving.
[¶13] Around 3:00 a.m., a Maine State Police detective sergeant arrived
at Hopkins’s home. Upon the detective sergeant’s arrival, the deputy met him
outside to brief him on the situation. Upon entering Hopkins’s home, the
detective sergeant exchanged introductory remarks with Hopkins and then
gave her Miranda warnings.3 Hopkins signed a Miranda waiver and agreed to
participate in a recorded interview.
[¶14] Hopkins told the detective that she went to bed around 9:00 p.m.,
then got up around 10:30 p.m. to do the “mommy thing” and check all the doors
to make sure they were secure, and then went back to sleep. She said that she
woke up later and found the baby cold, bruised, and not breathing. She
described herself to the detective as a “light sleeper,” but said that the baby had
not cried, she did not hear either of the older boys, and neither of the older boys
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
7
was in her bed when she woke up. She guessed that one of her older boys must
have climbed into bed beside her and killed the baby.
[¶15] Hopkins said that she had never seen either of the older boys be
aggressive with the baby. She said that the baby had been sleeping “beside
[her] like always” in his boppy and that she did not hear either of the older boys
come into the room. She also said that she “always” had her three-foot-tall
safety gate secured in her bedroom doorway, and that it had been in place that
night. She further indicated that neither of the older boys understood how to
work the gate.
[¶16] The deputy then returned inside at the request of Hopkins, and the
detective went outside. The detective left his recording device on the kitchen
table; the device continued to record Hopkins and the deputy as they
conversed. Hopkins again told the deputy that her oldest son must have killed
the baby. She stated that she was curled up in a ball asleep on her bed and she
didn’t feel the bed move, but she guessed that one of the boys “climbed over the
top of [the baby], like judging by [the baby’s] head. Maybe that’s why he didn’t
make a sound.” But she also said the safety gate was always secured in her
bedroom door and neither of the older boys had ever crawled over the baby in
the bed before because they knew it was his spot.
8
[¶17] After the baby’s body was removed from the home, Hopkins agreed
to participate in a videotaped walk-through to explain where she and the baby
had been positioned in her bed. A detective from the Maine State Police and a
sergeant from the Evidence Response Team participated in the videotaped
walk-through interview with Hopkins. During this walk-through, Hopkins
pointed out the boppy, described the blankets she used to cover the baby up,
described her position on her bed, pointed out the safety gate, and explained
that the safety gate had been in its position that night.
[¶18] Later that morning at around 7:30 a.m., Hopkins agreed to be
further interviewed by the detective who participated in the videotaped
walk-through. She met with the detective in his police cruiser because friends
and family were arriving at her home. The detective reminded Hopkins that
she had been provided Miranda warnings during her earlier recorded interview
with the detective sergeant, informed her that those rights were still in effect,
and offered to go over the rights with her. Hopkins declined the offer to review
her Miranda rights.
[¶19] Hopkins told the detective that she had two shots of Fireball
whiskey around 5:00 p.m., while her cousin was visiting, to “clear her sinuses.”
She explained that after dinner she got the older boys into bed around 8:00 p.m.
9
and then put the baby to sleep in his boppy on her bed around 9:00 p.m. She
said that she took two hits from a marijuana joint after the older boys had gone
to sleep and before she got the baby ready for bed because it “slows [her] brain
down long enough that [she] can fall asleep.” Hopkins stated that she lay down
and fell asleep around 9:00 p.m. and woke up about an hour later because her
gall bladder was bothering her. At that time, she checked on the baby and saw
that he was fine and still sleeping.
[¶20] Hopkins said that she put a “healthy bruise-free one hundred
percent healthy, happy baby to bed . . . .” She did not know what happened to
the baby, and she agreed with the detective that the injuries were inflicted by
someone but denied that she was responsible. She stated that she was “really
praying” that her oldest son would talk to the detective and provide him with
the answers he was looking for because one of her older boys was likely
responsible, but she acknowledged that she had never seen either of them be
violent with the baby.
[¶21] The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy found abrasions
and bruises all over the baby’s body; skull fractures on both sides of his head
and on the back of his head; multiple rib fractures; upper right arm fractures;
swelling and bleeding inside the scalp; retinal and optic nerve sheath
10
hemorrhage; and bleeding into the cervical spinal cord. The medical examiner
opined that these injuries were indicative of “whiplash” forces applied to the
body and that the rib fractures were likely a result of a “squeezing of the chest”
type of force. The medical examiner determined that the baby’s cause of death
was blunt force trauma with craniocerebral injuries.4
[¶22] On January 17, 2017, Hopkins was charged by complaint with one
count of knowing or depraved indifference murder (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 201(1)(A)-(B) (2017). Thereafter, Hopkins was indicted for manslaughter
(Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A). After the grand jury indictment, the State
dismissed the original murder charge in the complaint.
[¶23] On April 24, 2017, Hopkins filed a motion to suppress statements
she made to law enforcement officers during the course of several interviews.
A hearing on the motion was held on August 31, 2017. At the hearing, Hopkins
argued that (1) her initial interview with the responding deputy was in
violation of her Miranda rights and was involuntary; (2) her interview with the
detective sergeant at her kitchen table was undertaken without a valid waiver
4 At trial, Hopkins introduced the expert witness testimony of a pathologist who reviewed the
medical examiner’s autopsy report and agreed with the medical examiner’s autopsy results and her
testimony regarding the baby’s injuries. He further opined that the injuries were most likely caused
by multiple, rapid assaults on various different parts of the baby’s body and were not the result of a
fall or “co-sleeping.”
11
of her Miranda rights and was involuntary; and that (3) her second interview
with the deputy, (4) her interview during the videotaped walk-through, and
(5) her interview with the detective in his cruiser were each undertaken
without a reading of her Miranda rights and were involuntary. At the hearing,
recordings of the interviews were admitted in evidence and the State offered
the testimony of the law enforcement officers involved in the interviews.
II. RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
[¶24] On October 17, 2017, the court entered a written order on the
motion to suppress, granting the motion in part and denying the motion in
part.5 The court made specific findings of fact as to each challenged interview.
[¶25] Regarding Hopkins’s initial interview with the deputy, the court
found that although no Miranda warnings were given, they were not required
because the interview “was not a ‘custodial’ interrogation” and the deputy was
responding to a 9-1-1 call initiated by Hopkins. The court found that although
Hopkins was crying at points during the interview, for the most part she “was
coherent and understandable” and she did not “indicate she wanted to leave or
5 Addressing the five interviews Hopkins challenges on appeal, the court found that the
statements made by Hopkins during these interviews did not require suppression. In her motion to
suppress, Hopkins also challenged statements made during three other interviews with law
enforcement officers, and the court, in its order, made specific findings, some favorable to Hopkins,
as to those three interviews. Hopkins is not challenging those rulings.
12
that she did not want to answer questions.” Based on these findings, the court
concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hopkins’s statements made to the
deputy during the initial interview were voluntary.
[¶26] Addressing Hopkins’s interview with the detective sergeant at her
kitchen table, the court found that the detective sergeant informed Hopkins “of
her Miranda rights, and also provided her with a written Miranda consent form
which she signed.” The court also found that the interview was conducted in a
“conversational and calm tone.” Although Hopkins was crying at times and she
was denied the immediate opportunity to smoke a cigarette, the court found
that her waiver of her Miranda rights was valid and found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that her statements were voluntarily made.
[¶27] The court found that the deputy’s second interview with Hopkins
occurred “almost immediately after the conclusion of [the detective sergeant’s]
interview.” Although the deputy did not provide Hopkins with new Miranda
warnings, Hopkins “was allowed to smoke” and “went about various domestic
duties” while they conversed. The court found that no new Miranda warnings
were required for this interview, and that the statements made by Hopkins
were voluntary.
13
[¶28] The court also made specific findings regarding the videotaped
walk-through interview. The court found that this interview occurred
“approximately three hours after [the detective sergeant] had formally
provided the defendant with her Miranda warnings” and new Miranda
warnings were not given. The court found that Hopkins consented to
participating in the videotaped walk-through and concluded that although the
interview was conducted by different law enforcement officers, new Miranda
warnings were not required and the statements made by Hopkins, “which were
in response to the officer’s calm and nonconfrontational inquiries, were
voluntary.”
[¶29] Addressing Hopkins’s interview with the detective in his police
cruiser, the court found that no new Miranda warnings were given but that the
detective “did address Miranda” with Hopkins by “telling her that all the
Miranda rights which had previously been explained to her still apply, and
specifically asking her if she needed the officer to go over those again with her.”
Hopkins said she did not need to go over Miranda again. The court found that
this interview “lasted approximately three hours” and had a “conversational
low-key tone throughout.” Hopkins was provided with at least one smoking
break, was specifically told she was not under arrest, and at the conclusion of
14
the interview she was not placed under arrest. The court concluded that, based
on these circumstances, no new Miranda warnings were required and the
statements provided by Hopkins during this interview were voluntary.
III. TRIAL
[¶30] A five-day trial was held on October 31, 2017, through
November 7, 2017. At trial, Hopkins testified on her own behalf. She admitted
that much of what she had told law enforcement officers during the interviews
that occurred in the aftermath of her baby’s death was a lie. Hopkins testified
that she lied to the officers during these interviews because she was afraid that
her older sons would be taken from her if she admitted that the death occurred
while she was passed out from drinking.
[¶31] At the conclusion of the trial, Hopkins requested a specific
concurrent causation instruction, 17-A M.R.S. § 33 (2017), that informed the
jurors that, in order to convict her, the State would have to prove three
elements beyond a reasonable doubt,6 including a third element that read: “The
6 See Maine Jury Instruction Manual, § 6-50 at 6-91 (2017-18 ed.):
When the defendant’s conduct may have operated concurrently with other
actions, events or conditions to cause a particular result, then, to find the defendant
guilty of the result, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the result
would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct, and (2) the concurrent
cause was not alone clearly sufficient to produce the result and (3) the defendant’s
conduct was not clearly insufficient to produce the result.
15
Defendant’s conduct was clearly sufficient to produce the result of the death of
[her baby].” The court granted Hopkins’s request for a concurrent causation
instruction but declined to adopt the specific language proposed by Hopkins.
Instead, the court gave a concurrent causation instruction with a third element
that read: “Miranda Hopkins’s conduct was not clearly insufficient to produce
the resulting death of [her baby].” Hopkins objected to the court’s instruction,
and the court responded by stating that it “look[ed] at the language contained
in the statute itself on the issue of concurrent causation as it appears in Title
17-A, section 33. And there . . . , the language chosen by the Legislature also
uses the term clearly insufficient in addressing the conduct of the defendant as
something that, again, must be proven by the State.”
[¶32] During its deliberations, the jury sent the court a note requesting
clarification on “causation.” After consultation with the parties, the court
responded by giving further instructions on concurrent causation stating, in
part, “to the extent you may find that the conduct of one or more of the older
boys was involved in the cause of [the baby’s] death, the State must also prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that, number one, the boy or boys’ actions were not
alone clearly sufficient to produce the resulting death of [the baby] and, number
two, that Miranda Hopkins’s conduct alone was clearly sufficient to produce the
16
resulting death of [her baby].” The concluding sentence of this instruction was
similar to the concluding sentence of the instruction that Hopkins had originally
requested. Both parties were satisfied with the court’s response, and there
were no objections.
[¶33] On November 7, 2017, the jury returned a verdict finding Hopkins
guilty of manslaughter. Hopkins filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which
was denied on November 28, 2017. Hopkins filed a notice of appeal on
November 27, 2017.7 On December 13, 2017, Hopkins was sentenced to
eighteen years in prison, with all but thirteen years suspended, and four years
of probation.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Suppress
[¶34] Hopkins argues that the court erred in denying her motion to
suppress the statements that she made to law enforcement officers during the
five interviews because (1) Hopkins’s initial interview with the deputy
constituted a custodial interrogation requiring the deputy to inform Hopkins of
her Miranda rights; (2) Hopkins’s interview with the detective sergeant was
7 Because a sentence had not yet been entered at the time the appeal was filed, the appeal was
interlocutory, and we allowed the trial court to enter a final judgment and deemed the appeal to be
from the final judgment.
17
undertaken without a valid waiver of her Miranda rights; (3) Hopkins’s Miranda
rights were required to be reread during her second interview with the deputy,
the videotaped walk-through interview, and the interview with the detective in
his cruiser; and (4) Hopkins’s statements made during all five interviews were
not voluntary because of her emotional distress when she made the statements.
[¶35] When addressing a challenge to a court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, “we review the factual findings underlying the trial court’s ruling for
clear error and the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Cote, 2015 ME 78,
¶ 9, 118 A.3d 805. We will affirm a court’s denial of a motion to suppress if any
reasonable view of the evidence supports the court’s decision. State v. Marquis,
2018 ME 39, ¶ 15, 181 A.3d 684.
1. Whether Hopkins’s Statements in her Initial Interview With the
Deputy Were Made During a Custodial Interrogation
[¶36] “When a person has been subjected to an in-custody interrogation
but has not been advised of his Miranda rights, the State may not offer the
statements made during that interrogation against that person in its
case-in-chief.” State v. Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 15, 159 A.3d 840; see Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). A defendant is considered “in custody”
when subject to either a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement
to the degree associated with formal arrest. See State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251,
18
¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222. “To determine if a person was in custody for Miranda
purposes, a court must objectively review the pertinent circumstances to
decide whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have felt
free to terminate the interaction with law enforcement or if there was a
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.”
Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 15, 159 A.3d 840.
[¶37] In making this determination, we consider a number of factors,
viewing them in their totality, including:
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;
(2) the party who initiated the contact;
(3) the existence or nonexistence of probable cause to arrest (to
the extent communicated to the defendant);
(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested
to the defendant, to the extent they would affect how a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to
the police, to the extent the officer’s response would affect
how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would perceive it);
(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar
surroundings;
19
(8) the number of law enforcement officers present;
(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and
(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.
Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222.
[¶38] Review of these factors establishes that Hopkins was not in
custody at any point during her initial interview with the deputy. Hopkins
initiated this interview seeking help following the 9-1-1 call concerning her
baby. Hopkins was coherent and understandable during the interview, the
interview occurred in her home, the deputy was the only officer involved
during this interview, and the conversation maintained a “calm tone”
throughout. There was no point at which a reasonable person in Hopkins’s
position would have felt that she was not free to terminate the interrogation
and leave. See State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 8, 48 A.3d 769. The court did not
err in concluding that Hopkins was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
2. Whether Hopkins Validly Waived her Miranda Rights During her
Interview With the Detective Sergeant
[¶39] If an individual is determined to be “in custody,” the State then has
the burden of proving that the statements were obtained after a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1,
20
¶ 15, 704 A.2d 387. To constitute a valid waiver of Miranda rights, a
defendant’s conduct must amount to an “intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Gordon, 387 A.2d 611, 612
(Me. 1978). “Whether a defendant has validly waived her Miranda rights
depends on the factual circumstances of the interrogation.” Coombs,
1998 ME 1, ¶ 13, 704 A.2d 387.
[¶40] Hopkins was given Miranda warnings at the beginning of her
second interview—the interview with the detective sergeant in her kitchen—
and validly waived Miranda. After introductory remarks, the detective sergeant
informed Hopkins of her Miranda rights and provided her with a written
Miranda consent form, which she signed. Although Hopkins was crying at
times, she was coherent and understandable for the majority of the interview.
The court did not err in concluding, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that Hopkins’s waiver of her Miranda rights was knowing, voluntary, and
intentional.
3. Whether Miranda Warnings Needed to be Reread Before Hopkins’s
Second Interview With the Deputy, the Videotaped Walk-Through
Interview, or the Interview With the Detective in his Police Cruiser
[¶41] When the interrogation process is resumed after an interruption,
Miranda warnings may need to be reread for statements to be admissible.
21
State v. Birmingham, 527 A.2d 759, 761-762 (Me. 1987). Several objective
factors are examined to determine whether an accused must be re-informed of
her constitutional rights:
(1) the time lapse between the last Miranda warnings and the
accused’s statements;
(2) interruptions in the continuity of the interrogation;
(3) whether there was a change of location between the place
where the last Miranda warnings were given and the place
where the accused’s statements were made;
(4) whether the same officer who gave the warnings also
conducted the interrogation resulting in the accused’s
statement; and
(5) whether the statement elicited during the complained of
interrogation differed significantly from other statements
which had been preceded by Miranda warnings.
State v. Myers, 345 A.2d 500, 502 (Me. 1975); see State v. Drake, 1999 ME 91,
¶ 4, 731 A.2d 858.
[¶42] Hopkins’s contention that Miranda warnings should have been
reread during the second interview with the deputy, the videotaped
walk-though interview with the detective, and the interview conducted with
the detective in his police cruiser, is unavailing. These three interviews took
place shortly after Hopkins received Miranda warnings and validly waived
them, they occurred consecutively and reasonably close in time to one another,
22
and they occurred either in Hopkins’s home or right outside her home. Further,
Hopkins was reminded of her Miranda rights when she was interviewed by the
detective in his police cruiser, the last of the interviews at issue, but declined
the detective’s offer to review her Miranda rights. The court did not err in
determining that Miranda warnings did not need to be repeated before these
interviews.
4. Whether Hopkins’s Statements Were Voluntary
[¶43] When a voluntariness issue is raised, the State has the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement was voluntary. State v.
Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 24, 97 A.3d 106. We review the court’s factual findings
regarding voluntariness for clear error and its ultimate determination
regarding voluntariness de novo. State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172, ¶¶ 16-19,
151 A.3d 911; State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 15, 97 A.3d 595.
[¶44] To determine whether a statement was voluntary, we consider the
totality of the circumstances and consider factors “such as: the details of the
interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation;
whether the interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings;
the number of officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery;
threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant’s
23
age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct.” State v.
Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, ¶ 9, 772 A.2d 1173.
[¶45] Here, the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that
Hopkins’s statements to law enforcement officers during the five challenged
interviews were voluntary. The questioning that occurred throughout the five
interviews was nonconfrontational and most of the interviews took place in
Hopkins’s home, with the exception of the interview with the detective that
occurred in his police cruiser in front of Hopkins’s home. Although Hopkins
was crying at times during the interviews, Hopkins was coherent and
understandable during the interviews. There was no evidence that any of the
law enforcement officers coerced or tricked Hopkins to get her to talk. The
court did not err in finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hopkins’s
statements during all five interviews were voluntary.
B. Jury Instruction on Concurrent Causation
[¶46] Hopkins argues that the court erred by giving a concurrent
causation instruction that confused the jurors. We review jury instructions as
a whole for prejudicial error to ensure that they accurately and fairly informed
the jury of the law and to determine the potential for a juror misunderstanding
as a result of the instructions. See State v. Okie, 2010 ME 6, ¶ 8, 987 A.2d 495.
24
We will not vacate a judgment based on the denial of a proposed jury
instruction unless the appealing party can demonstrate that the instruction
“(1) stated the law correctly; (2) was generated by the evidence in the case;
(3) was not misleading or confusing; and (4) was not sufficiently covered in the
instructions the court gave.” State v. Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, ¶ 16, 38 A.3d 1278.
“A trial court has wide discretion in formulating its instructions to the jury so
long as it accurately and coherently reflects the applicable law.” State v. Martin,
2007 ME 23, ¶ 6, 916 A.2d 961. “When jury instructions closely parallel the
provisions of the Maine Criminal Code, they are adequate to provide the jury
with the necessary information.” State v. Mann, 2005 ME 25, ¶ 13,
868 A.2d 183.
[¶47] Title 17-A M.R.S. § 33 provides that “[u]nless otherwise provided,
when causing a result is an element of a crime, causation may be found where
the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant
operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the
concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct
of the defendant was clearly insufficient.”
[¶48] Reviewing the instructions as a whole, the court informed the jury
correctly and fairly of all necessary elements of the governing law on
25
concurrent causation. Although Hopkins’s requested instruction stated the law
correctly, was generated by the evidence, and was not misleading or confusing,
the trial court’s slightly different instruction mirrors the “clearly insufficient”
statutory language, and was adequate to provide the jury the necessary
information about the elements of concurrent causation. See 17-A M.R.S. § 33;
Mann, 2005 ME 25, ¶ 13, 868 A.2d 183.
[¶49] Additionally, upon receiving a note from the jury asking for
clarification on “causation,” the court responded by giving a clarifying
instruction that used language similar to the language that Hopkins originally
requested. The court did not err in instructing the jury on concurrent
causation.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶50] Hopkins argues that there was not sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that she “[r]ecklessly, or with criminal negligence,
cause[d] the death” of her baby. See 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A).
[¶51] On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
determine whether a trier of fact rationally could find beyond a reasonable
doubt each element of the offense charged. State v. McBreairty, 2016 ME 61,
26
¶ 14, 137 A.3d 1012. The jury may draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence presented at trial and decide issues of the weight and credibility of the
evidence. Id.
[¶52] Direct evidence of a defendant’s exact actions in committing a
crime is not required; the fact-finder “may properly find beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant acted recklessly or with criminal negligence based
solely on circumstantial evidence.” See State v. Brown, 2017 ME 59, ¶ 9,
158 A.3d 501. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be affirmed
even if the inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence are contradicted by
parts of the direct evidence. State v. Cummings, 2017 ME 143, ¶ 12,
166 A.3d 996; State v. Medeiros, 2010 ME 47, ¶ 17, 997 A.2d 95.
[¶53] To convict Hopkins of manslaughter, 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted
recklessly or with criminal negligence and caused the death of her baby. See
17-A M.R.S. § 35(3), (4)(A) (2017). In addition, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death would not have occurred but for
Hopkins’s conduct operating either alone or concurrently with another cause,
unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the
conduct of the defendant was clearly insufficient. See 17-A M.R.S. § 33.
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[¶54] Assessing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
jury, based on the evidence presented, could have found that the baby was
home with Hopkins and Hopkins’s two older sons at the time of his death, the
baby’s cause of death was consistent with severe inflicted trauma rather than
an act of a sleeping person or falling, and the evidence was not consistent with
the alternative cause of death asserted by Hopkins—that her older boys were
responsible for the baby’s death. See State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶¶ 25-27,
892 A.2d 447 (holding that there was sufficient evidence supporting the
defendant’s manslaughter conviction where the State presented evidence that
the toddler was alone with the defendant at the time of injury, the cause of
death was consistent with inflicted trauma rather than an accidental fall as the
defendant claimed, and the evidence was not consistent with an alternative
cause of death advanced by the defendant). The evidence was sufficient to
support Hopkins’s conviction of manslaughter.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
28
Laura P. Shaw, Esq. (orally), Camden Law LLP, Camden, for appellant Miranda
G. Hopkins
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Waldo County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-47
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY