State of Maine v. Andrew J. Kierstead , 2015 ME 45 ( 2015 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 45
Docket: Kno-14-118, SRP-14-117
Argued: February 10, 2015
Decided: April 30, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
ANDREW J. KIERSTEAD
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Andrew J. Kierstead appeals from a judgment of conviction of murder,
17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2014), entered in the trial court (Hjelm, J.) after a jury
trial. Kierstead argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements he made to law enforcement officers in the hours following the murder.1
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS
[¶2] On October 10, 2012, a Knox County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging Kierstead with knowing or intentional murder. 17-A M.R.S.
§ 201(1)(A). Kierstead pleaded not guilty, and moved to suppress the statements
he had made on September 27, claiming that they were involuntary due to his
1
The sentence review panel has granted Kierstead’s application to allow an appeal of his sentence,
and Kierstead argues that the court erred or abused its discretion in setting his forty-five-year prison
sentence. We find no error in the court’s sentencing decision pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1)-(2)
(2014), and therefore affirm the sentence.
2
intoxication and emotional state at the time.2 We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the court’s order. State v. Collier, 2013 ME 44, ¶ 2,
66 A.3d 563.
[¶3] On September 27, 2012, Kierstead went to Richard Mills’s house to
buy methadone, which he regularly purchased illegally from Mills. Kierstead had
been drinking alcohol since early that morning, and he continued to drink at
Mills’s house. After Mills refused to provide Kierstead with methadone because
Kierstead owed him money from prior drug purchases, Kierstead lured Mills
outside on the pretext that he needed help with his truck. Kierstead shot Mills with
a twelve-gauge pump-action shotgun several times at close range, including four
times in the back. After the shooting, Kierstead swallowed Mills’s Vicodin pills in
an attempt to commit suicide.
[¶4] After ingesting the pills and passing out for a period of time, Kierstead
awoke and called 9-1-1. He reported to the dispatcher that he had shot and killed
his friend, whose body was in the driveway. Kierstead provided an address for his
location as well as a description of the property, and reported that he had tried to
commit suicide by overdosing on pills. The dispatcher instructed Kierstead to go
out on the porch and wait for police to arrive. Throughout the twelve-minute call,
2
Kierstead did not contend that his statements were involuntary as a result of police coercion or
improper state action.
3
Kierstead was “calm but upset,” repeatedly saying things to the effect of, “I can’t
believe this happened,” and, “I ruined my life.” He did not slur his speech or
demonstrate any other signs of intoxication.
[¶5] Officer Kirk Guerrette of the Knox County Sheriff’s Department
responded to the address Kierstead had provided, and found Kierstead sitting on
the porch and talking on the phone. Following Guerrette’s instructions, Kierstead
put his hands behind his back and, without stumbling or falling, began walking
backward toward Guerrette. Guerrette asked where Mills was and how long he
had been there, and Kierstead responded coherently and without slurring.
Kierstead stood upright without difficulty during a pat-down search, was able to
walk normally and unassisted, and was calm and compliant.
[¶6] The emergency medical technicians who evaluated Kierstead while he
sat in the back of a police cruiser asked him several questions to determine his
alertness, and Kierstead responded appropriately to each question. An emergency
medical technician also took Kierstead’s vitals, which, except for an elevated
pulse, were all normal. At one point, Kierstead stood up so that his blood pressure
could be tested, and he did not stagger or fall in doing so. Kierstead was alert and
responsive throughout the evaluations, and did not nod off or slur his speech.
Though one emergency medical technician described him as “in shock” or
4
“stunned,” no one who evaluated Kierstead believed him to be in need of medical
care.
[¶7] Detective Reginald Walker of the Knox County Sheriff’s Department
conducted an audio-recorded interview of Kierstead at the scene. Walker, who at
no point told Kierstead that he had to speak with him, read Kierstead his Miranda
rights, each of which Kierstead indicated he understood before agreeing to speak
with Walker. Kierstead provided details about the shooting and also expressed his
regret for shooting Mills. Throughout the nonconfrontational interview, Kierstead
was soft-spoken, but calm, coherent, and mostly responsive. Although at times he
did not immediately respond to certain questions, Walker was able to quickly
regain his attention and resume his questioning. At no point during the interview
did Kierstead appear to lose consciousness. Kierstead became emotional at times,
particularly when he talked about the shooting. He requested and was given water,
and stated that he had not eaten in days but was not hungry. At one point,
Kierstead reported feeling nauseated and Walker let him step out of the car, which
Kierstead had no apparent difficulty doing. As Kierstead stood outside, Walker
began talking with another officer about hunting, and Kierstead asked that they
stop talking about guns and shooting things.
[¶8] Maine State Police detective Jason Andrews also met Kierstead at the
scene. Kierstead, who recalled having spoken with Walker and being read his
5
Miranda rights, said he was willing to speak with Andrews but asked that they
leave the scene. Andrews transferred Kierstead into his cruiser in order to bring
him to the Rockland Police Department, and Kierstead had no difficulty standing
or walking to Andrews’s car. After Kierstead smoked a cigarette that Andrews had
offered, he became nauseated and vomited.
[¶9] On the way to the police department, Kierstead spoke with Andrews
about his job and where he lived. He spoke clearly, and did not nod off or fall
asleep during the drive. Upon arriving at the police department, Kierstead drank
more water and smoked another cigarette before again becoming ill and vomiting.
[¶10] Inside the police station, Detectives Andrews and Jackson conducted
an audio-recorded interview of Kierstead. Kierstead was again informed of his
Miranda rights, and he indicated that he understood them and was willing to speak
with the detectives. The detectives were nonconfrontational and Kierstead agreed
that they treated him fairly and did not compel him to make any statements. After
coherently providing details about the shooting, Kierstead stated that he had tried
to kill himself and that he still wished to die. As a result, and pursuant to standard
booking procedure for an arrestee who indicates suicidal intentions, Kierstead was
taken to Pen Bay Medical Center for a mental health evaluation.
[¶11] At the hospital, Dr. John Whitney Randolph examined Kierstead.
Randolph concluded that Kierstead exhibited symptoms of toxic levels of
6
acetaminophen, which is found in Vicodin. He believed that Kierstead was at the
lowest stage of acetaminophen overdose, which is characterized by an upset
stomach. Randolph found that Kierstead’s blood-alcohol level was .054%—a rate
he believed sufficient to impair one’s judgment. Extrapolating backward based on
standard metabolic rates, he calculated that around the time Kierstead spoke with
law enforcement officers the previous evening his blood-alcohol level might have
been as high as .20%. At that level, Randolph opined, an individual may “slump
over,” lose consciousness and perhaps become comatose, and have difficulty
talking.
[¶12] The court denied Kierstead’s suppression motion based on its
conclusion that his statements had been proved voluntary beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court reasoned that, though there was evidence that Kierstead had
consumed Vicodin, methadone, and alcohol on the day of the shooting, he did not
display signs of heightened drug impairment or of actual significant impairment
due to alcohol.
[¶13] After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Kierstead
guilty of murder. The court sentenced Kierstead to forty-five years in prison.
Kierstead appealed to us.
7
II. DISCUSSION
[¶14] Kierstead contends that the court erred in denying his motion to
suppress because after the shooting he was in a state of intoxication and emotional
distress that rendered his statements involuntary. “We review the trial court’s
factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error, and its ultimate
determination regarding suppression de novo.” State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 8,
97 A.3d 595. Because Kierstead does not challenge the court’s factual findings,
we review only the legal determination that his statements were made voluntarily
and should not be suppressed. See id. We will uphold the “denial of a motion to
suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court’s decision.”
State v. Ormsby, 2013 ME 88, ¶ 9, 81 A.3d 336 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶15] In order for a statement to be voluntary, the State must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that it is “the free choice of a rational mind,
fundamentally fair, and not a product of coercive police conduct.”
Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶¶ 15-16, 97 A.3d 595. In determining voluntariness, we
consider the totality of the circumstances. Id ¶ 16. That a person is under the
influence of drugs or in emotional distress does not, by itself, render a statement
involuntary. See State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶ 22, 81 A.3d 360. Rather, the
particular circumstances of each case must be evaluated to determine whether a
defendant’s drug-related or emotional condition made him incapable of acting
8
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v. Ashe, 425 A.2d 191, 194
(Me. 1981); State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶¶ 6, 12, 704 A.2d 387; State v.
Philbrick, 481 A.2d 488, 494 (Me. 1984).
[¶16] Here, the court did not err in finding that the totality of the
circumstances establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Kierstead’s statements to
law enforcement3 were made voluntarily. Though Kierstead exhibited some signs
of a low-level acetaminophen overdose (specifically, nausea), and though there
was objective evidence of Kierstead’s alcohol consumption, there is abundant
evidence that Kierstead’s mental faculties were not significantly impaired at the
time he made the statements in question. This conclusion is supported not only by
the detectives’ testimony and the interrogation recordings, but also by the
testimony of the 9-1-1 dispatcher and medical personnel who evaluated Kierstead
that night.
[¶17] Kierstead complied with the 9-1-1 dispatcher’s instruction to go out
on the porch and wait for police to arrive. Each individual who evaluated
Kierstead after the shooting described him as calm, cooperative, and lucid. He
never nodded off or otherwise appeared drowsy. He at no point exhibited slurred
3
Though in its order on Kierstead’s motion to suppress the trial court expressly considered
Kierstead’s statements to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, we decline to decide whether these statements were made
to a law enforcement entity, and consider them only insofar as they are indicative of Kierstead’s ability to
act voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
9
speech or difficulty with balance or ambulation. He spoke clearly and coherently,
and at all times exhibited an awareness of his circumstances.
[¶18] Moreover, Kierstead coherently and appropriately responded to the
detectives’ questions, and was able to provide specific details about the shooting
and the events that led to it. He repeatedly affirmed that he understood his
Miranda rights, and that he was willing to speak with police. Kierstead asked for
water when he became thirsty, accepted a cigarette when he was offered one, asked
two officers to refrain from a conversation about shooting guns, and said that he
was hungry but did not want to eat. After a break in Walker’s interrogation,
Kierstead recalled Walker’s name, and during the Rockland Police Department
interview he recalled without hesitation Mills’s cellular and home telephone
numbers.
[¶19] Although Kierstead appeared withdrawn or not immediately
responsive at times, the court found that this was due to Kierstead’s reflecting on
the gravity of the situation. Likewise, although Kierstead’s suicide attempt and his
repeated statements that he wished to die may indicate irrationality or impaired
decision-making, these actions and statements are properly viewed in the context
of Kierstead’s recognition of his circumstances. His stated suicidal intentions and
occasional emotional breakdowns do not override the fact that he was consistently
10
alert, coherent, and responsive. See Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶¶ 22-25, 81 A.3d 360;
Philbrick, 481 A.2d at 494.
[¶20] The record fully supports the court’s determination that the totality of
the circumstances demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Kierstead’s
statements to law enforcement were the free choice of a rational mind, were
fundamentally fair, and were not a product of coercive police conduct. See Bryant,
2014 ME 94, ¶ 19, 97 A.3d 595. The court did not err in determining that the
statements were voluntary.
The entry is:
Judgment of conviction affirmed. Sentence
affirmed.
On the briefs:
Steven C. Peterson, Esq., West Rockport, for appellant Andrew J.
Kierstead
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
Steven C. Peterson, Esq., for appellant Andrew J. Kierstead
Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of
Maine
Knox Superior Court docket number CR-2012-265
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY