Michelle L. Seymour v. Joshua J. Seymour , 2021 ME 60 ( 2021 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2021 ME 60Docket: Yor-21-166
Submitted
On Briefs: October 20, 2021
Decided: November 23, 2021
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
MICHELLE L. SEYMOUR
v.
JOSHUA J. SEYMOUR
CONNORS, J.
[¶1] Joshua J. Seymour appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(York, Moskowitz, J.) modifying the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities in his divorce judgment. Joshua contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to take judicial notice of vaccine information
available on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website and
that the court failed to prioritize the children’s safety or provide an explanation
when it changed the contact schedule and allocated final decision-making
authority on educational and medical matters to Michelle L. Seymour. We agree
that the court abused its discretion in declining to take judicial notice and that
the court failed to adequately explain its modifications to the contact schedule
2
and the allocation of decision-making authority. Accordingly, we vacate the
judgment in part and remand for further findings.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Joshua and Michelle were divorced in 2018 by a judgment of the
District Court (York, Cadwallader, M.). The judgment ordered shared parental
rights and responsibilities concerning their children, born in 2014 and 2017,
with the children’s primary residence with Michelle, and incorporated a
settlement agreement providing that Joshua would have contact with the
children for part of the day several days per week.
[¶3] In April 2020, Joshua moved to modify the divorce judgment,
alleging that a change in circumstances had occurred because, inter alia,
Michelle objected to having the children vaccinated, had not arranged for either
child to see a pediatrician or dentist, and objected to the parties’ son seeing an
occupational therapist. Joshua asked the court to award him primary residence
and modify the division of parental rights and the contact schedule. After
subsequent litigation,1 the court (Springvale, Cadwallader, M.) entered an
1In April 2020, Michelle instituted an action for protection from abuse, alleging that Joshua had
sexually abused their three-year-old daughter. After a hearing, the District Court (York, Moskowitz, J.)
denied the request for an order for protection on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of
abuse. In the same month, Michelle filed a motion for contempt. On April 30, 2020, Joshua filed a
complaint for protection from harassment, alleging that Michelle had stalked him and had been
repeatedly removed from his property by police. He also alleged that Michelle had interrupted a
medical examination of their daughter that was ordered by the Department of Health and Human
3
interim order changing the contact schedule to give Joshua contact with the
children from Sunday to Wednesday each week.
[¶4] In March 2021, the court (Springvale, Moskowitz, J.)2 held an
evidentiary hearing on Joshua’s motion to modify.3 One issue at the hearing
was the dispute between the parents whether to vaccinate their children for
childhood diseases, such as polio and measles.4 As of the date of the hearing,
and against the advice of the children’s pediatrician, Michelle had not
vaccinated the children, testifying that she believed that the vaccines were not
needed and were unsafe. When pressed—though the court found her
testimony “evasive”—Michelle said that she would have the children
vaccinated if it were a requirement for them to attend school, although she also
expressed a desire to homeschool the children.
Services. The District Court (York, Moskowitz, J.) entered an order, agreed to by the parties, that
restricted contact between Michelle and Joshua to issues regarding the children and prohibited
Michelle from going onto Joshua’s property.
2 The docket sheet erroneously states that this hearing was held before Judge Daniel Driscoll.
3 The hearing was also scheduled to address two other motions filed by Michelle, but she
withdrew those motions during the hearing.
4 The vaccines at issue are those recommended by the CDC for young children and mandated by
state law and regulation for attendance in public school. See 20-A M.R.S. § 6359 (2021);
10-144 C.M.R. ch. 261 (effective Sept. 25, 2021).
4
[¶5] Joshua, who testified that he supported vaccination, asked the court
to take judicial notice of pages on the CDC website containing information about
childhood vaccination. In support of his request, Joshua provided printouts of
the information, including the CDC’s recommended vaccine schedule,
information about how different vaccines strengthen the immune system, and
safety information addressing common concerns about vaccines. The trial
court declined to take judicial notice without providing a reason, but seemingly
did so solely because of Michelle’s opposition.
[¶6] The court issued its written ruling five days later. The court
maintained the children’s primary residence with Michelle because she had
been their primary caregiver and it would not be in their best interests to
change their residence. The court noted that “neither of the parties presented
very believable testimony” because Michelle was nonresponsive and evasive
and because Joshua testified that he and Michelle had never wanted their
children to be exposed to parental conflict—an assertion that the court found
“astounding.” The court further found that “the parties have both created
issues at child exchanges that have had a negative impact on the children”; that
“[t]ransitions for the children need to be reduced”; that Michelle had
disparaged Joshua to the children; and that “the parties have failed to agree on
5
important decisions to be made about the children,” including “medical and
dental decisions.” The court summed up its findings by noting that “the
evidence clearly demonstrates that this case boils down to one very sad and
unfortunate fact: both of the parties are still treating each other abysmally
which is harming the children.”
[¶7] The court then allocated final, binding decision-making on
educational and medical matters to Michelle. The court also changed the
contact schedule to reduce Joshua’s contact to three weekends per month.
[¶8] Joshua timely filed a motion for reconsideration and for further
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) and
M.R. Civ. P. 59. The court denied the motion without discussion. Joshua timely
appeals. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1)-(2); 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2021).
II. DISCUSSION5
A. The trial court abused its discretion in declining to take judicial
notice of the CDC vaccine information.
[¶9] Joshua argues that the court erred by declining to take judicial
notice of the childhood vaccine safety information and recommendations
5In addition to the arguments discussed herein, Joshua asserts that the trial court deprived him
of the fundamental liberty to direct the care, custody, and control of his children. A court’s allocation
of rights between two fit parents “involves no state intrusion on the parties’ right to parent,” Mills v.
Fleming, 2017 ME 144, ¶¶ 7-8, 166 A.3d 1012; see Klein v. Klein, 2019 ME 85, ¶ 8 n.2, 208 A.3d 802,
at least as long as the allocation of rights does not impinge on one parent’s religious views, see Osier
6
available on the CDC website. Although we review a trial court’s ultimate
decision whether to take judicial notice of a fact for abuse of discretion, we
review legal errors underlying that decision de novo. See Wilmington Tr., N.A.
v. Berry, 2020 ME 95, ¶ 14 n.6, 237 A.3d 167; Bard v. Lord, 2010 ME 48, ¶ 8,
997 A.2d 101; see also Haskell v. Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶ 12, 160 A.3d 1176(explaining that review for abuse of discretion involves resolving whether the
trial court understood the law applicable to its exercise of discretion).
[¶10] When a court takes judicial notice of information available on a
website, it may do so for either of two purposes: solely to take notice that the
information appears on the website or for the truth of the matter asserted on
the website. See Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence
Manual, § 4.03[3] (Matthew Bender 2021) (“The cases taking judicial notice of
information on websites may take notice for the truth of the matter asserted or
may take notice only of the fact that the material appears on the website.”). We
v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1031 (Me. 1980). Given that the religious beliefs of Joshua and Michelle are
not factors in this appeal, we are unpersuaded by his argument and do not discuss it further.
Additionally, although Joshua’s brief asks that the decision be “reversed,” he primarily contests,
consistent with his post-judgment arguments and proposed findings of fact, the modified contact
schedule and allocation of final medical and educational decision-making. He does not appear to
challenge the determination to maintain primary residence of the children with Michelle. If he did so
wish to contest this aspect of the ruling, he has failed to develop that argument, see Mehlhorn v. Derby,
2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290, and, in any event, the court’s findings on this issue are sufficient to
sustain its decision.
7
analyze separately whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in not
taking judicial notice for each of these purposes.
1. The trial court abused its discretion in declining to take
judicial notice that the information proffered appeared on the
CDC website and represented the agency’s position.
[¶11] M.R. Evid. 201(b) authorizes a court to take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.” An adjudicative fact is a
fact relevant to the particular proceeding. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory
committee’s note (“[A]djudicative facts . . . [are] those which relate to the
parties.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Vallot v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc.,
641 F.2d 347, 351 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) (concluding that a court may
refuse to take judicial notice of irrelevant facts). If a party requests that the
court take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is not reasonably subject
to dispute, the court must take judicial notice if the party has supplied the
necessary information. See M.R. Evid. 201(c)(2).
[¶12] Courts routinely take judicial notice of information on official
government websites, see, e.g., Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 611 F.3d 79, 84 & n.5
(1st Cir. 2010); Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2003); Bard,
2010 ME 48, ¶¶ 7-8, 997 A.2d 101. Given the mandatory language of
M.R. Evid. 201(c)(2), it is an abuse of discretion not to take judicial notice if the
8
fact is appropriate for judicial notice and the proponent provides the proper
information. See Lyon v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 626 F.3d 1059, 1075
(9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that it was error not to take judicial notice of a
Bureau of Indian Affairs opinion); Denius, 330 F.3d at 926 (concluding that it
was error not to take judicial notice of facts confirmable on the National
Personnel Records Center website).
[¶13] The safety and efficacy of vaccines for the children was a central
issue in the proceeding, and Joshua provided the trial court with the website
and specific printouts of the information available from the CDC. Therefore, the
trial court was required—at a minimum—to take judicial notice that the
vaccine schedule and safety information was on the CDC’s website and
represented that agency’s position. See M.R. Evid. 201(c)(2); see also Lyon,
626 F.3d at 1075; Denius, 330 F.3d at 926. Indeed, in her appellate brief,
Michelle appears to concede that it is public knowledge that the information
proffered by Joshua reflects the CDC’s position, noting that the trial judge “no
doubt, not living underneath a rock, knew what the CDC web-based
documentation provided, promoted, and promulgated.”
[¶14] We cannot say that the court’s refusal to take judicial notice was
harmless, as Michelle contends. As discussed below, a parent’s adherence to
9
medical advice is relevant to the determination as to appropriate allocation of
medical and educational decision-making. Michelle testified about the
difficulty she had finding a pediatrician because of her position on vaccines and
that she was not following the advice of the pediatrician she had found by
refusing to vaccinate the children. The CDC documentation provides further
evidence as to her failure to accept the advice of established sources of medical
information, which is material to whether it is appropriate to allocate final
decision-making authority to her.
2. Whether the CDC evidence should be accepted for the factual
accuracy of the CDC’s position depends on whether it is
generally accepted within the scientific community.
[¶15] Courts frequently take judicial notice of information on
government websites, including the CDC’s website, for its truth, see, e.g.,
Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence Manual, § 4.03[3]; Gent, 611 F.3d at84 & n.5 (taking judicial notice of information from the CDC about Lyme
Disease); Holifield v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1234-35
nn.8-19 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (taking judicial notice of information from the CDC
about chronic fatigue syndrome). Michelle argues, however, that it would be
improper to do so in this case because of the “heated debate concerning locally
and nationally mandated immunization policies” and because “[m]illions and
10
millions of Americans take the position that their children should not be
subjected to such forced governmentally dictated medical treatment.”
[¶16] Facts subject to judicial notice fall into two categories:
common-knowledge facts and scientific facts. See O’Neil, J., A Practical Guide to
Evidence in Maine § 2.3.1(g) at 2-7 (Bryant & Nivison, eds., 1st ed. 2015
& Supp. 2020) (“Judicially noticed facts are generally divided into two types. . . .
The first category of facts includes those matters that can be established with
the general knowledge of those persons who live in the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The second category of facts that can be judicially noticed includes things
that are referred to as mathematical or scientific facts or almanac-type facts.”);
see also M.R. Evid. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) [i]s generally known within the
trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) [c]an be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”).
[¶17] For some matters of common knowledge, the proper inquiry may
be whether the fact is accepted by the general public.6 See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v.
Cole’s Express, 153 Me. 487, 493-94, 138 A.2d 466, 469-70 (1958) (“Those
Even then, however, that fact need not be universally accepted to be a proper subject of judicial
6
notice. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Cole’s Express, 153 Me. 487, 493-94, 138 A.2d 466, 469 (1958).
11
matters familiarly known to the majority of mankind or to those persons
familiar with the particular matter in question are properly within the concept
of judicial notice.” (quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., State v. Rines,
269 A.2d 9, 14 (Me. 1970) (“It is a matter of judicial notice that the consumer
public daily accepts as true and relies upon the assertions in labels and brands
appearing on packages displayed at the supermarket.”).
[¶18] The information that Joshua wanted the trial court to judicially
notice relates to the second category: scientific fact. When a court is asked to
take judicial notice of a scientific fact, the relevant inquiry is whether that fact
has been generally accepted by the scientific community—not whether it is
universally accepted by the public at large. See State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500,
503 (Me. 1978) (“General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking
judicial notice of scientific facts . . . .” (quotation marks and emphasis omitted));
see also State v. Fleming, 1997 ME 158, ¶¶ 11-12, 11 n.7, 698 A.2d 503 (taking
judicial notice of the reliability of restriction fragment length polymorphism
DNA testing and discussing other cases in which judicial notice of scientific
conclusions was taken).
[¶19] As the record stands, the only evidence relating to general
acceptance in the scientific community is the evidence offered by Michelle as to
12
the position of the pediatricians she consulted, and, on remand, the position of
the CDC coinciding with the advice of those doctors, see supra ¶¶ 13-14. On
remand, if Michelle seeks to contest the CDC’s position as a matter of scientific
fact, she must show that its position is not accepted to be true within the
scientific community. Information available from other scientific sources, such
as the Maine Centers for Disease Control, the Food and Drug Administration,
the National Institutes of Health, the World Health Organization, the American
Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Medical Association could be relevant
on this question. See In re K. Y-B., 215 A.3d 471, 485-90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2019) (discussing various medical authorities when ordering vaccination of a
child notwithstanding a parent’s opposition).7
B. On remand, the trial court should provide adequate findings and
explanation to support modification of the contact schedule and its
allocation of final medical and educational decision-making.
[¶20] Because the court erroneously excluded evidence material to the
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, we must remand for a new
assessment taking into account that erroneously excluded information. In that
reassessment, the court should provide specific findings of fact and an
Private websites that do not reflect any official or widespread scientific consensus would not be
7
relevant. See U.S. ex rel. Dingle v. BioPort Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (W.D. Mich. 2003).
13
explanation for its determination as to the allocation of final decision-making
and adjustment of the contact schedule, applying the relevant standards for
determining the best interests of the children.
[¶21] When a court establishes parental rights and responsibilities, it
may provide for shared parental rights, sole parental rights, or allocated
parental rights. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1501, 1653 (2021). Allocated parental rights
mean that various aspects of a child’s welfare are divided between the parents,
giving each parent control over particular issues. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1501(1),
1653(3)(S); see also Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.1 at 6-3 to 6-4 (8th ed. 2013).
Thus, the court can divide decision-making authority on different issues, such
as educational and medical matters, between the parents. See Levy, Maine
Family Law § 6.1 at 6-3 to 6-4; Pittman & Thompson, A Practical Guide to Divorce
in Maine § 8.4 at 8-4 (Whiting, ed., 1st ed. 2016 & Supp. 2020); see also Hinkley
v. Hinkley, 2000 ME 64, ¶ 9, 749 A.2d 752; Rodrigue v. Brewer, 667 A.2d 605,
606-07 (Me. 1995). When a court makes such an allocation, the ultimate
touchstone must remain the health and well-being of the child, see 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1653(3), and the court cannot prefer a parent because of the parent’s gender,
see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(4); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 507 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1986).
14
[¶22] Subsequent modifications to parental rights and responsibilities,
including a new allocation of rights, must be based on a substantial change in
circumstances, see Aranovitch v. Versel, 2015 ME 146, ¶ 12, 127 A.3d 542, and
be in the best interests of the children, see id.; Smith v. Padolko, 2008 ME 56,
¶ 11, 955 A.2d 740. We review judgments on motions to modify parental rights
for clear error as to the court’s finding of changed circumstances and for abuse
of discretion as to the final decision on whether to modify. See Aranovitch,
2015 ME 146, ¶ 13, 127 A.3d 542.
[¶23] When a party files a motion under M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), “the trial court
must ensure that the judgment is supported by express factual findings that are
based on record evidence, are sufficient to support the result, and are sufficient
to inform the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for the decision.”
Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 9, 135 A.3d 101. If the court’s judgment does not
include sufficient findings to support the result, the judgment must be vacated
and the matter remanded for further findings. See Douglas v. Douglas,
2012 ME 67, ¶ 27, 43 A.3d 965.
[¶24] In this case, Joshua moved to modify the existing award of shared
parental rights based on an alleged change in circumstances. The court
ultimately modified parental rights and responsibilities by allocating final
15
decision-making authority on medical and educational matters to Michelle and
by changing the contact schedule. After this decision, Joshua filed a Rule 52(b)
motion, which was summarily denied.8
[¶25] The trial court did not expressly find that there was a substantial
change in circumstances justifying modification of parental rights, though such
a finding is implicit because the court did order a modification. Joshua’s
Rule 52(b) motion, however, did not request further findings on this issue, so
we infer that the court made the necessary factual inferences, and the court
need not revisit this issue on remand. See Sullivan v Tardiff, 2015 ME 121, ¶ 15,
124 A.3d 652.
[¶26] In contrast, Joshua’s motion did request further findings on the
allocation of decision-making and the changes to the contact schedule. Thus,
the trial court was required to ensure that its decision included express factual
findings sufficient to inform the parties and us of the basis for the decision. See
Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 9, 135 A.3d 101.
[¶27] Although the existing record supports the trial court’s finding that
shared decision-making was not feasible because of the parties’ disagreements,
8 It should be noted that there is no statement of facts in Michelle’s appellate brief. Though a
statement of facts is not required in an appellee’s brief, its absence indicates that Michelle is satisfied
with the facts provided in Joshua’s brief. See M.R. App. P. 7A(b).
16
the trial court failed to explain why it allocated final decision-making authority
on all educational and medical issues to Michelle. Indeed, the trial court’s
judgment completely fails to address the parties’ disputes about vaccination
and Joshua’s allegations that Michelle had failed to bring the children to a
pediatrician or dentist. In light of Joshua’s Rule 52(b) motion, the trial court’s
failure to adequately explain why it chose to curtail Joshua’s rights and expand
Michelle’s was error. See Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 9, 135 A.3d 101.
[¶28] In revisiting this question on remand, the court should be sensitive
to its available options. For example, a court may allocate a subset of
decision-making to one parent. Hence, while general medical decisions might
be allocated to one parent, decision-making over immunizations could be
allocated to the other parent. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1501(1); Osier v. Osier,
410 A.2d 1027, 1031 (Me. 1980); see also Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.3[3]
at 6-28. Alternatively, a parent’s refusal to follow medical advice on one issue
could factor into whether it is in the best interests of the children to allocate
overall medical decision-making to that parent. See Bulkley v. Bulkley,
2013 ME 101, ¶ 17, 82 A.3d 116; see also In re Z.S., 2015 ME 110, ¶¶ 3, 6,
121 A.3d 1286 (“[T]he court found that the mother refused all efforts to
vaccinate the child based on her refusal to accept scientific facts . . . . As a result
17
of these findings, the court concluded that the child had been deprived of
necessary health care.”); see also In re E.A., 2015 ME 37, ¶ 9 n.1, 114 A.3d 207(“The parents’ initial refusal to vaccinate the twins further confirms their
current lack of insight.”). Given the evidence in the record that it is important
that the children attend public school, failing to follow medical advice as to
mandated vaccines could also affect educational and socialization
opportunities and thus which parent should be allocated final decision-making.
[¶29] Also potentially relevant is whether Michelle has listened to
medical advice and vaccinated the children since the date of the evidentiary
hearing or has caused disruptions in their education because of any refusal or
reluctance to do so.9
[¶30] The decision similarly fails to provide an adequate explanation for
reducing Joshua’s contact with the children. The record supports the trial
court’s finding that transitions are difficult for the children and should be
minimized. The court, however, fails to explain why difficulties attributable to
9 In her brief, Michelle asserts that she has started to vaccinate the children and argues that this
moots Joshua’s appeal. There is no record evidence before us, however, as to whether the children
have actually been vaccinated, so we cannot consider it on appeal. See McMahon v. McMahon,
2019 ME 11, ¶ 14, 200 A.3d 789. Also, even if the children have been vaccinated, it would not render
this appeal moot. The fact that the children have received some vaccines outside the dates
recommended by the CDC would not in itself answer the question whether it is in the best interests
of the children to give Michelle final medical and educational decision-making authority.
18
both parties justify reducing Joshua’s contact with the children to three
weekends per month—a substantial change from the previous schedule set by
the court.10 As with the decision-making issue discussed above, it is not enough
for the trial court to find that modification is necessary—the trial court must
explain the basis for the modification it makes. See Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 9, 135
A.3d 101.
III. CONCLUSION11
[¶31] We affirm the judgment of the trial court to the extent that it orders
that primary residence of the children remain with Michelle and finds that a
change of circumstances justifies modification of the original divorce judgment.
In all other respects, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the
Indeed, the arrangement in effect at the time of the hearing—which permitted Joshua to have
10
contact with the children three days per week—was itself a modification from the initial contact
schedule that was intended, in part, to address the problem of difficult transitions for the children.
That interim schedule reduced transitions to two per week. Scheduling transitions so that they occur
at school or day care might help to limit contact between the parents.
11We feel obligated to address the unprofessional nature of the brief filed by Michelle’s attorney.
Besides engaging in selective editing of the guardian ad litem’s report, the brief does not reflect the
standards of civility that we expect because it is filled with intemperate language and unsupported
allegations. For example, Michelle’s brief refers to parts of Joshua’s brief as “arrogant[]” and
“egocentric, self-serving, and nonsensical”; calls Joshua’s argument about the best interests of the
children “slanderous” and “false and defaming”; and makes an unsupported allegation that Joshua’s
attorney became “incensed” when the trial court did not take judicial notice of the CDC’s
“proclamations.” This type of uncivil language is never acceptable, see Key Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Hawkins,
2009 ME 117, ¶¶ 22-23, 985 A.2d 1139, but is particularly harmful here because the parties already
have a long history of strife. Attorneys should seek to reduce heated rhetoric between parties in
litigation, not fan the flames of conflict.
19
trial court. On remand, the position taken by the CDC as reflected on its website
shall be accepted as evidence of the CDC’s position. If the parties contest
whether that position should be accepted as scientific fact, the trial court will
need to determine whether the CDC’s position is generally accepted as fact
within the scientific community, a question that itself may be amenable to
resolution through judicial notice, either at the request of a party or on the
court’s own motion. Based on the existing record as supplemented by the
evidence admitted on remand, the trial court must then make specific findings
of fact and explain the basis for its decision as to the proper allocation of
decision-making between the parties and an appropriate contact schedule for
Joshua.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed as to the order that primary
residence of the children remain with Michelle
and the finding that a substantial change in
circumstances justifies modification of the
divorce judgment. In all other aspects, the
judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to
the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
20
Thomas G. Van Houten, Esq., Springvale, for appellant Joshua J. Seymour
Timothy C. Coughlin, Esq, Coughlin Law Offices, LLC, Newmarket, New
Hampshire, for appellee Michelle L. Seymour
Springvale District Court docket number FM-2018-328
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY