Samantha Ramelli v. Unemployment Insurance Commission , 130 A.3d 963 ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 6
Docket: Aro-15-211
Submitted
On Briefs: December 17, 2015
Decided: January 12, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
SAMANTHA RAMELLI
v.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION
HJELM, J.
[¶1] Samantha Ramelli appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior
Court (Aroostook County, Hunter, J.) on her petition for review of final agency
action, see M.R. Civ. P. 80C, affirming a decision issued by the Unemployment
Insurance Commission. In that decision, the Commission concluded that Ramelli
had not filed a timely appeal from an earlier administrative order determining that
she had been overpaid $13,157 in unemployment insurance benefits. We affirm
the judgment.
[¶2] Because the Superior Court reviewed the Commission’s decision as an
intermediate appellate court, we review the Commission’s decision directly.
Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2013 ME 76, ¶ 9,
73 A.3d 1061. Our review is limited “to determin[ing] whether the Commission
2
correctly applied the law and whether its [factual] findings are supported by any
competent evidence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶3] In a decision dated and mailed on March 30, 2011, a Deputy of the
Department of Labor, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation determined that
Ramelli was required to reimburse the Bureau for unemployment insurance
benefits she had received between April 2010 and March 2011 totaling $13,157.
See 26 M.R.S. § 1194(2), (10), (11)(C) (2015). The Deputy found that during this
period the Bureau had mailed Ramelli multiple requests for work search logs, that
Ramelli had failed to respond to those requests, and that she was therefore not
eligible for the benefits she had received.1 See 26 M.R.S. § 1192(3) (2015)
(providing that to be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits a claimant must
be “actively seeking work in accordance with the regulations of the commission”);
see also 5 C.M.R. 12 172 003-2 § 1(D) (2004) (stating that benefits will be denied
if a claimant fails to respond to the Bureau’s requests for “information which is
necessary to determine his eligibility”). The Deputy’s decision contained an
admonition that the specific deadline for any appeal from that overpayment
1
Although the Commission did not make a specific finding on the issue, the record contains evidence
that on March 17, 2011, nearly two weeks before the Deputy issued her decision, the Bureau mailed a
notice to Ramelli’s address of record to schedule a telephone fact-finding interview for the following
week. On the scheduled date, the Deputy attempted to contact Ramelli at a telephone number maintained
in the Bureau’s records, but the person who answered informed the Deputy that nobody with that name
was staying there. Because Ramelli’s contact information was not effective, she did not participate in the
administrative process that led to the Deputy’s decision.
3
determination was April 14, 2011, subject to a fifteen-day enlargement for good
cause shown. See 26 M.R.S. § 1194(2).2
[¶4] On April 11, 2012—nearly one year after the expiration of the appeal
period—Ramelli filed an appeal from the Deputy’s March 2011 decision with the
Department of Labor, Division of Administrative Hearings. In May 2012, the
Division dismissed the appeal as untimely. Ramelli then appealed the order of
dismissal to the Commission. Although notice of an appeal hearing was sent to
Ramelli, she did not appear, and the Commission accordingly dismissed her appeal
by order issued in September 2012, and subsequently denied Ramelli’s request for
reconsideration.
[¶5] Ramelli then filed an appeal from the Commission’s order of dismissal
with the Superior Court (York County)3 pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. On the
Commission’s own motion, the court (Fritzsche, J.) remanded the matter to the
Commission for further proceedings. After a hearing where Ramelli testified, the
2
26 M.R.S. § 1194(2) (2015) provides in pertinent part:
The deputy shall promptly notify the claimant and any other interested party of the
determinations and reasons for the determinations. Subject to subsection 11, unless the
claimant or any such interested party, within 15 calendar days after that notification was
mailed to the claimant’s last known address, files an appeal from that determination, that
determination is final, except that the period within which an appeal may be filed may be
extended, for a period not to exceed an additional 15 calendar days, for good cause
shown.
3
Ramelli was living in York County when she filed this first appeal to the Superior Court. She later
moved to Aroostook County, which is the venue in this action. See infra ¶ 6.
4
Commission concluded that the default and resulting dismissal of her appeal to the
Commission should be set aside for good cause. See 5 C.M.R. 12 172 005-2
§ 1(B) (2002). The Commission then remanded the matter to the Division to
develop an evidentiary record on both the timeliness of Ramelli’s initial appeal of
the March 2011 order and the merits of the work search log issue.
[¶6] On that further remand, the Division took testimony from Ramelli and
submitted a record of the hearing to the Commission for decision. The
Commission then held an additional hearing where Ramelli again testified, as did
the Deputy who issued the March 2011 decision, and a claims specialist who had
worked with Ramelli. Based on the evidence in the record, the Commission
determined that the Deputy’s March 2011 decision was mailed—as the statute
required—to Ramelli’s “last known address,” 26 M.R.S. § 1194(2), which was an
apartment located in Arundel. In her testimony, Ramelli acknowledged that
although her address of record was for the apartment building in Arundel, she was
actually living in New Hampshire at that time and that therefore she may not have
received the decision. Finding that the Bureau complied with the statutory mailing
requirements even though Ramelli was not living at the address of record she had
provided, the Commission concluded that Ramelli’s April 2012 appeal to the
Division of the March 2011 order was untimely, and that therefore neither the
5
Division nor the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal.4
Ramelli appealed the Commission’s decision to the Superior Court (Aroostook
County) pursuant 26 M.R.S. § 1194(8) (2015), 5 M.R.S. § 11002 (2015), and M.R.
Civ. P. 80C, and the court (Hunter, J.) affirmed the Commission’s determination.
[¶7] On this appeal from the Superior Court judgment, Ramelli argues that
the Commission erred by concluding both that her 2012 appeal to the Division of
Administrative Hearings of the March 2011 order was untimely, and that she was
ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits and was obligated to
disgorge benefits received during the period of her ineligibility. We conclude that
the Commission correctly determined that Ramelli’s appeal was time-barred and
do not reach the merits of her challenge to the overpayment determination.
[¶8] Based on competent evidence, see Sinclair Builders, Inc., 2013 ME 76,
¶ 9, 73 A.3d 1061, the Commission determined that when the Deputy issued the
decision on March 30, 2011, finding that Ramelli had failed to comply with her
obligation to submit work search logs and ordering her to repay $13,157, the
decision was properly mailed that same day to Ramelli’s address in Arundel. As
4
The Commission determined alternatively that even if Ramelli’s appeal were timely, she would not
have prevailed. Ramelli does not dispute the Deputy’s finding that she did not submit work search logs
but instead she argues that she was not required to do so. The Commission rejected this contention based
on the requirements established in 26 M.R.S. § 1192(2) (2015), which is different in some respects from
the version of section 1192(2) that was in effect when the Deputy made the overpayment determination in
March 2011. See 26 M.R.S. § 1192(2) (2010); P.L. 2011, ch. 645, § 2 (effective Aug. 30, 2012) (codified
at 26 M.R.S. § 1192(2) (2015)). Because we do not reach the merits of Ramelli’s argument and because,
in any event, the issue was not raised by the parties in this appeal, we do not consider whether the
Commission applied the correct version of 26 M.R.S. § 1192.
6
Ramelli herself acknowledged, that address was the most current one she had
provided to the agency even though she was not residing there at the time.
[¶9] Pursuant to 26 M.R.S. § 1194(2), a benefit determination is final unless
the claimant files an appeal “within 15 calendar days after that notification was
mailed to the claimant’s last known address.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the
fifteen-day appeal period began to run on March 30, 2011, which was the date the
decision was mailed to Ramelli’s address of record. As the Commission found and
as the decision itself correctly specified, the deadline for any appeal was April 14,
2011, subject only to a fifteen-day enlargement for good cause shown. See id.
Ramelli filed an appeal from the Deputy’s March 2011 decision, but she did not do
so until April 2012—nearly one year late. The Commission correctly concluded
that Ramelli’s appeal was filed well beyond any deadline allowed by statute.
[¶10] We have held that although Maine’s Employment Security Law is
“remedial legislation mandating a liberal construction in favor of the claimant,” the
statutory appeal periods within “the chain of administrative review are
jurisdictional and mandatory.” McKenzie v. Me. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n,
453 A.2d 505, 509 (Me. 1982). If we were to determine that Ramelli’s appeal was
timely even though it was filed nearly one year after the deadline established by
the clear language of the controlling statute, we would be rewriting that statute—
something we cannot do. See id. (stating that a court may not “enlarge the scope of
7
the” Employment Security Law). Rather, it is manifest that Ramelli’s appeal from
the Deputy’s March 2011 decision was time-barred and that she could not invoke
the administrative appellate process to challenge the merits of that decision.
Accordingly, the Commission correctly concluded that the Deputy’s March 2011
decision had become final and that it was without jurisdiction to address the merits
of her untimely appeal.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Samantha Ramelli, appellant pro se
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Nancy Macirowski, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for the
Unemployment Insurance Commission
Aroostook County Superior Court docket number AP-2014-5
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY