John P. Moyant v. Regina Petit , 2021 ME 13 ( 2021 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2021 ME 13Docket: Pen-20-190
Argued: February 11, 2021
Decided: March 23, 2021
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and HORTON, JJ.
JOHN P. MOYANT
v.
REGINA PETIT et al.
JABAR, J.
[¶1] John P. Moyant appeals from the judgment dismissing his complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction entered by the Superior Court (Penobscot
County, A. Murray, J.). See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b). On appeal, Moyant argues that the
court erred in determining that his dispute with Regina Petit and the
Passamaquoddy Tribe was an “internal tribal matter.” We disagree and we
affirm the court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
[¶2] The following facts were found by the Superior Court and are taken
from the pleadings and from “material outside the pleadings submitted by the
pleader and the movant.” Davric Me. Corp. v. Bangor Historic Track, Inc., 2000
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ME 102, ¶ 6, 751 A.2d 1024 (quotation marks omitted). We make no favorable
inference in favor of Moyant. Tomer v. Me. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 2008 ME 190, ¶ 9,
962 A.2d 335 (“Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law
that we review de novo. . . . [W]e make no favorable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” (citations omitted)).
[¶3] On November 1, 1983, Harry Fry, who is not a member of the Tribe,
entered into a one-year “Campsite Lease” with the Tribe. The camp was on
Junior Lake, which is located on tribal land.1 In 2011, Fry transferred his lease
to Regina Petit, a member of the Tribe, and stated that he had no future interest
in the property. In 2012, the Tribe formally approved this transfer.2 In 2015,
Fry died.
[¶4] John Moyant, a resident of Florida who is not a member of the Tribe,
visited the property, made improvements to the property, and stored personal
belongings at the property beginning while Fry was alive and continuing
through June 2017. At some point Petit told Moyant that he was not allowed
back on the property. In May 2017, Moyant wrote Petit a letter stating that he
The lease names only Fry as the lessee and states, “Lessee shall not sublet, assign or transfer this
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Lease or give or surrender possession of the leased premises without the prior written consent of
Lessor.”
2 In 1985, the Tribe passed a referendum that prohibited leasing of its tribal land to non-Indians.
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would break into the camp if he was unable to get into the camp. In June 2017,
Petit contacted the Chief of Police for the Passamaquoddy Tribe and caused
Moyant to be served with a no-trespass notice.
B. Procedural History
[¶5] On February 8, 2019, Moyant filed a complaint in the Superior Court
against Petit and the Tribe.3 Petit and the Tribe filed an answer alleging lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because it was an “internal tribal matter,” and for
Moyant’s failure to exhaust the tribal remedies.
[¶6] On October 28, 2019, Petit and the Tribe filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and filed affidavits and
exhibits with the motion. Petit and the Tribe argued that the action squarely
implicates the “right to reside” on the land, which is enumerated as an example
of an “internal tribal matter” in 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (2020). They argued
alternatively that even if this action does not implicate the “right to reside” on
tribal land, application of the factors announced in Akins v. Penobscot Nation,
130 F.3d 482, 486-87 (1st Cir. 1997), would still lead to the conclusion that the
The complaint alleged four counts against both parties. Count 1 alleged that Moyant “was the
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intended beneficiary of a lease entered into by mutual consent that [Petit and the Tribe] breached”;
Count 2 alleged that Petit and the Tribe “intentionally misrepresented a material fact relating to the
terms of termination of the lease”; Count 3 alleged that Petit and the Tribe “converted property of
[Moyant] for their own use”; and Count 4 alleged that Moyant “conferred a benefit to [Petit and the
Tribe]” for which he was not compensated.
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action concerned “internal tribal matters.” Additionally, Petit and the Tribe
argued that if the court decided that the action did not concern an “internal
tribal matter,” then the tribal exhaustion doctrine would apply. See Nat'l
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
Moyant filed a response to the motion to dismiss and filed exhibits with the
motions. Petit and the Tribe filed a reply with attached exhibits and affidavits.
[¶7] On February 20, 2020, the court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss, and on March 10, 2020, issued a written order granting Petit and the
Tribe’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the
dispute “does not fall squarely within any of the enumerated examples of an
‘internal tribal matter’ in section 6206(1),” but that it does involve an “internal
tribal matter” under the Akins test. The court concluded that it was
unnecessary to address the tribal exhaustion doctrine.4 Moyant timely
appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1); 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2020).
4 Moyant filed a motion to reconsider with attached exhibits and affidavits. Petit and the Tribe
filed a reply to the motion, and Moyant filed a response to this reply. The court denied the motion,
stating that the arguments and the “evidence” included in the motion were arguments that Moyant
already made or could have previously presented to the court and, alternatively, that the arguments
were not convincing. Moyant did not raise this issue on appeal, and therefore any objection to this
decision is not preserved. See Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160, ¶ 9 n.6, 759 A.2d 205 (“The failure
to mention an issue in the brief or at argument is construed as either an abandonment or a failure to
preserve that issue.”).
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
[¶8] “We review de novo an issue of statutory interpretation and a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.” Mutty v. Dep't of Corr., 2017 ME 7, ¶ 9, 153
A.3d 775; see also Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 14,
770 A.2d 574 (“Statutory construction is a question of law, and we review the
Superior Court’s interpretation of the . . . Maine Implementing Act de novo.”).
B. 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1)
[¶9] The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat.
1785, and the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Implementing Act, 30 M.R.S.
§§ 6201-6214 (2020), resulted from a settlement between the Passamaquoddy
Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the State of Maine that, among other
provisions, delineates areas of authority over Indian affairs. Great N. Paper, Inc.,
2001 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-41, 770 A.2d 574. Section 6206(1) of the Maine
Implementing Act provides that if a dispute is an “internal tribal matter,” then
it is within the tribal court’s jurisdiction. 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1).
[¶10] The statute does not provide a definition of “internal tribal matter,”
but does include a nonexhaustive list:
membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside
within the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal
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government, tribal elections and the use or disposition of
settlement fund income shall not be subject to regulation by the
State.
Id. (emphasis added); Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, ¶ 13, 962 A.2d
944.5
[¶11] We have reasoned that if a matter does not fit “squarely” within
one of the statutory examples, then additional analysis is needed. Francis, 2008
ME 184, ¶ 14, 962 A.2d 944. Although this dispute would not have originated
if Moyant had not asserted that he had a “right to reside” on Passamaquoddy
land, the relief he is seeking is “a judgment for contractual, compensatory,
equitable and punitive damages.” Therefore, we agree with the trial court that
this matter does not fit squarely within the “right to reside” on tribal land or
any of the other examples in section 6206(1)’s list because this case does not
require the court to determine if Moyant may reside on the land. Id. (holding
that when claims involved the “right to possession or ownership of a residence
on tribal land, they [did] not involve [the plaintiff’s] right to reside within the
Tribe’s territory”); In re Children of Mary J., 2019 ME 2, ¶¶ 11-13, 199 A.3d 2315There are limits to this jurisdiction; for example, if the Tribe creates an entity pursuant to Maine
state law, that business is not part of the Tribe as defined in the Implementing Act. See Francis v.
Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Hous. Auth., 1999 ME 164, ¶ 8, 740 A.2d 575. Contrary to Moyant’s
assertions, however, this limitation is not applicable in this case.
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(holding that when children were placed in a foster home outside the Tribe’s
territory, the lower court and the Department of Health and Human services
were not “attempting to regulate who may or may not reside within an Indian
territory”). We now determine whether the Akins factors apply to this dispute.
C. Akins Factors
[¶12] We have adopted the approach announced by the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Akins to determine if something is an
“internal tribal matter” when a dispute does not fit squarely into section
6206(1)’s examples. In re Children of Mary J., 2019 ME 2, ¶ 15, 199 A.3d 231;
Akins, 130 F.3d at 486-87. These factors, “which are nonexclusive and
nondispositive, include: (1) the effect on nontribal members, (2) & (3) the
subject matter of the dispute, particularly when related to Indian lands or the
harvesting of natural resources on Indian lands, (4) the interest of the State of
Maine, and (5) prior legal understandings.” In re Children of Mary J., 2019 ME
2, ¶ 15, 199 A.3d 231 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶13] When the Akins factors are applied here, almost all of them support
the determination that this dispute is an “internal tribal matter.” Although we
agree with the court that Moyant’s status as a nonmember of the Tribe weighs
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slightly toward a holding that the dispute is not an “internal tribal matter,” all
other factors support the conclusion that it is an “internal tribal matter.”
[¶14] Tribal jurisdiction does not disappear simply because a person
who is not a member of the Tribe is involved in a dispute, especially when the
action is against the Tribe and a tribal member concerning tribal land. It is
difficult to conceive of a more appropriate forum for this case than the tribal
court. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (“Tribal courts
have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of
both Indians and non-Indians.”); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18
(1987) (“Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.”).
[¶15] The Superior Court did not err by determining that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the dispute was an “internal tribal matter.”6
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
6 We do not need to address the tribal exhaustion doctrine because we are affirming the court’s
decision to grant the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Nat'l Farmers Union
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985).
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Eric G. Woodbury, Esq. (orally), Bucksport, and Bronson Stephens, Esq.,
Bucksport, for appellant John P. Moyant
Kaighn Smith, Jr., Esq., and Michael-Corey F. Hinton, Esq. (orally), Drummond
Woodsum, Portland, for appellees Regina Petit and the Passamaquoddy Tribe
Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CV-2019-21
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY