State v. Walters ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-796
No. COA22-291
Filed 6 December 2022
Watauga County, No. 20CRS51032
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ROBERT MACDONALD WALTERS, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 27 October 2021 by Judge R.
Gregory Horne in Superior Court, Watauga County. Heard in the Court of Appeals
1 November 2022.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Phyllis A.
Turner, for the State.
Assistant Public Defender Max E. Ashworth, III, for defendant-appellant.
STROUD, Chief Judge.
¶1 Defendant appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him
guilty of possession of methamphetamine. Defendant argues evidence regarding the
methamphetamine was inadmissible because the police did not have probable cause
to search his vehicle due to recent changes in North Carolina law involving marijuana
and industrial hemp. Because Defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the bag where he stored both his hemp and methamphetamine, and Defendant’s bag
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was not protected by the federal Constitution or this State’s Constitution, we affirm
the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.
I. Background
¶2 Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence found during a search of his vehicle. Defendant and the State agreed, on
the record, upon the factual basis for purposes of deciding the motion to suppress.
They agreed the trial court should consider an affidavit by Defendant’s counsel in
support of the motion to suppress and a “SYNOPSIS” written by the responding
deputy on the night of Defendant’s arrest, which was attached to Defendant’s
counsel’s affidavit as an exhibit. Defendant and the State did not formally introduce
any additional evidence when the motion was heard before trial on 26 October 2021.
¶3 The synopsis indicates on 16 October 2020 Watauga County Sheriff’s Deputy
Brian Lyall was driving and on duty when he “noticed a black Dodge diesel truck” at
an intersection. Deputy Lyall recognized the driver as Defendant; Deputy Lyall also
had information from another deputy, Deputy Norris, that Deputy Norris had “seized
suspected Methamphetamine off of [Defendant] in the recent past.” Deputy Norris
had also taken out felony possession warrants on Defendant, which were still
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outstanding.1 Deputy Lyall turned around to follow the truck and saw “a black in
color Dodge sitting in the parking lot of” a car dealership. Deputy Lyall then turned
on his lights and “initiate[d] a traffic stop.”
¶4 Here, Defendant’s counsel’s affidavit and Deputy Lyall’s synopsis differ on
some details of the exact sequence of events. According to Deputy Lyall’s synopsis,
he asked for Defendant’s driver’s license, radioed dispatch, and confirmed Defendant
still had an “outstanding warrant for his arrest.” Defendant’s counsel’s affidavit
states, based upon his review of the body-cam video of the event, that “Upon arriving
at the Dodge Ram, Dep. Lyall opened the driver’s side door of the Dodge Ram and
ordered Defendant to exit the vehicle. . . . Defendant complied with Dep. Lyall’s
request and immediately exited the Dodge Ram.” The affidavit continues, “[u]pon
exiting the Dodge Ram, Dep. Lyall immediately placed the Defendant under arrest
and handcuffed the Defendant.” The affidavit notes, “[d]espite what is noted in
Exhibit ‘A,’ [the synopsis,] Dep. Lyall did not ask Defendant for license, registration,
or any other documentation prior to placing him under arrest.” There was no further
explanation of the discrepancy between the events contained in the body-cam video
as asserted in Defendant’s counsel’s affidavit and Deputy Lyall’s synopsis.
1 The outstanding warrants that were the original cause for Defendant’s arrest were not
included in the Record on Appeal, but Defendant does not dispute that he was arrested upon
the outstanding warrants.
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¶5 Deputy Lyall called “Canine Handler Watson to the scene,” arrested
Defendant, searched him, placed him in handcuffs behind his back, and put him in
Deputy Lyall’s patrol car. The affidavit states Deputy Lyall “retrieved the
Defendant’s cell phone so that Defendant could make arrangements for the Dodge
Ram[,]” but the synopsis does not. The affidavit also states that, due to Defendant’s
discomfort and difficulty with having his hands handcuffed behind his back, Deputy
Lyall allowed Defendant to exit the patrol car and Deputy Lyall moved Defendant’s
handcuffs to the front of Defendant’s body. While Deputy Lyall was moving
Defendant’s handcuffs, or shortly thereafter, Deputy Watson arrived. Deputy Lyall
then placed Defendant back in the patrol car.
¶6 The affidavit indicates Deputy Lyall asked Deputy Watson to “run his dog”
around Defendant’s truck after Deputy Lyall placed Defendant back in the patrol car.
The synopsis does not indicate Deputy Lyall asked Deputy Watson to run his dog
around the truck, but only states that after Deputy Lyall placed Defendant in the
patrol car “Deputy Watson advised [Deputy Lyall] that his Canine indicated on the
vehicle.”2 Deputy Lyall searched the truck and “under the [driver’s side] seat [Deputy
Lyall] located a black [C]rown [R]oyal bag. Inside the bag was a bag of Marijuana, a
2 Deputy Watson confirmed during the State’s presentation of evidence that the “dog is
certified in cocaine, heroin, meth[amphetamine], and marijuana.” The dog is annually
recertified to detect these substances. Defendant did not object to Deputy Watson’s
testimony.
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Marijuana smoking device, a plastic tube of Marijuana and a plastic bag containing
a white crystal like substance.” Deputy Watson stayed behind to coordinate the
towing of the truck while Deputy Lyall took Defendant to a magistrate’s office where
he was served the “outstanding warrant for possession of Methamphetamine.”
Defendant was later indicted for possession of methamphetamine, possession of
marijuana paraphernalia, and simple possession of marijuana, a Schedule VI
controlled substance, based on the search on 16 October 2020. “The suspected
Methamphetamine” from 16 October 2020 was “sent to the Western Regional
Laboratory” for testing. The State presented expert testimony at trial identifying the
substance as methamphetamine. The record is unclear on the timing, but at some
point prior to trial the “Marijuana” located during the search of Defendant’s truck
was identified as hemp. The State voluntarily dismissed the charges for possession
of marijuana paraphernalia and possession of marijuana on 28 October 2021.
¶7 Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress “any and all evidence or potential
evidence seized following an illegal search of [his] motor vehicle” on 16 October 2021.
This motion was heard 26 October 2021, on the first day of Defendant’s trial, after
jury selection but before the State began presenting evidence. After hearing counsels’
arguments on the motion, the trial court reconciled the differences between the
synopsis and affidavit and made oral findings of fact:
The Court would find that Deputy Brian Lyall of
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Watauga County Sheriff’s department was on patrol. And
to be clear, I’m also relying upon the attached affidavit and
the synopsis from Deputy Brian Lyall that’s included in the
stipulation; . . .
...
THE COURT: On the 16th day of October 2020, that
Deputy Lyall was operating his patrol car on 421 South in
Boone, east side of Boone. That at the intersection of 421
South and Old 421 South, he observed a Dodge diesel
pickup truck and observed [Defendant] to be the operator
of that vehicle. That based upon Deputy Lyall’s previous
information, he knew that there was an outstanding order
for arrest with regard to the driver, [Defendant].
Accordingly, he followed the vehicle and ended up finding
the vehicle stopped in the PVA of the Chevrolet dealership
on the east side of Boone. That upon seeing the vehicle he
pulled up, activated his blue lights and initiated a formal
stop of the vehicle.
He approached the vehicle, found [Defendant] to be
the operator. That through communication with his
dispatch, and verified that there was an outstanding order
for arrest for [Defendant]. That he approached the vehicle,
directed [Defendant] to exit the vehicle, and placed him in
custody pursuant to the order for arrest. That he placed
[Defendant] in his patrol vehicle. That he then at the
request of [Defendant], approached the Dodge Pickup truck
to retrieve [Defendant’s] cell phone so that he could make
provision for disposition or care for the truck. That when
Deputy Lyall returned with the cell phone, he noted that
[Defendant] was uncomfortable, having been handcuffed
with his hands behind his back; that he was fidgeting and
was in an uncomfortable position. That Deputy Lyall then
allowed [Defendant] to step from the vehicle and unlocked
his handcuffs from behind [Defendant] and secured the
handcuffs so [Defendant’s] hands were in front to relieve
the discomfort. That is shown on the video.
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Deputy Watson pulled onto the scene at this time.
That at this point, [Defendant] was in custody pursuant to
the order for arrest. That Officer Watson was a K9 handler
and had a K9 officer. . . . And that after placing
[Defendant] back into his patrol car after adjusting his
handcuffs, Deputy Lyall requested Deputy Watson to run
his dog around the Dodge Ram. That Deputy Watson did
that and that the K9 alerted as to the vehicle. And
subsequent to that, the interior portion of the vehicle was
searched, resulting in the discovery and seizure of
contraband that is underlying the charge presently before
the court.
The trial court then discussed case law argued by Defendant and the State, after
which the trial court concluded:
That the parties having stipulated to the affidavit and
attached arrest report, the Court has made the above
findings of fact. The Court, therefore, would conclude that
[Defendant] was in custody. It’s separate and apart from
his arrest, yet contemporaneous with that, Deputy Watson
walked the trained K9 around the exterior portion of the
vehicle and the dog alerted.
The Court would conclude that the dog’s alert
constituted probable cause, and therefore, there was a
basis separate and apart from the arrest to search the
interior of the vehicle. That the subsequent search found
whatever the subsequent evidence shows. Therefore, the
Court would find and conclude that walking the K9 around
the vehicle did not delay the ongoing arrest at the scene.
That there was probable cause to support that walking the
K9 around did not constitute a search of the vehicle. That
the subsequent alert created probable cause for a search of
the interior of the vehicle, and any items seized as a result
were lawfully, subsequent search was lawful and any items
seized were lawfully obtained.
The trial court then disposed of other pretrial motions, and the State presented
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evidence.
¶8 During the State’s presentation of evidence, Defendant objected to Deputy
Watson’s testimony on the search of his truck generally and to Deputy Watson’s
testimony regarding the “Crown Royal bag with a container with a leafy green
substance . . . .” Defendant did not object after either Deputy Watson or Deputy Lyall
testified about the “white crystal substance” found in Defendant’s truck. Defendant
was ultimately convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine; the trial court
entered a judgment on or about 27 October 2021. Defendant gave notice of appeal in
open court.
II. Standard of Review
¶9 Defendant acknowledges he did not object when the State introduced Deputy
Watson and Deputy Lyall’s testimony regarding the “white crystal substance” found
in the truck or the State Crime Lab forensic scientist’s testimony that the substance
found in Defendant’s truck was identified as methamphetamine. Therefore, the issue
of whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress is unpreserved and
ordinarily would be precluded from appellate review. See State v. Grice, 367 N.C.
753, 764, 767 S.E.2d 312, 320 (2015). But,
[i]n criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by
objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved
by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be
made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the
judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly
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contended to amount to plain error.
N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4); see also State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 622, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875
(2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 835, 172 L.Ed.2d 58 (2008). Here, Defendant
“specifically and distinctly contend[s],” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4), “[t]he trial court
committed plain error when it denied [Defendant’s] motion to suppress . . . .”
(Emphasis removed.)
¶ 10 We therefore review Defendant’s appeal for plain error.
For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must
demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial.
See [State v.] Odom, 307 N.C. [655, ] 660, 300 S.E.2d [375,
] 378 [1983]. To show that an error was fundamental, a
defendant must establish prejudice—that, after
examination of the entire record, the error “had a probable
impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.”
See id. (citations and quotation marks omitted); see
also Walker, 316 N.C. at 39, 340 S.E.2d at 83 (stating “that
absent the error the jury probably would have reached a
different verdict” and concluding that although the
evidentiary error affected a fundamental right, viewed in
light of the entire record, the error was not plain error).
Moreover, because plain error is to be “applied cautiously
and only in the exceptional case,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660,
300 S.E.2d at 378, the error will often be one that “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at
378 (quoting McCaskill, 676 F.2d at 1002).
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012). Defendant “bear[s]
the heavier burden of showing that the error rises to the level of plain error.” Id. at
516, 723 S.E.2d at 333.
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“In conducting our review for plain error, we must first
determine whether the trial court did, in fact, err in
denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.” State v. Powell,
253 N.C. App. 590, 594–95, 800 S.E.2d 745, 748-49
(2017) (noting that, in a plain error analysis regarding the
denial of a motion to suppress, we apply the normal
standard of review to determine whether error occurred).
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a
motion to suppress is whether competent evidence
supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the
findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v.
Jackson, 368 N.C. 75, 78, 772 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2015).
“Competent evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the finding.” State v.
Ashworth, 248 N.C. App. 649, 651, 790 S.E.2d 173,
176, disc. rev. denied, 369 N.C. 190, 793 S.E.2d 694 (2016).
State v. Newborn, 279 N.C. App. 42, 2021-NCCOA-426, ¶¶ 23-24. If the trial court
erred, we then determine whether that error “had a probable impact on the jury’s
finding that the defendant was guilty.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334(quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378).
III. Analysis
¶ 11 Defendant presents and argues a single issue on appeal: “Whether law
enforcement officers need probable cause to use a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle
for narcotics when the dog is unable to distinguish between contraband and
noncontraband.” Because Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the bag where he stored his methamphetamine, which could be detected by the
drug-sniffing dog used by the police, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s
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motion to suppress. We affirm.
¶ 12 Defendant did not challenge any of the trial court’s findings of fact.3 Instead,
his arguments focus on the trial court’s conclusion the officers had probable cause to
search his truck and whether the dog sniff also constituted a search. The question
on appeal is therefore whether the trial court erred in determining the use of a drug-
sniffing dog and subsequent search of Defendant’s truck was lawful. If the trial court
did err, we must then consider whether this error was so fundamental in that “after
examination of the entire record, the error ‘had a probable impact on the jury’s finding
that the defendant was guilty.’” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334(quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378). Thus, we first focus our analysis
on whether the deputies were constitutionally permitted to search Defendant’s
vehicle and whether the deputies lawfully used the drug-sniffing dog.
¶ 13 Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
because the deputies made a warrantless search of his vehicle without probable cause
3 As a preliminary matter, we note the trial court did not reduce its ruling on Defendant’s motion to
writing, and only made oral findings of fact and conclusions of law at Defendant’s trial. As to a motion
to suppress, “[t]he judge must set forth in the record his findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-977(f) (2021). “A written determination setting forth the findings and conclusions is
not necessary, but it is the better practice.” State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309, 312, 776 S.E.2d 672, 674
(2015) (citing State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 268, 732 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2012)). Here, the trial court
resolved any issues of fact in its oral findings of fact, and we can address Defendant’s arguments based
upon the trial court’s oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. “Thus, our cases require findings of
fact only when there is a material conflict in the evidence and allow the trial court to make these
findings either orally or in writing.” Id.STATE V. WALTERS
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when Deputy Watson ran his dog around the truck. Defendant does not argue, if the
dog sniff is not a search, whether the dog sniff could assist in establishing probable
cause for the subsequent search of his truck by Deputies Lyall and Watson.
Defendant argues the dog sniff was a search because recent changes in North
Carolina law–namely passage of the Industrial Hemp Act in 2015 legalizing the
production, possession, and consumption of hemp–now renders drug-detecting dogs
unable to differentiate between contraband and noncontraband items. Because the
dogs signal to THC, which is present in both marijuana and hemp, and because
Defendant now has a legitimate privacy interest in hemp, Defendant argues the use
of drug-detecting dogs in this context “runs afoul of the holding in” Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). Defendant argues the use of the dog is now a
search, the deputies had no probable cause to search his truck, none of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement for a search apply, the evidence of the methamphetamine
should have been suppressed, and the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. Because Defendant does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings of
fact, we interpret these arguments to address the trial court’s conclusion “there was
probable cause to support that walking the K9 around did not constitute a search of
the vehicle.”
¶ 14 The State conversely argues “[t]he trial court properly denied Defendant’s
motion to suppress based on well-settled law in North Carolina[,]” specifically that
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“[t]he trial court relied on State v. Branch, 177 N.C. App. 104, 627 S.E.2d 506 (2006)
and Illinois v. Caballes[,] 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.CT. 834, 160 L. Ed. 842 (2005).” The
State argues these cases determine Defendant could not have had a privacy interest
in any contraband he possessed, and since the dog sniff revealed the location of a
substance Defendant had no right to possess, Caballes and Branch establish that the
dog sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Defendant’s arguments require us
to begin with the basics of the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
A. Search and Seizure
¶ 15 “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects ‘[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures[.]’” State v. Teague, 2022-NCCOA-600, ¶ 26
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). “‘The North Carolina Constitution affords similar
protection.’” Id. (quoting State v. Cabbagestalk, 266 N.C. App. 106, 111, 830 S.E.2d
5, 9 (2019)) (citing N.C. Const. art. 1, § 20). Defendant contends (1) following the
legalization of industrial hemp in North Carolina a dog sniff is a search, and (2) this
particular dog sniff was an “unreasonable” search from which he was protected by
the federal and State Constitutions.
1. What is a Fourth Amendment “Search”
¶ 16 This Court has previously addressed what constitutes a Fourth Amendment
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“search” and the implications of using drug-sniffing dogs to seek contraband in State
v. Washburn:
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment protects the
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.” State v. Phillips, 132 N.C.App. 765, 770, 513
S.E.2d 568, 572 (internal quotation marks omitted), disc.
review denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 846, 539
S.E.2d 3 (1999). Such an unreasonable search “occurs when
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85,
94 (1984).
Official conduct that does not compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy is not a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 123, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d at
101. Any interest in possessing contraband cannot be
deemed legitimate, and thus, governmental conduct that
only reveals the possession of contraband does not
compromise any legitimate privacy interest. Id. at 121–23,
104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d at 99–101.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the Fourth
Amendment implications of a canine sniff in United States
v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110(1983). There, the Court treated the sniff of a well-trained
narcotics dog as sui generis because the sniff “disclose[d]
only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item.” Id. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d at 121. As the
United States Supreme Court explained in Illinois v.
Caballes, since there is no legitimate interest in possessing
contraband, a police officer’s use of a well-trained narcotics
dog that reveals only the possession of narcotics does not
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compromise any legitimate privacy interest and does not
violate the Fourth Amendment. 543 U.S. 405, 408–09, 125
S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842, 847 (2005).
State v. Washburn, 201 N.C. App. 93, 96-97, 685 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2009). Because a
dog sniff was not a search, at least prior to the legalization of industrial hemp in
North Carolina, “probable cause was not a prerequisite for” the use of a dog to detect
contraband. See id. at 99, 685 S.E.2d at 560; see also Branch, 177 N.C. App. at 108,
627 S.E.2d at 509 (“[O]nce the lawfulness of a person’s detention is established,
Caballes instructs us that officers need no additional assessment under the Fourth
Amendment before walking a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of that
individual’s vehicle.”). As a result, the police were generally free to use drug-sniffing
dogs during traffic stops to detect contraband without implicating the Fourth
Amendment. Compare Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 350, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492, 496
(2015) (expanding upon Caballes and holding “a police stop exceeding the time needed
to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield
against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic
violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.”).
¶ 17 Defendant contends the United States Supreme Court and North Carolina
appellate court cases “must now be re-examined due to industrial hemp’s
legalization.” Defendant notes that previously “the United States Supreme Court
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and this Court held using a drug-detection dog to walk around a vehicle’s exterior to
sniff for narcotics is not a search. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40,
121 S. Ct. 447, 453; State v. Fisher, 141 N.C. App. 448, 457, 539 S.E.2d 677, 684.” But
given the legalization of hemp, Defendant argues that, because a drug-sniffing dog
may now alert to noncontraband, the underlying rationale in Caballes now requires
probable cause to use a drug-sniffing dog because the dog can alert to noncontraband.
¶ 18 As discussed above, the Supreme Court of the United States explained the
Fourth Amendment implications of dog sniffs in Caballes. See Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
160 L.Ed.2d 842. In Caballes, the defendant was stopped for speeding on the
highway. Id. at 406, 160 L.Ed.2d at 845. A K-9 unit overheard the responding officer
call dispatch to report the stop and also responded to the scene. Id. at 406, 160
L.Ed.2d at 845-46. When the K-9 unit arrived, the K-9 officer walked the dog around
the defendant’s vehicle while the responding officer wrote the defendant a citation.
Id. The dog alerted; based on the alert the officers searched the trunk of the
defendant’s vehicle; the officers found marijuana; and then the officers arrested the
defendant. Id.¶ 19 The United States Supreme Court held
[o]fficial conduct that does not “compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy” is not a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment. Jacobsen, 466 US, at 123, 80 L Ed 2d 85, 104
S Ct 1652. We have held that any interest in possessing
contraband cannot be deemed “legitimate,” and thus,
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governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of
contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy interest.”
Ibid. This is because the expectation “that certain facts
will not come to the attention of the authorities” is not the
same as an interest in “privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable.” Id., at 122, 80 L Ed 2d 85, 104 S Ct
1652 (punctuation omitted). In United States v. Place, 462
US 696, 77 L Ed 2d 110, 103 S Ct 2637 (1983), we treated
a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as
“sui generis” because “it discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item.” Id., at 707, 77 L
Ed 2d 110, 103 S Ct 2637; see also Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 US 32, 40, 148 L Ed 2d 333, 121 S Ct 447 (2000).
Id. at 408-09, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further held
“the use of a well-trained narcotics-detecting dog–one that ‘does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,’ Place,
462 US, at 707, 77 L Ed 2d 110, 103 S Ct 2637–during a lawful traffic stop, generally
does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.” Id. at 409, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847. The
Supreme Court noted this holding was consistent with recent precedent addressing
searches that could detect both lawful and unlawful activity:
The legitimate expectation that information about
perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically
distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations
concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of
his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful
traffic stop that reveals no information other than the
location of a substance that no individual has any right to
possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 409-10, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847-48 (emphasis added).
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¶ 20 Here, Defendant did not have a “legitimate privacy interest” in his
methamphetamine. The drug-sniffing dog was trained and certified to alert on
methamphetamine, and Defendant did not create a “legitimate privacy interest” as
to the methamphetamine simply by storing it in the same bag with the hemp. See id.
at 408, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847 (“We have held that any interest in possessing contraband
cannot be deemed ‘legitimate[.]’”). Deputy Watson confirmed during the State’s
presentation of evidence that the “dog is certified in cocaine, heroin,
meth[amphetamine], and marijuana.” The dog was annually re-certified to detect
these substances. The dog was trained to alert to the methamphetamine even in the
absence of hemp. Thus, Defendant’s argument that Caballes “must be re-examined
due to industrial hemp’s legalization” is simply not presented by the facts of this case,
where the methamphetamine and hemp were in the same bag, and the canine was
trained to detect both substances.
¶ 21 The legalization of hemp has no bearing on the continued illegality of
methamphetamine, and the Fourth Amendment does not protect against the
discovery of contraband, detectable by the drug-sniffing dog, because Defendant
decided to package noncontraband beside it. Additionally, we have repeatedly
applied precedent established before the legalization of hemp, even while
acknowledging the difficulties in distinguishing hemp and marijuana in situ. See
Teague, ¶ 58 (finding decisions of the federal courts of North Carolina persuasive and
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deciding “[t]he passage of the Industrial Hemp Act, in and of itself, did not modify the
State’s burden of proof at the various stages of our criminal proceedings”); State v.
Highsmith, 2022-NCCOA-560, ¶¶ 16-20 (determining the difficulties in
distinguishing hemp and marijuana did not alter the traditional probable cause
analysis, and the scent of marijuana or hemp in addition to other facts may grant an
officer probable cause to search for or seize suspected contraband); State v. Parker,
277 N.C. App. 531, 2021-NCCOA-217, ¶¶ 13, 31 (noting the defendant argued the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress by “failing to address the material
issue of the indistinguishable scents of marijuana and legal hemp[,]” this Court held
“we need not determine whether the scent or visual identification of marijuana alone
remains sufficient to grant an officer probable cause to search a vehicle” because the
police had additional facts available to them, other than the scent of marijuana or
hemp, sufficient to grant the police probable cause).
¶ 22 We need not re-examine the application of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Caballes to a canine sniff based on the facts of this case. Defendant had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in his contraband simply because it was stored together with
non-contraband in his vehicle, the dog-sniff could detect the methamphetamine
regardless of the presence of hemp, and the dog-sniff of Defendant’s truck did not
constitute a search.
STATE V. WALTERS
2022-NCCOA-796
Opinion of the Court
B. Probable Cause
¶ 23 Next, we address the trial court’s conclusion that the dog’s “alert created
probable cause for a search of the interior of [Defendant’s] vehicle.” We have, so far,
only determined that the use of the drug-sniffing dog did not constitute a search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. We must still determine whether the police
had probable cause for the subsequent search of Defendant’s vehicle.
¶ 24 This Court recently published an opinion in Highsmith where the defendant
made a similar argument. See Highsmith, ¶ 10. In Highsmith, the police received
multiple complaints of a house being used to sell narcotics. Id. ¶ 4. Two officers
followed a vehicle after it left the residence, then pulled the vehicle over after noticing
it “had a broken brake light” and it “illegally cross[ed] a yellow line.” Id. The
defendant “was sitting in the vehicle’s front passenger seat.” Id. ¶ 5. The police
recognized the defendant from “past encounters and arrests,” noticed ammunition in
a rear passenger seat, and the defendant and the driver of the vehicle “gave
inconsistent stories about where they were headed and from where they were
coming.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The police called a K-9 unit, and after the K-9 unit arrived the
dog “sniffed the exterior of the vehicle and alerted to the possible presence of drugs.”
Id. ¶ 7. The defendant was removed from the vehicle; the police searched the vehicle;
and the officers found evidence of marijuana and paraphernalia for the sale of
marijuana. Id. ¶ 7. The defendant was indicted and filed a motion to suppress. Id.
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2022-NCCOA-796
Opinion of the Court
¶¶ 9-10. The defendant and the State in Highsmith made similar arguments to
Defendant and the State in this case:
Defendant filed a motion to suppress, challenging the
lawfulness of the search and subsequent seizure of the
marijuana. Defendant premised his argument on the
emerging industry of legal hemp, indistinguishable by
either sight or smell from marijuana. Defendant argued at
the hearing that a K-9 alert standing alone cannot support
probable cause when legalized hemp is widely available.
Because marijuana and hemp are indistinguishable,
Defendant argued, an unlawful seizure would first be
needed in order to perform testing to confirm the substance
was marijuana. The K-9 alert therefore could not support
the warrantless search, and the ensuing evidence
recovered should be suppressed, as the result of both an
illegal search and an illegal seizure following the search.
The State argued the existence of legal hemp does not
change the analysis that a K-9 alert can support probable
cause. The prosecutor explained that because the K-9 alert
was not the only factor giving rise to the officers’ probable
cause to believe Defendant was engaged in criminal
activity, this is “a K-9 sniff plus” case. (Emphasis added).
Other factors cited by the prosecutor were the inconsistent
statements made to officers by Defendant and the driver of
the vehicle, the fact that neither the driver nor Defendant
was the registered owner of the vehicle, and the officers’
knowledge of Defendant's prior arrests related to
marijuana.
The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress by
order entered 8 February 2021. The trial court concluded
that “K-9 Mindy’s positive alert for narcotics at the SUV,
along with other factors in evidence, provided the officers
on the scene with sufficient facts to find probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of the inside of the vehicle.”
Id. ¶¶ 10-12 (emphasis added).
STATE V. WALTERS
2022-NCCOA-796
Opinion of the Court
¶ 25 On appeal, the defendant in Highsmith narrowed his argument compared to
the Defendant in the present case. The defendant did “not argue on appeal that the
search of the vehicle was unconstitutional. Instead, he argue[d] the trial court failed
to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the seizure of the
marijuana found during the search, given the difficulty of distinguishing legal hemp
from illegal marijuana.” Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis in original). This Court engaged in the
traditional totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the police had
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search and seizure of the marijuana:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures
and apply to “brief investigatory detentions such as those
involved in the stopping of a vehicle.” State v. Downing, 169
N.C. App. 790, 794, 613 S.E.2d 35, 38 (2005) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). However, “[i]t is a well-
established rule that a search warrant is not required
before a lawful search based on probable cause of a motor
vehicle in a public roadway . . . may take place.” Id. at 795-
96, 613 S.E.2d at 39. This probable cause standard is met
where the totality of “the facts and circumstances within
the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonable
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Zuniga,
312 N.C. 251, 261, 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984) (brackets
and quotation marks omitted)[.]
....
The trial court found that the officer’s search revealed not
only marijuana, but also additional items including a
STATE V. WALTERS
2022-NCCOA-796
Opinion of the Court
digital scale, over one thousand dollars in folds of money,
ammunition, and a flip cellphone. Under the totality of the
circumstances: a vacuum-sealed bag of what appeared to
be marijuana, hidden under the seat and found with these
items, without any evidence that Defendant claimed to the
officers the substance was legal hemp, the officers’
suspicions were bolstered, amounting to probable cause to
believe the substance at issue was in fact illicit marijuana
and not hemp. The trial court therefore did not err in
concluding that Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated.
Id. ¶¶ 17, 20. This Court then concluded “the trial court did not err in denying
Defendant’s motion to suppress . . . .” Id. ¶ 25. However, Highsmith does not answer
the question on appeal; the defendant in Highsmith specifically did not challenge the
legality of the search of his vehicle. See id. ¶ 16. But Highsmith does instruct us
that, although the law regarding marijuana and hemp has recently changed, we still
follow a traditional probable cause analysis in determining whether a defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by a warrantless search or seizure. See
U.S. Const. amend. IV, § 1; see also N.C. Const. art. I, § 20.
¶ 26 “Typically, a warrant is required to conduct a search unless a specific exception
applies.” Parker, ¶ 25 (citation omitted). Here, the only applicable warrant exception
is the motor vehicle exception. See id. The State conceded during the suppression
hearing that “the search of the vehicle was not a search incident to arrest, per se.”
The trial court later concluded “there was a basis separate and apart from the arrest
to search the interior of the vehicle.”
STATE V. WALTERS
2022-NCCOA-796
Opinion of the Court
In the context of the motor vehicle exception,
[a] police officer in the exercise of his duties
may search an automobile without a search
warrant when the existing facts and
circumstances are sufficient to support a
reasonable belief that the automobile carries
contraband materials. If probable cause
justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of
the vehicle and its contents that may conceal
the object of the search.
Id. ¶ 25 (quoting State v. Degraphenreed, 261 N.C. App. 235, 241, 820 S.E.2d 331, 336
(2018)).
¶ 27 Here, the “facts and circumstances” available to Deputies Lyall and Watson
established probable cause to search Defendant’s truck, including the bag in which
the methamphetamine and hemp were found, and the trial court did not err by so
concluding. As established above, the use of Deputy Watson’s K-9 did not constitute
a Fourth Amendment search. But the canine’s alert was a factor contributing to a
probable cause determination that supports Deputies Lyall and Watson’s decision to
search Defendant’s truck. In addition to the positive indication by the dog, Deputy
Lyall was aware of (1) Defendant’s outstanding warrants for possession of
methamphetamine, and (2) that Deputy Norris had previously seized
methamphetamine from Defendant. Defendant’s outstanding warrants, the fact that
Deputy Norris had already seized methamphetamine from Defendant, and the
STATE V. WALTERS
2022-NCCOA-796
Opinion of the Court
positive drug-sniffing dog alert by a dog certified to detect methamphetamine is a
sufficient basis for probable cause for Deputies Lyall and Watson to search
Defendant’s truck. The trial court did not err by concluding the deputies had probable
cause to search the truck.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 28 Because the State’s use of a drug-sniffing dog did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment “search” and because Deputies Lyall and Watson had probable cause to
search Defendant’s truck, the trial court committed no plain error in denying
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
AFFIRMED AND NO ERROR.
Judges HAMPSON and JACKSON concur.