Schmid v. Simmons , 311 Neb. 48 ( 2022 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    04/28/2022 08:07 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    311 Nebraska Reports
    SCHMID v. SIMMONS
    Cite as 
    311 Neb. 48
    Lanny Schmid, an individual, appellee and
    cross-appellee, v. Lee Simmons, an individual, and
    Niobrara River Ranch, L.L.C., a Nebraska limited
    liability company, appellants, MAR14, LLC,
    a Nebraska limited liability company,
    appellee and cross-appellant,
    and Thomas Masters, an
    individual, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 4, 2022.    No. S-20-524.
    1. Trial: Equity: Appeal and Error. On appeal from the bench trial
    of an equity action, the standard of review is de novo on the record
    and the court must resolve questions of law and fact independently
    of the trial court’s determinations. When the evidence is in conflict,
    the appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the
    trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts
    over another.
    2. Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. The review of constitutional
    standards is a question of law and is reviewed independently of the trial
    court’s determination.
    3. Motions for New Trial: Judges: Words and Phrases: Appeal and
    Error. An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial
    or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment, for an abuse of
    discretion. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or rul-
    ings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant
    of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted
    for disposition.
    4. Constitutional Law: Jury Trials: Equity. Article I, § 6, of the Nebraska
    Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial as it existed under the
    common law when the Nebraska Constitution was adopted in 1875. At
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    common law, legal claims were tried by a jury and equitable claims
    were tried by a court.
    5.   Claims: Jury Trials: Equity. In Nebraska, it is well established that
    litigants are typically entitled to a jury trial on legal claims, but not
    equitable claims.
    6.   Constitutional Law: Statutes: Actions: Jury Trials: Equity. Pursuant
    to the Nebraska Constitution and statutes, the courts have traditionally
    denied jury trials in equitable actions and provided them as a matter of
    right in legal actions.
    7.   Actions: Pleadings: Equity. The essential character of a cause of action
    and the remedy or relief it seeks as shown by the allegations of the peti-
    tion determine whether a particular action is one at law to be tried to a
    jury or in equity to be tried to a court.
    8.   ____: ____: ____. The nature of an action, whether legal or equitable,
    is determinable from its main object, as disclosed by the averments of
    the pleadings and the relief sought. This determination is unaffected by
    the conclusions of the pleader or whether or not the pleader denominates
    the case as one at law or in equity.
    9.   Jurisdiction: Equity. If a court of equity has properly acquired jurisdic-
    tion of a suit for equitable relief, it may make complete adjudication
    of all matters properly presented and involved in the case and grant
    relief, legal or equitable, as may be required and thus avoid unnecessary
    litigation.
    10.   Actions: Jury Trials: Equity. Under the equitable cleanup doctrine,
    when a cause of action for equitable relief is stated, and when the plain-
    tiff prays for equitable relief, a jury trial cannot be demanded as a matter
    of right by the defendant. This is true even if the defendant pleads legal
    defenses or files a counterclaim for damages in response to the plain-
    tiff’s equitable cause of action.
    11.   Constitutional Law: Jury Trials: Equity. Neb. Const. art. I, § 6, pre-
    serves the right to a jury trial as it existed under the common law when
    the Nebraska Constitution was adopted. It does not create or extend such
    right. At common law, litigants did not have a right to a jury trial in
    equitable actions.
    12.   ____: ____: ____. It does not offend the Nebraska Constitution to deny
    a jury trial when the main object of a civil action is equitable, even
    when a defendant raises legal counterclaims in response to the plaintiff’s
    equitable action.
    13.   Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
    analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy
    before it.
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    14. Actions: Pleadings: Notice. Nebraska is a notice pleading jurisdiction,
    and civil actions are controlled by a liberal pleading regime. A party is
    required to set forth only a short and plain statement of the claim show-
    ing the pleader’s entitlement to relief and is not required to plead legal
    theories or cite appropriate statutes so long as the pleading gives fair
    notice of the claims asserted. The rationale for this liberal notice plead-
    ing standard is that when a party has a valid claim, he or she should
    recover on it regardless of a failure to perceive the true basis of the
    claim at the pleading stage.
    15. Rules of the Supreme Court: Trial: Pleadings: Implied Consent. To
    determine whether an issue was tried by the express or implied consent
    of the parties under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1115(b), the key inquiry is
    whether the parties recognized that an issue not presented by the plead-
    ings entered the case at trial.
    16. ____: ____: ____: ____. Implied consent for purposes of Neb. Ct. R.
    Pldg. § 6-1115(b) may arise in two situations: First, the claim may be
    introduced outside of the complaint—in another pleading or document—
    and then treated by the opposing party as if pleaded. Second, consent
    may be implied if during the trial the party acquiesces or fails to object
    to the introduction of evidence that relates only to that issue.
    17. ____: ____: ____: ____. For purposes of Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1115(b),
    implied consent may not be found if the opposing party did not recog-
    nize that new matters were at issue during the trial. A court will not
    imply consent to try a claim merely because evidence relevant to a prop-
    erly pleaded issue incidentally tends to establish an unpleaded claim.
    18. Corporations: Courts: Judgments. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-147
    (b) (Cum.
    Supp. 2020) affords a court discretion to order a remedy other than dis-
    solution, but it does not require the court to exercise that discretion.
    Appeal from the District Court for Cherry County: Mark D.
    Kozisek, Judge. Affirmed.
    Bartholomew L. McLeay and Dwyer Arce, of Kutak Rock,
    L.L.P., for appellants.
    Michael C. Cox, John V. Matson, Quinn R. Eaton, and
    Cassandra M. Langstaff, of Koley Jessen, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellee Lanny Schmid.
    Eric A. Scott for appellee MAR14, LLC.
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    SCHMID v. SIMMONS
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    311 Neb. 48
    Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and
    Freudenberg, JJ., and Weimer, District Judge.
    Stacy, J.
    This appeal arises from a dispute involving a limited liabil-
    ity company (LLC) and its members. After a bench trial, the
    district court entered a judgment which ordered an accounting,
    declared the membership rights of the parties, quieted title to
    certain real estate, and established a resulting trust; all other
    requested relief was denied. One member of the LLC appealed,
    assigning error to the district court’s denial of a request for a
    jury trial on its legal counterclaims. The LLC cross-appealed,
    assigning error to the court’s denial of a request to dissociate
    one of the members. Finding no merit to the assigned errors,
    we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In 2014, Lanny Schmid and Lee Simmons pooled their
    money with others to bid on certain tracts of land being sold at
    public auction, including 560 acres near Valentine, Nebraska,
    which the parties refer to as the “Canyon Rim” land. The col-
    lective bid was successful. Only the Canyon Rim tract is rele­
    vant to this appeal.
    Schmid did not attend the closing for the Canyon Rim
    land, but on the day of closing, he transferred $600,000 to an
    account operated by Niobrara River Ranch, L.L.C. (NRR).
    NRR is a trade name that Simmons uses for some of his busi-
    ness ventures, and the account into which Schmid transferred
    the funds is owned and controlled by Simmons. The reason for
    Schmid’s transfer is disputed, but it appears Simmons used the
    $600,000, along with other funds, to close on the land acquired
    by the parties. The deed to the Canyon Rim land was titled in
    the name “MAR14, LLC” (MAR14).
    MAR14 is a member-managed limited liability company,
    and its only members are Simmons, Schmid, and Thomas
    Masters. Its operating agreement states that “this Company
    is formed to purchase land, transfer it and manage it.” The
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    SCHMID v. SIMMONS
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    operating agreement requires unanimous consent of all mem-
    bers for certain matters, including property transfers. The
    record shows that Simmons initially created MAR14 to take
    title to another tract of land and to serve as a tax-planning
    vehicle for other properties.
    After closing on the Canyon Rim land, Simmons and Schmid
    considered building cabins on the property, subdividing the
    property, and selling the property. But roughly 2 years after
    acquiring the land, the parties’ communications regarding the
    Canyon Rim land stalled.
    In May 2016, Schmid sent Simmons an email proposing that
    they divide ownership of the Canyon Rim land. Schmid sug-
    gested that 320 acres of the Canyon Rim land be titled in his
    name and that the remaining 240 acres be titled in Simmons’
    name. Simmons did not accept the proposal. About 2 months
    later, in July 2016, Schmid sent Simmons a demand letter
    requesting, among other things, a full accounting of MAR14’s
    activities, an accounting of his $600,000 transfer, and an expla-
    nation for why title to certain property was transferred from
    MAR14 to another entity without unanimous approval from all
    MAR14 members. Simmons’ attorney responded to this letter,
    but no resolution was reached.
    1. Lawsuit
    Shortly thereafter, Schmid filed a lawsuit against Simmons,
    MAR14, and NRR in the district court for Cherry County,
    Nebraska. In an amended complaint, Schmid added the third
    member of MAR14, Masters, as a defendant. Schmid’s opera-
    tive amended complaint sought (1) to quiet title to a specific
    parcel of land acquired in the auction and to eject Simmons
    from the parcel, (2) a declaratory judgment determining the
    MAR14 members’ percentage of ownership, (3) an accounting
    from MAR14, (4) judicial dissolution of MAR14, and (5) any
    other relief the court deemed just and equitable.
    Simmons and NRR filed a joint answer, generally denying
    that Schmid was entitled to the relief sought and disputing
    the nature of Schmid’s $600,000 transfer. Their answer also
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    alleged several counterclaims, including claims for (1) a result-
    ing trust, (2) a decree quieting title, and (3) an ­accounting/action
    for assumpsit.
    MAR14 filed its own answer to Schmid’s operative com-
    plaint and generally denied that Schmid was entitled to have
    MAR14 judicially dissolved. MAR14 also counterclaimed,
    seeking a “judicial determination and declaration concerning”
    Schmid’s membership status in MAR14, costs of its action,
    and other equitable relief. Masters filed an answer in which
    he denied making any capital contribution to MAR14 and dis-
    claimed any interest in the real estate held by MAR14.
    2. Telephonic Progression Conference
    In February 2017, the presiding judge held a telephonic
    conference with the parties’ counsel. The bill of exceptions
    does not include that conference, but our transcript includes a
    signed and file-stamped progression order which memorialized
    the conference. The progression order states the conference
    occurred in “Judge’s chambers at Ainsworth, Nebraska, by
    telephone conference call” and also states, “The parties agreed
    the matter was equitable and would be tried to the court with-
    out a jury.”
    3. Simmons and NRR Amend Answer to Add
    Counterclaim and Make Jury Demand
    In December 2017, Simmons and NRR amended their answer
    to include a counterclaim for “Breach of Contract/Estoppel.”
    The counterclaim sought to recover lost profits and demanded
    a jury trial on “any and all issues or claims triable by right
    under the Nebraska Constitution or Nebraska statutes.”
    Schmid moved to strike the jury demand from the amended
    answer, and the court granted that motion. In addition to
    noting that the parties agreed, during the progression con-
    ference, that the matter was equitable in nature and would
    be tried to the court, the court’s order stated that Simmons,
    Masters, MAR14, and NRR were not entitled to a jury trial.
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    SCHMID v. SIMMONS
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    It relied on Kuhlman v. Cargile 1 for the proposition that
    “when a court of equity acquires jurisdiction over a cause
    for any purpose it may retain the cause for all purposes and
    proceed to a final determination on all matters put in issue in
    the case.” This rule is sometimes referred to as the “equitable
    clean-up” doctrine. 2
    The court subsequently issued a final pretrial order which
    stated that “the pleadings adequately state the issues to be
    tried,” and it confirmed that “[t]he matter shall be tried to the
    court without a jury.” Simmons and NRR objected to that por-
    tion of the pretrial order which required a trial to the bench on
    their legal counterclaims, but the court overruled the objection
    and declined to reconsider its prior ruling. Simmons and NRR
    renewed their jury demand at the start of the bench trial, and
    the court again overruled their objection.
    During the 4-day bench trial, the parties adduced evidence
    on all disputed issues. We summarize only that evidence which
    is pertinent to the assignments of error on appeal.
    Schmid testified that he was a financial member of MAR14
    and that his $600,000 transfer was a capital contribution to the
    LLC. Schmid believed MAR14’s purpose was to acquire and
    manage agricultural land. Schmid testified that MAR14 refused
    to provide him an accounting of revenues and expenses and
    denied his right to authorize transfers, receive revenue, and
    participate in its operation and management. Schmid wanted
    MAR14 to be judicially dissolved because he and Simmons
    were unable to agree on the membership status of the MAR14
    members, the percentage of ownership of any member, the
    distributions to be made, or how to conduct the business and
    operations of MAR14. According to Schmid, MAR14 was
    “hopelessly deadlocked” and it was “not reasonably practical to
    carry on MAR14’s activities in conformity with the certificate
    of organization of MAR14 and the operating agreement.”
    1
    Kuhlman v. Cargile, 
    200 Neb. 150
    , 156, 
    262 N.W.2d 454
    , 458 (1978).
    2
    See John P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure §§ 29:9 and 29:10 (2021).
    See, also, 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 103 (2019).
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    Simmons testified that he was MAR14’s only “financial”
    member. He described Schmid’s $600,000 transfer to MAR14
    as an investment in Canyon Rim and the parties’ collective
    plans for that land, rather than a capital contribution to MAR14.
    He also testified that after making initial capital contributions,
    neither Schmid nor Masters contributed additional capital to
    MAR14. Simmons testified that he formed MAR14 to facili-
    tate certain property exchanges, and he believed Schmid was
    hindering that purpose.
    During closing argument, Schmid’s attorney urged the court
    to judicially dissolve MAR14. The attorney also suggested to
    the court that it had discretion to pursue other equitable alter-
    natives if it deemed dissolution inappropriate, but Schmid did
    not ask the court to dissociate any member from MAR14.
    When presenting closing arguments on behalf of Simmons
    and NRR, counsel expressly asked the court, for the first time,
    to consider using its equitable powers and authority under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-147
    (b) (Cum. Supp. 2020) to dissociate Schmid
    from MAR14. Later, MAR14 submitted a posttrial brief in
    which it asked, for the first time, to have Schmid dissociated.
    This brief is not in our appellate record.
    4. Judgment
    On May 27, 2020, the district court entered judgment deny-
    ing Schmid’s claims for quiet title and ejectment, but granting
    Schmid’s claims for an accounting and declaratory judgment.
    After determining that Schmid intended his $600,000 to be used
    to purchase the Canyon Rim land, the court declared Schmid
    to be the owner of an undivided 53.57 percent interest in the
    Canyon Rim land. It ordered MAR14 to convey that undivided
    interest to Schmid. The court effectively denied Schmid’s dis-
    solution claim, reasoning that its resolution of the other issues
    “removes the necessity of dissolving [MAR14].”
    The court granted Simmons and NRR’s request for a result-
    ing trust and to quiet title to certain land, but it denied their
    counterclaims for an accounting, assumpsit, reimbursement,
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    and breach of contract/estoppel. On MAR14’s counterclaim for
    declaratory judgment regarding Schmid’s membership ­status,
    the court found that “Schmid is not a financial/economic mem-
    ber” of MAR14. The court’s judgment did not expressly rule
    on the requests made during closing argument to dissociate
    Schmid from MAR14, but it did state that “[a]ny other claims
    for relief by any party, expressed or implied, are denied and
    dismissed with prejudice.”
    5. Motion to Alter or Amend
    MAR14 filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judg-
    ment, asking the district court to expressly rule on, and grant,
    its request to dissociate Schmid from MAR14. The court over-
    ruled MAR14’s motion, reasoning the request to dissociate was
    not properly before the court, because it was not presented in
    the pleadings, and instead was raised for the first time in clos-
    ing argument.
    Simmons and NRR filed this timely appeal, and MAR14
    cross-appealed. Simmons and NRR challenge the denial of a
    jury trial on their legal counterclaims. Among other things,
    they argue that the equitable cleanup doctrine, relied upon by
    the trial court to deny their jury demand, has been abrogated
    in Nebraska. Alternatively, they argue the doctrine should
    be abandoned. We granted bypass to consider the continued
    viability of the equitable cleanup doctrine in Nebraska.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Simmons and NRR assign that the district court erred in deny-
    ing their demand for a jury trial on their legal counterclaims.
    On cross-appeal, MAR14 assigns that the district court erred
    in failing to “rule on Schmid’s [membership] status . . . and
    order Schmid’s dissociation” from MAR14. For the sake of
    completeness, we note that MAR14 also assigned error to the
    court’s refusal to cancel a lis pendens filed on MAR14’s prop-
    erty, but it has since abandoned that assignment, so this opinion
    will not further address it.
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    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] On appeal from the bench trial of an equity action, the
    standard of review is de novo on the record and the court must
    resolve questions of law and fact independently of the trial
    court’s determinations. 3 When the evidence is in conflict, the
    appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that
    the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version
    of the facts over another. 4
    [2] The review of constitutional standards is a question
    of law and is reviewed independently of the trial court’s
    determination. 5
    [3] An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for
    new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment,
    for an abuse of discretion. 6 A judicial abuse of discretion exists
    if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
    unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying
    just results in matters submitted for disposition. 7
    IV. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Simmons and NRR contend they were entitled to
    a jury trial on their legal counterclaims and the district court
    erred in denying them that right. They argue the court erro-
    neously relied on the equitable cleanup doctrine, which they
    contend was effectively abrogated by our analysis in Jacobson
    v. Shresta. 8 Alternatively, they urge this court to abandon the
    doctrine now. We begin our analysis of these arguments by
    reviewing Nebraska law pertaining to the right to a jury trial
    in civil cases.
    3
    Benjamin v. Bierman, 
    305 Neb. 879
    , 
    943 N.W.2d 283
     (2020).
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    In re Interest of Zoie H., 
    304 Neb. 868
    , 
    937 N.W.2d 801
     (2020).
    6
    AVG Partners I v. Genesis Health Clubs, 
    307 Neb. 47
    , 
    948 N.W.2d 212
    (2020).
    7
    Dycus v. Dycus, 
    307 Neb. 426
    , 
    949 N.W.2d 357
     (2020).
    8
    Jacobson v. Shresta, 
    288 Neb. 615
    , 
    849 N.W.2d 515
     (2014).
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    1. Civil Right to Jury Trial and
    Equitable Cleanup Doctrine
    In their appellate briefing, Simmons and NRR focus on
    the right to a civil jury trial as guaranteed by the Nebraska
    Constitution. We limit our analysis accordingly.
    [4] Article I, § 6, of the Nebraska Constitution provides:
    The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the
    Legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a less number
    than twelve in courts inferior to the District Court, and
    may by general law authorize a verdict in civil cases in
    any court by not less than five-sixths of the jury.
    We have long held that this constitutional provision preserves
    the right to a jury trial as it existed under the common law
    when the Nebraska Constitution was adopted in 1875. 9 At com-
    mon law, legal claims were tried by a jury and equitable claims
    were tried by a court. 10
    [5-8] Under Nebraska statute, “[i]ssues of fact arising in
    actions for the recovery of money or of specific real or per-
    sonal property, shall be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is
    waived . . . .” 11 Thus, in Nebraska, it is well established that
    litigants are typically entitled to a jury trial on legal claims, but
    not equitable claims. 12 As we have explained:
    Pursuant to the Nebraska Constitution and statutes, this
    court has traditionally denied jury trials in equitable
    actions and provided them as a matter of right in legal
    actions. . . .
    The essential character of a cause of action and the
    remedy or relief it seeks as shown by the allegations
    9
    Id.
    10
    Id.
    11
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1104
     (Reissue 2016).
    12
    See State ex rel. Cherry v. Burns, 
    258 Neb. 216
    , 
    602 N.W.2d 477
     (1999).
    See, also, Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 
    279 Neb. 661
    , 
    782 N.W.2d 848
     (2010), disapproved on other grounds, Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh,
    
    283 Neb. 369
    , 
    808 N.W.2d 867
     (2012).
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    of the petition determine whether a particular action is
    one at law to be tried to a jury or in equity to be tried to a
    court. . . . The nature of an action, whether legal or equi-
    table, is determinable from its main object, as disclosed
    by the averments of the pleadings and the relief sought.
    This determination is unaffected by the conclusions of
    the pleader or whether or not the pleader denominates the
    case as one at law or in equity. 13
    [9] Moreover, we have consistently held that if a court of
    equity has properly acquired jurisdiction of a suit for equitable
    relief, it may make complete adjudication of all matters prop-
    erly presented and involved in the case and grant relief, legal
    or equitable, as may be required and thus avoid unnecessary
    litigation. 14 The historical roots and purpose of the doctrine has
    been described by one commentator as follows:
    The doctrine traces its roots to the days when there were
    separate equity and law courts. If an equity court acquired
    jurisdiction of a case because of a presence of an equita-
    ble claim, the court could adjudicate the entire case even
    though that might involve awarding legal relief. In other
    words, the equity court could grant any equitable relief
    that was warranted and could then clean-up the rest of the
    case by awarding any incidental legal relief that was war-
    ranted. The purpose of the doctrine was to avoid multiple
    litigation and to protect plaintiffs from being left without
    a remedy if they initially chose the wrong court. 15
    [10] Even after separate equity courts and law courts
    merged, Nebraska has consistently applied the equitable
    cleanup doctrine. 16 Relying on the doctrine, we have long
    13
    State ex rel. Cherry, supra note 12, 
    258 Neb. at 223-24
    , 
    602 N.W.2d at 482-83
     (citations omitted).
    14
    State ex rel. Cherry, 
    supra note 12
    .
    15
    See Lenich, supra note 2, § 29:9 at 1232.
    16
    Lenich, supra note 2.
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    said that when a cause of action for equitable relief is stated,
    and when the plaintiff prays for equitable relief, a jury trial
    cannot be demanded as a matter of right by the defendant. 17
    This is true even if the defendant pleads legal defenses or
    files a counterclaim for damages in response to the plaintiff’s
    equitable cause of action. 18
    Here, the district court relied on the above principles to find
    that Simmons and NRR were not entitled to a jury trial on their
    “Breach of Contract/Estoppel” claim. On this record, we find
    no error with this determination.
    The pleadings and relief sought by the parties reveal that
    this action was primarily equitable in nature. The parties do
    not dispute that Schmid’s claims sounded in equity, 19 as did
    most of Simmons and NRR’s counterclaims. 20 Simmons and
    NRR argue they raised legal counterclaims in their operative
    amended answer, 21 but we do not understand them to dispute
    that the “main object” 22 of this action was equitable. Thus,
    17
    Kuhlman, supra note 1.
    18
    Id.
    19
    See, Burnett v. Maddocks, 
    294 Neb. 152
    , 
    881 N.W.2d 185
     (2016)
    (recognizing action to quiet title sounds in equity); Robertson v. Jacobs
    Cattle Co., 
    285 Neb. 859
    , 
    830 N.W.2d 191
     (2013) (action for partnership
    dissolution and accounting sounds in equity); Detter v. Miracle Hills
    Animal Hosp., 
    269 Neb. 164
    , 
    691 N.W.2d 107
     (2005) (action for corporate
    dissolution sounds in equity); Lone Cedar Ranches v. Jandebeur, 
    246 Neb. 769
    , 772, 
    523 N.W.2d 364
    , 368 (1994) (explaining that whether to treat
    declaratory judgment action as one in law or equity depends on nature
    of dispute and that accounting can be an equitable remedy when action
    involves “a complicated series of accounts”).
    20
    See, Burnett, 
    supra note 19
     (quiet title action sounds in equity); Brtek v.
    Cihal, 
    245 Neb. 756
    , 
    515 N.W.2d 628
     (1994) (actions to impose resulting
    trust sound in equity).
    21
    See, Goes v. Vogler, 
    304 Neb. 848
    , 
    937 N.W.2d 190
     (2020) (action for
    breach of contract is action at law); Kissinger v. Genetic Eval. Ctr., 
    260 Neb. 431
    , 
    618 N.W.2d 429
     (2000) (assumpsit is action at law).
    22
    State ex rel. Cherry, 
    supra note 12
    , 
    258 Neb. at 223
    , 
    602 N.W.2d at 482
    .
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    because the district court properly acquired equitable jurisdic-
    tion over the suit, Simmons and NRR were not entitled to
    demand a jury trial on their legal counterclaims as a matter of
    right. Under the equitable cleanup doctrine, the district court
    was permitted to make complete adjudication of all matters
    properly presented to it and to grant either legal or equi-
    table relief. 23
    2. Has Equitable Cleanup
    Doctrine Been Abrogated?
    Simmons and NRR’s primary argument on appeal is that
    the equitable cleanup doctrine was abrogated by this court in
    Jacobson v. Shresta 24 and that thus, the district court should
    not have relied on it. Jacobson involved a medical malprac-
    tice suit, and the issue was whether the plaintiff waived the
    right to jury trial “by failing to object to a defendant’s motion
    for a bench trial before the court sustain[ed] the motion.” 25
    The appeal was originally docketed with the Nebraska Court
    of Appeals, which held that under such circumstances, there
    was a valid jury waiver. But we disagreed on further review,
    explaining that jury waivers are “statutorily governed by
    § 25-1126.” 26 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1126
     (Cum. Supp. 2020)
    provides:
    The trial by jury may be waived by the parties in
    actions arising on contract and with assent of the court in
    other actions (1) by the consent of the party appearing,
    when the other party fails to appear at the trial by himself
    or herself or by attorney, (2) by written consent, in person
    or by attorney, filed with the clerk, and (3) by oral con-
    sent in open court entered upon the record.
    23
    State ex rel. Cherry, supra note 12.
    24
    Jacobson, supra note 8.
    25
    Id. at 620, 849 N.W.2d at 519.
    26
    Id. at 623, 849 N.W.2d at 521.
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    Jacobson explained that “unless a party’s conduct falls into one
    of § 25-1126’s three categories, we will not find a waiver of a
    constitutional right.” 27
    Thus, Jacobson clarified the circumstances under which a
    court can find that a party has validly waived the right to a
    jury trial. But Jacobson has no bearing on the applicability
    of the equitable cleanup doctrine. It is axiomatic that a party
    must be entitled to a jury trial before they can validly waive
    that right. And as we have already explained, it is well estab-
    lished in Nebraska that when a cause of action for equitable
    relief is stated, and when the plaintiff prays for equitable relief,
    a jury trial cannot be demanded as a matter of right by the
    defendant, even when the defendant raises legal counterclaims
    or defenses in response to the plaintiff’s equitable cause of
    action. 28 Nothing in Jacobson purports to alter the applica-
    bility of the equitable cleanup doctrine, and we expressly
    reject Simmons and NRR’s suggestion that Jacobson abrogated
    the doctrine.
    3. Should Doctrine Be Abandoned?
    Alternatively, Simmons and NRR argue that even if Jacobson
    did not abrogate the equitable cleanup doctrine, this court
    should nevertheless abandon the doctrine. They suggest that
    the doctrine is either unconstitutional or “serves no purpose in
    Nebraska today.” 29
    [11,12] As an initial matter, we reject Simmons and NRR’s
    suggestion that the doctrine is unconstitutional. As already
    explained, Neb. Const. art. I, § 6, preserves the right to a jury
    trial as it existed under the common law when the Nebraska
    Constitution was adopted. 30 It does not create or extend
    27
    Id.
    28
    Kuhlman, 
    supra note 1
    .
    29
    Brief for appellants at 29.
    30
    Jacobson, supra note 8.
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    such right. 31 At common law, litigants did not have a right to
    a jury trial in equitable actions. 32 And as already explained,
    it is a basic and long-established principle of Nebraska’s
    equity jurisprudence that where a court of equity has properly
    acquired jurisdiction in a suit for equitable relief, it will make
    a complete adjudication of all matters properly presented and
    involved in the case and ordinarily will grant such relief, legal
    or equitable, as may be required and thus avoid unnecessary
    litigation. 33 Thus, it does not offend the Nebraska Constitution
    to deny a jury trial when the main object of a civil action is
    equitable, even when a defendant raises legal counterclaims in
    response to the plaintiff’s equitable action. 34
    We also disagree with Simmons and NRR’s suggestion that
    the equitable cleanup doctrine serves no purpose in Nebraska
    today. The primary purpose of the doctrine is to promote
    judicial efficiency in adjudicating cases, by allowing courts
    tasked with adjudicating actions which are primarily equitable
    in nature to hear and resolve all claims presented in those
    actions. 35 Simmons and NRR have not suggested the doctrine
    can no longer achieve this purpose, and they have offered no
    principled reason to abrogate a doctrine which we have fol-
    lowed for more than a century.
    31
    Sharmer v. Johnson, 
    43 Neb. 509
    , 
    61 N.W. 727
     (1895).
    32
    See, Jacobson, supra note 8; Sharmer, supra note 31. See, also, Krumm
    v. Pillard, 
    104 Neb. 335
    , 338-39, 
    177 N.W. 171
    , 172 (1920) (“[w]hen
    the action is one purely legal in its nature, the rule is that either party
    ordinarily, as a matter of right, is entitled to demand a jury trial. . . . When
    the cause is for equitable relief, a jury cannot be demanded as a matter of
    right by either party to try any issue arising in the case”); State v. Moores,
    
    56 Neb. 1
    , 8, 
    76 N.W. 530
    , 532 (1898) (“[t]he right of trial by jury, at
    common law, never existed in equitable proceedings”).
    33
    Sechovec v. Harms, 
    187 Neb. 70
    , 
    187 N.W.2d 296
     (1971).
    34
    See Kuhlman, 
    supra note 1
    .
    35
    See State ex rel. Cherry, 
    supra note 12
    .
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    We are aware that some states have chosen to limit or aban-
    don similar doctrines. 36 Here, however, Simons and NRR have
    not presented any compelling reason to abandon or modify the
    doctrine’s application in Nebraska.
    The equitable cleanup doctrine is still good law in Nebraska,
    and the district court did not err in relying on it to deny
    Simmons and NRR’s jury demand on their legal counterclaims.
    Simmons and NRR’s lone assignment of error is meritless.
    4. Waiver of Jury
    [13] For the sake of completeness, we note that the par-
    ties devote substantial briefing to whether Simmons and NRR
    validly waived the right to a jury trial under § 25-1126 at the
    February 2017 telephonic conference. Because we have con-
    cluded that Simmons and NRR were not entitled to a jury trial
    on their legal counterclaims in the first instance, we need not
    reach the issue of whether they validly waived a jury under one
    of the enumerated methods in § 25-1126. An appellate court is
    not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to
    adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 37
    5. Cross-Appeal
    On cross-appeal, MAR14 assigns error to the district court’s
    “fail[ure] to rule on Schmid’s [membership] status . . . and
    order Schmid’s dissociation” from MAR14. As explained
    below, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.
    We begin by noting that as part of its assignment of
    error, MAR14 contends the court erred in failing to “rule on
    Schmid’s [membership] status.” But the record belies this
    36
    See, e.g., State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 
    137 S.W.3d 462
    , 474 (Mo. 2004)
    (narrowing application of equitable cleanup doctrine, explaining that
    “[i]n some situations, the practical and efficient trial of a case may require
    limited incidental claims at law to be tried to the court in connection with
    equitable matters” but stating that “[t]rying incidental claims at law to the
    court . . . should be the exception and not the rule”).
    37
    Gonzales v. Nebraska Pediatric Practice, 
    308 Neb. 571
    , 
    955 N.W.2d 696
    (2021).
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    contention. In its written judgment, the court ruled that Schmid
    is not a financial/economic member of MAR14. Thus, the
    court did issue a ruling on Schmid’s membership status, and to
    the extent MAR14 suggests otherwise, it is mistaken.
    The primary thrust of MAR14’s cross-appeal is not that the
    court failed to rule on Schmid’s membership status, but, rather,
    that it failed to order Schmid’s dissociation from MAR14.
    MAR14 makes three arguments in support of this contention:
    (1) The court should have ruled on Schmid’s dissociation,
    because MAR14 raised this issue in its pleadings; (2) even if
    it was not raised in the pleadings, the court should have ruled
    on Schmid’s dissociation, because the parties tried the issue
    by consent; and (3) the court had authority under § 21-147(b)
    to order Schmid’s dissociation and should have exercised that
    authority. We address each argument in turn.
    (a) Was Dissociation Sufficiently Pled?
    MAR14 contends the district court should have ruled on its
    request to dissociate Schmid, because this issue was raised in
    the pleadings. The record does not support this contention.
    [14] Nebraska is a notice pleading jurisdiction, and civil
    actions are controlled by a liberal pleading regime. 38 A party
    is required to set forth only a short and plain statement of the
    claim showing the pleader’s entitlement to relief and is not
    required to plead legal theories or cite appropriate statutes so
    long as the pleading gives fair notice of the claims asserted. 39
    The rationale for this liberal notice pleading standard is that
    when a party has a valid claim, he or she should recover on it
    regardless of a failure to perceive the true basis of the claim at
    the pleading stage. 40
    38
    Tryon v. City of North Platte, 
    295 Neb. 706
    , 
    890 N.W.2d 784
     (2017).
    39
    AVG Partners I, supra note 6. See, also, Haffke v. Signal 88, 
    306 Neb. 625
    , 643, 
    947 N.W.2d 103
    , 117 (2020) (“the touchstone is whether fair
    notice was provided”); Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1108.
    40
    Tryon, 
    supra note 38
    .
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    Even under Nebraska’s liberal pleading regime, we cannot
    find the issue of Schmid’s dissociation was raised in any of the
    pleadings in this case or in the court’s pretrial order. No party
    requested that Schmid be dissociated from MAR14, nor did
    any party allege that Schmid engaged in any activities which
    would merit his dissociation from the LLC. And we reject as
    meritless MAR14’s suggestion that by seeking a judicial decla-
    ration regarding Schmid’s “membership status,” it also placed
    Schmid’s dissociation from MAR14 at issue.
    (b) Was Dissociation Tried by Consent?
    MAR14 next argues that even if the issue of Schmid’s dis-
    sociation was not raised in the pleadings, the parties tried the
    issue by consent. Again, we disagree.
    [15,16] Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1115(b) provides that when
    issues not raised by the pleadings have been tried by the
    express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
    in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 41 To
    determine whether an issue was tried by the express or implied
    consent of the parties under § 6-1115(b), the key inquiry is
    whether the parties recognized that an issue not presented
    by the pleadings entered the case at trial. 42 We have said that
    implied consent for purposes of § 6-1115(b) may arise in two
    situations:
    First, the claim may be introduced outside of the com-
    plaint—in another pleading or document—and then
    treated by the opposing party as if pleaded. Second,
    consent may be implied if during the trial the party acqui-
    esces or fails to object to the introduction of evidence that
    relates only to that issue. 43
    41
    See United Gen. Title Ins. Co. v. Malone, 
    289 Neb. 1006
    , 
    858 N.W.2d 196
    (2015).
    42
    
    Id.
    43
    
    Id. at 1028
    , 858 N.W.2d at 216, quoting Blinn v. Beatrice Community
    Hosp. & Health Ctr., 
    270 Neb. 809
    , 
    708 N.W.2d 235
     (2006) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
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    [17] Implied consent may not be found if the opposing party
    did not recognize that new matters were at issue during the
    trial. 44 A court will not imply consent to try a claim merely
    because evidence relevant to a properly pleaded issue inciden-
    tally tends to establish an unpleaded claim. 45
    The record in this case does not support MAR14’s argu-
    ment that the issue of dissociation was tried by consent of the
    parties. Notably, the issue of Schmid’s dissociation was raised
    for the first time during closing argument, after all parties had
    rested. We see nothing in the record suggesting that “during the
    trial,” Schmid “acquiesce[d] or fail[ed] to object to the intro-
    duction of evidence that relates only to [the issue of Schmid’s
    dissociation].” 46 While there was some testimony that the mem-
    bers of MAR14 were “hopelessly deadlocked” and that Schmid
    and Simmons did not see eye-to-eye on MAR14’s operations,
    this evidence was relevant to Schmid’s judicial dissolution
    claim. Thus, on this record, we cannot find that Schmid should
    have recognized that his dissociation from MAR14 was being
    placed at issue during trial. We reject MAR14’s claim that the
    parties tried the issue of Schmid’s dissociation by consent.
    (c) Dissociation Under § 21-147(b)
    [18] Finally, MAR14 contends the court had authority under
    § 21-147(b) to dissociate Schmid from MAR14 and erred in
    refusing to exercise that authority. Section 21-147(b) provides,
    “In a proceeding brought under subdivision (a)(5) of this sec-
    tion, the court may order a remedy other than dissolution.” This
    statutory language affords a court discretion to order a remedy
    other than dissolution, but it does not require the court to
    exercise that discretion. Nor was the court, under § 21-147(b),
    required to order dissociation of a member in the event it found
    dissolution to be inappropriate.
    44
    United Gen. Title Ins. Co., supra note 41.
    45
    Id.
    46
    See id. at 1028, 858 N.W.2d at 216, quoting Blinn, 
    supra note 43
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
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    Thus, the question here is whether the district court abused
    its discretion in failing to order Schmid’s dissociation from
    MAR14 as an alternative remedy to dissolution. A judicial
    abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or rulings of a trial
    judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a
    substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted
    for disposition. 47
    On this record, we cannot find the court abused its discre-
    tion in failing to dissociate Schmid from MAR14. The issue
    of dissociation was not mentioned by any party until closing
    arguments in the case, and MAR14’s request for dissociation,
    raised only in a posttrial brief, does not even appear in our
    record. Even assuming that facts exist to support Schmid’s
    dissociation—an issue on which we express no opinion—we
    cannot find the district court abused its discretion in failing to
    order dissociation as an alternative remedy to dissolution when
    this issue was not expressly litigated at trial. For the same rea-
    son, we cannot find the district court abused its discretion in
    failing to alter or amend the judgment to order Schmid’s dis-
    sociation. MAR14’s assignment of error is without merit.
    V. CONCLUSION
    For all of the reasons stated, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.
    47
    Dycus, 
    supra note 7
    .