Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Struckman , 2023 Ohio 244 ( 2023 )

[Cite as Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Struckman, 2023-Ohio-244.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PICKAWAY COUNTY
TEAYS VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL :
DISTRICT BOARD OF
EDUCATION, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 21CA7
v. :
MICHAEL STRUCKMAN, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Andrew C. Clark and Richard T. Ricketts, Pickerington, Ohio, for
appellant.
Nelson Reid and Sue W. Yount, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED: 1-25-23
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas
Court summary judgment in favor of Teays Valley Local School
District Board of Education, plaintiff below and appellee
herein. Michael Struckman, defendant below and appellant
herein, assigns the following errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO PERMIT APPELLANT TO PURSUE
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DISCOVERY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIVIL
RULES.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
STRIKING APPELLANT’S AMENDED ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIMS WHICH WAS FILED WITH CONSENT
OF OPPOSING COUNSEL PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE
15(A) AND SUBSEQUENTLY DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND.”
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY WHERE THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT ENVISIONED THAT
DEFENDANT WOULD BE PERMITTED TO GROW CROPS
ON THE PROPERTY DURING THE TIME PERIOD
RELEVANT TO THIS CASE.”
In 2004, appellant agreed to sell approximately 70 acres of
real estate to appellee.1 One provision in the contract gave
appellant the right to continue “Farming Activities on any part
of the Real Estate purchased by Buyer until Buyer commences
construction on any such portion of the Real Estate or otherwise
must occupy said portion of the Real Estate in connection with
its intended use thereof.”
1
The underlying facts can be found in our previous
decisions concerning the litigation between the parties:
Struckman v. Bd. of Edn. of Teays Valley Loc. Sch. Dist., 2019-
Ohio-115, 128 N.E.3d 709 (4th Dist.) (Struckman II), and
Struckman v. Bd. of Edn. of Teays Valley Loc. Sch. Dist., 4th
Dist. Pickaway No. 16CA10, 2017-Ohio-1177 (Struckman I).
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{¶2} In July 2015, Teays Valley Local School District
Superintendent Robin Halley sent a letter to appellant to inform
him that appellee intended to occupy the property and
appellant’s farming rights would terminate at the end of the
2015 farming season. Halley’s letter stated that appellee’s
“plans include the construction of a small facility on the site
in conjunction with its occupancy and use of the property for
the District’s student FFA organization and other potential
school-related or extracurricular functions.”
{¶3} In March 2016, appellant filed a complaint against
appellee for breach of contract, specific performance,
declaratory and injunctive relief, and willful, wanton and
knowing breach of contract. Appellant asserted that he agreed
to sell his property to appellee (at a generous discount) based
on the understanding that (1) appellee would use the property as
a school site, and (2) appellant would have the right to
continue to farm the property until appellee developed a school
on the property. Appellant argued that appellee’s use of the
property for any purpose other than a school site constitutes a
breach of the real estate purchase contract.
{¶4} In response, appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
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relief could be granted. Appellee argued that the contract did
not require it to build a school on the property.
{¶5} The trial court agreed with appellee that the purchase
contract did not require appellee to build a school on the
property and granted the motion to dismiss the complaint. The
court found its decision regarding the contract language
dispositive of the other arguments. Appellant appealed the
trial court’s judgment.
{¶6} Meanwhile, appellee filed the complaint that is the
subject of the present appeal. Appellee’s complaint alleged
that, based upon the purchase contract and the previous
litigation, appellant did not have any right to continued use of
the property. Appellee asked the court to eject appellant from
the property and to enter a permanent injunction to enjoin him
from entering, using, or possessing the property. Appellee also
requested that the court award it the planted crops and to find
that appellant engaged in a trespass.
{¶7} On July 11, 2016, appellant filed an answer and
counterclaims. In his counterclaims, appellant asserted that
appellee breached the purchase contract and requested specific
performance of appellee’s obligations under the contract.
Appellant asked the trial court to order appellee “to cease and
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desist any attempt to take possession of the Real Estate or
restrict in any manner [appellant]’s use of the Real Estate for
farming purposes as provided for in the Purchase Contract.” He
also alleged “willful, wanton and knowing intended breach” of
contract.
{¶8} On March 27, 2017, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment that dismissed appellant’s complaint in the
initial case (Struckman I). In doing so, we rejected
appellant’s argument that the purchase contract’s language was
ambiguous so as to permit appellant to introduce parol evidence
that the parties intended that appellee would use the property
to build a school. Instead, we concluded that the relevant
contract language is unambiguous and did not require appellee to
build a school on the property. The relevant contract language
states:
The Contract shall not affect the current right
to use the Real Estate for Farming Activities prior to
closing. Furthermore, Seller shall be entitled to
without charge from Buyer continue its Farming
Activities on any part of the Real Estate purchased by
Buyer until Buyer commences construction on any such
portion of the Real Estate or otherwise must occupy
said portion of the Real Estate in connection with its
intended use thereof.
{¶9} We did not agree with appellant that this language, or
any other language in the contract, showed that appellee
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promised to build a school on the property or that appellee
agreed it would terminate appellant’s farming rights only if
appellee started to build a new school. Rather, we concluded
that the contract’s plain language states that appellant
retained the right to farm the property until appellee (1)
started construction on any portion of the property, or (2)
“otherwise must occupy said portion of the property in
connection with ‘its intended use thereof.’” Id. at ¶ 26. We
determined that the language provides that appellant retained
the right to farm the property “until a certain time when
[appellee] sought to use the property [it] purchased.” Id. We
interpreted the phrase “its intended use” to mean that appellee
“could not arbitrarily occupy the property just to terminate
[appellant]’s farming rights. Instead, [appellee] must have
occupied the property with the intent to use it for some
envisioned purpose.” Id.
{¶10} We additionally pointed out that the contract’s
integration clause states that the contract “embodies the entire
agreement between Seller and Buyer.” Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶11} Next, we recognized that the superintendent’s July
2015 letter gave appellant notice that appellee intended to
occupy and use the property. We observed that appellant’s
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“entire complaint [was] based upon the assertion that
[appellee]’s notice breached the terms of the purchase contract
because [appellee] did not intend to use [the property] as a
site for a new school.” Id. at ¶ 27. We therefore concluded
that, because the contract did not require appellee to build a
school on the property, appellant’s complaint failed to set
forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. In sum, we
concluded that the “purchase contract presents an insuperable
bar to relief on [appellant]’s breach of contract claims.” Id.
Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio
Supreme Court.
{¶12} Appellant also filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief
from judgment and argued that appellee’s notice to occupy the
property was invalid for the failure to comply with the Ohio
Sunshine Law, R.C. 121.12.2 Appellant claimed that (1) the board
did not place the issue on the agenda of a public meeting, and
(2) new evidence showed that the parties intended that appellee
would use the property as a school site. On November 8, 2017,
2
The Ohio Supreme Court has referred to this law as the
“Open Meetings Act.” State ex rel. More Bratenahl v. Village of
Bratenahl, 157 Ohio St.3d 309, 2019-Ohio-3233, 136 N.E.3d 447, ¶
8.
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appellee filed a motion to stay discovery, which the trial court
later granted.
{¶13} On December 20, 2017, the Ohio Supreme Court declined
to accept appellant’s appeal of our decision that affirmed the
trial court’s decision that granted appellee’s motion to
dismiss. 151 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2017-Ohio-9111, 87 N.E.3d 1271.
{¶14} Subsequently, the trial court denied appellant’s
Civ.R. 60(B) motion and determined that laches barred
appellant’s Sunshine Law allegation and the law-of-the-case
doctrine precluded it from considering appellant’s claim
regarding the meaning of the purchase contract. Appellant
appealed this decision.
{¶15} On January 9, 2019, we affirmed the trial court’s
decision to deny appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion. We determined
that although appellant did not timely file his motion as it
related to the Sunshine Law allegation, appellant could have
discovered the basis for the claim through a “pre-suit public-
records request.” Id. at ¶ 24. We also concluded that the law-
of-the-case doctrine prevents appellant from relitigating his
claim that the purchase contract’s phrase, “its intend use,” is
ambiguous so as to permit appellant to introduce parol evidence
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to establish that the parties intended that appellee must use
the property as a school site.
{¶16} Following our remand, the trial court’s staff attorney
contacted the parties via email to ask how they intended to
proceed, and the court set the matter for a status conference.
In response to the staff attorney’s email, appellant’s counsel
outlined a proposed case schedule as follows:
Appellee’s deadline to file March 1, 2019
amended pleading
Appellant’s deadline to file March 21, 2019
an answer to appellee’s
amended pleadings and/or amend
its pleadings
Initial disclosure of April 26, 2019
witnesses
Supplemental disclosure of August 16, 2019
witnesses
Dispositive motion deadline November 15, 2019
Discovery cutoff December 31, 2019
Trial February/March 2020
{¶17} Appellee’s counsel responded:
We are fine with the proposed case schedule with
the exception of the discovery cut-off and dispositive
motion deadline. I would prefer that discovery close
before the dispositive motion deadline and suggest
that we simpl[y] flip those dates.
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{¶18} Appellant’s counsel replied that the “revision is
fine” and set forth a “new proposed schedule” that changed the
dates for discovery and dispositive motions.
{¶19} On March 18, 2019, the trial court issued a scheduling
order that denied appellee’s motion for leave to amend its 2016
complaint, ordered dispositive motions to be filed by July 8,
2019, and set the matter for a jury trial. Notably, the
scheduling order did not include dates for either party to amend
the pleadings.
{¶20} On March 21, 2019, appellant filed a first amended
answer to appellee’s complaint and first amended counterclaims.
Appellant, however, did not ask the court for leave to file the
complaint. Instead, appellant asserted that appellee provided
written consent to the amendment. Appellant attached the series
of emails between the court’s staff attorney and the parties
that discussed a proposed case schedule and contended that in
those emails, appellee provided written consent to appellant’s
amended answer and counterclaims. The amended counterclaims
contained the following claims for relief: (1) breach of
contract; (2) rescission for material mistake; (3) breach of
conditional gift; (4) failure of meeting of the minds; (5)
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reformation of purchase contract; and (6) Sunshine Law
violation.
{¶21} Appellee subsequently filed a motion to strike
appellant’s amended answer and counterclaims. Appellee (1)
disputed appellant’s claim that it had consented to appellant’s
amended pleading when it agreed in an email to a proposed case
schedule, (2) emphasized that the email discussions involved
only a proposed schedule that set forth dates for both parties
to amend their pleadings, and (3) noted that, after the March
18, 2019 status conference, the trial court set its own
schedule. The court’s scheduling order denied appellee’s
pending motion to amend its complaint and did not include a date
for appellant to file an amended answer and counterclaims.
Appellee stated that the parties had discussed a proposed
schedule only and that the court’s own case scheduling order
took precedence.
{¶22} On April 17, 2019, the trial court determined that,
because appellant filed his amended answer and counterclaims
without leave of court and without appellee’s consent, the
amended answer and counterclaims must be stricken from the
record.
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{¶23} On April 19, 2019, appellant filed a memorandum contra
appellee’s motion to strike and a motion for leave to file his
amended pleading instanter and a motion for reconsideration.
Additionally, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the
court’s April 17, 2019 judgment striking his amended pleading
from the record.
{¶24} On July 8, 2019, appellee requested summary judgment
and asserted that the doctrine of res judicata prevents
continued litigation. Appellee further argued that because the
trial court and this Court already determined that appellant
does not have any rights to the property, no genuine issues of
material fact remain. Thus, appellee requested (1) a judgment
declaring that it properly terminated appellant’s farming rights
as of October 2015 and that appellant’s continued use of the
property constitutes a trespass; (2) a judgment ejecting
appellant from the property; (3) a judgment permanently
enjoining appellant from entering, using, or otherwise
possessing the property; and (4) compensatory damages,
disgorgement of profits earned from the property, punitive
damages, and attorneys’ fees and expenses.
{¶25} On July 22, 2019, appellant filed a motion to strike
appellee’s summary judgment motion and asserted that his notice
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of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction. He also
filed a motion to continue the matter after the appeal is
resolved so that he can have additional time, under Civ.R.
56(F), to conduct discovery. Appellant also filed a memorandum
contra and contended that appellee did not satisfy its initial
Civ.R. 56(C) burden and issues remain regarding whether
appellant has a right to farm or use the property and whether
appellee’s use of the property is legitimate. Appellant argued
that “[n]o court has determined, or even reviewed, the issue of
whether [appellee]’s clandestine plan to needlessly occupy the
Property was legally sufficient under the Contract or if it was
an impermissibly arbitrary plan concocted ‘just to terminate
[appellant]’s farming rights.’”
{¶26} After this Court dismissed appellant’s appeal from the
trial court’s decision that struck his amended answer and
counterclaims, the trial court held a hearing to consider the
outstanding matters. First, the court allowed appellant’s
counsel to address his first amended answer and counterclaims.
Counsel stated that in January 2019, he received a notice from
the court that asked the parties to agree to a proposed
scheduling order and to submit it to the court. Counsel sent an
email to appellee’s counsel with proposed dates for filing
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certain documents and this email included dates to submit
amended pleadings. Appellee’s counsel responded that she would
change the dates to complete discovery and to file dispositive
motions. Appellant’s counsel then “agreed to that change and we
submitted that proposed order.” Appellant’s counsel stated that
he “interpreted [appellee’s counsel’s] consent in writing to
that deadline of March 21st for [appellant] to file its amended
pleadings to be written consent to the pleadings, and that was
the basis for the filing of the motion at first.”
{¶27} Appellee’s counsel responded that she did not consent
to appellant’s filing of an amended answer and counterclaim, but
instead, stated that the parties “exchanged emails regarding a
proposed case schedule, which is entirely procedural in nature.”
She stated that “the first time [that she] saw the proposed
amended answer and counterclaim was after it was filed,” that
she “did not consent to the substance of it” and “did not and
do[es] not consent to the filing of their amended answer and
counterclaim.”
{¶28} On December 23, 2019, the trial court denied
appellant’s motion for leave to file an amended answer and
counterclaims. The court rejected appellant’s claim that
appellee’s counsel consented to the filing an amended complaint
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when counsel agreed, via email, to a case scheduling order that
appellant’s counsel had proposed. Instead, the court stated
that the emails concerned “scheduling negotiation * * * in
preparation for a pre-trial conference with [the trial] Court,
in which [the trial] Court disagreed with the proposed schedules
and imposed its own schedule.” The court thus denied
appellant’s motion for leave to file an amended answer and
counterclaims. The court then gave both parties additional time
to provide any further responses to appellee’s pending summary
judgment motion.
{¶29} On January 10, 2020, appellant filed a supplemental
memorandum in opposition to appellee’s summary judgment motion
and asserted that genuine issues of material fact remained for
resolution at trial regarding (1) whether appellee’s use of the
property for a storage shed is arbitrary and solely to terminate
appellant’s farming rights, (2) whether appellee’s efforts to
terminate appellant’s farming rights violated the Ohio Sunshine
Law, and (3) whether appellee had a legal basis to send a 2015
termination notice “where documentation shows that [appellee]
did not concoct its ‘intended use’ for the property until at
least March 2016.”
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{¶30} On March 26, 2020, the trial court granted appellee
summary judgment. The court first determined that res judicata
barred appellant’s counterclaims. The court next considered
whether appellee is entitled to summary judgment regarding the
claims raised in its complaint and determined that no genuine
issues of material fact remained regarding whether appellant
trespassed on the property. The court noted that the previous
decisions established that appellant did not have any right to
the property or any right to continue farming any portion of the
property and, thus, his continued presence on the property
constituted a trespass. The court declared that appellant does
not have any rights to the property and that he may not enter,
use, or possess the property. With that, the court set the
matter for a damages hearing.
{¶31} On April 9, 2021, the parties entered into a
“stipulated final judgment entry.” In this entry, the parties
agreed to divide the $34,173.14 currently held by the receiver
as follows: (1) $20,000 to appellant; and (2) the remaining
balance to appellee. This appeal followed.
I
{¶32} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
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request to conduct discovery. Appellant contends that the trial
court’s decision prevented him from fully preparing his case for
litigation.
{¶33} Appellee argues that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by staying discovery until the court ruled on
appellee’s summary judgment motion because that decision was
perfectly rational because appellee sought summary judgment
based upon the doctrine of res judicata. Appellee claims that
any discovery that appellant would have pursued would not have
helped him overcome the res-judicata bar and would have been
completely unnecessary.
{¶34} “Appellate courts generally review a discovery dispute
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Torres Friedenberg v.
Friedenberg, 161 Ohio St.3d 98, 2020-Ohio-3345, 161 N.E.3d 546,
¶ 22. Accordingly, a decision to grant or deny a stay of
discovery rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Alford v. Arbors at Gallipolis, 2018-Ohio-4653, 123 N.E.3d 305,
¶ 70 (4th Dist.). Moreover, a reviewing court will not overturn
a trial court’s ruling regarding a Civ.R. 56(F)3 continuance
3
Civ.R. 56(F) provides as follows:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion for summary judgment that the party
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unless the trial court abused its discretion. State ex rel.
Denton v. Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 305, 2003-Ohio-861, 784
N.E.2d 99, ¶ 31, citing Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc., 75 Ohio
St.3d 578, 592, 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996); Bender v. Logan, 2016-
Ohio-5317, 76 N.E.3d 336, ¶ 86 (4th Dist.); Citizens Bank of
Logan v. Hines, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA5, 2013-Ohio-690, ¶ 8.
“‘[A]buse of discretion’ [means] an ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable use of discretion, or * * * a view or action that
no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’” State v.
Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶
67, quoting State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493,
894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23. “An abuse of discretion includes a
situation in which a trial court did not engage in a ‘“sound
reasoning process.”’” State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343,
2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Morris,
132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14,
quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban
Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597cannot for sufficient reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s
opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits
to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
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(1990). The abuse of discretion standard is deferential and
does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court. Darmond at ¶ 34.
{¶35} We further observe, however, that a trial court’s
discretion “is not without limits.” Mauzy v. Kelly Services,
Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 592, 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996). As the
Mauzy court explained:
Although unusual, appellate courts will reverse a
discovery order “when the trial court has erroneously
denied or limited discovery.” 8 Wright, Miller & Marcus,
Federal Practice & Procedure (2 Ed.1994) 92, Section
2006. Thus, “[a]n appellate court will reverse the
decision of a trial court that extinguishes a party’s
right to discovery if the trial court’s decision is
improvident and affects the discovering party’s
substantial rights.” Rossman v. Rossman (1975), 47 Ohio
App.2d 103, 110, 1 O.O.3d 206, 210, 352 N.E.2d 149, 153–
154.
Id. A trial court ordinarily abuses its discretion by limiting
discovery when “[t]he record discloses that further discovery
was warranted in order to fully prepare to litigate” the
pertinent legal issues. Id.{¶36} On the other hand, “‘[a] trial court acts within its
discretion when it grants a stay of discovery pending the
resolution of a dispositive motion.’” State ex rel. Ebbing v.
Ricketts, 133 Ohio St.3d 339, 2012-Ohio-4699, 978 N.E.2d 188, ¶
21, quoting Thomson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist.
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No. 09AP–782, 2010-Ohio-416, ¶ 32. Furthermore, a trial court
does not abuse its discretion by staying discovery or by
“overruling a Civ.R. 56(F) motion to continue when further
discovery would prove fruitless.” Bender v. Logan, supra, at ¶
88, citing Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. Rankin, 4th Dist.
Pickaway No. 10CA45, 2011-Ohio-2757, ¶ 33; Battle v. Favreau,
5th Dist. Morgan No. 15AP0007, 2015-Ohio-5106, ¶ 17, quoting
Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1478 (C.A.5 1985) (“‘discovery
should not be allowed’” until threshold issue resolved).
Discovery ordinarily is fruitless when additional time would not
provide any benefit. Davis v. Eachus, 4th Dist. Pike No.
04CA725, 2004-Ohio-5720, ¶ 41.
{¶37} In Davis, for example, we determined that when res
judicata is a dispositive issue, then giving a party additional
time to conduct discovery will not provide any benefit. We
explained:
in light of our conclusion that the non-attorney
defendants are entitled to dismissal on res judicata
grounds, we fail to see how the appellant could have
suffered any prejudice arising from the trial court’s
failure to provide the appellant with additional time to
conduct discovery.
Id.{¶38} Other courts likewise have determined that when res
judicata is a dispositive issue or when a motion raises a purely
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legal issue, then discovery generally will be fruitless. State
ex rel. Sawyer v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family
Servs., 110 Ohio St.3d 343, 2006-Ohio-4574, 853 N.E.2d 657, ¶ 10
(additional discovery not necessary to resolve summary judgment
motion that involved “purely legal arguments”); Dehlendorf v.
Ritchey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-87, 2012-Ohio-5193, ¶ 23
(court did not abuse discretion by staying discovery when
appellant did not establish that additional discovery “could
lead to admissible evidence related to the issue of collateral
estoppel”).
{¶39} In the case sub judice, appellee asserted that it is
entitled to summary judgment based upon the doctrine of res
judicata. Appellee’s motion involved a purely legal issue –
whether the prior proceedings between the parties demonstrated
that res judicata precluded appellant’s counterclaims and
established appellee’s entitlement to relief. Here, additional
discovery would not have helped appellant to illustrate that the
doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. The trial court,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery or
by overruling appellant’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion for additional
time to conduct discovery.
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{¶40} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.
II
{¶41} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the trial court abused its discretion by striking
appellant’s amended answer and counterclaims. Appellant first
argues that opposing counsel consented to the amendment via
email and that this email constitutes written consent under
Civ.R. 15(A). Appellant claims that the question regarding a
party’s consent to an amended pleading under Civ.R. 15(A) is a
question of law for this Court to decide, but if this court
determines that the email did not constitute written consent, we
should review the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for
leave to amend for an abuse of discretion.
{¶42} Appellant further asserts that the trial court
prematurely entered its decision without affording appellant an
opportunity to respond. Appellant also challenges the lack of
analysis contained in the trial court’s decision.
{¶43} Appellee disputes appellant’s assertion that the
question regarding a party’s written consent is a question of
law for this Court to decide. Instead, appellee argues that
whether a party consented to a Civ.R. 15(A) amendment is a
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factual matter reserved for the trial court and the issue is
subject to a manifest weight of the evidence standard.
{¶44} Appellee also asserts that appellant had an adequate
opportunity to be heard regarding the issue of written consent.
Appellee claims that the trial court ultimately considered all
of appellant’s arguments.
{¶45} Appellee additionally argues that the trial court’s
denial of appellant’s motion for leave to amend his answer and
counterclaims did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Appellee contends that res judicata barred the counterclaims
that appellant sought to amend and, as a consequence, rendered
any amendments futile. Appellee notes that appellant’s motion
for leave to amend relied upon the same words that this Court
interpreted in our March 27, 2017 decision, i.e., “its intended
use.” Appellee thus argues that appellant’s amended
counterclaims constitute an attempt to relitigate an issue that
this Court previously decided.
A
{¶46} Initially, we note that the “ultimate decision to
grant leave to amend a pleading is vested in the sound
discretion of the trial court and its decision on such matters
will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of that
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discretion.” Martin v. Wandling, 2016-Ohio-3032, 65 N.E.3d 103,
¶ 34 (4th Dist.); Rose v. Cochran, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3445,
2014-Ohio-4979, ¶ 17. Additionally, appellate courts review “a
trial court’s orders regarding docket and case management for an
abuse of discretion.” King v. Divoky, 9th Dist. Summit No. CV
29769, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 26.
B
{¶47} Civ.R. 15(A) states that after the initial pleadings
have been filed, “a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.”
Although Civ.R. 15(A) provides that leave of court shall be
freely given when justice so requires, litigants do not have an
“absolute or unlimited right to amend a complaint.” State ex
rel. Jeffers v. Athens Cty. Commrs., 4th Dist. Athens No.
15CA27, 2016-Ohio-8119, ¶ 64, citing Kinchen v. Mays, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 100672, 2014–Ohio–3325, ¶ 17.
{¶48} We further note that Civ.R. 16(A) requires litigants
to attempt to agree upon a case management schedule and for the
court to “consider such agreements in the establishment of any
such schedule.” Nevertheless, it is well-established that a
trial court has “inherent authority to control its own docket
and manage the cases before it.” Holsopple v. Holsopple, 9th
25
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Dist. Summit No. 29441, 2020-Ohio-1210, ¶ 18; Matrix
Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Merriman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96280,
2011-Ohio-4419, ¶ 8, quoting Mackey v. Steve Barry Ford, Inc.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 58681, 1991 WL 95081, *2 (May 30, 1991);
Rudolph v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services, 4th Dist. Meigs No.
00CA023, 2001 WL 379112, *2 (Apr. 9, 2001); see State ex rel.
Haley v. Davis, 145 Ohio St.3d 297, 2016-Ohio-534, 49 N.E.3d
279, ¶ 13, citing Horman v. Veverka, 30 Ohio St.3d 41, 42–43,
506 N.E.2d 218 (1987) (recognizing “trial court’s inherent power
with respect to its orders and docket”).
{¶49} To that end, Civ.R. 16(B)(3)(a) allows trial courts to
enter a scheduling order that “limit[s] the time to * * * amend
the pleadings.” Once a court enters a scheduling order, then
the “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the
court’s consent.” Civ.R. 16(B)(4). Furthermore, Civ.R. 16(D)
states that a court’s scheduling order “controls the course of
the action unless the court modifies it.”
{¶50} In the case at bar, appellant first contends that
appellee gave written consent to his amended answer and
counterclaims when appellee agreed via email to appellant’s
proposed case schedule. Appellant asserts that whether a party
gave written consent is a legal issue that we review on a de-
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novo basis. Appellee, on the other hand, argues that whether it
gave written consent is a factual finding subject to a manifest
weight of the evidence standard of review.
{¶51} In the case sub judice, regardless of which standard
should apply, we do not believe that the trial court erred by
determining that appellee did not consent to appellant’s amended
answer and counterclaims. As the trial court recognized, the
parties discussed a proposed case schedule that the court had
yet to approve. Part of the parties’ proposed case schedule
included a date for appellee to file an amended complaint and a
date for appellant to file an amended answer and counterclaims.
The trial court, however, did not adopt the parties’ proposed
case schedule and did not allow either party to amend their
pleadings. Instead, the trial court imposed its own case
schedule. In view of the fact that the trial court did not
adopt the parties’ proposed case schedule, appellee cannot be
deemed to have consented to appellant’s amended answer and
counterclaims. Rather, any consent that appellee may have given
was premised upon the trial court adopting the parties’ proposed
case schedule, which included dates for both parties to amend
their pleadings. Once the court entered its own scheduling
order, that order controlled the proceedings. See Civ.R. 16(D)
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
(a court’s scheduling order “controls the course of the action
unless the court modifies it”).
{¶52} Moreover, we do not believe that the trial court
abused its discretion by striking appellant’s amended answer and
counterclaims or by denying appellant’s motion for leave to file
the amended pleading. “The general policy of Civ.R. 15(A)
favors liberal amendment of pleadings.” State ex rel. Reese v.
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction Legal Dept., ___ Ohio St.3d
___, 2022-Ohio-2105, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 30. A trial court
ordinarily abuses its discretion by denying a timely filed
motion for leave to file an amended pleading when the amendment
would allow the pleading party to “set forth a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d
161, 175, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973). Conversely, a trial court does
not abuse its discretion by denying a party leave to file an
amended pleading when amending the pleading “would be futile.”
State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 161 Ohio St.3d 130, 2020-
Ohio-3686, 161 N.E.3d 575, ¶ 20, citing ISCO Indus., Inc. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 2019-Ohio-4852, 148 N.E.3d 1279, ¶ 52 (1st
Dist.); see Wilmington Steel Prods., Inc. v. Cleveland Elec.
Illum. Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 123, 573 N.E.2d 622 (1991)
(“[W]here a plaintiff fails to make a prima facie showing of
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
support for new matters sought to be pleaded, a trial court acts
within its discretion to deny a motion to amend the pleading.”);
Kinchen v. Mays, supra, at ¶ 17.
{¶53} In the case sub judice, we do not believe that the
trial court abused its discretion by striking appellant’s
amended answer and counterclaims and by denying him leave to
file an amended pleading. Permitting appellant to file an
amended answer and counterclaims would have been futile due to
the res judicata bar.
It has long been the law of Ohio that “an existing
final judgment or decree between the parties to
litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or
might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.” * * *
The doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to
present every ground for relief in the first action, or
be forever barred from asserting it.
Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558
N.E.2d 1178 (1990), quoting Rogers v. Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d
67, 69, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986).
{¶54} The res judicata doctrine applies even if the first
lawsuit did not “explore[] all the possible theories of relief.”
Id. Thus, res judicata extinguishes a litigant’s claim even if
the litigant “‘is prepared in the second action (1) To present
evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the
first action, or (2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not
29
PICKAWAY, 21CA7
demanded in the first action.’” Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 383,
quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 209,
Section 25; see Brown v. Dayton, 89 Ohio St.3d 245, 248, 730
N.E.2d 958 (2000).
{¶55} In the case sub judice, in the first lawsuit between
the same parties that involved the same purchase contract, a
final judgment had been entered. This existing final judgment
between the parties “is conclusive as to all claims which were
or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.” Natl.
Amusements, 53 Ohio St.3d at 62, quoting Rogers v. Whitehall, 25
Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986). Because appellant
did not “present every ground for relief in the first action,”
he is “forever barred from asserting [them].” Id.Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
striking appellant’s amended pleading or by denying him leave to
file the amended pleading.
{¶56} Appellant also asserts that the trial court
prematurely ruled upon appellee’s motion to strike and deprived
him of an opportunity to be heard. We, however, agree with
appellee that the trial court ultimately considered all of
appellant’s arguments. In December 2019, the trial court held a
hearing and allowed appellant to present an argument regarding
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
his amended answer and counterclaims and his claim that
appellee’s counsel had agreed to the filing. Consequently, any
error that may have occurred by prematurely striking appellant’s
amended answer and counterclaims is harmless error that we must
disregard. See Watershed Mgt., L.L.C. v. Neff, 4th Dist.
Pickaway No. 10CA42, 2012-Ohio-1020, ¶ 67 (trial court errs by
ruling upon motion before allowing nonmoving party adequate
response time but error may be harmless); Entingh v. Old Man’s
Cave Chalets, Inc., 4th Dist. No. 08CA14, 2009–Ohio–2242, ¶ 21–
22 (ruling on motion to compel before adverse party had
opportunity to respond is harmless error when court considered
adverse party’s argument in a subsequent motion to vacate the
premature ruling).
{¶57} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s second assignment of error.
III
{¶58} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the trial court erred by granting appellee summary
judgment. Appellant claims that appellee failed to satisfy its
initial Civ.R. 56 burden and that the following questions of
fact remain: (1) whether appellee properly terminated
appellant’s farming rights; (2) if so, whether appellee
31
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terminated those rights as to the entire tract or to only a
portion of the tract; and (3) whether appellee’s termination, to
the extent that it was legally enforceable, was effective to
prohibit all access and all farming activities during the 2016
crop season.
{¶59} Appellee asserts that appellant fails to consider the
primary basis for the trial court’s summary judgment decision,
i.e., that res judicata bars appellant’s claims. Appellee
contends that appellant’s arguments remain focused upon the
contract language even though the parties already have litigated
the meaning of the contract language.
A
{¶60} Initially, we emphasize that appellate courts conduct
a de novo review of trial court summary judgment decisions.
E.g., State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio St.3d
425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 8; Pelletier v. Campbell,
153 Ohio St.3d 611, 2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 13;
Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d
241 (1996). Accordingly, an appellate court need not defer to a
trial court’s decision, but instead must independently review
the record to determine if summary judgment is appropriate.
Grafton, 77 Ohio St.3d at 105.
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Civ.R. 56(C) provides in relevant part:
* * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence,
and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed
in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or
stipulation may be considered except as stated in this
rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless
it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only
from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the
evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the
party’s favor.
{¶61} Therefore, pursuant to Civ.R. 56, a trial court may
not award summary judgment unless the evidence demonstrates
that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be
litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law; and (3) after viewing the evidence most strongly
in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to
but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the
nonmoving party. E.g., State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lucas Cty.
Prosecutor’s Office, 164 Ohio St.3d 151, 2021-Ohio-1241, 172
N.E.3d 143, ¶ 8; Pelletier at ¶ 13; Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,
50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
B
{¶62} In the case sub judice, the trial court granted
appellee summary judgment based upon the doctrine of res
judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two
related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata
or estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as
collateral estoppel.” O’Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113
Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 6; accord Baker
by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–34, 118 S.Ct.
657, 663–64, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998), fn.5 (citations omitted)
(the term, “res judicata,” traditionally describes both “claim
preclusion (a valid final adjudication of a claim precludes a
second action on that claim or any part of it); and (2) issue
preclusion, long called ‘collateral estoppel’ (an issue of fact
or law, actually litigated and resolved by a valid final
judgment, binds the parties in a subsequent action, whether on
the same or a different claim”)).
With regard to claim preclusion, a final judgment
or decree rendered on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is a complete bar to any subsequent action
on the same claim between the same parties or those in
privity with them. [Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d
379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995)], citing Norwood v.
McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943),
paragraph one of the syllabus, and Whitehead [v. Gen.
Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969)],
paragraph one of the syllabus. Moreover, an existing
34
PICKAWAY, 21CA7
final judgment or decree between the parties is
conclusive as to all claims that were or might have been
litigated in a first lawsuit. [Grava] at 382, 653 N.E.2d
226, citing Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53
Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990). “‘The
doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present
every ground for relief in the first action, or be
forever barred from asserting it.’” Id. at 382, 653
N.E.2d 226, quoting Natl. Amusements at 62, 558 N.E.2d
1178.
Brooks v. Kelly, 144 Ohio St.3d 322, 2015-Ohio-2805, 43 N.E.3d
385, ¶ 7.
{¶63} Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, “‘precludes
the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that has been
actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior
action.’” Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 152 Ohio St.3d 277, 2017-Ohio-
8845, 95 N.E.3d 359, ¶ 9, quoting Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20
Ohio St.2d 108, 112, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969); accord Lowe’s Home
Centers, Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d
463, 2018-Ohio-1974, 116 N.E.3d 79, ¶ 33; Ft. Frye Teachers
Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392,
395, 692 N.E.2d 140 (1998).
While the merger and bar aspects of res judicata have
the effect of precluding the relitigation of the same
cause of action, the collateral estoppel aspect
precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an
issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated
and determined in a prior action that was based on a
different cause of action. “In short, under the rule of
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collateral estoppel, even where the cause of action is
different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior
suit may nevertheless affect the outcome of the second
suit.”
Fort Frye, 81 Ohio St.3d at 395 (citation omitted), quoting
Whitehead, 20 Ohio St.2d at 112.
{¶64} The res judicata doctrine, therefore, “serves to
preclude a defendant who has had his day in court from seeking a
second on that same issue.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176,
2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel.
Willys–Overland Co. v. Clark (1925), 112 Ohio St. 263, 268, 147
N.E. 33. The doctrine “promotes the principles of finality and
judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue
on which a defendant has already received a full and fair
opportunity to be heard.” Id.{¶65} In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court
correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata bars
appellant’s counterclaims. Appellant’s counterclaims seek to
relitigate the same claims that were, or could have been,
litigated in the first lawsuit. In the first lawsuit, we
determined that the contract language presented an “insuperable
bar” to appellant’s breach of contract claims. Appellant’s
counterclaims in the present case essentially repeat the claims
raised in the first lawsuit. Therefore, our previous decision
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
governs the outcome of appellant’s counterclaims, and appellant
is barred from relitigating those claims.
{¶66} Moreover, res judicata bars appellant’s additional
arguments that appellee’s termination notice violated the
Sunshine Law and that he retained a right to continue farming a
portion of the property. Appellant could have raised the
Sunshine Law claim and the argument that he retained a right to
continue farming a portion of the property in the first lawsuit,
but did not. Therefore, res judicata precludes appellant from
raising these additional claims.
{¶67} Appellant nevertheless argues that “in the context of
declaratory judgments, ‘res judicata precludes only claims that
were actually decided.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, quoting
State ex rel. Trafalgar Corp. V. Miami Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 104
Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-6406, 819 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 22. However,
even if true, we point out that in the first lawsuit appellant
claimed that appellee breached the purchase contract in addition
to seeking a declaratory judgment and other forms of relief.
Our decision in the first lawsuit addressed appellant’s breach
of contract claim and determined that our resolution of his
breach of contract claim was dispositive of the other claims
raised in his complaint, all of which focused upon the language
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
of the contract and appellee’s alleged breach of the contract.
See Struckman I at ¶ 15 and ¶ 27 (appellant argued that trial
court erred by dismissing complaint when he “set forth facts
that would allow him to recover on his breach of contract
claims” and stated that contract language presented “an
insuperable bar to relief on [appellant]’s breach of contract
claims”). Thus, we believe that appellant’s reliance upon
Trafalgar is misplaced.
C
{¶68} Appellant also argues that the trial court incorrectly
entered summary judgment in appellee’s favor regarding its
trespass claim. “‘The elements of civil trespass are (1) an
unauthorized intentional act and (2) entry upon land in the
possession of another.’” Ogle v. Hocking Cty., 4th Dist.
Hocking No. 14CA3, 2014-Ohio-5422, ¶ 39, quoting DiPasquale v.
Costas, 186 Ohio App.3d 121, 2010–Ohio–832, 926 N.E.2d 682, ¶
102 (2d Dist.). Appellant contends that whether he had a
continued right to enter the property in 2016 constitutes a
genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment
in appellee’s favor. In particular, appellant asserts that the
following contract language shows that he had the right to
continue farming the property in 2016:
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
Seller shall be entitled to without charge from
Buyer continue its Farming Activities on any part of the
Real Estate purchased by buyer until Buyer commences
construction on any such portion of the Real Estate or
otherwise must occupy said portion of the Real Estate in
connection with its intended use thereof. In the event
Buyer notifies Seller by October 1 (Buyer shall provide
Seller with as much advance notice as is reasonably
possible of its intent to use the Real Estate) of any
given year that Buyer intends to use the Real Estate
purchased by Buyer, Seller agrees that Buyer shall not
be liable to Seller for any loss or damage incurred by
Seller, including the cost of any damaged crops on the
Real Estate, as a result of Buyer’s use of said Real
Estate in the ensuing year. If Buyer fails to notify
Seller of its intentions by October 1 of any given year
as described above, then Buyer agrees to reimburse
Seller for any loss or damage to Seller’s crops planted
on the Real Estate purchased by Buyer as a result of
Buyer’s use of said Real Estate in the ensuing year, in
amounts mutually agreed to by both Seller and Buyer, or
as determined by the actual loss incurred by Seller.
Appellant thus contends that res judicata does not prevent him
from litigating this issue because none of the previous court
decisions actually decided this specific issue.
{¶69} Assuming, arguendo, that res judicata does not bar
appellant from litigating this issue, we do not agree with his
argument that this contract language demonstrates that he had a
right to continue farming the property in 2016 and that he could
not have been trespassing on the property.
{¶70} The interpretation of a contract is a question of law
that appellate courts independently review. Sharonville v. Am.
Emp. Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-2180, 846 N.E.2d
39PICKAWAY, 21CA7
833, ¶ 6. “In all cases involving contract interpretation, we
start with the primary interpretive rule that courts should give
effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the
language of their written agreement.” Sutton Bank v.
Progressive Polymers, L.L.C., 161 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-
5101, 163 N.E.3d 546, ¶ 15, citing Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) v. Toledo
Edison Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011-Ohio-2720, 953 N.E.2d 285,
¶ 37. Courts presume that the language used in the contract
reflects the parties’ intent. Smith v. Erie Ins. Co., 148 Ohio
St.3d 192, 2016-Ohio-7742, 69 N.E.3d 711, ¶ 18; Westfield Ins.
Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d
1256, ¶ 11.
{¶71} Thus, courts must first review the plain and ordinary
meaning of the language used in a contract “unless manifest
absurdity results, or unless some other meaning is clearly
evidenced from the face or overall contents of the instrument.”
Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374
N.E.2d 146 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus; accord Galatis
at ¶ 11. If the language is clear and unambiguous, “a court may
look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of
the parties.” Galatis at ¶ 11 (citation omitted). “[A]
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contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal
meaning.” Id. (citation omitted).
{¶72} In the case sub judice, the contract language is
unambiguous, and it does not state that appellant has the right
to continue farming the property “in the ensuing year.”
Instead, the contract outlines appellee’s liability, if any, to
appellant for any damages during the year after appellee
notifies appellant of its intent to begin using the property.
The language indicates that the parties contemplated that
appellant might plant crops before appellee notified him of its
intention to use the property and that they determined, in
advance, whether appellant would be entitled to compensation for
any loss or damage to those crops if appellee’s use of the
property during the ensuing year damaged the crops. The
language does not, however, give appellant a right to continue
planting crops or otherwise to continue engaging in farming
activities “in the ensuing year.” Rather, the language
clarifies appellee’s obligations after it notifies appellant
that it intends to begin using the property. It does not
nullify the preceding language that gives appellant the right to
continue farming the property only “until Buyer commences
construction on any such portion of the Real Estate or otherwise
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
must occupy said portion of the Real Estate in connection with
its intended use thereof.”
{¶73} Consequently, we do not agree with appellant that the
trial court incorrectly entered summary judgment in appellee’s
favor regarding its trespass claim.
D
{¶74} Appellant next argues that appellee failed to support
its summary judgment motion with proper Civ.R. 56(C) evidence.
{¶75} Appellee, however, contends that it cured any defect
when it later authenticated the documents from the previous
court proceedings in its reply memorandum. Appellee further
points out that the trial court granted appellant an opportunity
to respond to appellee’s reply memorandum.
{¶76} After our review, we agree with appellee’s assertion.
Moreover, appellee’s motion rested upon res judicata principles,
which in turn, relied upon previous court proceedings subject to
judicial notice. “Both trial courts and appellate courts can
take judicial notice of filings readily accessible from a
court’s website.” State v. Wright, 4th Dist. Scioto Nos.
15CA3705 and 15CA3706, 2016–Ohio–7795, fn. 3; citing In re
Helfrich, 5th Dist. Licking No. 13CA20, 2014–Ohio–1933, ¶ 35;
see also State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195,
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
2007–Ohio–4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 8, 10 (court can take judicial
notice of judicial opinions and public records accessible from
the internet). Consequently, we do not agree with appellant
that the trial court improperly entered summary judgment in
appellee’s favor.
{¶77} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
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PICKAWAY, 21CA7
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that
appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry
this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.