State v. Lawson , 2022 Ohio 3332 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Lawson, 2022-Ohio-3332.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff- Appellee, :
No. 111288
v. :
PAMELA A. LAWSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 22, 2022
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-15-592484-B
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Brandon A. Piteo and Kristen Hatcher,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Jonathan Sidney, Assistant Public Defender, for
appellant.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
Appellant-defendant Pamela Lawson filed a motion to withdraw her
guilty plea several years after her conviction for aggravated murder was affirmed by
this court. She claimed the guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
because of her trial counsel’s defective performance during the plea proceeding. The
trial court found it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion. We agree and affirm
the trial court’s decision.
Background
In 2015, Lawson was indicted for aggravated murder, murder,
felonious assault, and endangering children. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she
pleaded guilty to aggravated murder with a three-year firearm specification and
received a prison sentence of 33 years to life. On appeal, she raised a single
assignment of error challenging her sentence as being contrary to law. This court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment in State v. Lawson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
103699, 2016-Ohio-7607.
As summarized by this court, the circumstances of the case involved
Lawson recruiting codefendant Lekev Spivey to kill Lawson’s former boyfriend, who
was shot by Spivey in the residence the victim shared with Lawson, her two
daughters, and the victim’s six-year-old disabled daughter, in the presence of all of
them.
In 2016, Lawson filed a postconviction petition. She alleged that she
suffered bipolar disorder and past sexual abuse and, therefore, there should have
been a psychological examination regarding her mental illness issues in the plea
proceeding. She attached unsworn affidavits from several individuals regarding her
good character and past sexual abuse she suffered. The trial court denied the
petition, finding that Lawson failed to present new evidence to support her claims
and that, in any event, the claims were barred by res judicata. Lawson did not appeal
from the denial.
In 2021, Lawson filed the instant motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
She attached to the motion only her own affidavit. She claimed her plea was not
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary due to trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. In the
affidavit, she stated that counsel provided her “bad advice,” did not communicate
with her about various aspects of the plea, and engaged in no negotiation on her
behalf; she also stated that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and PTSD in
2005 and had sought mental health help in 2011, and that a mental health evaluation
would have proved her state of mind at the time of the plea.
The trial court denied Lawson’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
citing its lack of jurisdiction to consider the motion after the court of appeals
affirmed her conviction on direct appeal. Lawson raises a single assignment of error,
claiming that the trial court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
her motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Law and Analysis
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Romero, 156 Ohio St.3d 468, 2019-Ohio-1839,
129 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 13. Furthermore, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she
generally waives all errors that may have occurred unless such errors have precluded
the defendant from entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. See, e.g.,
State v. Wilson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105876, 2018-Ohio-3666, ¶ 6.
As Lawson acknowledges in her brief on appeal, this court has
consistently held that, pursuant to State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court
of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978), a trial court has no
jurisdiction to entertain a defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea under
Crim.R. 32.1 after the appellate court affirms the defendant’s convictions. The
Supreme Court of Ohio held in that case that “Crim. R. 32.1 does not vest jurisdiction
in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to withdraw the guilty plea
subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate court.” Id. at 97.
The holding of Special Prosecutors has been consistently applied by
this and other appellate courts. “[O]nce the convictions have been affirmed on
appeal, the trial court no longer may entertain a postsentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1.” State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110855,
2022-Ohio-1674, ¶ 16, citing State v. Hill, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190337,
2020-Ohio-3271, ¶ 10; State v. Carter, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-36, 2011-Ohio-6104,
¶ 11; State v. Caston, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-11-077, 2012-Ohio-5260, ¶ 10; State v.
Smith, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 14 MA 65, 2015-Ohio-4809, ¶ 5; State v. Bains,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98845, 2013-Ohio-2530, ¶ 21; State v. Torres, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 19CA0076-M, 2020-Ohio-3691, ¶ 7; State v. Davic, 2021-Ohio-131,
166 N.E.3d 681, ¶ 16-22 (10th Dist.); and State v. Peters, 12th Dist. Clermont
No. CA2015-07-066, 2016-Ohio-5288, ¶ 8. See also State v. Darling, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 109439, 2021-Ohio-440; State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 109178, 2020-Ohio-3726, ¶ 7; and State v. Grant, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 107499, 2019-Ohio-796, ¶ 14.
Lawson, however, asks this court to “clarify the present state of its
jurisprudence” on this issue in light of State v. Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-
5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, a death penalty case decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio
11 years ago. In that case, appellant filed a motion for a new trial under Crim.R. 33
based on newly discovered evidence, which consisted of the affidavit of a DNA expert
opining that the state’s DNA evidence was questionable. The court of appeals,
relying on Special Prosecutors, held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain Davis’s motion for a new trial after his conviction had been affirmed on
appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, explaining that “Special Prosecutors
does not bar the trial court’s jurisdiction over posttrial motions permitted by the
Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure.” It held that “a trial court retains jurisdiction to
decide a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific
issue has not been decided upon direct appeal.” Id. at ¶ 37.
In the wake of Davis, the appellate courts were confronted with the
question of whether Davis, which concerns a motion for new trial, could be applied
to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Several districts, including this district, found
the word “posttrial” significant and determined Davis only applied to a motion for
a new trial. See, e.g., State v. Panning, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-15-11, 2016-Ohio-
3284; State v. Moon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101972, 2015-Ohio-1550; State v.
Perry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107596, 2019-Ohio-547; and State v. Crangle, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 25735, 2011-Ohio-5776.1
Following the well-established case law precedents, therefore, we find
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Lawson’s motion on the ground
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider her Crim.R. 32.1 motion after her conviction
had been affirmed on direct appeal. Citing State v. West, 2017-Ohio-5596, 93 N.E.3d
1221 (1st Dist.), where the First District applied Davis to a Crim.R. 32.1 motion,
Lawson asks us to change our jurisprudence on this issue.
West involved highly unique circumstances. The appellant in that
case was convicted of sexual battery, and was also adjudicated as a sex offender,
which required him to register for ten years in Ohio. After his release from prison,
appellant relocated to Florida and learned that his sexual battery conviction
subjected him to a lifetime registration requirement in Florida. He then filed a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, claiming his plea was not knowing because his
trial counsel failed to advise him of Florida’s lifetime sex-offender registration
1 Lawson acknowledges that this court held in Moon and Perry that a trial court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1
after an appellate court has affirmed the defendant’s convictions on direct appeal. She
claims, however, that those cases are procedurally distinguishable because in those cases
the defendant had challenged the validity of the plea on direct appeal. In both cases,
however, this court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction without considering whether
the guilty-plea issue had been raised on direct appeal.
requirement even though counsel had known his intention to relocate to Florida
upon his release from prison.
The First District addressed the trial court’s jurisdiction over
appellant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea under these circumstances. Citing
Davis’s holding that “the lower court does have jurisdiction, when the issue
presented by the motion [for a new trial] could not have been raised in the direct
appeal because it depends for its resolution upon evidence outside the record in that
appeal,” id. at ¶ 10, the First District framed the issue on appeal as “whether, in the
wake of Davis, [131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516,] a court has
jurisdiction to entertain a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after
the conviction upon that plea has been affirmed on direct appeal, when the issue
presented by the motion could not have been raised on direct appeal.” (Emphasis
added.) West at ¶ 12. The trial court found the distinction between a “posttrial”
Crim.R. 33(A)(6) motion for a new trial and a “postsentence” Crim.R. 32.1 motion
to withdraw a guilty plea to be immaterial and answered the question in the
affirmative. The court stated that “we join those districts in holding that an appeal
court’s decision affirming a judgment of conviction does not deprive a lower court
of jurisdiction to entertain a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty plea, when the
issue presented by the motion could not have been raised on direct appeal.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 20. However, the court then found the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion because appellant did not support his
claim with an affidavit or any evidence demonstrating his counsel had failed to
advise him concerning Florida’s sex-offender registration requirement.
Appellant in West, 2017-Ohio-5596, 93 N.E.3d 1221, also raised a
claim of actual innocence in his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, attaching to his
motion an affidavit from the victim averring that appellant had never molested him.
The court construed the claim as alleging that the guilty plea was not voluntary
because appellant felt compelled to accept the plea agreement offering reduced
charges for fear that the victim would falsely testify against him at trial and he would
be convicted of more serious offenses. The First District determined that the trial
court abused its discretion in not holding a hearing to assess the claim.
This case is distinguishable from West due to the unique
circumstances present in that case, where appellant could not have raised in his
direct appeal the issue of Florida’s stricter registration requirement or the claim of
actual innocence predicated on the victim’s recanting affidavit. Here, Lawson’s
claim that her plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent due to counsel’s
allegedly defective performance during the plea proceeding could have been raised
in her direct appeal. As such, the instant case does not present an occasion for us to
consider whether to adopt the holding from West. The holding that once the
convictions have been affirmed on appeal, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain a motion to withdraw the guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1 remains the
precedent of this district.2
We note that, even if we were to apply Davis to a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea, for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over such a motion, there
must be evidence that is “newly discovered” and “the specific issue has not been
decided upon direct appeal.” Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d
516, at ¶ 37. Here, Lawson did not submit any “newly discovered” evidence — she
only attached her own affidavit alleging counsel’s defective assistance, and her
failure to raise that issue on direct appeal is why the issue has not been decided upon
2 Lawson also cites State v. Staffrey, 7th Dist. Mahoning Nos. 10 MA 130 and 10 MA 131,
2011-Ohio-5760, and State v. Lauharn, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2011 CA 10, 2012-Ohio-1572.
In Staffrey, appellant claimed counsel provided erroneous information regarding the
sentence. The Seventh District cites Davis’s holding that “a trial court retains jurisdiction
to decide a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific
issue has not been decided upon direct appeal” and stated that “merely because the
defendant appealed the conviction and the cause was affirmed on appeal, does not mean
that the trial court is necessarily deprived of jurisdiction over the Crim.R. 32.1 post-
sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Without any further analysis, the court then
determined that res judicata barred the claims raised on the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea because the claims could have been raised in appellant’s direct appeal.
Lauharn involves a different procedural posture. During the pendency of his direct
appeal, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea claiming his trial counsel
provided erroneous advice about his sentence. The trial court denied the motion and
appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging he was under the influence of certain
medications at the time of the plea and his counsel failed to report it to the trial court. The
Second District held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motions during
the pendency of the direct appeal. The court then noted in passing that, pursuant to Davis,
the trial court would have jurisdiction to address the motions after the direct appeal was
concluded. The Davis issue was neither analyzed nor dispositive in these cases, and we
decline to rely on them as guiding precedents.
direct appeal. Her failure cannot be a ground for granting the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea.
Finally, we observe that even if, for argument’s sake, the trial court
had jurisdiction to entertain Lawson’s motion, her claim that her plea was not
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary due to counsel’s allegedly defective performance
could have been raised on direct appeal and is, therefore, barred by the principle of
res judicata.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
__________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR