Kilroy v. Peters , 2011 Ohio 3415 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Kilroy v. Peters, 
    2011-Ohio-3415
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
    MICHAEL P. KILROY, et al.                                 :
    Plaintiffs-Appellants                   :             C.A. CASE NO. 24268
    :        T.C. NO.       07CV5170
    WILLIAM PETERS, et al.                                    :            (Civil appeal from
    Common Pleas Court)
    Defendants-Appellees                              :
    :
    ..........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the           8th       day of       July    , 2011.
    ..........
    CHRISTOPHER R. CONARD, Atty. Reg. No. 0039751 and DAVID P. PIERCE,
    Atty. Reg. No. 0061972 and SASHA ALEXA M. VANDEGRIFT, Atty. Reg. No.
    0080800, 33 W. First Street, Suite 600, Dayton, Ohio 45402
    Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Michael P. Kilroy and Vickie Kilroy
    DOUGLAS M. TROUT, Atty. Reg. No. 0072027, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
    th
    301 W. Third Street, 5 Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
    Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, Jackson Township Trustees
    ..........
    PER CURIAM:
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellants Michael and Vickie Kilroy (hereinafter “the Kilroys”)
    appeal a decision of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, General
    Division, overruling their motion to enforce the settlement agreement and declaring
    2
    a settlement reached between the Kilroys and defendant-appellee Jackson
    Township Board of Trustees (hereinafter “the Trustees”). The Kilroys filed their
    motion to enforce the settlement agreement on March 12, 2010. The trial court
    filed its decision overruling said motion on August 23, 2010. The Kilroys filed a
    notice of appeal with this Court on September 22, 2010.
    I
    {¶ 2} The instant appeal began as a dispute regarding the removal of
    “offensive plants and noxious weeds” from the fence line running between property
    owned by the Kilroys and an adjoining piece of property owned by Timothy and
    Nicole Johnson.     The properties in question are located in Jackson Township,
    Ohio.
    {¶ 3} Pursuant to R.C. 971.33, the Kilroys requested that the Trustees clear
    the fence line or, in the alternative, direct the Johnsons to do so.              After the
    Trustees failed to take any action, the Kilroys filed a complaint against the Trustees
    collectively, and in the board members’ individual capacities on June 21, 2007.
    The Kilroys advanced the five following claims for relief in their complaint: 1)breach
    of contract; 2) declaratory judgment; 3) failure to perform a special duty; 4)
    1
    tortious/intentional interference with a contract; and 5) civil conspiracy.
    {¶ 4} The case was referred to mediation in December of 2009.                   On
    January 6, 2010, the parties participated in court ordered mediation, but a
    1
    Although they were initially named as defendants in the Kilroys’
    complaint, the Johnsons were dismissed from the case with prejudice on
    December 31, 2008, after both parties agreed to the Kilroys’ purchase of the
    Johnsons’ adjoining property.
    3
    settlement was not reached.      After the unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the
    parties engaged in a series of communications aimed at ending the dispute.
    Specifically, the parties discussed the execution of an apology letter, as well as a
    monetary settlement from the Trustees, in order to end the litigation.
    {¶ 5} Between January 11 & 14, 2010, the parties reached a tentative
    verbal agreement in which the Trustees agreed to sign an apology letter drafted by
    the Kilroys and their legal counsel.    On January 15, 2010, the Kilroys’ counsel
    contacted the trial court to report that the case had been settled. Between January
    15 & 20, 2010, the parties exchanged communications regarding the final draft of
    the settlement agreement.
    {¶ 6} On January 20, 2010, the Kilroys sent the Trustees a draft of the final
    written settlement agreement and dismissal entry memorializing the terms of the
    settlement.   Shortly after receiving the draft, the Trustees sent a message
    indicating that they refused to sign the apology letter.     The Trustees proposed
    several alternative apology letters containing different language.       The Kilroys
    rejected all subsequent attempts to revise the language in the final draft of the
    apology letter, and the parties were left at an impasse.
    {¶ 7} Thus, the Kilroys filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement
    on March 12, 2010.         The Trustees opposed the motion to enforce in a
    memorandum filed on May 10, 2010. On August 23, 2010, the trial court overruled
    the Kilroys’ motion to enforce the settlement, but also held that a settlement had, in
    fact, been reached with respect to the financial portion of the agreement and
    ordered the Trustees to pay the Kilroys approximately $15,000.00. The trial court
    4
    also found that the Trustees had already apologized to the Kilroys several times
    such that it was unnecessary for the Trustees to sign the final draft of the apology
    letter sent by the Kilroys.
    {¶ 8} It is from this judgment that the Kilroys now appeal.
    II
    {¶ 9} The Kilroys’ assignments of error are as follows:
    {¶ 10} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE TRUSTEES
    COULD NOT ENTER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITHOUT HOLDING A
    PUBLIC VOTE.”         “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT A VALID
    SETTLEMENT EXISTED WITHOUT REQUIRING THE TRUSTEES TO SIGN THE
    PREVIOUSLY AGREED-TO APOLOGY LETTER.”
    {¶ 11} “IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF A PUBLIC VOTE IS A CONDITION
    PRECEDENT TO THE TRUSTEES BEING BOUND TO THE SETTLEMENT,
    THEN THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENFORCING ONLY THE MONETARY
    PORTION OF THE SETTLEMENT AND THIS CASE MUST BE REMANDED.”
    {¶ 12} Initially, we note that the trial court failed to include Civ. R. 54(B)
    language in its decision overruling the Kilroys’ motion to enforce the settlement
    agreement. Accordingly, there is a lack of a final appealable order, and we are left
    without jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits in the instant case.
    {¶ 13} Ohio law provides that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the
    final orders of inferior courts in their district. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio
    Constitution; R.C. 2505.02. If an order is not final and appealable, then we have
    no jurisdiction to review the matter and must dismiss the appeal. Stonehill v. Jones,
    5
    Athens App. No. 09CA1, 
    2009-Ohio-6052
    .          “In the event that this jurisdictional
    issue is not raised by the parties involved with the appeal, then the appellate court
    must raise it sua sponte.” Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 
    44 Ohio St.3d 86
    , syllabus; Whitaker-Merrell v. Geupel Co. (1972), 
    29 Ohio St.2d 184
    . An
    order of a court is a final, appealable order only if the requirements of both R.C.
    2505.02 and Civ. R. 54(B), if applicable are met. Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State
    Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d at 88.
    {¶ 14} Under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), an order is final order if it “affects a
    substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents the
    judgment.” For an order to determine the action and prevent a judgment for the
    party appealing, it must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate
    and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the
    court. State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 
    107 Ohio St.3d 347
    , 
    2006-Ohio-8
    , ¶ 20.
    {¶ 15} Additionally, the rationale of Civ. R. 54(B) is “‘to make a reasonable
    accommodation of the policy against piecemeal appeals with the possible injustice
    created by the delay of appeals,’ as well as to insure that parties to such actions
    may know when an order or decree has become final for purposes of appeal.”
    Pokorny v. Tilby Dev. Co. (1977), 
    52 Ohio St.2d 183
    , 186. Absent the mandatory
    language “no just reason for delay,” an order that does not dispose of all claims is
    not final and appealable. Noble v. Colwell (1989), 
    44 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 96.
    {¶ 16} In the instant case, the trial court notified the parties in an entry filed
    on August 23, 2010, that “pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 58(B) *** a judgment has
    been filed that may be a final appealable order.” The entry in this case simply
    6
    informed the parties that a final appealable order may have been issued. The
    decision of August 23, 2010, did not refer to Civ. R. 54(B) and did not cite any
    language from the rule. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s judgment entry
    issued on August 23, 2010, is not a final appealable order, and the appeal is
    dismissed.
    ..........
    GRADY, P.J., DONOVAN, J., FROELICH, J., concur.
    Copies mailed to:
    Christopher R. Conard
    David P. Pierce
    Sasha Alexa M. VanDeGrift
    Douglas M. Trout
    Hon. Dennis Adkins, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 24268

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 3415

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 7/8/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014