State v. Cross , 2022 Ohio 2094 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Cross, 2022-Ohio-2094.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2021-11-135
: OPINION
- vs - 6/21/2022
:
TYREE JEFFERY CROSS, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2020-06-0777
Michele K. Temmel, for appellee.
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and John C. Heinkel, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Tyree Jeffery Cross, appeals from his conviction in the Butler
County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of murder. For the reasons
outlined below, we affirm Cross' murder conviction.
{¶ 2} On September 2, 2021, the trial court accepted Cross' guilty plea to one count
Butler CA2021-11-135
of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), an unclassified felony. The charge arose after
Cross was involved in a robbery with two codefendants on the morning of June 9, 2020 that
resulted in the death of the victim, K.R.-S.M. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on
October 12, 2021 and sentenced Cross to a term of life in prison with the possibility of parole
after 15 years. Cross now appeals from his murder conviction, raising the following single
assignment of error for review.
{¶ 3} MR. CROSS' PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND
VOLUNTARILY MADE.
{¶ 4} In his single assignment of error, Cross argues his guilty plea to murder was
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. We disagree.
{¶ 5} When a defendant enters a guilty plea to a felony, the plea must be knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered. State v. Gabbard, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-12-
125, 2021-Ohio-3646, ¶ 12. "'Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the
plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.'"
State v. Tipton, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2020-05-011, 2021-Ohio-1128, ¶ 10, quoting
State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). "Crim.R. 11(C) prescribes the process that
a trial court must use before accepting a plea of guilty to a felony." State v. Bishop, 156
Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, ¶ 11. "The rule 'ensures an adequate record on review
by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the
consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily
made.'" State v. Murphy, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-05-048, 2021-Ohio-4541, ¶ 8,
quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). This requires the trial court to notify
the defendant of the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and to make the
required determinations and give the necessary warnings set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)
and (b). State v. Oliver, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-07-041, 2021-Ohio-2543, ¶ 41.
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{¶ 6} To support his single assignment of error, Cross initially argues his guilty plea
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the trial court did not make
an explicit determination, on the record, that his plea was voluntarily made. Cross also
argues his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the
trial court did not specifically state, on the record, its finding that Cross understood the effect
of his guilty plea. In support of these claims, Cross cites to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), which
states, in pertinent part, the following:
(2) In felony cases the [trial] court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of
guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant
personally either in-person or by remote contemporaneous
video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and * * *
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
of the maximum penalty involved and, if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
{¶ 7} Despite Cross' claims, however, there is nothing within the language of
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) that requires the trial court to make an explicit determination, on the
record, that a defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily made. The same is true as it relates
to the question of whether a defendant understood the effect or his or her plea. It is in fact
well established that a trial court is not required to use any specific, talismanic words prior
to accepting a defendant's guilty plea to comply with the requirements set forth under
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-16, 2021-Ohio-
97, ¶ 16 ("a trial court is not required to use specific talismanic words" prior to accepting a
defendant's guilty plea in order to comply with the requirements set forth under Crim.R.
11[C][2][a]). Because of this, we decline Cross' invitation to impose a "magic words"
requirement that lacks any basis in Crim.R 11(C)(2)(a), ignores the context of a full plea
colloquy, and focuses exclusively on the trial court's use of an unnecessary qualifier. The
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fact that the trial court accepted Cross' guilty plea is a clear indication that the trial court
found Cross' plea to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered without the need to
make those express findings on the record. Therefore, because the record indicates the
trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) prior to accepting Cross' guilty plea, Cross' first
two arguments lack merit.
{¶ 8} Cross further argues his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered because the trial court failed to notify him prior to entering a plea that he
would be classified as a violent offender and be included on the violent offender database.1
However, as this court has stated previously, "classification as a violent offender and
enrollment into the violent offender database 'is a collateral consequence of the offender's
criminal acts rather than a form of punishment per se.'" State v. Hubbard, 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2019-05-086, 2020-Ohio-856, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7,
2008-Ohio-4824, ¶ 34. Therefore, it is now well established that "'because registration
requirements are collateral consequences rather than punishment, Crim.R. 11 does not
require a trial court to inform a defendant of the registration and notification requirements
before accepting a defendant's guilty plea.'" State v. Baker, 12th Dist. Madison No.
CA2021-03-006, 2021-Ohio-4544, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Beard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
109630, 2021-Ohio-2512, ¶ 53. Accordingly, for these reasons, Cross' third argument also
lacks merit.
{¶ 9} In light of the foregoing, and finding no merit to any of the three arguments
Cross raised herein in support of his single assignment of error, Cross' single assignment
1. R.C. 2903.41 through 2903.44, commonly known as "Sierah's Law," became effective on March 20, 2019.
Sierah's Law created a statewide violent offender database that sets forth a rebuttable presumption that
violent offenders, as defined in R.C. 2903.41(A), register in person annually for ten years. Sierah's Law also
subjects violent offenders to criminal prosecution for failing to comply with Sierah's Law. Pursuant to R.C.
2903.41(A)(1)(a), Cross is a violent offender subject to Sierah's Law because of his guilty plea to one count
of the unclassified felony of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B).
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of error lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 10} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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