State v. Cochran , 2022 Ohio 885 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Cochran, 2022-Ohio-885.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 9-21-19
v.
SHAQUILLE S. COCHRAN, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2020 CR 0279
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 21, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Paul L. Scarsella for Appellant
Nathan R. Heiser for Appellee
Case No. 9-21-19
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Shaquille Cochran, appeals the April 7, 2021
judgment of sentence of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} In the early morning hours of July 5, 2020, police officers from the
Marion Police Department responded to an emergency call regarding an
unresponsive child at a residence on Bennett Street in the city of Marion. On arrival,
the officers located a three-year-old child, Ka.C., in an upstairs bedroom. Ka.C.’s
body was covered in bruises, and he weighed only 24 pounds. Ka.C. was rushed to
the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. It was later determined that the
principal cause of Ka.C.’s death was head and neck trauma, with dehydration and
malnutrition serving as contributing factors. The ensuing investigation identified
Cochran, Ka.C.’s father, and Cochran’s girlfriend, Angel Morgan, as the parties
likely responsible for Ka.C.’s injuries and malnourishment.
{¶3} On July 15, 2020, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Cochran on
five counts: Counts One and Two of felony murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B),
unclassified felonies; Count Three of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony; and Counts Four and Five of endangering
children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), second-degree felonies. The two counts
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of felony murder were premised on allegations that Cochran had caused Ka.C.’s
death as a proximate result of committing the felonious assault and endangering
children offenses. Additionally, the felonious assault charge contained a
specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1426 alleging that Ka.C. “suffered permanent
disabling harm as a result of the offense” and that Ka.C. was under ten years of age.
On July 20, 2020, Cochran appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the
counts and specifications of the indictment.
{¶4} A jury trial was held on February 23-March 1, 2021. On March 1, 2021,
the jury found Cochran guilty of felonious assault and two counts of endangering
children. The jury also found Cochran guilty of the specification associated with
the felonious assault charge. However, the jury found Cochran not guilty with
respect to the two counts of felony murder.
{¶5} A sentencing hearing was held on April 6, 2021. At the hearing, the
trial court sentenced Cochran to 8 to 12 years in prison for felonious assault, 5 to
7.5 years in prison for endangering children as charged in Count Four, and 8 to 12
years in prison for endangering children as charged in Count Five. The trial court
ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate term
of 21 to 25 years in prison. The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on
April 7, 2021.
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II. Assignments of Error
{¶6} On June 3, 2021, Cochran filed a notice of appeal.1 He raises the
following three assignments of error for our review:
1. The Court erred as a matter of law when it imposed
consecutive sentences without making the appropriate findings
and without a factual basis to justify the imposition of consecutive
sentences.
2. The jury in this matter clearly lost its way and the verdicts
are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
3. The Sentencing structure created by the Reagan Tokes Act
is a violation of the separation of powers and is therefore
unconstitutional.
We begin by addressing Cochran’s second assignment of error. Then, because they
concern related issues, we address Cochran’s first and third assignments of error
together.
III. Discussion
A. Second Assignment of Error: Are Cochran’s convictions against the
manifest weight of the evidence?
{¶7} In his second assignment of error, Cochran argues that his convictions
for felonious assault and endangering children are against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
1
Although Cochran did not file his notice of appeal within the 30-day period prescribed by App.R. 4(A), we
granted Cochran leave to file a delayed appeal pursuant to App.R. 5.
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i. Standard for Manifest-Weight-of-the Evidence Review
{¶8} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[] the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses and
determine[] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A
reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on
matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-
weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily
against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s
judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9,
quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
ii. Cochran’s convictions for felonious assault and endangering children are
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶9} In support of his claim that his convictions are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, Cochran points to the jury’s “inconsistent” verdicts,
maintaining that the jury’s guilty verdicts on the felonious assault and endangering
children offenses are irreconcilable with its not guilty verdicts on the felony murder
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offenses. Cochran argues that “the inconsistent verdicts can be used as evidence
that the jury clearly lost its way” and that they “raise[] questions as to the manifest
weight of the evidence.”
{¶10} Yet, “[i]nconsistent verdicts on different counts of a multi-count
indictment do not justify overturning a verdict * * *.” State v. Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d
72, 78 (1989). “‘The several counts of an indictment containing more than one
count are not interdependent and an inconsistency in a verdict does not arise out of
inconsistent responses to different counts, but only arises out of inconsistent
responses to the same count.’” State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539,
¶ 347, quoting State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223 (1978), paragraph two of the
syllabus. “[J]uries can reach inconsistent verdicts for any number of reasons,
including mistake, compromise, and leniency.” State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 89629, 2008-Ohio-1626, ¶ 10. Thus, as we have recently held, inconsistencies
in the jury’s verdicts “do[] not suggest that [the guilty] verdicts are against the
manifest weight of the evidence and do[] not provide a basis for the reversal of [the]
convictions.” State v. Cobb, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-20-43, 2021-Ohio-3877, ¶ 87; see
State v. Bell, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-18-40, 2020-Ohio-4510, ¶ 58 (concluding that
the fact that guilty verdicts for rape and kidnapping might be inconsistent with the
not guilty verdicts for two additional counts of rape does not mean the defendant’s
convictions for rape and kidnapping are against the manifest weight of the
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evidence). Consequently, there is no merit to Cochran’s argument that his felonious
assault and endangering children convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶11} Cochran’s second assignment of error is overruled.
B. First & Third Assignments of Error: Are Cochran’s prison sentences
unsupported by the record or contrary to law?
{¶12} In his first and third assignments of error, Cochran argues that his
aggregate sentence of 21 to 25 years in prison is unsupported by the record and
contrary to law. Under his first assignment of error, Cochran argues his sentence is
unsupported by the record because the trial court “did nothing more than reiterate
the statutory language of [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)] when addressing the consecutive
sentences.” He also contends that the trial court did not properly “balance the
overriding principles of felony sentencing and take the ability for rehabilitation into
consideration” when it decided to order consecutive service. Cochran’s third
assignment of error focuses on the indefiniteness of each of the individual sentences
imposed for his felonious assault and endangering children convictions. Cochran
maintains that the indefinite sentences are contrary to law because the statutory
provisions authorizing trial courts to impose indefinite sentences, i.e., certain
provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law, violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
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i. Standard of Review
{¶13} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,
¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.
at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
ii. The trial court fully complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing
consecutive sentences.
{¶14} Cochran first takes issue with the trial court’s decision to impose
consecutive sentences. “Except as provided in * * * [R.C. 2929.14(C)], * * * a
prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with
any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of
this state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)
provides, in relevant part:
(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions
of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the
prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive
service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to
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the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds
any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18], or
was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). “R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific
findings on the record before imposing consecutive sentences.” State v. Nienberg,
3d Dist. Putnam Nos. 12-16-15 and 12-16-16, 2017-Ohio-2920, ¶ 17. “Specifically,
the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect
the public or punish the offender; (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate
to the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b),
or (c) applies.” Id.{¶15} When imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court must make the
findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate
those findings into its sentencing entry. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-
Ohio-3177, ¶ 29, 37. Here, the trial court fully complied with this requirement by
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making clear R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and (C)(4)(b) findings at the sentencing hearing
and incorporating those findings into its sentencing entry. Cochran faults the trial
court for providing a rote recitation of the statutory language without elaborating on
its findings. However, the trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to support
its findings.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
{¶16} Furthermore, Cochran has failed to make a proper argument that the
trial court’s consecutive-sentencing findings are unsupported by the record. As
noted above, he maintains that the trial court did not properly “balance the
overriding principles of felony sentencing” or consider his capacity for
rehabilitation. He further claims that the trial court took a “one-sided view” of the
“recidivism factors” and that the trial court “focus[ed] only on the seriousness
factors.” Thus, while Cochran does not explicitly invoke R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,
he effectively argues that his consecutive sentences are not supported by the record
under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
{¶17} However, “the Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that R.C. 2929.11
and 2929.12 do not apply to consecutive-sentencing review.” State v. Hiles, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-20-21, 2021-Ohio-1622, ¶ 18, citing State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d
279, 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 17. Accordingly, we cannot review Cochran’s consecutive
sentences for compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Id. Because Cochran
has mounted no other challenge to his consecutive sentences, we conclude that
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Cochran’s consecutive sentences are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by
the record or otherwise contrary to law.
iii. Cochran’s indefinite sentences do not violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine.
{¶18} Cochran argues that his indefinite sentences for felonious assault and
endangering children are contrary to law because the indefinite sentencing
provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law,2 under which he was sentenced, run afoul of
the separation-of-powers doctrine. Cochran’s challenge does not present a matter
of first impression in this court. Since the indefinite sentencing provisions of the
Reagan Tokes Law went into effect in March 2019, we have repeatedly been asked
to weigh in on the constitutionality of these provisions. In answer, we have
invariably concluded that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes
Law do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.3 E.g., State v. Crawford, 3d
Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 10; State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No.
8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22. As Cochran has not presented us with any
compelling reason to depart from our earlier precedent, we decline to do so.
Consequently, we conclude that the indefiniteness of Cochran’s sentences for
2
Because we have thoroughly explained these provisions in previous opinions, we need not do so here. See,
e.g., State v. Barnhart, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-20-08, 2021-Ohio-2874, ¶ 9; Hiles, 2021-Ohio-1622, at ¶ 11-
16.
3
Until recently, there had been some question whether constitutional challenges like Cochran’s are ripe for
review. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that “a criminal defendant’s challenge to the
constitutionality of R.C. 2967.271 is ripe for review on the defendant’s direct appeal of his or her conviction
and prison sentence.” State v. Maddox, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-764, ¶ 22.
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felonious assault and endangering children does not render the sentences contrary
to law.
{¶19} Cochran’s first and third assignments of error are overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶20} For the foregoing reasons, Cochran’s assignments of error are
overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Marion County Court
of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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