DeVito v. Clear Fork Valley Local Schools Bd. of Edn. , 2022 Ohio 3894 ( 2022 )

[Cite as DeVito v. Clear Fork Valley Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2022-Ohio-3894.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
KIRSTEN DEVITO : JUDGES:
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE :
CLEAR FORK VALLEY LOCAL :
SCHOOLS : Case No. 2022 CA 0025
:
Defendant-Appellee : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2021-CV-0097
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 31, 2022
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
DENNIS L. PERGRAM KARRIE M. KALAIL
NANCY K. KRUEGER SHERRIE C. MASSEY
50 North Sandusky Street 6480 Rockside Woods Boulevard S.
Delaware, OH 43015-1926 Suite 300
Cleveland, OH 44131
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 2
Wise, Earle, P.J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Kirsten DeVito, appeals the March 2, 2022 judgment
entry of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio, overruling her
administrative appeal. Defendant-Appellee is Board of Education of the Clear Fork Valley
Local Schools.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} Appellant was employed by appellee as a principal pursuant to a contract
due to expire on July 31, 2019. In September 2018, appellant received a letter from
appellee setting forth five grounds for termination containing ten specifications. A twelve-
day hearing before a referee was held over several months. By report and
recommendation dated July 4, 2020, the referee recommended the termination of
appellant's contract for good and just cause. In a letter dated February 12, 2021, appellee
notified appellant it had terminated her employment contract.
{¶ 3} Appellant appealed the decision to the Court of Common Pleas. By
judgment entry filed March 2, 2022, the trial court affirmed appellee's decision and
overruled appellant's appeal in its entirety.
{¶ 4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
I
{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT
FINDING THAT THE BOARD VIOLATED MRS. DEVITO'S RIGHTS UNDER R.C.
3319.16."
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 3
II
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT
FINDING THAT THE BOARD WAS OBLIGATED TO GIVE MRS. DEVITO AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE HER CONDUCT."
III
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY HOLDING
THAT UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THE BOARD WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
CONSIDER MRS. DEVITO'S EMPLOYMENT RECORD IN MAKING A DECISION OF
TERMINATION."
IV
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT
REVERSING THE ORDER OF TERMINATION BECAUSE THE ORDER OF
TERMINATION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY RELIABLE, PROBATIVE, AND
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, AND IS
CONTRARY TO LAW."
V
{¶ 9} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT
REVERSING THE ORDER OF TERMINATION WHERE IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT
THE BOARD HAD NOT READ THE ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 10} As held by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Aldridge v. Huntington School
District Board of Education, 38 Ohio St.3d 154, 157, 527 N.E.2d 291 (1988), syllabus:
In teacher contract termination disputes arising under R.C. 3319.16:
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 4
1. The referee's findings of fact must be accepted unless such
findings are against the greater weight, or preponderance, of the evidence;
2. A school board has the discretion to accept or reject the
recommendation of the referee unless such acceptance or rejection is
contrary to law.
{¶ 11} "The Common Pleas Court may reverse an order of termination of a
teacher's contract, made by a Board of Education, where it finds that such order is not
supported by or is against the weight of the evidence." Hale v. Lancaster Board of
Education, 13 Ohio St.2d 92, 234 N.E.2d 583 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus.
"Absent a claim that the school board violated a statutory or constitutional obligation by
depriving the appellee of a vested right, or engaging in impermissible discriminatory
conduct, the trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board." Ross v.
Board of Education, 52 Ohio App.2d 28, 34, 367 N.E.2d 1209 (8th Dist.1977). "If
substantial and credible evidence is presented to support the charges of the board, and
a fair administrative hearing is had, the reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for
the judgment of the administrative authorities." Strohm v. Reynoldsburg City School
District Board of Education, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE07–972, 1998 WL 151082, *4
(Mar. 31, 1998).
{¶ 12} Our standard of review of the trial court's decision is abuse of discretion.
Graziano v. Amherst Exempted Village Board of Education, 32 Ohio St.3d 289, 294, 513
N.E.2d 282 (1987) ("Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the court
of appeals may not engage in what amounts to a substitution of judgment of the trial court
in an R.C. 3319.16 proceeding"). In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 5
determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and
not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450
N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 13} This case is governed by R.C. 3319.16, titled "Termination of contract by
board of education," which states the following in pertinent part:
The contract of any teacher employed by the board of education of
any city, exempted village, local, county, or joint vocational school district
may not be terminated except for good and just cause.
Before terminating any contract, the employing board shall furnish
the teacher a written notice signed by its treasurer of its intention to consider
the termination of the teacher's contract with full specification of the grounds
for such consideration. The board shall not proceed with formal action to
terminate the contract until after the tenth day after receipt of the notice by
the teacher. Within ten days after receipt of the notice from the treasurer of
the board, the teacher may file with the treasurer a written demand for a
hearing before the board or before a referee, and the board shall set a time
for the hearing which shall be within thirty days from the date of receipt of
the written demand, and the treasurer shall give the teacher at least twenty
days' notice in writing of the time and place of the hearing. If a referee is
demanded by either the teacher or board, the treasurer also shall give
twenty days' notice to the superintendent of public instruction. * * * The
hearing shall be conducted by a referee appointed pursuant to section
3319.161 of the Revised Code, if demanded; otherwise, it shall be
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 6
conducted by a majority of the members of the board and shall be confined
to the grounds given for the termination. The board shall provide for a
complete stenographic record of the proceedings, a copy of the record to
be furnished to the teacher.
After a hearing by a referee, the referee shall file a report within ten
days after the termination of the hearing. After consideration of the referee's
report, the board, by a majority vote, may accept or reject the referee's
recommendation on the termination of the teacher's contract.
{¶ 14} As stated by our colleagues from the Sixth District in Hiss v. Perkins Local
School District Board of Education, 2019-Ohio-3703, 144 N.E.3d 1093, ¶ 149-150 (6th
Dist.):
"Good and just cause" is not defined by R.C. 3319.16, but the
Supreme Court has defined it as involving a "fairly serious matter." Hale v.
Bd. of Edn., City of Lancaster, 13 Ohio St.2d 92, 99, 234 N.E.2d 583 (1968).
What constitutes "good and just cause" depends on the context and unique
facts of each case. Lanzo v. Campbell City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 7th
Dist. Mahoning No. 09 MA 154, 2010-Ohio-4779, 2010 WL 3835868, ¶ 18.
Although "good and just cause" is an imprecise concept, appellate
courts have defined its broad outlines to include behavior that had or could
have had a serious effect on the school system, Winland v. Strasburg-
Franklin Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2013-Ohio-4670, 999 N.E.2d 1190,
¶ 39 (5th Dist.), citing Bertolini, 139 Ohio App.3d at 608, 744 N.E.2d 1245,
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 7
and behavior that is "hostile to the school community." Hykes v. Bellevue
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2012-Ohio-6059, 985 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 26 (6th
Dist.), citing Florian v. Highland Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 24 Ohio
App.3d 41, 493 N.E.2d 249 (9th Dist.1983).
{¶ 15} We note the referee's report and recommendation consists of 237 pages
and the trial court's judgment entry is 52 pages in length. While this court has reviewed
the entire record, we will not restate all of the testimony and extensive findings in
specificity, as the report and judgment entry thoroughly do so.
I
{¶ 16} In her first assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court committed
prejudicial error in not finding appellee violated her rights under R.C. 3319.16. We
disagree.
{¶ 17} Specifically, appellant argues: 1) appellee failed to set a time for the hearing
within thirty days of receipt of the written demand and the treasurer failed to give her and
the superintendent a twenty-day notice of the time and place of the hearing; 2) the
treasurer failed to sign the written notice of appellee's intention to consider her
termination; and 3) the referee and appellee both departed from the specification of
grounds given for the termination.
TIMELINESS AND NOTICE
{¶ 18} In her appellate brief at 5, appellant argues the hearing requirement in R.C.
3319.16 is mandatory, and in support, cites the following language from the Supreme
Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Webb v. Board of Education of Bryan City School District,
10 Ohio St.3d 27, 460 N.E.2d 1121, syllabus:
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 8
The pertinent language in R.C. 3319.16 regarding hearing
requirements in the case of the termination of the contract of a teacher is
directory and not mandatory, and a board of education under this statute in
a referee-requested hearing need only schedule the date for such hearing
within thirty days of the receipt of the written demand from the teacher for
such hearing.
{¶ 19} In its March 2, 2022 judgment entry at 12-13, the trial court noted this
holding and found the referee gave "thorough consideration" to the cited language. The
trial court stated the referee "reviewed the entire Webb case and provided a well-
reasoned analysis of the paragraph * * * in context with the rest of the Webb case." Id. at
13. The trial court quoted the referee's analysis who concluded the hearing requirements
of R.C. 3319.16 are directory and not jurisdictional. The trial court found the referee's
analysis to be legally correct and adopted the referee's ruling on the issue.
{¶ 20} In reviewing the appellate arguments in each brief and the record, we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in its finding.
TREASURER'S SIGNATURE
{¶ 21} In her appellate brief at 6-7, appellant argues the written notice she received
was not signed by the treasurer as required in R.C. 3319.16. She did not provide any
further argument.
{¶ 22} In its March 2, 2022 judgment entry at 8-9, the trial court noted although the
notice was unsigned, the notice contained a typed signature line containing the treasurer's
name, thereby giving appellant the identity of the treasurer and informing her that the
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 9
letter came from the treasurer's office. The trial court reviewed the letter and found it
provided all the necessary information to put appellant on notice of appellee's intention to
suspend her and consider terminating her contract, informed her of her statutory rights,
and "substantially complied with the intent of the statute." Id. at 9. The trial court
concluded "[w]here an educator facing termination has been afforded a full hearing, is
represented by counsel, presents evidence, and exercises her right to appeal to the court
of common pleas, the lack of a signature on the notice presented to the educator does
not invalidate the notice and due process has not been denied to the educator." Id.
{¶ 23} In reviewing the appellate arguments in each brief and the record, we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in its finding.
SPECIFICATION OF GROUNDS
{¶ 24} In her appellate brief at 7-8, appellant argues two discrepancies pertaining
to specification of grounds:
{¶ 25} 1) In its specification of grounds, appellee alleged appellant asked a teacher
"to sign a blank document," but in its order of termination, appellee's Ground No. 1 states
appellant asked a teacher to sign an evaluation form which had a "blank narrative
summary."
{¶ 26} 2) In its specification of grounds, nowhere did appellee allege a
"walkthrough," but in its order of termination, appellee's Ground No. 5 states appellant
recorded an inaccurate end time for her walkthrough of a teacher's classroom.
{¶ 27} Appellant argues the hearing must be confined to the grounds and
specifications given for the termination prehearing and therefore, termination Ground
Nos. 1 and 5 should have been reversed.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 10
{¶ 28} In its March 2, 2022 judgment entry at 36, the trial court noted appellant's
cited cases and found:
[they] all reject a rigid standard of matching a board's specification of
grounds with identical grounds for termination found by the referee and
adopted by the board. Rather, Ohio appellate courts have allowed the
board's evidence to stand as long as the totality of the circumstances
indicate that the teacher was sufficiently apprised of the issue in question
to present countervailing evidence if so inclined.
{¶ 29} The trial court concluded appellant "was provided sufficient notice of the
allegations against her to enable her to prepare and present her defenses." Id. at 37.
{¶ 30} In reviewing the appellate arguments in each brief and the record, we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in its finding.
{¶ 31} We note in each of the complained of issues, appellant did not argue in what
way she suffered any prejudice.
{¶ 32} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not finding
appellee violated her rights under R.C. 3319.16.
{¶ 33} Assignment of Error I is denied.
II
{¶ 34} In her second assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court committed
prejudicial error by not finding appellee was obligated to give her an opportunity to change
her conduct. We disagree.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 11
{¶ 35} In her appellate brief at 10, appellant argues she should have been given
an opportunity to change her conduct because she merely made clerical errors and "did
not engage in conduct hostile to the community."
{¶ 36} In its March 2, 2022 judgment entry at 17, the trial court found the cases
cited by appellant in support of her argument do not cite to "any statutory or binding case
law to establish that precedent exists to require a school board considering termination
of an educator to give the educator the opportunity to change her alleged behavior in all
circumstances." The trial court then conducted a thorough analysis of appellant's conduct
and reviewed teacher testimony. The trial court found "contrary to Plaintiff/Appellant's
characterization of Mrs. DeVito's conduct as 'good faith clerical errors' and 'honest
mistakes,' Mrs. DeVito's conduct was conscious wrongful behavior related to fairly serious
matters and was hostile to the school community." Id. at 21. Therefore, the trial court
concluded given the specific facts of the case, appellee was not required to give appellant
an opportunity to change her conduct. Id. at 23.
{¶ 37} In reviewing the appellate arguments in each brief and the record, we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in its finding.
{¶ 38} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not finding
appellee was obligated to give appellant an opportunity to change her conduct.
{¶ 39} Assignment of Error II is denied.
III
{¶ 40} In her third assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court committed
prejudicial error by holding that under the facts of the case, appellee was not required to
consider her employment record in making a decision of termination. We disagree.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 12
{¶ 41} In her appellate brief at 11, appellant argues "a school board must be
required to consider an educator's employment record before initiating termination
proceedings."
{¶ 42} In its March 2, 2022 judgment entry at 24, the trial court found neither party
cited to "any statutory or case law from the Ohio Supreme Court or the Ohio Court of
Appeals, Fifth Appellate District, to establish that binding precedent exists on the issue of
whether a school board considering termination of an educator is required to consider the
educator's good employment record in most circumstances." The trial court reviewed
appellant's cited cases and found them "to be persuasive where fully cited and applied in
their entirety. The Court further finds that a school board considering termination of an
educator is not required to consider the educator's good employment record in most
circumstances." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 27. The trial court then conducted a thorough
analysis of the applicable case law, noted appellant did not have a longstanding positive
employment record with appellee to consider in mitigation of her conduct, considered her
conduct, and noted the referee's report referenced her employment record in many
places. The trial court concluded given the facts of the case, appellee was not required
to consider appellant's employment record in making a decision on termination.
{¶ 43} In reviewing the appellate arguments in each brief and the record, we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in its finding.
{¶ 44} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding
appellee was not required to consider appellant's employment record in making a decision
of termination.
{¶ 45} Assignment of Error III is denied.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 13
IV
{¶ 46} In her fourth assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court committed
prejudicial error by not reversing the order of termination because the order of termination
is not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, is against the weight of
the evidence, and is contrary to law. We disagree.
{¶ 47} In her appellate brief at 13-14, appellant lists the six specifications found by
the referee constituting "good and just cause" for termination, as well as the two additional
specifications found by appellee. Appellant argues the specifications found were clerical
errors reflecting "nothing other than honest mistakes" and proves she is not perfect. Id.
at 22. She further argues "the honest clerical mistakes" did not prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that she engaged in dishonest, fraudulent, and immoral conduct.
{¶ 48} In his July 4, 2020 report and recommendation at 11-13 and 159-161, the
referee set forth all of the specification of grounds for consideration as provided by
appellee (five grounds with ten specifications). The referee fully analyzed each
specification and found appellee proved by clear and convincing evidence appellant
asked a teacher to sign a blank document (Specification #7) and recorded inaccurate
observation/walkthrough times on six occasions (Specification #8). Id. at 202, 206-207,
208, 211, 219. The referee analyzed the terms "dishonesty, fraud, and immorality" and
concluded the errors violated Board Policy GCN-1, were hostile to the school community,
and impacted the professional duties of appellant and a teacher; therefore, the errors
constituted dishonest, fraudulent, and immoral behavior. Id. at 227-228.
{¶ 49} The referee found Specification #1, cutting and taping/stapling teachers'
signatures without their knowledge or approval, and Specification #5, using teachers'
signatures without their knowledge or approval, was not proven to violate school board
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 14
policy or to constitute dishonest, fraudulent, and immoral behavior, respectively. While
the referee found copied/cut-out signatures were stapled/taped to Evaluation Cycle
Forms without the teachers' knowledge and approval, he concluded the behavior did not
violate a school board policy, was not hostile to the school community, did not have a
serious effect on the school district or appellant's professional duties, and did not
constitute fraud as it was clear on the face of each form that the form was not signed by
the respective teacher. Id. at 167-168, 169-173, 213, 224. He concluded the board did
not prove the Evaluation Cycle Form was an evaluation document and was a component
of the teacher evaluation process. Id. at 167-168. The referee noted several teachers
testified they found the behavior to be "very upsetting," shocking, disappointing, and
concerning, and caused them to lose trust in appellant and the evaluation process. Id. at
128, 130-132, 225-226.
{¶ 50} We note the referee's findings are supported by the transcript.
{¶ 51} In its February 11, 2021 special meeting minutes, appellee accepted in part
and rejected in part the referee's report. Appellee accepted the referee's report except
for his conclusion on Specifications #1 and #5. In some eight pages, appellee found the
behavior of copying/cutting signatures and stapling/taping them to Evaluation Cycle
Forms without the teachers' knowledge and approval violated Board Policy AFC-1 and
GCN-1 and constituted dishonest, fraudulent, and immoral behavior warranting good and
just cause for termination. Appellee analyzed a superintendent's authority to modify the
evaluation process, develop handbooks, and implement the evaluation policy, and
concluded the Evaluation Cycle Form was in fact part of the evaluation process and was
an official document within the teachers' personnel files.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 15
{¶ 52} In its March 2, 2022 judgment entry, the trial court analyzed appellant's
arguments and concluded the following at 41:
The Court finds that Board acted within its statutory authority and met
all of the statutory and legal requirements for reaching conclusions differing
from those of the Referee, based on a different interpretation of the
significance of the facts. The Court further finds that that (sic) the Record
contains sufficient reliable, probative, substantial, and credible evidence
supporting the Board's two additional grounds for termination of Mrs.
DeVito's employment contract.
The Court finds that reliable, probative, substantial, and credible
evidence was presented to support the specifications for termination
presented by the Board; that the September 19, 2018 specification of
grounds issued by the Board, and the grounds for termination found by the
Referee and adopted by the CFVLS Board on February 11, 2021, are
sufficiently interrelated to present no violation of due process or other rights;
and, that Referee Alexander conducted a fair administrative hearing.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the CFVLS Board's February 11,
2021 Order of Termination properly adopted the Referee's Report and
Recommendation; is properly supported by reliable, probative, credible, and
substantial evidence; is not against the weight of the evidence; and, is not
contrary to law.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 16
{¶ 53} In reviewing the appellate arguments in each brief and the record, we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in its finding. A review of the referee's 237-
page report and recommendation does not indicate any confusion by the referee as
argued by appellant in her appellate brief at 16. To the contrary, the referee was
painstakingly thorough, precise, and clear about terms, words, forms, dates, and times.
{¶ 54} Upon review, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion by not
reversing the order of termination because the order of termination is not supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, and
is contrary to law.
{¶ 55} Assignment of Error IV is denied.
V
{¶ 56} In her fifth assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court committed
prejudicial error by not reversing the order of termination where it was established that
appellee had not read the entire transcript. We disagree.
{¶ 57} In her appellate brief at 29, appellant argues because appellee disagreed
with the referee and added two specifications for termination which the referee had
rejected, appellee should be required to read the entire transcript.
{¶ 58} In its March 2, 2022 judgment entry at 44, the trial court noted appellant's
cited authority which acknowledged a split of authority as to whether a board must read
the actual transcript of the hearing in order to override a referee's recommendation. The
trial court reviewed the two cited cases, and found "the better rule, and an excellent
rationale for the rule that the board need not read the actual transcript" can be found in
Ricchetti v. Cleveland City School District Board of Education, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
64833, 1994 WL 66227 (Mar. 3, 1994). We note an appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 17
was sua sponte dismissed as improvidently allowed. Ricchetti v. Cleveland City School
District Board of Education, 72 Ohio St.3d 1214, 650 N.E.2d 109 (1995). Of note is the
Supreme Court stating "[t]his court orders that the court of appeals' opinion not be
published in the Ohio Official Reports and that it may not be cited as authority except by
the parties inter se." Id.{¶ 59} R.C. 3319.16 states "[a]fter consideration of the referee's report, the board,
by a majority vote, may accept or reject the referee's recommendation on the termination
of the teacher's contract." Upon the filing of an appeal, "[t]he court shall examine the
transcript and record of the hearing and shall hold such additional hearings as it considers
advisable, at which it may consider other evidence in addition to the transcript and
record." While the statute directs the trial court to review the hearing transcripts, the board
is not directed to do so. Witt v. Woodmore Local School Board of Education, 6th Dist.
Ottawa No. OT-76-12, 1976 WL 188435, *1 (Oct. 22, 1976) ("There is no statutory
requirement that the Board read the transcript of the hearing.") The statute directs the
board to consider the referee's report and recommendation which the board did in this
case. The referee's report and recommendation, 237 pages in length, detailed much of
the testimony elicited during the hearing. The report certainly is not devoid of facts.
{¶ 60} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not
reversing the order of termination where it was established that appellee had not read the
entire transcript.
{¶ 61} Assignment of Error V is denied.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0025 18
{¶ 62} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Wise, Earle, P.J.
Hoffman, J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
EEW/db
[Cite as DeVito v. Clear Fork Valley Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2022-Ohio-3894.]