Com. v. Reid, A. , 117 A.3d 777 ( 2015 )

J-S21017-15
2015 Pa. Super. 135
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ANTHONY REID
Appellant No. 1968 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 16, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003040-2010
BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2015
Appellant Anthony Reid (“Appellant”) appeals from the January 16,
2014 judgment of sentence in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas following his guilty plea convictions for attempted murder,1 assault of a
law enforcement officer in the first degree,2 and aggravated assault.3
Appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders4 brief, together with a petition to
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 901.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1.
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.
4
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).
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withdraw as counsel. We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant
counsel’s petition to withdraw.
The trial court summarized the events underlying Appellant’s
convictions as follows:
On the morning of September 4, 2009, Appellant and his co-
defendant, Brian Williams (“Williams”), ran out of the Sunoco
gas station at 52nd and Spruce Streets in Philadelphia. Officer
Julius Cesar observed that the men were armed and carrying a
bag of money. Both men jumped into a get-away car and fled
the scene. Officer Cesar engaged in a high-speed pursuit of the
two defendants through the city. As Appellant was driving,
Williams leaned out the passenger window and fired at Officer
Cesar’s vehicle, which struck the car’s front grille – the officer
was not injured. Both men continued to elude police until
crashing into a parked car at 63rd and Grays Avenue. At that
time, multiple officers converged on the scene. Appellant
opened the driver’s door and opened fire at the officers. The
police returned fire, and during the exchange of bullets, Officer
Adrian Hospetale was struck in the mouth. Both Appellant and
Williams were immediately apprehended. A search of the vehicle
revealed two (2) loaded firearms and $100,000 in cash.
Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed November 24, 2014 (“1925(a)
Opinion”), p. 2.
On March 21, 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to the aforementioned
charges. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, on January 16, 2014,
the trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 to 20 years’ incarceration on the
attempted murder conviction,5 20 to 40 years’ incarceration on the assault
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5
The trial court sentenced Appellant – who had five prior robbery
convictions – pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714, which provides mandatory
sentences for second and subsequent crimes of violence.
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of a law enforcement officer in the first degree conviction6 concurrent to the
attempted murder conviction, and 5 to 10 years’ incarceration for the
aggravated assault conviction to be served consecutive to the attempted
murder and assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree
convictions, for an aggregate total of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration. 7 On
January 24, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se post-trial motion to reconsider
sentence that was denied by operation of law on June 11, 2014. Appellant
filed a notice of appeal on July 2, 2014.8 On August 18, 2014, Appellant’s
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6
The trial court sentenced Appellant pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9719.1, which
requires a mandatory 20-year minimum sentence for convictions for assault
of a law enforcement officer in the first degree.
7
The trial court imposed no further penalty for six other charges of
aggravated assault to which Appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted.
The court nolle prossed the remaining charges as part of the guilty plea
agreement.
8
Appellant was represented by counsel at the time he filed his pro se motion
for reconsideration. Accordingly, his pro se motion for reconsideration was a
nullity. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa.1993)
(“[T]here is no constitutional right to hybrid representation either at trial or
on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355
(Pa.Super.2007) (pro se post-sentence motion filed while represented was a
nullity, having no legal effect). Therefore, Appellant’s counsel actually
properly filed the notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf on February 11,
2014, despite the pending pro se motion for reconsideration. Despite this,
this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory on May 15, 2014. See
Commonwealth v. Reid, 553 EDA 2014. Following the denial of the pro se
motion for reconsideration by operation of law on June 11, 2014, Appellant’s
counsel once again filed a timely notice of appeal. We find this procedural
posture, while flawed, presents no jurisdictional impediment to the instant
appeal.
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appointed counsel filed a statement of intent to file an Anders brief
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). The trial court filed its 1925(a) Opinion
on November 24, 2014.
As previously noted, Appellant’s counsel has filed an application
seeking to withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v. California
and its Pennsylvania counterpart, Commonwealth v. Santiago.9 Before
addressing the merits of Appellant’s underlying issue presented, we must
first pass on counsel’s petition to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin,
928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super.2007) (en banc).
Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,
counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established by our
Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel must also provide the appellant with a
copy of the Anders brief, together with a letter that advises the appellant of
his or her right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed
pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of
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9
978 A.2d 349 (Pa.2009).
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the court’s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the
Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353
(Pa.Super.2007). Substantial compliance with these requirements is
sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290
(Pa.Super.2007). “After establishing that the antecedent requirements have
been met, this Court must then make an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.”
Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.Super.2006).
Instantly, counsel contemporaneously filed a petition to withdraw as
counsel with the Anders brief. The petition states that counsel determined,
after communicating with Appellant about the appeal, independently and
conscientiously reviewing the record, and conducting appropriate legal
research into possible issues, that no non-frivolous issues exist to be raised
on appeal. See Petition to Withdraw As Counsel, ¶¶ 8-9. The petition
further explains that counsel drafted and filed an Anders brief that included
all issues Appellant wished raised on appeal as well as any issues counsel
felt were of arguable merit, all of which counsel ultimately concluded were
wholly frivolous. Id. at ¶ 11. Additionally, the petition explains that counsel
notified Appellant of the withdrawal request, furnished Appellant with a copy
of the Anders brief, and sent Appellant a letter explaining his right to
proceed pro se or with new, privately-retained counsel to raise any
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additional points or arguments that Appellant believed had merit. 10 See id.
at ¶¶ 12-13; see also Letter to Appellant, January 12, 2015. In the Anders
brief, counsel provides a summary of the facts and procedural history of the
case with citations to the record, refers to evidence of record that might
arguably support the issues raised on appeal, provides citations to relevant
case law, and states his conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous and his
reasons therefor. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 7-33. Accordingly, counsel has
substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.
As Appellant filed neither a pro se brief nor a counseled brief with new,
privately-retained counsel, we review this appeal based on the issues of
arguable merit raised in the Anders brief:
[1.] Was [Appellant’s] negotiated guilty plea knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary?
[2.] Was the negotiated sentence imposed upon [Appellant] by
the lower court pursuant to the terms of the negotiated guilty
plea manifestly excessive?
[3.] Was the sentence imposed upon [Appellant] illegal under
Alleyne v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) insofar as it included
mandatory minimum sentences imposed pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.[] §§ 9714 and 9719.1?
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10
Appellant’s counsel originally filed his Anders brief and petition to
withdraw on January 12, 2015. On January 28, 2015, this Court entered a
per curiam order directing counsel to file, within 10 days, copies of the letter
he sent to Appellant with the Anders brief, which counsel had neglected to
attach to his petition to withdraw. See Order, January 28, 2015. Counsel
timely complied with this Court’s directive on February 3, 2015.
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[4.] Is [Appellant] entitled to have his sentence vacated due to
the fact that the District Attorney’s Office breached the terms of
an agreement with [Appellant]?
[5.] Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of counsel due
to the fact that his privately retained plea counsel failed to file a
pre- or post-sentence motion to withdraw [Appellant’s]
negotiated guilty plea?
[6.] Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of counsel due
to the fact that his privately retained plea counsel advised him
not to exercise his right of allocution at sentencing?
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6.
1. Appellant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.
Appellant’s first claim alleges that his plea of guilty was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 17-20. This claim lacks
merit.
“A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the
charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the
presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s
power to deviate from any recommended sentence.” Commonwealth v.
Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa.Super.2005); Pa.R.Crim.P. 590,
Comment. Additionally, a written plea colloquy that is read, completed and
signed by the defendant and made part of the record may serve as the
defendant’s plea colloquy when supplemented by an oral, on-the-record
examination. Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108 (citing Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P.
590). “[A] plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances
surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full
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understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and that he
knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.” Commonwealth v.
Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa.Super.1993). “Our law presumes that a
defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He
bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832
A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super.2003) (internal citation omitted). The entry of a
negotiated plea is a “strong indicator” of the voluntariness of the plea.
Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa.Super.1994).
Moreover, “[t]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with
the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is
that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
made.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1192
(Pa.Super.2010).
The record reveals Appellant understood the nature of the charges
against him and the plea to which he was agreeing, and that he voluntarily
and intelligently entered his guilty plea. At the outset of the guilty plea
hearing, the trial court placed the terms of the agreement on the record.11
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11
The trial court summarized the plea agreement as follows:
THE COURT: . . . It’s my understanding that on each of these
transcripts in exchange for your pleas to Counts 1 and 2 of the
first transcripts that I referred to which you’re charged with
robbery and criminal conspiracy, and on the second transcript in
exchange for your pleading guilty to Counts 2 and 3 on that
transcript involving robbery and criminal conspiracy.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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See N.T. 3/21/2011, pp. 6-7. Appellant confirmed that he understood the
terms of the negotiated agreement. Id. at 7. Thereafter, the trial court
conducted a lengthy guilty plea colloquy in which Appellant fully participated.
See id. at 8-35. During the guilty plea colloquy, the trial court explained to
Appellant his right to a jury trial, his post-guilty plea appellate rights, and
the elements and statutory maximum penalty possible for the charges. Id.
at 9-21. Appellant indicated he understood. Id. at 10, 13, 21. Additionally,
the Commonwealth provided lengthy factual bases for the charges, after
which Appellant admitted he was guilty of each crime. Id. at 21-29.
Appellant is bound by his statements made during the colloquy. See
Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa.Super.2001)
(defendant is bound by statements he makes during plea colloquy, and may
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
In exchange for your pleas to Counts 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16,
21 and 24 of the third transcript in which you’re charged with six
separate counts of attempted aggravated assault, one count of
attempted murder, one count of criminal conspiracy, and one
count of aggravated assault, causing serious bodily injury to a
police officer, in exchange for those pleas the Commonwealth
has agreed to nolle pros all other counts under each of the
respective transcripts.
And they have agreed to recommend a sentence which is to be
deferred for a total period of 25 to 50 years of incarceration
which the sentence is to be served concurrent to and as yet a
federal sentence is to be imposed in the near future together
with fines and costs, plus restitution.
N.T. 3/21/2011, pp. 6-7.
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not assert grounds for withdrawing plea that contradict statements made
when he pleaded guilty).
Additionally, defense counsel and Appellant reviewed and completed a
written guilty plea colloquy for each docket on which he pleaded guilty,
which the trial court reviewed with Appellant and admitted into evidence
during the oral colloquy. See N.T. 3/21/2011, pp. 29-31; see also Written
Guilty Plea Colloquies. The written colloquies outlined the plea agreement
and discussed the charges, the right to a jury trial, and the pre-trial rights
relinquished by pleading guilty. See Written Guilty Plea Colloquies. The
written colloquies further outlined the presumption of innocence and the trial
court’s power to deviate from the recommended sentence. Id. Appellant
further acknowledged in the written guilty plea colloquies that he had ample
opportunity to consult with counsel, and that he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation. See id. at 3. He is further bound by these written
statements. See McCauley, supra.
Our review of the guilty plea hearing transcript and documents reveals
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion. The record supports the
trial court’s conclusion that Appellant entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently.
2. Appellant waived his discretionary aspects of sentence claim.
Appellant next claims the negotiated sentence imposed upon
acceptance of his guilty plea was manifestly excessive. See Appellant’s
Brief, pp. 29-33. This claim raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects
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of Appellant’s negotiated sentence, and is unreviewable. The trial court
imposed the sentence Appellant negotiated with the Commonwealth.
Appellant may not now seek discretionary review of that negotiated
sentence. See Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267
(Pa.Super.2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence
may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”). This claim fails.
3. The trial court did not impose an illegal sentence under Alleyne.
Appellant next claims his sentence is illegal based on the Supreme
Court of the United States’ decision in Alleyne v. United States12 because
it includes certain mandatory minimum sentences. See Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 25-28. Appellant is incorrect.
First, Appellant challenges the application of the 10-year mandatory
minimum sentence imposed on his attempted murder conviction. Regarding
mandatory minimum sentences for second or subsequent convictions for
crimes of violence, the Sentencing Code provides, in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory sentence.--
(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this
Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time
of the commission of the current offense the person had
previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be
sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of
total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of
this title or other statute to the contrary. Upon a second
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12
__ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
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conviction for a crime of violence, the court shall give the
person oral and written notice of the penalties under this
section for a third conviction for a crime of violence.
Failure to provide such notice shall not render the offender
ineligible to be sentenced under paragraph (2).
42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a).
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
Sixth Amendment requires that any fact – other than a prior conviction –
that increases a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense must be
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly,
Alleyne did not overturn prior precedent that prior convictions are
sentencing factors and not elements of offenses. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at
1260 n.1; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
243-44, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1230-31 (1998).
Section 9714 increases mandatory minimum sentences based on prior
convictions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1). Accordingly, this section is not
unconstitutional under Alleyne. See Alleyne, supra; see also
Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 239 n.9 (Pa.Super.2014), appeal
granted and order vacated on other grounds, No. 238 EAL 2014, 2015 WL
920472 (Pa. Mar. 4, 2015).
Here, at his guilty plea hearing, Appellant acknowledged that his cases
involved “mandatory sentences [that would] be imposed by the [trial
c]ourt[.]” N.T. 3/21/2011, p. 8. At sentencing, the court characterized the
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instant matter as a “second strike case[,]” without objection from
Appellant.13 See N.T. 1/16/2014, pp. 4-6. The trial court then imposed a
section 9714 mandatory minimum sentence on the attempted murder
conviction. This sentence was legal.
Appellant also challenges the application of the 20-year mandatory
minimum sentence imposed on his conviction for assault of a law
enforcement officer in the first degree. Regarding sentences for offenses
committed against law enforcement officers, the Sentencing Code provides,
in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory sentence.--A person convicted of the following
offense shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment
as follows:
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a) (relating to assault of law
enforcement officer)[14]--not less than 20 years.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9719.1.
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13
Appellant concedes he had five prior convictions for robbery, a crime of
violence. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 27 n.9; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g).
14
Section 2702.1 defines the crime of assault of a law enforcement officer in
the first degree as follows:
Assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree.--A
person commits a felony of the first degree who attempts to
cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a law
enforcement officer, while in the performance of duty and with
knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer, by
discharging a firearm.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a).
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This mandatory sentence provision does not implicate Alleyne.
Section 9719.1 does not require proof of any additional elements beyond
those already required to convict a defendant of assault of a law
enforcement officer in the first degree under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a). Nor
does section 9719.1 follow the statutory scheme that allowed a trial court to
apply a mandatory minimum sentence if the Commonwealth established the
triggering fact for the mandatory minimum by a preponderance of the
evidence,15 which this Court found unconstitutional under Alleyne. See,
i.e., 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(b) (relating to sentencing for drug crimes committed
in school zones),16 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(b) (relating to sentencing for drug
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15
Since Alleyne, this Court has ruled unconstitutional multiple statutes
containing nearly identical “proof at sentencing” provisions. These
provisions all included language essentially identical to the following:
Proof at sentencing.--Provisions of this section shall not be an
element of the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall
not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the
Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this section shall be
provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability
of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall
consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the
Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any
necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a
preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(b).
16
Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Bizzel, 107 A.3d 102, 103
(Pa.Super.2014).
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trafficking);17 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(b) (relating to sentences for offenses
committed with firearms),18 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1(c) (relating to sentences
for certain drug offenses committed with firearms),19 42 Pa.C.S. § 9713(c)
(relating to sentences for offenses committed on public transportation),20
and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(c) (relating to sentences for offenses against infant
persons).21 Instead, section 9719.1 simply describes the legislatively-
required sentence for an offender convicted of assaulting a law enforcement
officer pursuant to section 2702.1(a). Because it does not require proof of
facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence, and does not follow the
statutory construction that allowed trial courts to find such facts by a
preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, section 9719.1 is not
unconstitutional under Alleyne or its Pennsylvania progeny.
For these reasons, the trial court did not impose an illegal sentence.
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17
Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748
(Pa.Super.2014).
18
Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801
(Pa.Super.2014).
19
Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86
(Pa.Super.2014).
20
Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801
(Pa.Super.2014).
21
Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800
(Pa.Super.2014).
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4. No evidence exists of any agreement breached by the
Commonwealth.
Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth induced him to plead
guilty with the promise of an alleged, nebulous agreement between the
Commonwealth and Appellant, which the Commonwealth subsequently
breached. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 24-25. This claim lacks merit.22
Appellant appears to argue that he received no benefit for having
testified for the Commonwealth in other cases.23 However, nowhere in his
brief or filings does Appellant set forth when he made any agreement with
the Commonwealth to testify in other cases or the terms of the alleged
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22
Appellant’s claim challenges the validity of his plea and is therefore
eligible for review on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98
A.3d 1268, 1275 (Pa.2014) (noting “upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant
waives all claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction
of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed the
“legality” of the sentence imposed”). To the extent Appellant argues that his
counsel unlawfully induced his guilty plea with false promises, such a claim
must await collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d
562, 576 (Pa.2013); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii).
23
Appellant’s pro se post-sentence motion to modify contains the claim:
F. I feel that there was a breach of contract on behalf of the
District attorney office – ADA ODonnelly – where as I Fullfilled
my part, after coming Forward and testifying, but no
acknowledgement was acredited, Nor brought Forward to the
commonwealth court. Now I are being left hung out to dry and
Fend for my life. For the remainder days of my life through
lengthy incarceration sentence.
Motion for Reconsideration/Modification of Sentence, filed January 24, 2014,
p. 2 (verbatim).
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agreement(s). In fact, Appellant does not even allege the existence of an
agreement in the first place. Instead, he simply explains that he testified
and expresses his dissatisfaction that he did not receive some undefined
benefit from the Commonwealth in return. See Motion for
Reconsideration/Modification of Sentence, p. 2. Further, the record contains
no evidence of such an agreement. The only agreement that appears in the
record is the guilty plea agreement that the trial court summarized with
Appellant’s approval, as discussed supra. Accordingly, this claim fails.
5. Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims must await
collateral review.
Appellant’s final two claims allege trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by (1) failing to file pre- or post-sentence motions to
withdraw Appellant’s guilty plea, and (2) advising Appellant not to exercise
his right of allocution at sentencing. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 20-23. It is
well-settled that, absent circumstances not present in the case at bar,
“claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA
review[.]” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa.2013).
Accordingly, these claims are premature and we will not address them at
this time.
For the aforementioned reasons, the claims raised in the Anders brief
lack merit. Additionally, our independent review of the record has revealed
no non-frivolous claims that Appellant could have raised, and we agree with
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counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw is
granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/9/2015
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