Com. v. Anderson, M. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S20038-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    MARK J. ANDERSON                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1902 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 19, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-45-CR-0002437-2020
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                              FILED AUGUST 28, 2023
    Appellant, Mark J. Anderson, appeals, pro se, from the order of the Court
    of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) that denied his first petition
    filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 After careful review, we
    affirm.
    Appellant was charged with retail theft, terroristic threats, criminal
    mischief, public drunkenness, three counts of reckless endangerment, and
    three counts of simple assault2 following an incident on November 9, 2020, in
    which he stole $625 in merchandise from a North Face store in Pocono
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
    2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3929(a)(1), 2706(a)(3), 3304(a)(5), 5505, 2705, and
    2701(a)(1), respectively.
    J-S20038-23
    Township, Pennsylvania and threatened and hit store employees when they
    tried to stop him. Criminal Information; Criminal Complaint. On April 28,
    2021,    Appellant   pled   guilty    to   retail   theft,   one   count   of   reckless
    endangerment, and one count of simple assault pursuant to a plea agreement
    in which the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss all of the other charges, but
    did not agree to the sentence that would be imposed or agree to any
    sentencing recommendation.           N.T. Guilty Plea at 3-13; Guilty Plea Order;
    Written Guilty Plea Agreement and Colloquy. On July 6, 2021, the trial court
    sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms of one to two years’ incarceration
    for reckless endangerment, nine months to three years’ incarceration for retail
    theft, and one to two years’ incarceration for simple assault, resulting in an
    aggregate sentence of two years and nine months to seven years’
    incarceration, and the Commonwealth dismissed all of the remaining charges
    against Appellant. N.T. Sentencing at 7-8; Sentencing Order. Appellant did
    not file a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence.
    On December 3, 2021, Appellant filed the instant timely pro se first
    PCRA petition, in which he asserted, inter alia, that his guilty plea was not
    valid and that his trial counsel was ineffective with respect to the plea. The
    trial court appointed PCRA counsel, who on March 7, 2022 filed a motion to
    withdraw and a no-merit letter. On March 31, 2022, the trial court entered
    an order granting PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw and gave Appellant
    notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of intent to dismiss the PCRA petition on
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    J-S20038-23
    the ground that the claims that it asserted facially lacked merit. Trial Court
    Order, 3/31/22.   Appellant timely filed a pro se objection to the Rule 907
    notice requesting a hearing, and the trial court in response scheduled a
    hearing on July 14, 2022 at which it afforded Appellant an opportunity to
    respond to the notice of intent to dismiss.   Trial Court Order, 4/18/22.
    At the July 14, 2022, hearing, Appellant stated that his PCRA claim was
    that his guilty plea was not valid because he agreed only to plead guilty to
    lesser charges. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 14. Appellant testified that he did not
    sign the written plea agreement and colloquy that set forth that he was
    pleading guilty to retail theft, one count of reckless endangerment, and one
    count of simple assault and the possible sentence for those offenses and
    testified that he had only signed a blank form to which those terms were later
    added. Id. at 16-21, 24. Appellant admitted, however, that he was told the
    offenses to which he was pleading guilty at the guilty plea hearing and agreed
    at the plea hearing to plead guilty to those offenses. Id. at 18-22. Appellant
    also admitted that he received the full written plea agreement and colloquy
    before his sentencing hearing. Id. at 18, 21.
    At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that Appellant’s
    testimony that the plea agreement was blank when he signed it was not
    credible and that Appellant’s guilty plea was voluntary and knowing.        N.T.
    PCRA Hearing at 25-28. The trial court accordingly issued an order, entered
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    July 19, 2022, denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. Id. at 27-28; Trial Court
    Order, 7/19/22. This timely appeal followed.
    Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition is limited to determining
    whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its decision
    is free of legal error.     Commonwealth v. Mason, 
    130 A.3d 601
    , 617 (Pa.
    2015); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    236 A.3d 63
    , 68 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en
    banc); Commonwealth v. Orlando, 
    156 A.3d 1274
    , 1280 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    We must view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a
    light most favorable to the prevailing party.      Mason, 130 A.3d at 617;
    Commonwealth v. Mojica, 
    242 A.3d 949
    , 953 (Pa. Super. 2020); Johnson,
    236 A.3d at 68. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, if supported by
    the record, are binding on this Court. Mason, 130 A.3d at 617; Mojica, 242
    A.3d at 956; Orlando, 
    156 A.3d at 1280
    .
    Appellant argues in this appeal that the trial court erred in denying his
    PCRA petition because trial counsel was allegedly ineffective with respect to
    his guilty plea.3 Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a guilty plea
    ____________________________________________
    3  Appellant’s brief, in violation of Rules 2111(a)(4) and 2116 of the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, does not contain a statement of
    questions involved. His brief, however, in its summary of argument and
    argument sections clearly identifies this as the issue that he is raising in this
    appeal, and the failure to comply with Rules 2111(a)(4) and 2116 has not
    impeded our review or the Commonwealth’s ability to respond. We therefore
    will not quash the appeal for failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate
    Procedure and we address Appellant’s issue on the merits. Werner v.
    Werner, 
    149 A.3d 338
    , 341 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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    J-S20038-23
    can be a basis for PCRA relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant
    to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.      Orlando, 
    156 A.3d at 1281
    ;
    Commonwealth        v.   Wah,   
    42 A.3d 335
    ,   338   (Pa.   Super.   2012);
    Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    833 A.2d 800
    , 802 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    To establish that a guilty plea is voluntary and knowing, the trial court
    must conduct a colloquy that shows the factual basis for the plea and that the
    defendant understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading
    guilty, his right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, the permissible
    sentencing range for the charges, and the court’s power to reject terms of a
    plea agreement. Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 
    200 A.3d 500
    , 506 (Pa. Super.
    2018); Commonwealth v. Reid, 
    117 A.3d 777
    , 782 (Pa. Super. 2015);
    Commonwealth v. Morrison, 
    878 A.2d 102
    , 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en
    banc); Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. These matters may also be shown by
    a written plea colloquy read and signed by the defendant that is made part of
    the record and supplemented by an oral, on-the-record examination. Reid,
    
    117 A.3d at 782
    ; Morrison, 
    878 A.2d at 108-09
    ; Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P.
    590. A defendant is bound by the statements which he makes in his plea
    colloquy and cannot assert challenges to his plea that contradict his
    statements when he entered the plea. Jabbie, 
    200 A.3d at 506
    ; Orlando,
    
    156 A.3d at 1281
    ; Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 
    794 A.2d 378
    , 384 (Pa.
    Super. 2002).
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    J-S20038-23
    Here, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s
    guilty plea was voluntary and knowing.      The transcript of Appellant’s plea
    hearing shows that the trial court made clear that Appellant was pleading
    guilty to retail theft, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of
    simple assault and that there was no agreement as to his sentence, that the
    trial court advised Appellant correctly of the maximum sentences that he could
    receive for each of these offenses and that he could be receive an aggregate
    sentence of up to nine years’ incarceration, and that Appellant confirmed that
    understood the charges to which he was pleading, the penalties he faced, and
    the absence of any agreement as to his sentence. N.T. Guilty Plea at 4-5, 9-
    10. At the plea hearing, the trial court set forth the factual basis for each of
    the offenses to which Appellant was pleading guilty, Appellant admitted that
    he committed those acts, and Appellant confirmed that he wished to plead
    guilty to those offenses and that he was doing so voluntarily. Id. at 4, 8-9,
    11-12.
    In addition, Appellant confirmed at the plea hearing that he signed a
    written plea colloquy and that he went over that written plea colloquy with
    counsel and understood it.      N.T. Guilty Plea at 3-4.     The written plea
    agreement and colloquy fully advised him of the terms of his plea and the
    rights that he was giving up. The plea agreement and colloquy clearly stated
    that Appellant was pleading guilty to retail theft, reckless endangerment, and
    simple assault and set forth the factual basis for Appellant’s guilty plea, the
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    J-S20038-23
    nature of the charges to which he was pleading guilty, the permissible
    sentencing range, and the fact that there was no agreement as to sentence
    or sentencing recommendations. Written Guilty Plea Agreement and Colloquy
    ¶¶1-7. The plea agreement and colloquy also explained Appellant’s right to a
    jury trial, the presumption of innocence, and the court’s power to reject the
    plea agreement.    Id. ¶¶8, 13.     Appellant further confirmed in the plea
    agreement and colloquy that he was mentally competent, had conferred with
    his attorney concerning the plea, and was satisfied with his attorney.     Id.
    ¶¶10, 12.
    Although Appellant testified that he signed a blank document that did
    not contain this information, the trial court found that this testimony was not
    credible. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 25-27. That credibility determination is amply
    supported by the record.    Appellant admitted at the PCRA hearing that a
    colloquy was conducted at the plea hearing that confirmed he knew that he
    was pleading guilty to retail theft, one count of reckless endangerment, and
    one count of simple assault. Id. at 18-22. Moreover, Appellant’s claim that
    he signed a blank document is contradicted by the transcript of the plea
    hearing. Not only did Appellant admit at the plea hearing that he went over
    the plea document that he signed with counsel, but counsel specifically
    discussed at the plea hearing a change to one portion of the document,
    Appellant’s prior record score, and Appellant confirmed that he had discussed
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    J-S20038-23
    that change with trial counsel and, knowing that change, still wished to plead
    guilty. N.T. Guilty Plea at 3-4, 10-11.
    Appellant also asserted at the PCRA hearing that that he sought to
    withdraw his guilty plea at his sentencing before sentence was imposed. N.T.
    PCRA Hearing at 18. To the extent that Appellant contends that he is entitled
    to relief based on that claim, Appellant’s Brief at 7, that argument likewise
    fails. The transcript of Appellant’s sentencing shows that Appellant made no
    request or attempt whatsoever to withdraw his guilty plea. N.T. Sentencing at
    2-7. To the contrary, when the trial court asked if he would like to address
    the court and say anything before he was sentenced, Appellant stated only:
    Well, the situation that I was involved with, it was a bad situation
    on all parties. I have an ill mother that’s 84 years old. I’ve been
    here for eight months now. I would like to address the Court and
    say that I’m very sorry for the situation. I wasn’t in the right state
    of mind during that time. Most folks now generally, when I am
    focused, I do – that’s all I could say, Your Honor.
    Id. at 3.
    Because the trial court’s determination that Appellant’s guilty plea was
    knowing and voluntary is supported by the record, Appellant’s claim for PCRA
    relief fails.   We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s
    PCRA petition.
    Order affirmed.
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    J-S20038-23
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/28/2023
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